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PREFACE 
People have often asked how I came to be interested in Japanese sci­
ence. There are many routes by which an American might develop this 
interest today, but my own goes back some years and probably had an 
unusual genesis. I think it began in 1952, when I was a naive fifth-
grader in Rapid City, South Dakota. My school happened to show a 
documentary film on atomic energy that Bell Telephone Laboratories 
(as 1 later learned) had produced and distributed. For reasons I am 
wholly at a loss to explain, I remembered just one thing from the film 
that day—its brief discussion of Yukawa Hideki, the Japanese physicist 
and Nobel laureate! Because of this episode I grew up with an attitude 
about Japan which at that time was unusual, namely, that Japan was a 
country of great achievements in science. A few years later the Sputnik 
crisis came, and I promptly resolved to do my part by studying physics at 
Cal Tech or Princeton. What I actually did was enter Stanford, where I 
initially hoped to study mathematics. But I soon discovered that my 
talents lay elsewhere and completed a degree in history and Japanese. 
Thomas C. Smith, who taught Japanese history at Stanford (and later 
at Berkeley), had a formative influence on me both at this stage and 
later. He first suggested that I study Japanese and subsequently steered 
me to a dissertation topic. It might be interesting, he intimated, to find 
out why some Japanese became scientists in the Meiji period. I wrote 
my thesis on Kitasato's career, but I continued to find Tom's idea in­
triguing, and my later research on it became chapter 3 of this book. I 
owe Tom Smith a special debt of thanks. He has always been a friend, a 
helpful critic, and an unfailing mentor. He read chapters 3 through 6 
with particular care. Many of his suggestions I readily incorporated, and 
any remaining faults reflect on me and not on him. 
The lengthy genesis of this book has caused me to incur a great many 
debts. One is to ltd Shuntaro, historian of science at Tokyo University, 
who sponsored my affiliation to his own institution and made me part of 
his research seminar. My long-time friend Kuramoto Hiroyuki of 
Kitasato University put me in touch with the late Otori Ranzaburo, 
historian of medicine at Keio University. Otori generously shared his 
knowledge of Japanese medical history with me and introduced me in 
turn to Dr. Aki Motd, clinical neurologist at Toranomon Hospital and a 
gifted historian of medicine. Dr. Aki's vast knowledge of Kitasato 
Shibasaburo was very helpful for my work on this subject. Sidney Al­
ford, a visiting chemist at Tokyo University, provided intellectual stim­
xv 
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ulation and moral support. Bernard Krisher, Tokyo Bureau Chief for 
Neusueek, offered me the needed distraction of part-time reporting and 
patiently worked to improve my writing! 
At Harvard University, Everett Mendelsohn helped especially by 
arranging funding for me and providing leadership to a group of avid 
researchers in the Department of the History and Philosophy of Sci­
ence. Albert M. Craig gave me an office in the East Asian Research 
Center and offered valuable suggestions and interpretive comments on 
parts of the manuscript. My long and valued friendship with Nathan 
Sivin also dates from this period. Nathan s keen appraisal of an early 
version of chapter 6 caused me both to rethink some issues and add new 
material. For his assistance and support I am particularly grateful. 
Numerous people have assisted me on my research trips to Japan. 
Two librarians at the National Diet Library helped me find certain 
materials I needed—Sakuma Nobuko. of the Reference Department, 
and Imagawa Koichi, Head of the Parliamentary Documents Room. 
Miura Yoshiaki, biochemistry professor at Chiba University, gave me 
extraordinary guidance in obtaining material from medical journals. 
Several other colleagues were also very helpful: Yoshida Mitsukuni. 
Fujino Tsunesaburo. Yagi Eri. Oya Shin'ichi, Terasaki Masao. Amano 
Ikuo, and Itakura Kiyonobu. Dr. Itakura also arranged my affiliation 
with the National Institute for Education Research. My work has bene­
fited over the years from discussions with Watanabe Masao, Yuasa 
Mitsutomo. and especially Nakayama Shigeru. I must offer Shigeru 
particular thanks for our long years of friendship and many discussions. 
The notes to his work throughout the present book are one indication of 
the respect I have for him. 
Several months at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton in 
1977 and a seminar presentation to the Shelby Cullom Davis Center for 
Historical Studies at Princeton in 1979 contributed positively to my 
research. For these opportunities I thank John Elliott, Marius Jansen, 
and Lawrence Stone. Other valuable exchanges took place at meetings 
of the Midwest Japan Seminar sponsored by the Social Sciences Re­
search Council. I owe special thanks for bib ho graphical assistance and 
moral support to several colleagues and friends at The Ohio State Uni­
versity and the University of Michigan. These include, at Michigan, 
Naomi Fukuda and Masaei Saito, and at Ohio State, Alan Beyerchen, 
John C. Burnham, Maureen H. Donovan, Barbara Reeves, William J. 
Studer, and June Z. Fullmer. Others for whose inspiration and encour­
agement I am grateful include James M. Kittelson, Laurence Schnei­
der, Gerald Holton, Rolf Barth, Ronald Overmann, Fred Notehelfer, 
Alfred Donovan, Robert E. Cole, Michael Les Benedict, Richard Sam­
uels, Merrit Roe Smith, Randolph A. Roth, Samuel Coleman, Harry 
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Harootunian, Bernard Silberman, Byron Marshall, and the late Joseph 
Ben-David. 
Research projects always cost money, this one particularly so. My 
original dissertation project was supported by Stanford University, the 
Fulbright-Hays Fellowship Program of the U.S. Office of Education, 
and the Josiah Macy, Jr., Foundation. Research for this book was car­
ried out with the aid of grants from Ohio State University, the National 
Endowment for the Humanities, and the Social Sciences Research 
Council. Writing was mostly funded by the National Science Founda­
tion, while publication costs have been partly defrayed by the Japan 
Foundation and the College of Humanities of Ohio State University. 
For help with various aspects of the publication process I am obliged 
to: the Japan Society for the History of Science (Ninon Kagakushi 
Gakkai) for permission to reprint from my previously published article 
"Why Was There No Scientific Revolution in Tokugawa Japan?" in 
chapter 2; Princeton University Press for permission to use part of my 
article "Science, Culture and Freedom in Meiji Japan" in chapter 5 
(from Tetsuo Najita and J. Victor Koschmann, eds.. Conflict in Modern 
Japanese History. The Neglected Tradition. Copyright © 1982 by 
Princeton University Press. Kxcerpts reprinted with permission of 
Princeton University Press); Nakagawa Toru (of the National Science 
Museum), Tokuda Hiroshi(of Mainichi Newspapers), and Nakano Mi­
noru (of Tokyo University) for help in locating photographs; Alan 
Zanyk, Paul ShewTnon. and Dwight Burford (all of Ohio State Univer­
sity) for photographic and technical assistance; Charles Grench, execu­
tive editor of the Yale University Press, and the Press's reviewer for their 
suggestions and encouragement at various stages. 
A final expression of thanks goes to my wife, Maureen H. Donovan, 
to whom this book is dedicated. There must be few researchers, I think, 
who are fortunate enough to receive both emotional encouragement 
and professional help from the person to whom they are married. In any 
case, I am one—and am deeply grateful for it. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE SOCIAL FORMATION OF 
JAPANESE SCIENCE 
In the years following Japan's defeat in World War II. Japanese scien­
tists intensely criticized their own profession. Medical researcher Tam­
ura Masao claimed that relatively little original work had been done in 
Japan because of the "apprenticeship system." which bound men to 
their seniors.1 The physicist and historian of science Hiroshige Tetsu 
argued that the power of senior professors was a handicap to cooper­
ative effort2 Two physicists and a biochemist lamented the general lack 
of democracy in science.1 And the distinguished theoretical physicist 
Sakata Shoichi insisted that Japanese science had suffered from aca­
demic inbreeding, suppression of freedom, and a tendency to hoard 
4resources.
The same critics also took aim at society. Japanese allegedly regarded 
scientists as little more than "tools for the extraction of knowledge (from 
the West).'* Though treated well enough from this point of view, they 
were rarely considered real "creators of knowledge."5 In fact, scientists 
were usually excluded from official decisions even when the promotion 
of research was at stake,6 and science had little support except from the 
Japanese government. One point of view held that this pattern devel­
oped in the nineteenth century from the paucity of connections with 
industry. In 1868, Japanese capitalism was so far behind capitalism in 
Europe that the state had to intervene on its behalf. Because of this 
technology and science became dependent upon the state, and their 
natural development was distorted.7 
Had these various criticisms been an isolated phenomenon, we 
might link them to postwar despair. Military defeat had been hard on 
the country not only economically but spiritually and psychologically. 
The country was controlled by the Allied Occupation, and sweeping 
reforms had been launched. It is no coincidence that Sakata defined his 
target as science's "Fiihrer system."8 And American delegations of edu­
cators and scientists offered their views on Japanese science without 
asking whether they were welcome.9 
These criticisms of society and science have a far broader context, for 
in the 1980s American and English-language media have repeated 
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such claims as frequently as the Japanese of decades past. Japanese 
organization "tends to stifle initiative, especially youthful initiative," 
according to astronomer Robert J as trow (1983).10 The Japanese have a 
saying about the nail that sucks its head up getting hit, noted computer 
scientist Edward Feigenbaum in 1981, and "that tells the Japan[ese] 
researcher, 'Don't propose something novel."'11 Time criticized 
"rigidity in (Japanese] research laboratories" in 1983.12 A study con­
ducted by the Stanford Research Institute knocked academic "inbreed­
ing" in Science 85.13 The views of the emigre physicist Leo Esaki are 
especially worth noting.I4 Japan, he says, has failed to "shake free of its 
copying habit."15 Its strength in technology is "not buttressed by a 
broad base of scientific research,' and its "contribution to . .  . learning 
is minimal." Why is this so? According to him, it is because Japan is a 
strongly group-oriented society. Now is the time, in Esaki's estimation, 
"to recognize that Japan s future does not lie in group solidarity, but in 
the cultivation of individuality."16 
Esaki and others who articulate this theme of individualism stand in 
a line that can be traced back to 1881. American zoologist Charles Otis 
Whitman claimed in a report on the status of his field at Tokyo Univer­
sity that the "baneful influence of caste (factions]" had "survived the 
overthrow of [Japan's] feudal system' and still had "vitality enough to 
work immense mischief."17 A few years later, in 1892, bacteriologist 
Sata Yoshihiko claimed that the influence of factions had impaired his 
job search.18 Medical and other journals of opinion were lamenting 
factionalism in science by the turn of the century,19 and a 1917 report 
on the scientific community went so far as to attribute scientific success 
to the right social system.20 Between the wars intellectuals continued to 
denounce the negative effects of Japanese society on the progress of 
science.21 
These complaints on behalf of individualism in science have a long 
tradition in Europe and America. Sociologists from Max Weber to Tal­
cott Parsons, as well as numerous historians and scientists, have insist­
ed for decades that science can develop only in societies that have 
thrown off all vestiges of feudalism. Sociologists and social historians 
have usually condemned feudalism for obstructing social mobility, im­
peding disclosure of technical information, and impairing development 
of personality.22 Leading figures of the French Enlightenment even 
saw feudalism as contrary to nature.23 Some scholars have begun to 
recognize the value for early modern science of medieval corporatism, 
political decentralization, and the church-state duality associated with 
feudalism, but the opposing views are far from extinct2 4 
Whatever the validity of the antifeudal opinions, they do call atten­
tion to three basic questions in the Japanese context, where feudalism 
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had long been entrenched. How did Japan in the modem era—after 
about 1860—build a tradition of modern scientific research out of noth­
ing? How did the Japanese—officials and scientists—make use of in­
digenous and some foreign traditions to construct their model of scien­
tific research? And how was the operation of that model tempered or 
checked by the various realities of Japanese life—its society, economy, 
or political system?25 
Such questions are more easily asked than answered. Despite (or 
because of) the ideological undercurrents of the various criticisms, the 
historical record is especially important. This book, for several reasons, 
focuses attention on the Meiji and early Taisho years (1868-1920). 
Meiji and early Taisho marked the period in which the Japanese people 
created their tradition of scientific research. Critics emphasize this time 
on the assumption that such "feudalistic" values as loyalty and soli­
darity were more vigorous closer to the Tokugawa period (1600-1867), 
when they enjoyed official sanction. The period also marks the era 
immediately before and after the formal abolition of feudalism, which 
mostly occurred in the 1870s. 
This brings us to the question of what "science" is when seen 
through the lens of historical perspective. Scientific development any­
where in the world was once thought to result from "correct" research 
methodology (empiricism), "right" views about nature (the mechanical 
world view), or from something called the "scientific attitude." There is 
now a recognition (reflected in this book) that these historical features 
of early modern science cannot fully carry the burden of explanation, 
whatever their importance in some contexts or periods.26 
There are other facts to note in discussing Japan. It has not histor­
ically been part of the Western tradition, and while this fact is obvious, 
some of its implications are not. Japan's dominant Confucian intellec­
tual tradition was loosely structured andrelatively tolerant of new ideas 
and perspectives. There was no legacy of revealed religion with an 
elaborate structure of natural philosophy intricately woven with a for­
mal theology.27 Qontroversial theories of modern Western science like 
heliocentrism or the origin of species aroused little opposition in the 
Japanese context and werereadilyespoused.28 Japanese scientists did 
not consider it necessary to slay the dragons of traditional religion but 
adapted to popular beliefs and refrained from developing a "scientific" 
philosophy.29 The physicist Yuasa Mitsutomo, who noted and disap­
proved of this fact, even wrote: "It was as though Japanese science had 
had the teeth of its spirit of [cultural] criticism removed."30 
Another singular feature of the Japanese scene is the external origin 
of science. Science was imported from Europe at the instigation of the 
government as a commodity, mostly in the period after the Meiji Resto­
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ration (1868). The conceptual schemes of Western science at the time 
were taken as true because they came from the West,31 and Meiji 
commentators gave little attention to differences between science and 
technology, regarding them as the same thing, and foreign.32 Decision 
makers in the government eschewed debates on the properties of sci­
ence. Recruiting men to science, building institutions for teaching and 
research, and putting in place the bureaucratic structures to manage 
the science establishment were more important.33 It is particularly 
notable that Japanese scientists were inclined to support this agenda. 
"We should remember," wrote the historian of science Yoshida Mit­
sukuni, "that among the scientists (of Meiji Japan] was the desire to 
participate in building a new era."34 
Japanese science after 1868 was not an amateur occupation. Profes­
sionalization was already under way in European science, particularly 
in Germany, which most inspired Japan. The German approach to sci­
ence was important for how science was organized in Japan, though the 
Japanese drew on the experience of several countries. Such questions 
as whether science should be housed primarily in universities or in 
separate, specialized institutes were hot issues and occasioned much 
debate. 
Japanese sciencerepresenteda departure from the pattern of devel­
opment in Europe. There the classical scientific revolution of the six­
teenth and seventeenth centuries began with physics and then spread 
elsewhere. Compare with this how Japanese intellectuals first studied 
Western science: not through physics, but through medicine.35 Medi­
cal endeavors were important in the Tokugawa period for other kinds of 
technical studies, and it was medicine that developed most fully be­
tween 1868 and 1920.36 Even the concept of science was different in 
Japan. Some writers in the Tokugawa period used the term kyuri 
("investigation of the basic principles of things") for the subject matter 
of physics and, less frequently, other disciplines. But by about 1871 a 
new term had been coined which had little to do with the philosophy of 
nature. The present term for science in Japanese, kagaku,refers less to 
content or method and more to the spectrum of specialized fields.37 
Despite changes—in terminology and in other areas—Tokugawa 
developments left their mark on modern science. Meiji (1868-1912) 
scientists did not draw on Tokugawa ideas, for they were almost entirely 
abandoned after 1868, replaced by ideas from the West38 The 
Tokugawa contribution to modem science was not in the realm of the 
intellect but in recruitment: the kinds of people, in terms of family 
background and class origin, who had shown serious interest in science 
during Tokugawa times were the same kinds who came forward after 
1868. And this same Tokugawa legacy had a substantial effect on the 
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growth of particular disciplines. Medical research in Japan did relatively 
well after 1868 because medicine had flourished in the earlier period. 
Similarly, physics developed slowly in Meiji Japan, partly because of 
earlier restrictions. 
Tokugawa developments also affected the growth of research institu­
tions, not because modern institutions had Tokugawa predecessors, 
though a few important ones did, but by the continuity of political 
synergisms. Tokugawa Japan had 277 daimyo administrations that re­
tained considerable powers despite the centralizing force of the 
shogunal government in Edo. In the decades following the Meiji Resto­
ration, these local allegiances continued to operate and in some sense 
revived, inspiring competition which greatly helped science. Most crit­
icism of Japanese science has passed by the issues of recruitment and 
the growth of institutions and focused instead on the behavior of indi­
viduals, whether scientists or government officials. 
The Tokugawa legacy was certainly complex and highly prob­
lematic. Meiji Japan's bureaucracy as it came to maturity after 1890 
tended to follow est abb shed Tokugawa patterns, and its ways of doing 
business were not always congenial to scientists. But the behavior of 
the scientists is quite another matter. Criticisms of scientists1 behavior 
are suffused with the influence of ideology and are difficult to ap­
proach in a spirit of fairness. I would argue that Japanese scientists 
have historically tried to balance personal judgment and a scientific 
creativity that came, to a certain degree, from the West with deep-
rooted norms of solidarity and loyalty inherent in Tokugawa (and mod­
ern) culture. Their success in this effort has been greater than gener­
ally recognized.39 
This means that the critics are wrong. Japanese science has made 
important contributions, contrary to what its critics assert. Two contri­
butions of the Meiji-Taisho years should almost certainly have received 
the Nobel Prize. In 1901 Emil von Behring of Germany received the 
prize in medicine and physiology for the discovery of natural immunity. 
But this work was actually done with Kitasato Shibasaburo, and his 
exclusion from the accolade has never been explained. In 1926 the 
same Nobel Prize in medicine and physiology was given to Johannes 
Fibiger of Denmark when it probably should have gone to a Japanese 
pathologist, Yamagiwa Katsusaburo of Tokyo University, who during 
the World War I years had discovered a technique for induction of 
tumors in laboratory animals which many consider basic to modern 
oncology.40 (See chapter 6.) 
The critics have certainly made some valid points. During the period 
before 1914, many Japanese officials did stress importation of Western 
technology and science in preference to supporting research at home. 
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This often expressed itself in spending money on overseas study instead 
of on domestic research. The error is to think that these priorities were 
unanimous, when they were usually debated rather vigorously. Not 
even among officials was there a consensus on the priority of "copying" 
foreign work over research at home. Scientists sometimes resisted the 
priorities that were set; and they managed to prevail on occasion. 
But if the critics are wrong in most of their claims, how does one 
explain the persistence of their views? Are they simply ignorant of 
facts? Certainly this is a .possibility. Physicists like Esaki and Sakata 
take little or no notice of contributions in medicine or at least seem 
oblivious to their historical importance, and-they ignore important work 
which they themselves have done. Sakata, in partial collaboration with 
two other scientists, made a significant contribution to theoretical phys­
ics by predicting mathematically the existence of two particles. In 1973 
Esaki received the Nobel Prize for discovering the tunnel diode effect. 
And both men—contrary to misleading impressions—achieved these 
results entirely in Japan.41 Such covering up of facts suggests an ide­
ology at work, in this case the individualism so deeply rooted in the 
history of science. Probably because it came from the West and there­
fore retains a certain prestige, individualism has appealed to Japanese 
who find themselves at odds with their society. 
Another local factor linked to the past has strongly affected the re­
search tradition. This was (and is) the relative isolation of Japan and its 
culture from other research centers. As every student of Japanese histo­
ry knows, the Tokugawa regime maintained strict isolation from the 
outside world for over two hundred years (1639-1853). Travel abroad 
by Japanese and travel to Japan by foreigners (especially the former) 
were almost nonexistent; the flow of ideas was also, not surprisingly, 
limited. There was some traffic in ideas, and on occasion it had signifi­
cant local consequences. But Japanese development of science and 
technology was much less than it might have been. 
Of course, the isolation of Japanese science was not solely political. 
Japan is also geographically distant from most other countries, es­
pecially those active in science, and its language and culture are highly 
distinctive. Rapid communications with Japan were technically impos­
sible before World War II. To a lesser extent such factors still matter, as 
many researchers are keenly aware. 
This book takes up several themes in the formation of modern re­
search in Japan. Recruitment, training, and socialization of scientists— 
community formation in science—is one. These themes, which are 
treated in chapter 3, are related both to Tokugawa experience (chapter 
2) and the effects of foreign study. It is my conclusion that the social 
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object of such efforts (what is usually called the "scientific role") was 
not fully established until about 1920 or so. In chapter 41 treat research 
institutions as they developed in Japan before World War I. In addition 
to the Tokugawa background, I discuss the influence of different West­
ern models and the potiOcs of selection. Chapter 5 considers official 
decision making as it affected the availability of material resources, 
especially in the period before World War I. Who could decide what, and 
under what conditions, is a major theme, as are differences between 
various government ministries. Chapter 6 looks at behavioral patterns 
in the scientific community and their apparent meaning for Japanese 
research. It suggests that Japanese scientists usually were able to bal­
ance different values in the substance of their actions, if not in the 
forms. 
Chapters 7 and 8 describe and analyze the impact of World War I on 
Japan's scientific establishment. The war marked a turning point in the 
organization, funding, and applications of science in Japan and many 
other countries. Medical research lost its preferred status as the phys­
ical sciences made significant gains. Funding increased substantially 
for virtually every field, and new institutions appeared on the scene. 
The Ministry of Education"s Science Research Grants Program (1918) 
and the National Research Council (hereafter NRC, 1920) were es­
pecially important and are discussed at some length for their long-term 
implications. 
World War I had an impact on science that transcended effects in 
particular countries. Shortly before the Armistice in November 1918, 
scientists from Allied nations held a meeting in London to decide how to 
punish their colleagues in Germany. Because the Central Powers were 
deemed guilty of monstrous crimes, many scientists (especially in 
France) opposed the renewal of technical cooperation with the Ger­
mans or even the Austrians. They organized the International Council 
of Scientific Unions (ICSU) partly to bolster their political ostracism. 
Because it was formally a leading Allied power, Japan was an organizer 
and a charter ICSU member. In fact, participation in this group was a 
matter of prestige for so new a scientific community. 
It was also a source of considerable discomfort Many of the older 
scientists had close ties to Germany, and some were afraid of direct 
retaliation. Would the Germans exclude Japanese from access to their 
laboratories out of spite for their role in founding the ICSU? Others 
taunted those who made this kind of argument because they believed 
that Japanese science had now proven itself to the world. Many scien­
tists thus saw the issue as one of autonomy or continuing depen­
dence—one theme of this book. Certainly the formation of a modern 
research tradition demands a complex blending of indigenous and for­
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eign influences. I have emphasized indigenous factors in the Japanese 
case partly to compensate for the bias of others who attribute the pro­
cess to cultural diffusion from the centers of science to non-Western 
countries.42 Japan was not a center by 1921, but it had reached the 
point of self-sustaining growth and stood on the threshold of major 
contributions.43 
CHAPTER TWO 
SCIENCE AND SOCIETY IN 
THE TOKUGAWA PERIOD 
The Tokugawa period was in some ways an unlikely time for science to 
flourish. Japan was formally isolated from the outside world, and politi­
cal affairs were controlled by warriors who were not always keen on 
scholarship. These warrior officials consistently tried to shape intellec­
tual affairs to serve their own interests. Relatively few institutions with 
permanent support existed for scholarly activities. Scientists them­
selves were often unable—or unwilling—to share their work, and the 
scholarly researcher had no social role. 
Nevertheless, Tokugawa Japan was the scene of positive, unprece­
dented developments for scientific study Numerous texts on technical 
subjects were imported from China and devoured by Japanese scholars, 
who in the seventeenth century based their indigenous mathematics 
partly on this Chinese-language literature. In the eighteenth century 
technical literature was imported from Europe and gradually absorbed 
by various groups. Ultimately, of course, these developments seem 
abortive, since Meiji Japan made a new beginning after 1868. But 
although European science and its leading practitioners did supply the 
paradigms and sometimes the precedents for Japanese efforts during 
the Meiji period, beneath these Western influences was a layer of at­
titudes and practices that had been formed in the Tokugawa period. 
Which parts of the Tokugawa experience were decisive? The para­
digms in effect in the Tokugawa period were all replaced by Western 
ones, and government policiesrestricting certain fields did not survive 
the demise of the shogunate. The Tokugawa era continued to shape 
science through a combination of attitudes and trends in society, for 
example, the patterns in recruitment of Japanese scientists, which sur­
vived the Meiji Restoration. Inherited institutional weaknesses, and 
strengths of particular disciplines, influenced the modern tradition. 
Some Tokugawa administrative ^ vactices lasted even beyond the end of 
the Meiji (1912), and some behavioral norms that had appeared among 
scientists in the Tokugawa period affected their successors as well. 
Finally, the effects on Japanese research of Japan's long-term isola­
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tion—cultural, linguistic, intellectual, and geographical—have yet to 
be calculated fully. 
Recruitment to Science in Tokugawa Japan 
There can be no science without scientists, but the use of the word 
scientist in the Tokugawa context can only be ambiguous. In recent 
times scientist has had the connotation researcher, but research was 
not well developed in Tokugawa times and was only haphazardly prac­
ticed. Some people did conduct careful experiments and even publish 
their findings, but there was neither an institutionalized research role 
nor anything like a modern scientific community. Journals did not 
exist—let alone grants awarded by peers. Even those customs of Euro­
pean science that developed in the early modem period—a dispassion­
ate attitude and a stress on objectivity—were not always accepted in 
Japan. And many Tokugawa scientists had an "unprofessional" and 
certainly "unmodem" code of conduct They might, for example, keep 
vital information from qualified colleagues or refuse to publish their 
findings. 
Consequently, the term scientist applied to a person of Tokugawa 
Japan refers simply to one with an active interest in nature who made a 
reputation for that interest. Tokugawa society did not support the pur­
suit of knowledge for its own sake, nor did Japanese scientists think that 
they should contribute to universal knowledge.l Most commentators 
believed that the goal of knowledge was its application, which could be a 
search for better surgical procedures and medical therapies, correction 
of discrepancies in the calendar, more accurate maps of the Japanese 
coastline, or a variety of other uses. Nearly all the translation of Euro­
pean and Chinese technical works that engaged so many scientists had 
a practical motivation. 
How science was denned affected recruitment of scientists, but one 
can rarelyfind out why a particular individual chose to become a scien­
tist because the pertinent biographical information does not exist in 
most cases. Even if it did, the Tokugawa emphasis on heredity for 
allocating roles would usually make the information superfluous.2 One 
needs to consider broader social forces. Scientists were recruited from 
several groups in Tokugawa society. One was the population of official 
translators based in the port of Nagasaki, where official foreign trade 
was conducted. These men knew Dutch and Chinese and took an early 
lead in bringing foreign scientific and technical materials to the atten­
tion of other Japanese. Another group was the medical community. 
Physicians often had not only the motivation but the intelligence and 
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the money prerequisite to technical studies. Some abandoned routine 
medical practice and devoted themselves to science. Astronomers em­
ployed by the shogunate and occasionally by daimyo had (in varying 
degrees) the desire and qualifications to undertake scientific work, and 
by virtue of their official status, they often had access to resources not 
usually available to men working outside the government. 
But other Japanese outside these groups also got interested in sci­
ence on occasion.3 A few came from merchant families, and some of 
those were among the leading scientists. Another source was the gener­
al samurai population. Samurai training was not designed to produce 
technical specialists, but the spread of formal education among the 
samurai in the eighteenth century, together with the desire to improve 
their positions, led some samurai into the sciences. And there were even 
recruits from the farm population. Beginning in the eighteenth century, 
Tokugawa society included a decent number of educated, affluent 
fanners who had some leisure time. Certainly, farmers rarely became 
active in experimental science, but a number of students of advanced 
mathematics emerged from their ranks after the middle of the century. 
Samurai society in this period did not especially encourage interest in 
science or technology; scholarship of any sort had relatively low pres­
tige among samurai when the Tokugawa period began. Before the sev­
enteenth century and for decades thereafter, learning was a monopoly 
of Japan's Buddhist clergy. (To survive as a scholar, one needed support 
from a temple or at least some feudal lord. )4 The clergy at that time were 
hot well regarded, a condition ambiguous for learning.5 The new 
Tokugawa regime eventually separated Confucianism from Buddhism 
by creating a separate hierarchy, but even this action did not wholly 
solve the problem, for Confucian scholars' status failed to match that of 
the learning they espoused.6 For a time scholars became so dependent 
on government that they had relatively little standing of their own.7 
Tokugawa scholars were chronically underpaid. Where high-rank­
ing samurai retainers of the Shogun might receive 8,000 koku per year, 
no Confucian scholar ever received more than 3,500—and very few 
reached that leveL8 The head of the Hayashi family (which ran the 
shogunal academy in Edo) generally earned 3,500 koku but 300 was a 
more usual salary for scholars in official positions.9 Compensation lev­
els for technical specialists were not very different. For example, the 
shogunate paid its astronomers stipends "equivalent only to [those] of 
lower grade samurai."10 But the salary range could be greater than that 
among Confucian philosophers. The affluent Higo domain in Kyushu 
was well known for its medical establishment, and compensation for 
physicians there varied from 150 to 5,000 koku.11 
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There were also nonpecuniary compensations for professional ser­
vice. The professional opinions of official astronomers were highly re­
garded by the samurai elite,12 and scholars were often treated deferen­
tially. A daimyo might allow them to wear special clothing or even ride 
about in palanquins, and when attending a scholarly lecture might 
show his respect by taking an inferior seat.13 Warriors, of course, did 
not always view technical specialists with a high degree of esteem. 
Even in 1869, a local newspaper for samurai readers declared that 
physicians were "not greatly respected" in spite of their "considerable 
technical knowledge."14 
The opinions of other Japanese about scholarly professions also influ­
enced recruitment. Commoners respected even ordinary medical prac­
titioners without official positions. Prominent Tokugawa intellectuals 
like Motoori Norinaga and Ogyu Sorai came from families of physi­
cians. 15 At least one samurai native of Satsuma was induced to take up 
medical studies by the high social standing of a village physician.16 For 
the commoner population of Japan, scholarly activities—including 
technical ones—offered the prospect of upward mobility. The great 
surveyor I no Tadataka, born in 1743 to a peasant family, rose to samurai 
status late in his life almost entirely on the basis of professional achieve­
ments, as did the astronomer Shibukawa Harumi.17 
Scholarship could not have developed without support of this kind. 
Although status was supposed to be inherited in feudal society, schol­
arly posts, not being attractive to the warrior class, needed other re­
cruits. Scholars were supposed to hold positions on the basis of compe­
tence; but what if their heirs were not competent? One answer was 
adoption, which became common and in some families normative. The 
Hayashi family of Confucian humanists maintained its position over 
many generations by a number of careful adoptions,18 and the impor­
tant physicist Shizuki Tadao was adopted from the Nakano merchant 
family by a Nagasaki family of official interpreters. For Shizuki his 
adoption was doubly fortunate since the professional position of his new 
family gave him access to the resources he needed.19 
None of these features or strictures applied to one technical field— 
mathematics. After the earlier decades of Tokugawa rule, mathematics 
developed not only outside the formal status system but in many re­
spects apartfrom the scholarly world. In part this was the nature of the 
discipline, because mathematics shared with astronomy the need for 
special abilities among its practitioners if they were to produce impor­
tant achievements. Families wishing to specialize in mathematics 
might have solved the problem of lack of innate ability by adoption, but 
mathematics never became a specialty of particular families, because 
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there was little demand for mathematical work and no prospect of eco­
nomic gain.20 
Conceivably this pattern was unique to mathematics and needs no 
special explanation. Even in the developed countries of nineteenth-
century Europe, mathematics had difficulty creating occupational 
niches and lost recruits to other technical specialties.21 But the West­
ern situation was better in other ways. In Europe and North America, 
mathematics at least had a home in universities as a traditionally pres­
tigious academic discipline. Tokugawa Japan offered nothing so sub­
stantial as a base of material support. Authors of elementary textbooks 
like Yoshida Mitsuyoshi, whose 1627 work on the abacus went through 
several editions, could live in comfort. But works of advanced mathe­
matics, even when published, had a very small market and could not 
sustain their authors.22 Most domain schools did not employ anyone to 
teach mathematics as a specialty even at the end of the Tokugawa 
period.23 Consequently, the occupational base for Tokugawa mathe­
maticians, with few exceptions, consisted of inadequate patronage by 
wealthy individuals.24 
In spite of the practical problems, technical specialties attracted re­
cruits and managed to expand their activities. The most important 
achievements took place in medicine and to a lesser degree in astrono­
my. Medicine, after all, was immediately useful, and a country so de­
pendent on rice agriculture needed an accurate calendar. Except in 
mathematics, progress in most fields initially depended on the work of 
physicians, astronomers (temmongata), and the Nagasaki interpreters. 
Medical progress was able to build on the existing base of Chinese 
medicine, and physicians trained in the Chinese tradition later helped 
to introduce Western science.25 
European medicine was first brought to Japan by Spanish and Por­
tuguese missionaries and by Dutch traders in the sixteenth century. 
Prior to the accession of Tokugawa Ieyasu in 1600, interest in Western 
medicine naturally focused on surgery and materia medica. Sustained 
investigation of other disciplines began after seclusion was fully in 
place. In 1650 the shogunate ordered the Dutch trade mission at 
Nagasaki, thereafter Japan's only regular contact with Europe, to pro­
cure a European anatomy text for examination by certain officials, and 
four years later it directed a Nagasaki physician to study Western medi­
cine, but major interest remained focused on surgery for a considerable 
period.26 
During the eighteenth century there were two important develop­
ments in medicine, the diffusion after 1774 of Chinese-style vaccina­
tion techniques and the founding of European anatomical studies. The 
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Kyoto physician Yamawaki Toyo published Zoshi, a book on internal 
organs, in 1759 after making some effort to verify the description given 
in a German anatomical text by dissection.27 This stimulated consider­
able interest in experimental medicine and led directly to the epochal 
publication in 1774 of the Kaitai shinsho (New book on human dissec­
tion) by Sugita Gempaku and some Edo physicians. Kaitai shinsho was 
a translation with drawings of the Dutch edition of Johan Adam 
Kulmus' Anatomische Tabellen, first published in 1722.28 Sugita's 
translation indicates the strongly empirical approach to nature in­
creasingly typical of Tokugawa science; it helped undermine the pres­
tige of Chinese medicine. 
Progress came more rapidly after the turn of the nineteenth century. 
In 1805 Hanaoka Seishu became the world's first surgeon to excise a 
breast tumor under general anesthesia.29 In 1807 smallpox vaccination 
was introduced to Hokkaido through contacts with the Russians.30 
During the 1820s medical studies benefited from the presence at 
Nagasaki of Philip Franz von Siebold, member of a prominent 
Wurzburg family of professors of anatomy. Siebold opened a small med­
ical academy and trained several Japanese.31 In 1832 Takano Choei 
published Japan s first translation of a European work on physiology, 
and in 1836 Homma Gencho employed stethoscopy in medical diag­
nosis.32 
The strength of medicine's institutional base was a boon to other 
technical fields. By the end of the eighteenth century the medical pro­
fession was the "strongest voice raised in behalf of natural sci­
ence."33 In fact, those who contributed most to natural sciences other 
than astronomy came "mainly from the medical group [of Edo physi­
cians)."34 Considerable evidence supports this conclusion. European 
botany was completely dependent on physicians, beginning with Noro 
Genjo, who published Oranda honzo wage in 1750. Noro was followed 
by Ono Ranzan {Honzo somoku keimo, 1803), whom a German physi­
cian called "Japan's Linnaeus"; Udagawa Yoan (Botanika kyo, 1822, 
and Shokugaku keigen, 1833); ltd Keisuke (Taisei honzo meiso, 1828); 
and the most important linnaean pioneer, Iinuma Yokusai (Somoku 
zusetsu, 1855).35 Scholarly activity by doctors was also important in 
physics: Aochi Rinso contributed by publishing Kikai kanran (Overall 
view of the atmosphere) in 1827.36 While Aochi was virtually the only 
physician to publish a major work of physics before the Restoration, 
only about a half-dozen such works were published altogether, so the 
medical contribution was not insubstantial. 
There has been a tendency to accord major significance to Aochi's 
Kikai kanran, to publication of a longer version, Kikai kanran kogi, by 
his son-in-law Kawamoto Kdmin- in 1851, to Shizuki Tadao's un­
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published Rekisho shinsho (1798; published after the Restoration) or to 
Sakuma Shozan's experiments with electrical phenomena in the 1850s. 
Nevertheless, physical knowledge, except for Shizuki's work, remained 
rather elementary, did not circulate widely, and rested on an extremely 
narrow social base before 1868. The Rekisho shinsho, which introduced 
Newtonian mechanics, suffered from the lack of suitable terms for 
kinematics and attracted little attention.37 Chemistry had a larger clien­
tele, but here as well official impediments to the diffusion of knowledge 
hindered advances. 
Mathematics did make progress, and so did astronomy. Histories of 
Tokugawa mathematics usually begin with the work of Mori 
Shigeyoshi, who reportedly first acquired significant portions of the 
Chinese mathematical corpus in the 1590s. Mori used the abacus to 
teach arithmetic at Kyoto, and Yoshida Mitsuyoshi was his pupil. 
Yoshida, the son of a Kyoto merchant (though raised to samurai status), 
became famous as the author of the Jinkoki, a book that told merchants 
how to perform simple calculations for commercial transactions.38 At a 
higher level, the principal early Tokugawa development was Seki Tak­
akazu's work in geometry and algebra, which led him to devise a limited 
form of calculus. Seki's calculus could not solve problems of motion; his 
interest was limited to finding the areas of two-dimensional curved 
geometric figures.39 (Later mathematicians were able to calculate the 
volumes of solid objects with considerable accuracy.) Through the 
efforts of a pupil, Araki Son ei, who inherited Seki's papers, Seki's great 
work became institutionalized in the so-called Seki school, several of 
whose members worked to extend the boundaries of mathematical 
knowledge by importing, translating, and publishing such major Chi­
nese works as Mei Wen-ting's eighteenth-century treatise Li-suan 
ch'uan-shu (Comprehensive work on calendrical science and mathe­
matics). Western trigonometry and logarithms reached Japan by the 
end of the eighteenth century through the translation and publication 
of other such treatises.40 
Tokugawa astronomy focused almost exclusively^on producing^bet­
ter calendars, and for much of the period depended mainly on the 
acquisition (in some cases recovery) of informationjrom China. How­
ever, earlier astronomical studies done in Japan by Jesuits also had an 
effect This was particularly true of a work known as the Kenkon benset­
su (Western cosmography, with critical commentaries). Compiled in 
the 1640s by the apostate Jesuit Christovao Ferreira, it gave a detailed, 
systematic account of Aristotelian and Ptolemaic views of nature and 
the cosmos. Adding to its importance as a cultural artifact are commen­
taries by the Confucian scholar Mukai Gensho, who was ordered to 
study it by Shogun Iemitsu. Specialists do not agree on how significant 
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the work was, but it did give Japanese readers a first description of 
Westerners' views of nature.41 
With the introduction from China of the Shou-shih calendar (ca. 
1670), Japanese astronomy began slowly to improve. Described as the 
"single most important influence on Japanese calendar-making" of the 
Tokugawa period, the Shou-shih calendar was noted for the sophistica­
tion of its mathematics and attracted attention from leading mathemati­
cians like Seki Takakazu and Takebe Katahiro. It also formed the basis 
for Shibukawa Harumi's Joky6 calendar of 1684, which the imperial 
court in Kyoto adopted alter the failures of its own astronomers. 
Shibukawa's success won him the position of official astronomer to the 
shogunate and promotion to the status of samurai His work was impor­
tant scientifically because it was based on the "first systematic astro­
nomical observations in Japan," but it is interesting to note his inability 
to resolve the difficult mathematical problem of reducing the ecliptic 
coordinates of the sun to equatorial coordinates. Shibukawa stated that 
he had merely copied relevant information from tables appended to the 
Shou-shih calendar in creating the Jokyo calendar.42 
Three important astronomical developments occurred in the eigh­
teenth century: introduction of better instruments for observation, dif­
fusion by stages of Copemican heliocentrism, and preservation, in trun­
cated form, of Newton s mechanics. Importation and translation 
between 1726 and 1733 of three major Chinese texts led to thefirst of 
these advances. One was the Li-suan ch'uan-shu. The other two, Ling-
t'ai i hsiang chih (1730) and the Ch'ung<hen li-shu (1733), compiled 
by Jesuits working in China, explained various European astronomical 
instruments, including accurate drawings and descriptions of their use. 
New instruments and information made creation of the Kansei calendar 
possible in 1798. This was the first time Japanese astronomers em­
ployed Western data officially.43 
As for the Copemican heliocentric doctrine, the surprising thing is 
not its arrival in the late eighteenth century but its absence in the 
seventeenth. De revolutionibus orbium coelestium first appeared in 
1543, but Japanese astronomers did not hear of it at all until 1769 and 
got a superficial description only in 1792. The indifference of seven­
teenth-century Jesuit astronomers in Japan and China, together with 
Chinese authorities' lack of interest in Western cosmology, meant that 
Japanese astronomers had to wait for the importation of texts from 
Europe. In 1769 Asada Goryu, an influential astronomer outside the 
government, stated that many European astronomers believed the 
earth was not the center of the universe, and in 1772 Motoki Ryoei, an 
official translator for the shogunate at Nagasaki, first mentioned the 
name of Copernicus in a Japanese scientific treatise. Twenty years later 
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Motoki produced an extensive nonmathematical description of Coper­
nican theory in a handwritten, seven-volume work. Of this work's intel­
lectual content, an historian of astronomy wrote: "Elliptic orbits were 
introduced but were not associated with Kepler . . . Kepler's second 
and third laws were not given; the name of Newton was ignored. Dy­
namic theory did not appear, and mathematical formulation was con­
sciously avoided.. . . Lack of accurate detail made this treatise of little 
practical value to Japanese calendar makers."44 Inability to publish was 
a further limitation on the impact of Motoki's achievement. Manuscript 
copies circulated among a few intellectuals, but for most educated Japa­
nese the details of Copernican theory remained under lock and key in a 
government warehouse, although Shiba Kokan popularized the doc­
trine.45 
Japanese astronomy did not change much before 1868. The most 
important developments were in instrumentation. By 1800 Japanese 
astronomers were regularly producing telescopes and even grinding 
lenses.46 Using a telescope of his own devising, Kunitomo Tobei ob­
served sunspots in 1835 and published a drawing of the surface of the 
moon; other astronomers began to do systematic observations of the 
planets. However, the most important development was arrival (in 
1803) of a book in Dutch by the French astronomer J. J. F de Lalande. 
Lalande was a preeminent figure in eighteenth-century science, and 
his work was the first "advanced treatise on contemporary Western 
astronomy" to make its way to Japan. The shogun's official astronomer, 
Takahashi Yoshitoki, saw at once the importance of the work. He was 
determined to secure translation, with all the mathematics, but he was 
also aware that official translators were not up to the job. He therefore 
decided to begin learning Dutch in order to do it himself, but, unfortu­
nately for the development of astronomy in Japan, died a year later. 
Takahashi did leave behind many unpublished notes (Lalande rekisko 
kanken [A personal view of Lalande's astronomy]), but no one took 
notice of them until many years later.47 
That Tokugawa efforts did not lead to modern science directly can be 
linked to several conditions. One has to do with long-term trends in the 
recruitment of scientists, especially in mathematics and astronomy. 
Another relates to research institutions, schools and academies, and 
scientists' behavior. Government policy constitutes a third. What did 
Tokugawa officials tolerate or support? What did they proscribe or try to 
suppress? In examining these issues we look for connections. Did cer­
tain people enter onefield or another on the basis of class? If so, did this 
make any difference for science as a whole?- Did some fields have in­
stitutional support that others lacked? If so, why? 
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The kinds of people who became active in the scientific movement 
varied considerably over the years. In the seventeenth century most 
astronomers and students of the physical sciences were commoners. A 
substantial proportion came from the twenty or so families of Nagasaki 
interpreters.48 Higuchi Gon'emon (1590-1640), Imamura Eisei 
(1671-1736), Kobayashi Kentei (1601-84), and Nishikawa Joken 
(1648-1724) were among the most prominent figures in the physical 
sciences, and all of them came from interpreter families.49 But from 
about the beginning of the eighteenth century, more and more came 
from the samurai. The samurai HiragaGennai (1729-79), Koike Yuken 
(1683-1754), and Yamaji Shuju (1704-72) were active early in the 
century, although men of commoner origin like Aoki Kon'yd (1698­
1769), Miura Baien (1723-89), Nakane Genkei (1662-1733), and 
Nishikawa Seikyu (1693-1756) continued to outnumber their samurai 
colleagues. 
Samurai predominated in the physical sciences from about the mid­
dle of the eighteenth century. Honda Toshiaki (1744-1821), Mori 
Shiko (1750-1818), Otsuki Gentaku (1757-1827), and Takahashi 
Yoshitoki (1764-1804) were active at this time, and all were members 
of the warrior class. By the 1820s samurai were by far the majority. 
Takahashi Kageyasu (1785-1829), Aochi Rinso (1784-1833), 
Nakanishi Fungaku (1763-1837), and Sakuma Shozan (1811-64) 
were notable samurai scientific figures of the late Tokugawa. Of course 
there were other famous scientists who were not samurai. Hoashi Banri 
(1778—1852), the noted astronomer and Confucian scholar, was not of 
samurai origin, and neither were such men as Takeda Shingen (1785­
1846) or, slightly earlier, Shizuki Tadao (1760-1806). 
Mathematics showed quite a different trend. In the seventeenth 
century, most mathematicians came from the samurai population. Mori 
Shigeyoshi (1580-1640), Furugoori Hikozaemon (1642-1720), Seki 
Takakazu (1642-1708), Araki Son'ei (1640-1718), and other early 
pupils of Seki were allfrom the warrior class.50 Samurai were predomi­
nant in mathematics into the eighteenth century (examples are Tatebe 
Kenko [1690-1760], Fujita Sadasuke [1734-1807], and Matsuoka 
Ryosuke [1770-1830]), but their influence was decreasing; by 1800 
commoners were more numerous. During the last decades of 
Tokugawa rule, wasan mathematics was largely controlled by men like 
Uchida Itsumi (1805-82), Kurita Nobutada (1800-70), and Akita Yu­
jiro (1811-70), who came from mercantile or agrarian families, al­
though a few samurai—Baba Kotaro (1801-60), Abe Yuji (1825­
1875), and Kanda Takahira (1832-90) were still active in mathematics. 
Table 2.1 shows the evolution of these trends in the Tokugawa peri­
od. In 1650 samurai were only 22 percent of the astronomers and stu­
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dents of the physical sciences, but 75 percent of mathematicians. By 
1700 the physical sciences had attracted more samurai: 45 percent of 
physical scientists and 70 percent of mathematicians were samurai. 
Samurai and commoners were about equally numerous in the physical 
sciences until almost the end of the eighteenth century; samurai spe­
cialization in mathematics declined slowly. But by 1820, nearly two-
thirds of physical scientists were samurai, and a majority of mathemati­
cians were of commoner origin. Time confirmed these trends. When 
the Tokugawa shogunate came to an end, 80 percent of physical scien­
tists were samurai; two-thirds of mathematicians commoners. 
Table 2.1 is based on many cases (263 astronomers and physical 
scientists and 515 mathematicians), but these are only a fraction of the 
total. As many as 8,000 mathematicians may have been active in the 
Tokugawa period, and there were certainly more students of physical 
science than the number represented in the graph.51 But other evi­
dence suggests that the pattern table 2.1 presents was real. Sato 
Shosuke found that commoners were most active in the physical sci­
ences during the early decades of the Tokugawa period.52 The historian 
Takahashi Shin'ichi found that an Edo group active in Dutch studies in 
the 1850s was mostly samurai.53 Katsu Kaishu in 1855 made a survey 
of "European "-style scholars in Edo for the Tokugawa shogunate and 
reported that two-thirds were samurai.54 And Meiji publicist Fukuzawa 
Yukichi commented (ca. 1865), "During the ninety years that preceded 
the Horeki and Meiwa periods 11751-72). most of the students of 
Rangaku [Western science) were physicians (mosdy commoners). 
However, since the Koka and Kaei periods (1844-54), most of them 
have been samurai."55 
What accounts for this bifurcation in the scientific movement? To 
answer this question we must first look at several others: Why in the 
seventeenth century did commoners dominate astronomy and the 
physical sciences? Why did samurai control mathematics? Why did 
both trendsreverse in the eighteenth century? Why did samurai appar­
ently lose interest in studying mathematics not long before they got 
interested in physical science? In the nineteenth century, why did more 
samurai not perceive the need for mathematics? To pose the question 
differently, why did more commoners who were active in mathematics 
not see the value of their work for the scientific movement? 
Commoners became dominant in the scientific movement of the 
seventeenth century primarily because of differential opportunities. 
With the imposition of strict seclusion in 1639, it became almost impos­
sible to import Western books, and contacts with foreigners sharply 
declined. But these effects hurt some groups more than others. Since 
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the warrior class belonged to the chain of command, it was particularly 
hard hit by government restrictions. Some were motivated to remain 
active in science from an interest in defense and navigation, but they 
could not obtain any fresh stimulation and had little incentive to pass on 
their expertise. Nagasaki interpreters suffered as well, losing greatly in 
numbers and status, although they at least had access to information 
from Europe when it was almost impossible for others to get it. Com­
moners became most active in science because only they could become 
interpreters.56 
The samurai's early interest in mathematics reflected the origins of 
the subject in Japan. Mori Shigeyoshi had been a retainer of the famous 
general Toyotomi Hideyoshi and had studied in China with Hideyoshi's 
encouragement and endeavored to obtain Chinese works in mathemat­
ics.57 Mdri's seventeenth-century successors like Seki Takakazu had 
also had access to foreign information and were further interested in 
applying mathematics. Seki studied European astronomy with a one­
time Japanese resident of Macao and formally advised the new govern­
ment about the calendar.58 Samurai, as military experts, saw the value 
of mathematics for surveying, navigation, and calendar making. 
While the imposition of seclusion disrupted these patterns, its partial 
relaxation by a subsequent Shogun gave them new vigor and a different 
direction. Samurai could have access to new kinds of knowledge once 
Shogun Yoshimune allowed Western technical literature into Japan 
(1720), but his action was not publicized and its effects were delayed.59 
Not until about 1750 did scientific learning change noticeably, and 
samurai importance in the scientific movement resulted primarily from 
formal education. The government put some effort into promoting edu­
cation for samurai, and by 1760 forty-two domains and the shogunate 
had established their own schools, which local samurai were encour­
aged to attend.60 
The preeminence of the samurai had other causes. To begin with, in 
the eighteenth century very little science was actually taught in any of 
the schools established by daimyo. Those interested in learning Dutch 
or a technical discipline had to enroll in a private academy, find a tutor, 
or work on their own. Commoners could certainly do any of these 
things; that samurai's tendency to do them was greater reflects dif­
ferences in attitudes. Second, commoners' access to formal education 
was rising for a number of reasons. Certain fiefs established special 
schools for commoners beginning in the 1790s, and some domains (like 
Higo) even admitted them to the regular school. Commoners could 
always attend private academies, which operated in most larger cities.61 
By the late eighteenth century affluent commoners were tending to 
favor more formal education in emulation of samurai values. "The sam­
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urai virtues," Fukuzawa Yukichi wrote, "(by the late Tokugawa] were 
not confined to those who lived off rice stipends or wore swords [by 
virtue of their status]."62 
Samurai still had better access to schooling than did commoners, 
and the education they got had special features because of their politi­
cal position as the governing class. In that sense education for samurai 
was not suited to scientific studies but instead emphasized developing 
suitable moral character, gaining classical knowledge of the tech­
niques of government, and meeting their responsibilities to society.63 
It included the military arts and Confucian humanism of a sometimes 
arid sort. But samurai education had other features which served sci­
ence better, in that it tended to be somewhat philosophical and formal 
and was not tied too closely to occupational performance.64 It also 
stressed comprehension of knowledge in general, not just mastery of 
particular specialties.85 
Samurai had incentives to acquire education that were peculiar to 
their class, for their socialization seems to have produced a kind of 
"need achievement" of the sort that drives people to outdo and dominate 
others.66 As their standing in the national economy deteriorated in the 
eighteenth century, this attitude combined with a new fervor. Because 
samurai youth werereared on stories of the privations endured by their 
ancestors, they had more courage to tolerate hardship in pursuing edu­
cation than did commoners. For increasing numbers, at least toward 
the end of the century, education was seen as the best way to revive 
sagging family fortunes.67 
Commoners' education also reflected needs and values, but their 
position in society was very different. Their education was heavily prag­
matic: language instruction, moralistic aphorisms, and the subject mat­
ter required in their various occupations, including a substantial dose of 
arithmetic.68 And though local regimes, including the shogunate, had 
some official interest in education for commoners, one should not over­
state that interest. After all, only a small minority of fiefs provided 
special schools for commoners. Official steps were usually confined to 
employing itinerant lecturers who instructed villagers in the Confucian 
virtues of filial piety and obedience.69 However, another factor influ­
enced education for all. This was the sense of deprivation and the 
resentment samurai felt toward commoners whose incomes were tend­
ing to rise while theirs either remained constant or decreased.70 
To explain the bifurcation in the social class basis of Tokugawa 
science one needs to consider the role of commoners in mathematics. 
Affluent commoners began to pursue mathematical interests when 
their position in society changed. Changes of position were linked to 
significant changes in the economy. The private commercial sector, 
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where commoners were active, grew, and grew substantially. After 
1700 especially, economic historians estimate that the Japanese econo­
my grew significantly faster than total population, and such expansion 
demanded proficiency in arithmetic.71 Tokugawa Japanese naturally 
distinguished between arithmetic and higher mathematics, but one 
could not pursue interests in higher mathematics without some ac­
quaintance with arithmetic. Schooling for commoners was organized 
differently from that for samurai. Whereas samurai were schooled at 
public expense, most commoners were educated privately. Signifi­
cantly, this was also the case with higher mathematics. By the mid-
eighteenth century, Tokugawa Japan had nineteen schools of mathe­
matics, each headed by a master practitioner who either pursued a 
separate occupation or subsisted on tuition payments.72 
The private-school experience of commoners contrasts sharply with 
the experience of samurai, more and more of whom got their basic 
education in daimyo-supported schools where mathematics either was 
not taught at all or was limited to arithmetic. Seclusion had eliminated 
ocean navigation as a stimulus to interest in higher mathematics, and 
most samurai felt that mathematical studies had little or no value for 
society. The growing concern in the nineteenth century for practical 
studies at the daimyo schools made this sentiment, if anything, strong­
er.73 Samurai could also see that commoners—especially merchants— 
were increasingly coopting mathematics. This made a difference in 
their fundamental attitudes because of their growing indebtedness to 
merchants.74 They increasingly hated not only their creditors but any­
thing associated with them. This point of view explicitly included high­
er mathematics. Ogyu Sorai condemned mathematicians as early as 
1727.75 The astronomer Nishimura Tosato wrote in 1761, "Mathemat­
ics is a childish subject in which only people wishing to seek fame by 
constructing impracticable theories . . . will indulge."76 The biog­
rapher of the Meiji physicist Yamakawa Kenjiro, whoreceived his early 
education in Tokugawa schools, noted that Yamakawa was unable to 
study mathematics at his domain school in Aizu because mathematics 
"was despised by samurai as something which only the merchants 
should study." According to the biographer, 'The same situation exist­
ed in every other fief."77 
The negative attitude toward mathematics also had an intellectual 
basis. Critics resented the increasingly trivial or esoteric character of 
later Tokugawa mathematics. By the time Nishimura was active, or 
even earlier, in the lifetime of Ogyu Sorai, wasan mathematics had 
developed the characteristics of an art form or a cult. A major preoc­
cupation of later mathematicians was a type of problem called yojutsu 
("packing problems"), which consisted of efforts to inscribe the largest 
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possible number of small circles of a certain size in a large circle or to 
circumscribe various polygons whose dimensions were given in the 
problem. Certainly yojutsu did not represent the whole of Tokugawa 
mathematics. Seki Takakazu discovered—and his followers im­
proved—the enri calculus for finding the areas of spaces bordered by 
curves. Wada Yasushi compiled tables of definite integrals and applied 
them to the mathematically infinite and infinitesimal. Other mathe­
maticians developed calculus techniques which in some respects were 
better than Seki's.78 But these achievements all came early and had no 
parallels in later mathematics. 
Why should Tokugawa mathematics have been conceptually fertile 
in its earlier decades and increasingly sterile as the period went by? 
Some think that wasan mathematics* intellectual poverty is largely a 
product of the environing culture. Since many of Japan's basic cultural 
patterns were derivedfrom overseas, specialists tended toward the artis­
tic rather than toward the critical.79 There may be some truth to this 
view, but a number of other factors were also at work. 
Leaving aside the behavior of mathematicians themselves, the gen­
eral direction of Tokugawa mathematics seems to have resulted from 
two different forces. One was surely class barriers to intellectual 
communication. For example, a samurai student of astronomy like 
Takahashi Yoshitoki, endeavoring in 1804 to translate Lalande, would 
never think of asking a merchant mathematician like Aida Yasuaki 
(1747-1817) for assistance, assuming Takahashi even knew of his 
existence.80 The other was the shogunate's policy of national seclusion, 
which removed some powerful stimuli toward mathematics. 
Instead, samurai after 1800 became increasingly interested in the 
physical sciences, aresult in part of Western expansion. Shortly before 
and after the turn of the century, British and Russian ships appeared at 
Nagasaki; and the Americans were not far behind. These developments 
were alarming enough, but the Opium War (1839-42) was much more 
so. When Britain defeated China in this uneven conflict, the samurai 
were taken aback and began to reexamine their own defense needs. 
With coastal navigation and coastal defense suddenly brought sharply 
to the warriors1 attention, ballistics, metallurgy, and naval engineering 
again seemed relevant to Japan's survival. 
One might have expected that samurai and other nineteenth-cen­
tury physical scientists would have included mathematics in their stud­
ies. Plotting trajectories or casting cannon is nearly impossible without 
it Some of these men did see the connection, but wasan mathematics 
was incapable of responding to practical needs and was no longer con­
trolled by the right kind of people. Thefirst Japanese book on Western 
mathematics was published only in 1857, several years after the Perry 
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expedition. Three factors may explain the tardiness of Tokugawa in­
terest in Western mathematics. For one thing, the official Nagasaki 
translators did not translate Western works on mathematics and seem 
not to have known of local interest in the subject. Second, no important 
Western mathematician in this period ever visited Japan (unlike China) 
before or after seclusion was abolished.81 Third, so many samurai had 
developed a hostility to wasan that it took time to change their minds, 
about mathematics. 
Curiously, most mathematical experts from the commoner popula­
tion also failed to perceive the value of their subject for society, although 
there are exceptions. The Tsuwano school of wasan emphasized the 
practical value of mathematical work in the rules governing its stu­
dents. And another commentator in 1816 declared mathematics a part 
of gakumon, a legitimate branch of higher Japanese learning.82 But 
many did not much care whether it had any standing or not, let alone 
whether it could be applied. The eminent eighteenth-century mathe­
matician Fujita Sadasuke spoke approvingly of what he called the "util­
ity of the useless,"83 and another mathematician insisted that his col­
leagues would take up problemsfrom astronomy only if unable to find a 
topic from mathematics.84 The forms of the discipline were set, and in 
the absence of new stimuli they were quite unlikely to change. The 
same lack of access to advanced information from Europe that affected 
science in general was also a powerful factor here. Hagiwara Teisuke 
(1828-1909), a talented practitioner of wasan, refused to convert to 
Western mathematics even after seclusion was lifted because a perusal 
of a British calculus text in translation convinced him that wasan was 
better.85 
Tokugawa Educational and Scientific Institutions 
Social class trends of the late Tokugawa may not have aided science in 
the early nineteenth century, but they had an effect later on. The mod­
ern research community was formed to a surprising degree by the 
extension of these trends (see chapter 3). Medicine had attracted a 
large share of the available talent in the Tokugawa period and con­
tinued to do so in the Meiji, and samurai predominance in the physical 
sciences persisted well beyond 1868. The marginality typical of 
Tokugawa mathematics exacted its price after 1868. Continuities in 
recruitment are striking, but they are much less obvious when we look 
at institutions. Relatively few scientific institutions of the Meiji era can 
trace their lineage to the Tokugawa period, and the Tokugawa institu­
tions often had goals that set them apartfrom their modern successors. 
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Scientific institutions in the Tokugawa period developed under di­
verse conditions. Some constraints promoted competition and in that 
sense benefited learning. The system of Alternate Attendance estab­
lished by the shogunate to control the daimyo by compulsory spending 
on travel, for example, brought many samurai retainers to Edo, where 
they acquired important new information and confronted "intellectual 
challenges . .  . to their [traditional] way of thinking."86 The political 
structure consisted not only of the central administration of the shogun­
ate, but also of more than 270 local domains each headed by a daimyo. 
Sometimes local domains could be induced to compete in a way that 
was helpful to science. Institutions in the purely private sphere could— 
and did—challenge the position of those supported by government. 
Other factors served to limit competition and constrain the scientific 
movement. The shogunate tried hard to dominate European studies 
(Rangaku or Yogaku) and in some ways all forms of learning. Parochi­
alism in a climate of seclusion certainly impeded some dissemination of 
knowledge. Fear of Christianity restricted the growth of the physical 
sciences. Some members of well-entrenched intellectual communities 
(for example, kampo physicians) even directly restrained competition to 
protect themselves. Many besides mathematicians had no wish for 
important new knowledge, and the private sector, in spite of its 
strengths, was in some respects weak and dependent. As for institu­
tional functions, schools and even putative research facilities in 
Tokugawa Japan were not necessarily established for fully "modern" 
purposes. They were supposed to diffuse scientific knowledge and tech­
nical information, at least to those who created them, but they had little 
concept of adding to knowledge and never awarded degrees. 
Tokugawa institutions were certainly valuable, however, for as R. P. 
Dore noted in a classic study, Tokugawa Japan saw a rebirth of learning. 
Peacetime conditions allowed for considerable curiosity. Official pa­
tronage of scholarship flourished. Subsidies for printing books, main­
taining libraries, and hiring lecturers were on a scale without prece­
dent, and a substantial recovery of knowledge from China took place. 
Also, while one would not wish to exaggerate its extent, there was some 
freedom for intellectual inquiry.87 Political structures reinforced this 
remarkably favorable climate. Consider the effects of Alternate Atten­
dance. Nagasaki, of course, had originally been the site of the Japanese 
scientific movement, while Kyoto and Osaka had their parts to play. But 
by bringing large numbers of samurai to Edo, the national system of 
political control eventually reshaped the learned establishment Alter­
nate Attendance indirectly promoted new ways of thinking among 
those who undertook to travel and eventually laid much of the ground­
work for the capital's preeminence in science. Schools, academies, and 
SCIENCE AND SOCIETY IN THE TOKUGAWA PERIOD YJ

other institutions sprang up out of all proportion to the wealth and 
population of Edo, and as a result, it came to dominate the scientific 
movement after about 1750. The capital's preeminence in scholarship 
became permanent in Japanese life. 
But Alternate Attendance in and of itself did not bring about these 
results. Regional competition also stimulated scholarly activities. About 
fifteen daimyo domains built official academies in the seventeenth cen­
tury, and by 1770 about thirty more schools had been built, followed by 
another sixty or so by the end of the century. School construction had 
several motivations. Confucianism held that formal education helped 
promote virtue and hence the governability of society, and troubling 
events could reinforce this notion. In the 1770s Tokugawa Japan faced 
a series of particularly severe famines, bad weather, daimyo financial 
crises, and peasant revolts. Some administrators thought that more 
education would help, at least with the last two. But building schools 
was also a way of keeping up with one's neighbors. In 1755 the Higo 
domain in Kyushu built a school at a time when they were still quite 
unusual, and this action by the Hosokawa family prompted other do­
mains to do the same thing.88 
Domains could also improve conditions for technical studies by 
adding programs to existing institutions. One domain added a mathe­
matics course to its school in the 1760s. Four more did so in the next two 
decades, and an additional nine had added mathematics by 1803. Two 
domains introduced courses in astronomy—including calendrical sci­
ence, geography, and surveying—during the 1790s. Two added medi­
cal courses in the 1780s, and seven more did so in the 1790s. In the 
nineteenth century this expansion continued, as nine domain schools 
added mathematics courses between 1804 and 1829, while one added 
medicine and two astronomy. From about the time of the Opium War, 
the pace accelerated, so that by the time Perry arrived in 1853, twenty-
two additional domain schools had added mathematics, thirteen had 
added medicine, and four had created new courses in astronomy and 
related disciplines.89 
Thesefigures may suggest a preference for mathematics, but in fact, 
medicine was usually the discipline of choice and often had its own 
institutions. From the mid-eighteenth century on the more affluent 
domains began to establish separate academies for medical studies, 
Higo once again being the pacesetter. In 1757 the Higo daimyo, Hoso­
kawa Shigekata, established the Saishunkan at Kumamoto as a spe­
cialized school for medical studies. His initiative was copied by Satsuma 
(1774), Kyoto (1782), Aizu (1801), and others.90 
Disciplines considered more explicitly Western were also included in 
domain academies, though rarely before 1800. Higo's medical academy 
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offered Dutch surgery from the start,91 but the Chdshu and Sakura 
domain schools which did so only after the Opium War (from 1843) 
were by far the more typical cases. Often the military rather than the 
medical value of Dutch studies led to their adoption in domain acade­
mies.92 Military studies based on Western texts werefirst conducted at 
Chdshu and Saga in 1840, and their popularity grew after Perry's arriv­
al. The shogunate developed several new programs, but the domains 
were slower to act. A few forward-looking daimyo did send young sam­
urai to Nagasaki, Osaka, or Edo for technical studies, but that was not 
until the mid-1840s.93 
With the change of regime (1868) the daimyo began to catch up. In 
1870, for example, areformist administration in Higo closed the tradi­
tional Confucian academy (the Jishukan, built in 1755) andreplaced it 
with a Western-style school. Securing the services as instructor of a 
West Point graduate, the new Yogakko academy offered a broad pro­
gram. Captain L. L. Janes devoted the entire first year to instruction in 
English. In the remaining three years he taught various subjects, in­
cluding algebra, geometry, trigonometry, chemistry, physics, and geol­
ogy.94 Separately but simultaneously, the Higo administration created a 
new school for medical studies (the Igakko) by reorganizing the exist­
ing Saishunkan. Although both schools were reform-minded, their 
sponsors viewed them quite differendy. As an antidote to Westerniza­
tion, Yogakko students hadregular compulsory lectures on Confucian 
ethics and morality, but Igakko students could attend the lectures or not 
as they liked. The Yogakko was housed in a Western-style building; the 
Igakko used the Saishunkan's facilities and some of its equipment as 
well.95 
Medicine's establishment in separate academies was a trend of par­
ticular importance. Domain academies taught a little science, but be­
fore the Opium War they were not very serious about it Only elemen­
tary mathematics, botany, and medical subjects were usual, with 
astronomy less frequently offered. Partly for this reason the medical 
academies took on additional functions. Especially in the intermediate 
period of the scientific movement (1780-1840), the medical academy 
of a domain was the leader in accepting Western science. Many of their 
teachers of technical subjects were private physicians.96 
The private-sector status of many physicians was a source of addi­
tional competition for daimyo-supported institutions. Private physicians 
were more likely to exploit new techniques like vaccination or Dutch 
surgery than their official counterparts. After all, private doctors re­
ceived nofixed salary, and special expertise could justify a boost in their 
fees. Saga already possessed several private practitioners of Dutch-style 
medicine before it began to be taught in the daimyo's academy. In 
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Fukui, Dutch medicine was established in the domain academy only as 
a result of pressure from private physicians, and even then it was 
strongly opposed by conservative doctors on the'academy staff.97 But 
the attentions of private physicians were not confined entirely to medi­
cine. An important development of the late eighteenth century was the 
cultivation of astronomy and other technical subjects by physicians. 
The noted Osaka physician Asada Goryu (1734-99) became a highly 
successful astronomer. In the 1780s he discovered the secular diminu­
tion of tropical-year length, and two of his pupils in 1798 developed the 
Kansei calendar for the Tokugawa shogunate after Asada himself de­
clined the assignment. This calendar was an important advance, and it 
used European measurements officially.98 
The shogunate s founding of scientific institutions should certainly 
have enhanced the scientific movement. The number of these institu­
tions was impressive. The Astronomical Bureau and Observatory (Tem­
mongata) was the oldest of the group. Founded in 1684 as a result of 
Shibukawa Harumi's work on the Jokyo calendar, the observatory got 
effective control over calendar making and made various contributions 
of note." In the late eighteenth century it sponsored Ino Tadataka's 
survey of the Japanese coast, which used sophisticated mathematical 
techniques.10° In the nineteenth century it became the base for many 
of the specialists in European astronomy.l01 Partly because of the ob­
servatory's successes, the shogunate began to expand its technical in­
frastructure, in 1791 adding an official academy of medicine, then an 
agency for the translation and diffusion of technical materials (1811), a 
full-fledged school for scientific studies (1856), a related bureau for 
mathematical studies (1863), and a number of other institutions. Not 
much was done, however, between 1811 and Perry's mission in 1853, 
and certain parts of the program, particularly in medicine, gained mo­
mentum not by competing with, but by coopung the accomplishments 
of private institutions. Government policy dictated that scholars at­
tached to public institutions dominate and control the scientific move­
ment rather than advance its mission. 
The official policy of not competing is clear from the beginning, with 
the founding of the medical academy, which actually involved recon­
stituting an existing private facility. In 1765 the Taki family of shogunal 
physicians had established its own school, the Seijukan, for training 
Chinese-style doctors. The Seijukan was privately funded, but the sho­
gunate publicized its existence among the daimyo and later required 
physicians living in shogunal territories to contribute to its mainte­
nance. Though neither historically unprecedented nor programmati­
cally innovative, the Seijukan was an important institutional develop­
ment in the Tokugawa context, and for that reason it eventually became 
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a public institution.102 It would also initiate a longer-term pattern. The 
Seiyo Igakusho (Academy of Western Medicine) of 1861 was created in 
much the same way, and this same nationalizing of private institutions 
in the medical field continued beyond 1868. 
The creation of the Office for Translating Dutch Books (Bansho 
Wage Goyo) in 1811 illustrates two of the shogunate's aims. One was to 
obtain useful knowledge through translation, the other to control its 
diffusion once the knowledge had been obtained. Before this, the Dutch 
studies movement had been in the hands of private physicians and 
curious samurai, who sometimes performed experiments while endeav­
oring to learn from European texts. But with the establishment of the 
translation office, official activities rose to the top, and interest in experi­
ments waned. Baba Sajuro, an able Nagasaki translator, and Otsuki 
Gentaku, a leading Edo Dutch scholar from the Sendai domain, were 
named to the staff of the translation office, but they and their staff were 
basically generalists with only occasional interests in science. While 
technical materials were included in their purview, much more of then-
work dealt with public administration.103 Moreover, the translation of­
fice had duties ostensibly at odds with the scientific movement. Begin­
ning in 1842 it had to censor all translations of European materials and 
oversee their circulation. Under these circumstances, it is hardly sur­
prising that before 1856 the translation office made no more than a 
limited contribution to science in Japan.104 
After Perry arrived, the government made changes. It expanded the 
work of the translation office and built a school in 1856.105 This school 
initially taught only Dutch, but in 1862 English, French, and German 
were offered along with courses in mathematics, metallurgy, and indus­
trial arts. Geography, physics, and history were added in the final years 
of Tokugawa rule.106 In the Tokugawa context, the school was inno­
vative. Students were admitted from all over Japan without regard to 
place of origin or status, and members of the faculty were not educated 
generalists but specialists in the subjects they taught.107 Such spe­
cialists were hard to recruit. The shogunate could obtain just two of the 
teachers from among its own retainers and had to hire the other thirty-
two from other domains.108 
The school's program in physics shows its limitations. The eminently 
qualified Kawamoto Komin had charge of physics, but it is not at all 
clear what he did. Earlier Dutch studies specialists in physics had 
investigated topics in ballistics, electricity, friction, and celestial me­
chanics, but it is far from certain that any of this work continued in the 
Tokugawa academy. Kawamoto and his staff were forbidden to lecture 
and confined their efforts to translating documents. The only scientific 
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work they are known to have accomplished is the installation and study 
of a telegraph system.109 
Tokugawa institution building did not neglect medicine. Chinese 
medicine had had its own academy for decades. Fearing loss of their 
status, some of its members had opposed Western medicine, and in 
1849 they persuaded the authorities to ban Western medicine except 
for surgery and ophthalmology, never specialties of Chinese medi­
cine. l10 Ironically, the same year this ban was issued a German surgeon 
employed by the Dutch at Nagasaki managed through vaccination to 
achieve the desired prophylactic effect against smallpox, and opposition 
to Western medicine waned as the information spread.! 11 Accordingly, 
a group of private physicians opened a vaccination office at Edo in 1857. 
In 1861 the shogunate took it over and made it a medical school. Ini­
tially known as the Academy of Western Medicine (Seiyo Igakusho). 
this academy later became part of Tokyo University.*l2 
During the years of institutional expansion in Kdo. similar events 
were occurring at Nagasaki. This is in some ways surprising, given the 
capital's rise as a center of scholarship, but throughout the period of 
national seclusion Nagasaki was the center of contacts with Europe, 
and it attracted several Westerners with scientific training. Philip Franz 
von Siebold, J. L. C. Pompe van Meerdervoort, A. F Bauduin, and W. K. 
Gratama were especially influential toward the end of the period. Sie­
bold was both thefirst to arrive and the most influential. Between 1823 
and 1829 he lived in Nagasaki. Nagasaki officials gave him unprece­
dented social access. He attracted students to classes in medicine and 
biology where he promoted the Linnaean system and various current 
views in European medicine.'13 Siebold was particularly well prepared 
for his sojourn in Japan. He came from a prominent academic family 
and had taken his degree at the University of Wiirzburg. His interest in 
Japanese affairs had led the Dutch to appoint him physician at their 
Nagasaki trading post, and the same interests eventually got him in 
trouble. In 1829 he was expelledfrom the country because the shogun­
ate believed him a threat to the nation's security.114 
Partly because of this "Siebold Affair," Japanese scientists had few 
Western contacts in the years before Perry's arrival. However, Dr. Otto 
Mohnike resided at Nagasaki between 1848 and 1850, and he promoted 
vaccination and the use of the stethoscope. But a breakthrough came in 
1857. when Matsumoto Ryojun, aspiring student of European medi­
cine, and the Dutch army physician Pompe van Meerdervoort arrived in 
Nagasaki and began a collaboration that stimulated the scientific move­
ment With formal approval from the Tokugawa authorities, the two 
opened a full-fledged academy of European medicine. Known as the 
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Nagasaki Igaku Denshu Jo, the academy offered a five-year program 
beginning with basic biology, chemistry, and physics and progressing 
to medical subjects.'15 The school was formally a companion subordi­
nate to another facility located nearby. The simultaneous founding of 
this Nagasaki Kaigun Denshu Jo had been motivated by military con­
cerns about coastal defense, and it was staffed by Dutch naval officers 
who taught physics, mathematics, chemistry, and engineering as well 
as various military subjects.116 
The Nagasaki Igaku Denshu Jo grew in the 1860s. Pompe van Meer­
dervoort left Japan in 1862, but not before he had persuaded the sho­
gunate to establish a teaching hospital and new facilities at the medical 
school.117 A. F Bauduin, who became his replacement, further recom­
mended establishment ofa separate academy for basic science, and this 
was done in 1864 by moving basic science out of the older institutions. 
Presiding over this Bunseki Kyuri Jo, as it came to be known, was 
another Dutch physician, W K. Gratama, who reached Nagasaki in 
1866. The political instability that preceded the demise of the 
Tokugawa shogunate led the authorities to remove the science school 
first to Edo in 1867 andfinally to Osaka in 1869. There it became known 
as the Osaka Shamitsu Kyoku or Osaka School of Chemistry, and it 
continued to operate until 1881.! 18 
The impact of these institutions outlasted their existence. Modern 
chemistry was taught at the Nagasaki institutions for the first time in 
Japan, and official restrictions on the teaching of physics that limited 
the work of the Edo academy (Bansho Shirabesho) had no effect in 
distant Nagasaki. The Bunseki Kyuri Jo never had many students after 
it moved to Osaka, but two that it did teach became highly influential. 
Takamine Jokichi, perhaps the leading chemist of Meiji Japan, received 
his earliest training there, and so did Nagaoka Hantaro, its most promi­
nent physicist119 Nor was the medical program without long-term 
results. Several prominent figures in the Meiji medical community 
were students of Pompe van Meerdervoort, including the five earliest 
recipients of the D.Sc. degree.120 
Public institutions were certainly important for the scientific move­
ment, but before the Perry expedition, private institutions had the edge. 
Private individuals dominated the movement from 1720 on, when 
Shogun Yoshimune had relaxed the ban on technical literature from 
Europe. Private physicians carried out thefirst anatomical dissections. 
Asada Goryu, a late eighteenth-century astronomer with no official post, 
criticized the official calendar and instigated its successful revision.121 
Others had established various private academies, and these continued 
to proliferate well after Perry arrived. Although little information about 
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their number exists, we know that by early Meiji there were nearly 1500 
higher-level private academies, and some had a "Western" cast to 
them.122 As always, medical institutions were especially numerous. 
During the last century or so of Tokugawa rule, twenty-three full-
fledged medical academies opened their doors; the majority were 
private.123 
Private academies made several contributions. They were the "basic 
communities in which the work of introducing and translating medical 
texts was sustained." They provided the most capable members of the 
shogunate's translation office in the Bureau of Astronomy and of many 
of the daimyo academies.l24 Otsuki Gentaku, founding member of the 
translation office, opened a private academy (the Shirando) at Edo in 
1786. This school was the most important Japanese center of Western 
studies in Otsuki's active years (he died in 1827) Of its ninety-four 
pupils, a number were quite influential. Udagawa Genshin and his heir, 
Udagawa Yoan, were prolific translators of technical materials. In fact, 
the younger, in translating Lavoisier's work in chemistry, coined many 
Japanese terms still used in that field.l25 Otsuki's initiative also started 
a trend. In 1801 two of his pupils established their own academies in 
Kyoto and Osaka. A pupil's pupil, Tsuboi Shindo, set up a school at Edo 
in 1829.126 Other notable private foundations of the period included 
establishment of the Tekitekisaijuku of Ogata Koan at Osaka in 1838. 
From Tsuboi s school came Tsuboi Shogoro, subsequently professor of 
zoology at Tokyo University; and from Ogata s school came Fukuzawa 
Yukichi and Nagayo Sensai, leading figures in modern research 
policy.127 
One should not, however, overrate the importance of private or pub­
lic academies. They did contribute substantially to the later formation of 
the modern community of researchers. And the common responsibility 
of the public institutions to serve the state even at the expense of the 
learned community did not in itself make them peculiar.128 But in other 
respects contributions were limited, and functions were not very mod­
ern. With the exception of those for mathematics or medicine, the 
academies were rarely very specialized in the courses they offered, but 
tended to present a general program that would appeal to young men of 
ambition. Even of a prominent institution like Ogata's Tekitekisaijuku, 
Nagayo Sensai could write: "[Ogata's academy] was originally de­
scribed as a medical school. Actually it was a place for reading Dutch 
books. Thus among the pupils were not only physicians but men who 
came there for all kinds of Dutch learning, about military matters, 
botany, chemistry, or whatever."129 
Apart from the character of the learning dispensed, each type of 
academy had its own limitations. The public institutions were late in 
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incorporating Western forms of knowledge (except for some medicine 
and a little astronomy, few did much before the Opium War),130 and 
they were supposed to restrict the diffusion of knowledge to their re­
spective sponsors in government.131 Private institutions did not have 
this problem, but they had others that were probably as serious. Daimyo 
or the shogunate tended to coopt their best talent, as the career of 
Otsuki Gentaku illustrates,132 and most of these schools had limited 
funds. Scholars of Western studies could rarely make much money 
even when they ran their own schools. Students could not afford to pay 
high tuition unless they had scholarships from the shogun or a daimyo. 
Teaching at such an academy was more a hobby than areal occupation. 
Proprietors usually got most of their income from medical practice or, if 
they were samurai, from a daimyo's stipend.l M The academies were not 
very numerous, and they developed too late, for by the time they began 
to proliferate, learning in the West was far better institutionalized. 
"(Modern science) now. . . required the creation of an institutional 
system around not self-taught amateurs, but professional scientists 
who had received a modem education."134 As a result, Tokugawa in­
stitutions were not, for the most part, direct precursors of modern 
institutions.135 
The degree of competition the academies generated was limited as 
well. Fukuzawa Yukichi argued that Tokugawa scholars were "con­
fined to a cage called government" and therefore "spent their time in 
anguish within the small universe which this cage created."136 
Whether this judgment is true or not, the shogunate certainly wanted 
control over European studies at least, and in some sense all learning. 
Its skimming of leading scholars from the private sector was partly 
prompted by this aspiration, and so was a persisting tendency to link 
physical science with the supposed threat of Catholicism. Parochialism 
and seclusion impeded the dissemination of knowledge. "It is an old 
parochial tradition to seek exclusive profit for one's own fief and to keep 
secret any discoveries from others," wrote a "Dutch scholar" about 
1800.137 An 1864 incident illustrates this pattern. A Nihonmatsu sam­
urai requested permissionfrom his older brother to study applied phys­
ics and cannonry in Mito, but the brother refused on the grounds that 
pursuing such knowledge would upset society by diffusing very dan­
gerous technology.138 Such attitudes were probably common.139 
Finally, entrenched opposition and a lack of demand for new knowl­
edge could also impede competition. Mathematics gradually became 
more detached from society and separatedfrom intellectual life. When 
mathematical works were actually published, they usually stated only 
problems, solutions, and sometimes-rules. Among the reasons for this 
was a lack of "product" demand. Because there was such a limited 
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market for any kind of book in advanced mathematics, production costs 
were high, and the authors themselves usually prepared the wood 
blocks for printing. 14° 
Medicine's problems were entirely the opposite. There was a strong 
demand for medical "products" and some incentive to develop new 
therapies. Partly for this very reason, medicine was prestigious and 
offered specialists a living. Specialists who became successful then 
might resist innovations and novelties. It is misleading to say that West-
em science and medicine waged an "uphill battle against [the 
older] Chinese-style science."141 But the domain medical schools were 
controlled by relatively high-ranking samurai doctors who usually op­
posed innovation, and these doctors were able for a time to delay the 
introduction into their institutions of new forms of medicine from 
Europe.142 
Tokugawa Science in Its Bureaucratic Setting 
Tokugawa scholarship, asserted Fukuzawa Yukichi. was very little 
more than an "adjunct of government." Its practitioners mostly taught 
in schools and had little if any power and certainly no influence in 
formulating policies.143 Scholars were also treated rather shabbily. 
"The samurai had a higher regard for Confucianism than (they did] for 
the professional Confucianist," so that scholars rarely became advisers 
to persons in power and even more rarely held secure official posts.144 
This was even more true of technical disciplines than of humanistic 
studies because of Tokugawa officials' no more than occasional interest 
in science and firm belief that general administrators should always 
hold sway over specialists. Technical experts had subordinate posts and 
could lose them at the whim of a shogun.145 
Though well established, these patterns did van as periods of out­
right proscription or repression alternated with periods of encourage­
ment, and attitudes changed when new officials entered office. The 
seventeenth century, despite seclusion, offered better conditions for 
some kinds of research than any other era save the Bakumatsu years 
(1853-67). The official promotion of classroom instruction conspic­
uous of the late eighteenth century may actually have damaged the 
scientific movement by arousing suspicion of mathematics. 
The incongruities between Tokugawa priorities and the needs of 
science are clear from the seclusion edicts of the 1630s, which frus­
trated navigational astronomy (so important to the work of Newton in 
England),146 and in the same decade Shogun Iemitsu issued a ban on 
the use of Western mathematics in surveying activities, a proscription 
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that lasted to the end of the century.147 European astronomy got es­
pecially harsh treatment, probably because it was linked to the Jesuits, 
who had first introduced it to Japanese officials. Those who were in­
terested in European astronomy were often suspected of professing 
Catholicism. The European-style astronomer Kobayashi Kentei was 
jailed in the 1640s, while a colleague, Hayashi Kichizaemon, was actu­
ally executed in 1646.148 And these attitudes of suspicion persisted. In 
the eighteenth century only the shogunate and five other domains were 
allowed to compile a calendar.149 
From the beginning, however, there was a different side to the sho­
gunate's treatment of scholarship. Shogun Ieyasu thought that learn­
ing would contribute to peace and morality and began to support it once 
his power was secured. His policy was mostly confined to library contri­
butions and publication subsidies, but successors went considerably 
further. His grandson Shogun Iemitsu hired Hayashi Razan to head an 
academy which received state support and official recognition. In 1690 
Shogun Tsunayoshi authorized construction of new facilities for this 
Shoheiko Academy and exempted its faculty from Buddhist holy or­
ders. 15° This patronage also extended to the sciences. In the 1680s 
Tsunayoshi appointed a talented mathematician of "lower-class" origin 
official astronomer and gave him a military rank. This astronomer's 
descendants included several mathematicians and prominent astrono­
mers. 151 Daimyo governments, meanwhile, followed Edo's policies 
closely. A half-dozen had established schools by 1700, and several be­
gan subsidizing individual scholars, as, for example, when the daimyo 
of Mito created a mathematics post in 1661.152 
These trends continued in the eighteenth century. More schools 
were built with official encouragement, and patronage of individual 
scholars increased somewhat: in 1730 another daimyo established a 
position to support mathematics.153 Other initiatives were soon under­
taken. In midcentury the Kumamoto domain launched reforms which 
included a medical academy and the mandatory certification by it of 
local physicians (1762).154 Other domains were slower to act, but the 
action set a precedent In the shogunal territories, a group of doctors got 
permission to publish a book on anatomy (Kattai shinsho; 1774) that 
was largely based on a European text, and in 1793 its academy of 
medicine admitted Western surgery to the academic program.155 
But limitationsremained strict. Hiraga Gennai, a samurai student of 
both astronomy and medicine, was forbidden by his daimyo to employ 
his skills in any domain but his own.156 Scientists could never be cer­
tain that government officials would tolerate their scholarly work. 
Which European technical and scientific works were officially trans­
lated was determined by government regulations,157 and general cir­
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dilation of the shogunate's translators' works was invariably forbidden. 
Private scholars were not so constrained, but even they could encounter 
many problems. In 1765 a work on botany by Goto Rishun was confis­
cated upon publication simply because itreproduced the Dutch alpha­
bet,158 even so long after Shogun Yoshimune in 1720 had authorized 
importation of nonreligious books. 
Who was in power could make a big difference. Shogun Yoshimune's 
administration (1716-45), as often noted, was one of the best. He took 
several steps favorable to science besides admitting Western technical 
works. In 1730 he named the physician and mathematician Nakane 
Genkei to be the official shogunal astronomer strictly on the basis of 
Nakane's ability.l59 During his last year in office as Shogun, he autho­
rized translation projects by two private physicians who were interested 
in European botany. This action was especially important in creating a 
precedent, for later officials could not easily oppose translation projects 
solely because of their Western subject matter. I6° 
On the other side, the administration of Lord Matsudaira Sadanobu 
during the reign of Shogun Ienari was a low point for the scientific 
movement. Matsudaira was obsessed with political unity and despised 
all kinds of intellectual novelty. This led him to proscribe anti-
mainstream schools of Confucian philosophy and to meddle systemat­
ically in the Shdheikd Academy. After proscribing heterodoxy in 1790, 
he took control of faculty appointments out of the hands of the 
Shoheiko's rector and named professors who agreed with his views. In 
1791 he took it on himself to reshape the curriculum and issue new 
rules.161 These actions were political and not aimed at science, but the 
scientific movement could not remain unscathed. In 1788 Matsudaira 
had authorized Honda Toshiaki to conduct geographical surveys in 
Hokkaido and Sakhalin, primarily to determine whether Sakhalin was 
an island. Investigations confirmed that it was an island, not a penin­
sula as many had claimed, but Matsudaira suppressed this by citing 
"state security."162 His concept of security was wide-ranging. In 1793 
he blocked publication of a work on heliocentrism by the shogunal 
astronomer Motoki Rydei even though others had already publicized 
the theory.163 
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the scientific movement 
had developed to a point where major systemic changes might well 
have been expected. The first dictionary of the Dutch language had 
been published. Western anatomy was rapidly being assimilated. At 
least a small number of Japanese were studying Newtonian physics. 
Several botanical compilations had been launched which were based 
entirely or in part on the Linnaean classification. A survey of the entire 
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Japanese coastline using the most advanced mathematical techniques 
had begun. And the first fundamental revision of the national calendar 
using Western data had just been completed.164 Nevertheless, these 
developments did not yield the sort of institutional breakthrough that 
occurred in European science, and the movement within which these 
advances took place did not even lead directly to modern Japanese 
science. 
Government policy was one reason. The desire of shogunal officials 
to use scientists and their work for political goals restricted the diffusion 
of technical knowledge. In 1829 the shogunate sentenced its official 
astronomer, Takahashi Kageyasu, to prison and condemned him to 
death after the fact. In 1839 several intellectuals and scientists were 
imprisoned on a charge of opposing the regime. Nor were these acts the 
sole forms of oppression. In 1842 the Edo government ordered that 
translations of all Dutch books be censored before publication, and in 
1850 it handed down an edict requiring that the title of every book 
imported from Europe be reported immediately to the governor of 
Nagasaki. In 1856, three years after the Perry expedition, the regime 
forced the Bansho Shirabesho to censor all translations of technical 
(and other) works from any European language.165 
Most historians of these events justifiably emphasize Takahashi's 
persecution, the so-called Siebold Affair. The Tokugawa government 
had almost institutionalized suspicion and paranoia, and the effect of its 
policies on intellectual life could scarcely be supportive.166 Takahashi 
got into trouble because he had shared I no Tadataka's coastal survey 
maps of Japan with Philip Franz von Siebold in return for European-
language materials dealing with the coast of Sakhalin Island. This ex­
change occurred in 1828 within the context of an official assignment to 
prepare a map of the Sakhalin area Apparently Takahashirealized that 
his action broke the law, but he willingly assumed the risk of punish­
ment because he was strongly committed to the task and because the 
information he got was not obtainable otherwise.167 The consequences 
were severe. Takahashi was imprisoned and died four months later. His 
son was fired from a government post and sent to a place of. internal 
exile. Several Nagasaki interpreters who had innocently carried mes­
sages between Takahashi in Edo and Siebold in Nagasaki were also 
sent to prison. And this was just the beginning. While living in 
Nagasaki (1823-29), Siebold had offered formal instruction in Euro­
pean medicine to Japanese pupils with the shogunate's approval. All but 
one of his twenty-four pupils were arrested and imprisoned because of 
this connection. (The exception, Takano Choei, went into hiding. He 
was indicted ten years later in connection with the "Bansha Circle" 
persecution.) Siebold was detained for some months and then expelled 
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from the country. The shogun's personal physician in Edo lost his 
position and samurai standing for having given Siebold a garment with 
the crest of the shogun in return for a medicine used to treat eye 
diseases.168 
The "Siebold Affair" divided and demoralized the learned communi­
ty. Most scholars kept silent, whatever their views, but others felt more 
threatened by official hostility. Aochi Rinso, the first Japanese to pub­
lish a textbook of European physics, the noted botanist Udagawa Yoan. 
and several other scholars who resided in Edo felt compelled to deny 
they even knew Takahashi.I69 And effects were by no means confined 
to individuals. The "Siebold Affair" hastened Nagasaki's decline as a 
center of learning and laid the groundwork for another persecution.170 
This "Bansha Circle Incident" of 1839 reflected the rising concerns 
about Western expansion and the scattered resentment of technical 
experts. In 1804, 1811. and 1837. foreign ships belonging to Russia, 
Britain, and the United States entered Japanese waters without permis­
sion and exposed the weakness of coastal defenses.>71 Fearing political 
criticism for dereliction of duty, the Tokugawa government ordered 
countermeasures. The "incident" began when the shogunate commis­
sioned a conservative but incompetent official. Torii Yozo, to conduct a 
survey of Edo Bay with a colleague named Egawa Hidetatsu. Torii was 
formally in charge of the project but lacked the necessary- technical 
skills. Egawa was better equipped, because he belonged to a group of 
officials and scholars, the "Bansha Circle," who regularly discussed 
policy issues. The group, led by Watanabe Kazan, chief administrator of 
a daimyo domain, also included the noted mathematician Uchida It­
sumi and Takano Choei, the physician who had fled the Nagasaki 
dragnet the shogunate had launched in 1829.172 
The Bansha group—especially Uchida—was able to help in com­
pleting the survey. But Torii Yozo was deeply chagrined by the tech­
nical prowess of the Bansha intellectuals and his own incompetence. As 
an official censor (o-metsuke) for the Tokugawa shogunate, he also 
suspected their political motives and decided to take action against 
them. Egawa was too well connected and Uchida too apolitical, so he 
focused on Watanabe Kazan. 
Police searches of Watanabe's house produced nothing direcdy in­
criminating, but they did turn up drafts of policy statements prepared 
for Egawa that could be construed as suspicious. One draft argued that 
scholars and others concerned with policy should investigate the actual 
causes of problems. Another called for an accurate appraisal of Japan's 
position in the world.173 Torii claimed that these statements revealed 
the circle's opposition to seclusion and were basically treasonous. 
His charges had the desired effect. Watanabe was arrested and sent 
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to prison, where he committed suicide in 1841. Takano went into hiding 
and managed to survive for ten years on translation and consulting 
work for various daimyo. In 1850 he, too, was arrested and subse­
quently committed suicide in detention. Several other "Bansha Circle" 
members (though not U chid a) were arrested, while a number of lower-
ranking shogunal retainers connected with the survey were indicted 
but escaped imprisonment. Meanwhile, public responses by unindicted 
associates followed the pattern of the "Siebold Affair." Egawa Hidetatsu 
remained aloof and assumed a posture of indifference. Officials in 
Watanabe's domain fell all over themselves in apologies to Edo. Appar­
ently this response from his former associates prompted Watanabe to 
take his own life.174 
Following the "revelations" of the "Bansha Circle Incident," scien­
tific and Western studies were engulfed for some years in a cloud of 
official suspicion. Besides advance censorship of translations and re­
porting of titles of imported books, other measures were felt necessary. 
In 1849, physicians living in shogunal territories were forbidden to 
practice European-style medicine. In 1850 a ban on diffusion of the 
contents of any translation of a European book to the Japanese public 
went into effect.175 Even mathematics suffered from the "Bansha Cir­
cle Incident." In 1839, Edo stopped publication of a book on tax calcula­
tions and practical measurements that was intended to help local 
Toku gawa officials!* 76 
In 1853-54 the American expedition of Matthew C. Perry visited 
Japan and ended seclusion. This event heightened the Japanese 
awareness of Western technology earlier aroused by the Opium War. 
But the Perry expedition did not lead at once to an unqualified embrace 
of science and technology. On the contrary, the shogunate displayed 
considerable ambivalence about how to deal with the American chal­
lenge. It did take some positive steps, in 1857 founding the Nagasaki 
Medical Academy (Igaku Denshu Jo) and a military college in the town 
of Numazu. The same year it undertook to upgrade the Bansho 
Shirabesho and gave it a more appropriate name, the Institute of West­
ern Studies (Yogaku Jo). A year later the Edo regime officially recog­
nized the superiority of Western medicine over its Asian competitors. It 
also ordered shogunalretainers Matsumoto Ryojun and Ono Tomogoro 
to study European medicine and mathematics in Nagasaki with the 
young Dutch surgeon Pompe van Meerdervoort.177 In 1860 Edo sent 
official missions to Europe and North America, partly to collect Western 
technical information.178 
But in other respects the shogunate's response was half-hearted. As 
late as March 1857, two high officials, Kawaji Toshiakira and Mizuno 
SCIENCE AND SOCIETY IN THE TOKUGAWA PERIOD 41

Tadanori, could issue an edict against the teaching of physics at the 
Institute of Western Studies, saying: 
It is perfectly appropriate to deal with matters of a military nature 
in lectures at the [Western Studies] Institute. But whether works 
on science should also be presented is quite another matter. Those 
captivated by outlandish theories come inevitably to resemble the 
Europeans and Americans in the way they look at the world. Such 
things also lead to unorthodox views. There seems to be some 
element in physics [kyurigaku] which inevitably gives rise to un­
orthodox views. We are concerned that the study of sci­
ence will destroy the relations—between lords and retainers 
or fathers and sons—which have existed in Japan for so long. 
Consequently, ordinary lectures {at the Institute of Western Stud­
ies] should deal only with military books.'79 
Whatever elicited these particular remarks, they probably drew on 
two distinct sources. Torii Yoz6 was certainly one, because he was 
serving at the time as adviser to Mizuno His wife belonged to the 
Hayashi family, which directed the Shoheiko Academy. And Torii's own 
views about European studies were clear cut and thoroughly hostile. 18° 
The other resource for the edict's point of view may well have been an 
official newsletter.181 The Oranda Fusetsugaki was regularly prepared 
for shogunal officials by Dutch representatives employed at Nagasaki to 
inform the Japanese about developments in Europe. There is no direct 
proof that it provoked Kawaji and Mizuno's statement, but the circum­
stances are suggestive. European thinkers had long contended that the 
atomistic concept of the physical universe developed by Newton should 
serve as a model for human society. Whatever the merits of this notion, 
it was highly obnoxious to traditional conservatives who opposed its 
espousal of individualism.182 If European conservatives with a legacy of 
feudalism could find this offensive and a threat to society, it is hardly 
surprising that a feudal regime in Tokugawa Japan should draw a sim­
ilar conclusion. 
Only in the very last years of the Tokugawa shogunate was the 
government's policy toward European science unswervingly favorable. 
Eight shogunal delegations traveled abroad between 1860 and 1867, 
and they brought back two hundred books to Japan. In 1862 the first 
Japanese was sent to Europe for formal technical study. Akamatsu 
Daizaburo, an officer in the shogunate's new navy, enrolled at Leiden in 
mathematics and engineering. In 1864 Choshu sent Inoue Masaru to 
the University of London, also for engineering studies.183 But there 
were limits to change under Tokugawa feudalism: in 1863 several 
Choshu samurai had to sneak out of the country for studies overseas,184 
42 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY IN THE TOKUGAWA PERIOD 
while under the Restoration government of 1868, Inoue could help 
build the country's first railway. 
Scholarly Conduct in Tokugawa Japan 
The suspicion and paranoia reflected by Tokugawa policies had many 
ramifications in the scholarly world. With the shogunate's efforts to 
freeze society, occupational recruitment came to be based largely on 
inherited position. Although this may not have mattered so much for 
farmers, in technical professions like medicine or astronomy it posed 
problems. The oldest son of a particular family might not be suited to 
continue the specialty. Of course, adoption of a talented outsider was 
one solution. The Shibukawa family of shogunal astronomers followed 
this strategy, and so on occasion did others.185 Even so, professional 
recruitment in Tokugawa Japan was hardly open in any modem sense. 
About 1770 the eminent samurai mathematician Fujita Sadasuke re­
jected the talented Aida Yasuaki as a pupil in his mathematics school in 
part because of his lower-class origins,186 and such occurrences were 
probably common.187 
Tokugawa policies caused other kinds of problems, too. By adopting 
Chu Hsi's intellectually imposing neo-Confucian synthesis of the 
twelfth century as the official ideology of state, the regime signaled its 
encouragement of ideas and attitudes that looked on the major ques­
tions of politics and nature as already answered and exempt from revi­
sion. "All that was worth inventing had been invented by the (Chinese] 
Sage Emperors; all that was worth knowing had been known by Con­
fucius. The task of later generations was simply to absorb this body of 
knowledge."188 Such a philosophy could not fail to affect definitions of 
scholarship and scholarly conduct as well. According to the ideology, 
scholars were "retailers of packaged knowledge," not innovative "par­
ticipants in a developing branch of inquiry."189 They worked with a 
finished product and were expected to transmit it to students 
unchanged. 
Another policy intensified the effects of this conservative philosophy. 
The Tokugawa shogunate, in reaction to the conflicts that had preceded 
its accession, set the highest value on personal loyalties, and this em­
phasis affected the scholarly world no less than it did the rest of society. 
Students were admonished to be loyal to their teachers. In part this 
meant a high degree of formal deference, but at its most intense, it could 
include intellectual subservience.190 "It was a basic principle of 
[Tokugawa] morality," according to. the Meiji microbiologist Kitasato 
Shibasaburo, "that students always took their own status into account 
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and did not oppose their teachers, whatever they did."191 Formal prac­
tices exemplified this loyalty. Upon hearing a lecture or reading a 
text, students were supposed to be attentive and hold back their ques­
tions.192 Students' curiosity and personal discoveries were of little 
importance. Consideration of different interpretations of particular 
texts was seldom allowed or expected. Bonds of loyalty between teacher 
and student were usually considered to be permanent and static, so 
much so that in some specialties, a student was not supposed to change 
teachers under any circumstances. Those who did so were severely 
condemned.193 
These bonds of loyalty had important implications for the dynamics 
of particular groups. Certainly teachers were supposed to show benev­
olence toward pupils and offer their advice at critical moments, but they 
also insisted on receiving the deference that custom and ideology held 
to be theirs.194 If anything, the political marginality and general poverty 
to which Tokugawa policies confined most scholars made them particu­
larly insistent on respect from their students.195 Personal ties in schol­
arly groups affected students' relations with men of learning by promot­
ing extreme solidarity. Collective orientations and exclusivity in 
scholarship grew out of the "feudal tradition of . .  . loyalty toward (the) 
master."196 
One would like to suppose that the stultifying tendencies of Toku­
gawa social norms were confined to the mainstream system of Confu­
cian studies or most of the various martial-arts fields, and such patterns 
were strongest in fields where feudal loyalties were most vigorously and 
consistently articulated. But they were prevalent in the scholarly world. 
R. P. Dore argues that the Confucian rejection of intellectual curiosity 
seriously stifled independent inquiry in anatomy before the mid-
eighteenth century.197 Mathematicians developed into sectarians, 
which greatly affected their discipline. 'The members of the Saijo 
school [of mathematics]," wrote one historian, "had a strong group 
identification and looked upon [their mentor] Aida Yasuaki as more or 
less the founder of a religion."198 The historian of Japanese culture and 
science Yoshida Mitsukuni stresses the influence of Confucianism on 
every field of scholarly endeavor.199 
But the least "modern" aspect of Tokugawa science, which was its 
strong propensity toward secrecy, had only tenuous connections with 
Confucian aspirations and ideals. For one thing, secrecy antedated the 
seventeenth century, when Confucianism became a powerful influ­
ence. Much medical knowledge was being transmitted secretly in the 
sixteenth century, and so was information in astronomy.200 Medical 
documents were still being "handed down privately from master to 
disciple" even in the seventeenth century.201 Secrecy was so en­
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trenched in mathematics that it persisted well into the nineteenth cen­
tury. Knowledge—especially of ethics, ultimately of other things—in 
classical Confucianism was supposed to be objective and accessible to 
all.202 Secrecy was probably connected with Confucianism because of 
the system's stress on personal loyalty. Considering the role of the 
teacher in transmitting knowledge and the attachment of pupils to their 
various teachers, it is not unlikely that the emphasis on loyalty had the 
effect of intensifying secrecy. 
Secrecy was widespread in Tokugawa scholarship, including the 
technical fields. Shizuki Tadao's important late eighteenth-century 
work on Newtonian mechanics was never published, only privately 
circulated in manuscript.203 There was no publication at all in the 
physical sciences until 1827, when the physician Aochi Rinso pub­
lished Kikai kanran.204 Even in the 1830s, the astronomy student 
Koide Shuki could obtain access to information he needed only by 
enrolling in an academy and waiting eight years.205 Nor were the phys­
ical sciences particularly unusual: the mathematician Yamazaki 
Yasunan was denied access to an important mathematical technique in 
the eighteenth century by the head of a school in Kanazawa.206 Seki 
Takakazu's major discoveries were kept secret by a few disciples as long 
as their master was alive, and even after he died in 1708 publication was 
spotty and haphazard.207 
By the mid- eighteenth century this extreme solidarity and its pattern 
of secrecy had only one exception: medicine. Beginning with the pub­
lication of Zoshi (On the viscera) by Yamawaki Toyo in 1759 and the 
nearly simultaneous publication of Idan (Perspectives on medicine) by 
Yoshimasu Todo, medicine not only abandoned secrecy, it began openly 
to debate technical subjects in books. Yamawaki s work was a major 
contribution to Japanese anatomy based on a dissection in 1754 and 
aroused considerable interest from medical colleagues. It was also ex­
tremely controversial. Medical opinion had emphasized the functions of 
organs as the basis for treatment, viewing the observation of dead 
organs as entirely useless. Battle was joined when a professional rival 
developed this argument in a major refutation (Hi Zoshi [Against 
Zoshi)), published in 1760. Yoshimasu Todo's work was also controver­
sial. Its central argument that all illness is due to a single toxic principle 
was not so well grounded in empirical research, and criticisms by his 
peers were intense. Hata Kozan published a chapter-by-chapter refuta­
tion in 1762 called Seki Idan, (Against Idan\ and other physicians had 
their say as well. Whatever the merits of either side in the matter, the 
debate clearly stimulated medical thought208 
Tokugawa medicine's pioneering role in abandoning secrecy and 
promoting publication requires some brief explanation. In the history of 
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European scholarship, after all, medicine, as the "elder sister of the 
sciences," has usually been seen as extremely conservative and strong­
ly attached to "medieval traditions."209 That Tokugawa medicine play­
ed a different role was due in some measure to the strength of competi­
tion. Doctors were not so close to the centers of power as mathematical 
astronomers or scholars of Confucianism. Because of their place in the 
private sector they were relativelyfree of official restraints on new ideas 
and procedures. They were also more numerous than other kinds of 
specialists. Nearly all samurai had access to doctors, and many villages, 
too, had some kind of physician. Other things being equal, this implied 
competition for preferment and professional recognition. Moreover, the 
medical world was geographically scattered and culturally diverse. The 
Taki family of shogunal physicians did try to centralize the medical 
community, but they ultimately failed. Doctors could and did move 
around; other "professionals" could not. at least not so easily. And un­
like mathematics, medicine had no guilds to restrict competition or 
restrain new ideas.210 
Another reason that medicine took the lead in developing new ideas 
and techniques of diffusion was its role in the history of Japanese print­
ing. Printing began early (eighth century AD.) in Japan, but for cen­
turies it was confined almost entirely to Buddhist religious uses. Late in 
the period of unrestrained Western contacts (1542-1616). however, it 
began to be used for more secular purposes. As Literacy spread through 
the influence of Confucianism, demand for materials to read increased 
(this was especially true in the seventeenth century). Publishing and 
printing became commercial operations, and many of the earliest 
printers were physicians. Ose Hoan (1564-1640), Isokawa Ryoan 
(1579-1666), and Manase Gensaku (1549-1631;, three of the earliest 
Tokugawa printers, were all wealthy—and also physicians. Their pub­
lishing activities (and those of later printers) undoubtedly reflected 
their personal interests, but the printing of books was a way to make 
money, too. Given the relative independence of doctors in Tokugawa 
culture and their financial ability to carry on businesses, their role in 
early secular printing is not so surprising.211 
The development in printing shows the society's capacity to generate 
trends congenial to science. Although secrecy was widespread, some 
information was shared. Among Confucian scholars, for example, it was 
considered bad manners to refuse to lend a book to a colleague.212 
Factional solidarity was not equally intense in every field of study. At 
least some circles tried objectively to assess the merits of students. And 
one should not overlook the increasing availability and variety of school­
ing. The influential Meiji chemist Sakurai jqji, writing in 1910 of 
Tokugawa developments, argued that their most important contribu­
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tion to modern Japanese science derivedfrom education and its patron­
age by officials.213 
The deeply rooted factionalism of Tokugawa society helped to gener­
ate competition. We have already considered medicine, where the 
works of Yamawaki Toyo and Yoshimasu Todo inspired lively debate. 
Vigorous public discussion of professional issues, some of it clearly 
traceable to factional loyalties and cliques, existed in other fields, too. 
Mathematics, divided as it was into nineteen different "schools," is good 
evidence for this pattern. One competitive practice in Tokugawa mathe­
matics was the posting in public of idai. These were problems that the 
challenger had solved and was challenging other mathematicians to 
solve. Though hardly akin to the best modem practice, the posting of 
idai stimulated mathematical thought and competition among various 
schools.214 
A late eighteenth-century incident shows how intense mathematical 
competition could be. After the samurai mathematician Fujita 
Sadasuke rejected the commoner Aida Yasuaki as a pupil, Aida not only 
founded his own Saijo school but vigorously attacked Fujita and the 
parent Seki school. In 1784 Aida claimed that the Seki school had tried 
to monopolize mathematics and had done considerable harm by ne­
glecting applications. His attacks were published and aroused great 
interest. In 1799 Fujita s pupil, Kamiya Sadaharu, lashed out at Aida in 
print for demeaning his teacher and harming mathematics. "(Aida] is 
bigoted, has little knowledge, and does not understand . . . the princi­
ples of mathematics." For emphasis he added that Aida was guilty of 
superstition and of "making a good technique into a bad one." Aida 
himself was wholly unrepentant when he finally replied in 1801. "As if 
in a war, they boasted o f . . . killing my followers, but all they did was 
give us a nosebleed. I can boast of beheading their chief!"215 
One does not find such open, public conflict in any of the physical 
sciences. On the contrary, the close relationship between I no Tadataka 
and his teacher Takahashi Yoshitoki exemplified the dominant pattern. 
Takahashi taught I no astronomy and advanced mathematics and con­
tinued to advise him throughout his career; his son was a member of 
Ino's survey party. Ino expressed the desire in his will to be buried by 
the side of his teacher.216 But intellectual differences were by no means 
always suppressed. One can find cases like that of Koide Shuki (1797­
1865) and Shibukawa Kagesuke (in astronomy), where strong commit­
ments to use of empirical evidence stimulated competition between 
teacher and pupil and led to improvements in the shogunate's calendar. 
But it is true that their differences remained strictly confidential and 
never became known outside the government217 If anything, the phys­
ical sciences suffered lessfrom suppression of differing views and more 
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from lack of scrutiny by peers. The work of Shizuki Tadao on Newto­
nian mechanics, for example, "may have represented the early stages of 
an important new natural philosophy," but in the absence of a "mature 
support group," it did not become a new scholarly tradition.218 
Assessment of merit in students or others is a critical factor in the 
progress of science, and here no clear trends existed. Some scholars 
tried to be fair in evaluating students. Many domain schools regularly 
seated students according to achievement, not status, and the number 
that did this increased over time.219 Emphasis on merit was a well-
established theme in the Confucian tradition. Still, Fujita Sadasuke 
apparently did reject the otherwise qualified Aida Yasuaki as a student 
of mathematics partly because of his lower-class origins, and this inci­
dent was probably far from unique. But the major problem with merit 
in professional recruitment was the society. Tokugawa Japan had a 
powerful inclination to allocate all roles by ascription, and those who 
controlled the highest positions were rarely inclined to disregard 
rank.220 Thus when Asada Goryu nominated his two best students for 
official posts in the Bureau of Astronomy (late 1790s), the outcome 
was wholly predictable. The shogunate would give an official position 
only to the one (Takahashi Yoshitoki) with samurai status. The equally 
qualified commoner, Hazama Shigetomi, had to settle for a lowly 
assistantship.221 
Conditions affecting deployment of talent did improve over time, 
especially after Perry's visit. It became possible to buy samurai status, 
and there was some relaxation of distinctions by class.222 Society in this 
era was very far from stable, and many forces were stimulating new 
attitudes and values. There were plenty of men committed to changes, 
"despite the efforts of . .  . Tokugawa educators."223 Certainly one sees 
this in the scientific community. Long-term loyalty to teachers began to 
wane, at least in medicine, where the striking publications of the mid-
eighteenth century had already shaken the profession to the roots. Both 
lively debates on medical topics and a tendency to "shop around" for 
teachers became normal. Omura Masujiro moved around extensively in 
his medical studies, and so did Takano Choei, dumping at least one 
teacher he considered inadequate.224 And when one considers the case 
of Koide Shuki, who began studying astronomy with Tsuchimikado 
Yasukuni and later switched to Shibukawa Kagesuke, it is evident that 
attitudes were changing in other fields, too.225 
Even group solidarity and the sharing of scholarly information began 
to change in the late Tokugawa. Mathematics had been the most fac­
tionalized of disciplines—and remained so—but even here efforts were 
made to change. In 1830 Hasegawa Kan published a readable textbook 
of wasan mathematics that thoroughly explained its techniques. He 
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was, predictably, ostracized by other mathematicians, but their hostile 
response did not end such attempts. A mathematician named Akita 
Giichi wrote a textbook for local officials in 1837 which is notable for its 
stress on applications. The book emphasized such mainstays of political 
economy as the calculation of taxes, construction of buildings, and 
measurement of fields. The author apparently intended the book as a 
response to the Tempo famine that year, but colleagues attacked him 
for "disclosure of secrets," showing just how long a way mathematics 
had to go.226 
CHAPTER THREE 
FORMATION OF THE MEIJ1 
SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY 
"Japan," wrote J. M. Cattell and Dean Brim hail about 1920, "had no 
distinguished scientific men a generation ago but it may be that in 
a few years its contributions to science willrivalours."1 This remark by 
the compilers of American Men ofScience is not an accurate assessment 
of Japanese science in the interwar period, but it does underscore the 
importance of recruitment into science. Technology, ideas, organiza­
tion, and values all contribute to the scientific enterprise, but the scien­
tific community is the engine of progress. For this reason the Marquis 
de Condorcet once cited the "number of men acquainted with science's 
leading and most important truths" as the essential indicator of national 
progress, while the sociologist of science Jean Dessau lists recruitment, 
training, and maintenance of scientists first among requirements for 
the "implantation of science" in countries, like Meiji Japan, that have 
no tradition of research.2 
Specialists on the subject of recruitment disagree broadly on two 
basic points. Where were the scientists of Meiji Japan recruited? Did 
they come from traditional elites, long engaged in intellectual pur­
suits?3 Were they products of a wholly new class?4 Role formation is 
also fundamental to community building in science. "The social role of 
the scientist and the organizational surroundings of his work in 
Japan," wrote Joseph Ben-David in 1970, "(were variations of] social 
forms originating in Western Europe. They were [not modifications of] 
the traditional pattern of intellectual work that existed there before the 
adoption of Western science."5 Some Japanese who were active at the 
time would certainly have agreed with this view. According to educa­
tion ministry official Koba Sadatake, speaking to a Diet committee in 
1893: "The scientists Japan had at the time of the Restoration were 
capable only of transcribing foreign books and could not really perform 
like scholars in the truest sense."6 Others, however, had a different 
opinion. "The scientific or scholarly progress that occurred in the time 
of the shogunate," stated the minister of education on this occasion, 
"has had a cumulative effect [on science's modern progress]."7 In fact, 
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the role of scientists in Meiji Japan was partly an extension of their 
Tokugawa role. 
We have to consider the status of scientists in both periods, as well as 
any contributions to modern Meiji science made by Tokugawa scien­
tific studies. We have seen that by 1800 medicine, dominated by com­
moners, held a moderately high-level status well surpassing mathemat­
ics but inferior to physical science, where samurai were predominant. 
To be sure, Fukuzawa Yukichi criticized one component of traditional 
science—kampo medicine—as "old moldy theories."8 Historians of sci­
ence like Sugimoto and Swain argue that kampo medicine imposed an 
"uphill struggle on modern Western medicine,"9 and another historian 
thinks that neither Dutch studies nor the traditional Japanese sciences 
provided the basis for Meiji science's great successes.10 But other 
scholars think otherwise. Nakayama Shigeru writes that Tokugawa 
doctors "brought modern . . . science to Japan."11 Tominari Kimahei 
argues that the researches of the Rangaku (Dutch studies) scholars 
"justify their being recognized as the forerunners of Meiji science."12 
Whether Tokugawa medicine should be described as "old moldy 
theories," or whether Rangaku laid the intellectual foundation for Meiji 
science is of little concern here, for neither Tokugawa medicine nor 
Rangaku was compatible with the Western scientific tradition. Neither 
was consistently—or at all—dedicated to the goals of Western science, 
nor did either anticipate full-scale efforts to expand human knowledge 
of nature. But the latent effect of Tokugawa traditions was substantial 
and positive. The kinds of people who went into science had been 
pinpointed, their choices of fields to some extent predetermined. And 
the Tokugawa legacy influenced the success of efforts to establish a 
Western-style researcher role. 
Studies of recruitment to science in Meiji Japan face serious meth­
odological problems. One study was neither comprehensive nor in any 
sense typical,13 another restricted to academic scientists.14 And there is 
very little point to a comprehensive study of everyone who received an 
undergraduate degree. (About 7,800 such degrees were awarded in 
technical fields between 1877 and 1921.) Such a study would identify 
the recruitment base for science but would not in itself be entirely 
germane, since few such graduates took jobs in research.15 Even look­
ing at everyone who contributed to the scientific literature would not be 
ideal. Such a search would be cosdy, difficult, and unpersuasive since 
many works were not reviewed by peers. We cannot impose a definition 
of "scientist" on a society where the role was unformed. Japanese soci­
ety had not fully established the scientific role as that role had developed 
in Europe. Knowledgeable observers at the time commented on and 
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commended central differences from Western practice as appropriate to 
the needs of society. 
Hakusht, or holder of the doctor's degree, is the definition for scien­
tist used in this book. The degree was invented by Mori Arinori, minister 
of education in the late 1880s.16 It included most learned fields then 
recognized in continental Europe: law and letters (which I ignore), 
medicine, science, agriculture, engineering, forestry, and veterinary 
medicine.17 But the system introduced by Mori lacked explicit prece­
dent and cannot easily be linked to a single country's practice.18 Thus, 
the meaning of some categories is probably self-evident, but others are 
ambiguous. "Science" (rigaku) included mathematics, physics, astron­
omy, botany, zoology, geology, chemistry, and physical anthropology. 
But exclusivity of labels was not a feature of the system, nor were 
boundaries sharply defined. Several different doctoral degrees were 
awarded to chemists, and physicists, among others, could qualify for 
two (science and engineering). 
Degrees were supposed to be conferred for significant contributions 
certified by peers. The term hakushi approximates the concept of "sci­
entist" operative among government officials and the public. There was 
increasing reliance on the doctorate in science as a criterion for appoint­
ments at the rank of full professor.19 The German-style trend toward 
formal dissertations under academic auspices mitigates the problem of 
setting standards. But readers are cautioned that my definition has 
problems. Favoritism and clique affiliations were factors in some con­
ferrals. One pathologist has suggested that degrees were sometimes 
awarded for work never done.20 And my choice of definition excludes 
some people who published their papers before 1910 or held probation­
ary posts in the imperial universities. 
Medicine was the dominant element in Japanese scientific or tech­
nical studies. Among the 1,360 holders of the hakushi degree awarded 
between 1888 (when conferrals began) and 1920 (when the system 
was changed), 656 men (48 percent) did their work in medicine, 366 
(27 percent) in engineering, 138 (10 percent) in agriculture or forestry, 
and 200 (15 percent) in all other fields (see table 3.1).21 The small 
numbers awarded in physics (54) and mathematics (22) are particu­
larly significant. In fact, the small number even of undergraduate 
degrees (about 452 in physics and 125 in mathematics for all of the 
imperial universities combined) further underscores the neglect of 
these fields.22 
These numbers show the strength of the Tokugawa legacy. The 
testimony of Meiji and later commentators, as well as the body of liter­
ary evidence, not only singles out medicine as the principal field but 
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TABLE 3 .1 
Japanese Doctorates in Technical Fields, 1888-1920 
SPECIALTY NUMBER SPECIALTY NUMBER 
Chemistry (D.Sc.) 27 Agriculture 108 
Physics 54 Forestry 30 
Biology 56 Engineering 366 
Mathematics 22 Medicine 656 
Geology 18 Veterinary medicine 23 
Sources: Iseki Kurd, ed.. Dai Sihon hakushi roku. 5 vols. (1921-30); Jinji kdshm roku, 
1903-37 eds ; Tsunesaburd Kamesaka, ed. Who's Who in Japan, 1914-37 eds. 
links its development to the Tokugawa past.23 As we have seen, 
Tokugawa doctors had no guild structure to impose uniformity or sup­
press competition, were mobile geographically and socially, were usu­
allyfreefrom official interference, and often had money to live in some 
comfort Conversely, that small numbers entered the physical sciences 
was partly a function of historical obstacles—restrictions on informa­
tion, poor job opportunities, few schools (and those latecomers), and 
suspicion of contamination by Christianity. 
Whether the smallness of the number of Japanese who entered 
mathematics after 1868 was also the result of Tokugawa conditions is 
an interesting question. Certainly Tokugawa developments had not 
been favorable to the growth of modern mathematics. Wasan 
mathematicians were competitive, interested in publication, and even 
on occasion inventive, but the details of their work were usually con­
cealed. Devotees tended to disdain applications. The subject was intro­
duced late to the schools, and many of the samurai hated mathematics. 
However, even samurai interest in Western mathematics in the 
Bakumatsu (1853-67) years failed to yield major results before 1921, so 
factors other than tradition must have been at work. The principal 
difficulty was the narrow range of occupational choice available to Meiji 
mathematicians. They either taught their subject, worked in the gov­
ernment, or went into another field.24 
Recruitment to Science in Meiji Japan 
The predominance of samurai after 1868 was one of the ways 
Tokugawa developments affected mathematics and other technical 
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fields. Though medicine and the physical sciences had been dominated 
by commoners in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the 
influx of samurai after 1775 set the stage for a new situation. More 
experiments were carried out. European books became more common. 
Domain and shogunal schools showed more interest in the sciences and 
after the Opium War taught them more often. Samurai remained domi­
nant in the scientific movement throughout the Bakumatsu and Meiji 
eras. About 72 percent of D.Sc. recipients in basic chemistry between 
1888 and 1921 came from samurai families. In physics they accounted 
for 66 percent, in engineering for 64 percent, in mathematics and geol­
ogy for 50 percent, and even in medicine for 43 percent of doctorates. 
Overall, 53 percent of the scientists active before 1921 were samurai 
(see table 3.2). 
Categorizing scientists by region shows that samurai status was not 
decisive for recruitment into science, though several regions with high 
proportions of them did compile good records. Tokyo, with somewhere 
between 3.4 (1869) and 2 8 (1889) percent of total population, pro­
duced 146 scientists or 11.4 percent. Four (4.0) percent came from 
Yamaguchi-Choshu, with its 1.9 to 2.3 percent of total population, 
while Fukuoka prefecture (1.3 to 3.0 percent of total population) pro­
duced 3.2 percent of the scientists. These areas all had samurai popula­
tions above the average for 1889 (5.0 percent). In Tokyo, samurai were 
reported as 10.0 percent of population, in Yamaguchi as 7.6 percent, 
and in Fukuoka, 6.5 percent.25 
But Osaka and Kagoshima-Satsuma do not fit this pattern. Though 
its samurai were just 1.4 percent of the population in 1889, the percent­
age of scientists from Osaka was exactly proportional to its percentage 
of the national (3.0 percent; 41 scientists) population Kagoshima-Sat­
suma, with a 24 percent samurai population, was a conspicuous under-
producer Satsuma had 3.4 percent of total population in 1869 (2.5 
percent in 1889) and produced just 19 scientists, which was 1.4 percent 
of the total. 
Local education was as important for the recruitment of scientists in 
Meiji Japan as the number of samurai. The country's four largest cities 
yielded many scientists, undoubtedly because of their academies and 
schools. Tokyo and Osaka, of course, did well, and so did the city of 
Kyoto. With 1.7 (1869) to 2.2 (1889) percent of total population, it 
produced 3.3 percent of all scientists. And Aichi prefecture (Nagoya) 
with 2.9 to 3.6 percent of Japan's population, produced 4.6 percent of 
the scientists. Only the strength of local education could explain the 
record of Fukui This region was one of the most remote in the country, 
had no large city or even a small one, and its samurai were only 4.0 
percent of population. But in 1857 Fukui carried out a sweeping reform 
TABLE 3.2 
Class Origins of Doctorate Recipients. 1888-1920 
SAMURAI COMMONERS SAMURAI COMMONERS 
SPECIALTY N % N % SPECIALTY N % N % 
Chemistry (D.Sc.) 19 72 8 28 Agriculture 60 55 48 45 
Physics 36 66 18 34 Forestry 19 62 11 38 
Biology 34 60 22 40 Engineering 232 64 134 36 
Mathematics 11 50 11 50 Medicine 281 43 375 57 
Geology 9 50 9 50 Veterinary medicine 15 65 8 35 
Sources: Iseki Kurd, ed.. Dai Nihon hakushi roku, 5 vols. (1921 -30). Jtnji kdshin roku. 1903-37 eds.; Tsunesaburt Kamesaka, 
ed. Who's Who in Japan. 1914-37 eds. 
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of its educational system that led to great changes. All Fukui officials 
were required to prove their attainments in formal education before 
assuming any office, and one of the first foreigners to teach science in 
Japan, W. E. Griffis, came to Fukui in 1870.26 The results were im­
pressive. With only 1.0 percent of total population in 1869 and 1.5 
percent in 1889, Fukui between 1888 and 1920 produced 43 scientists, 
3.2 percent of the total. Fukui had more scientists per capita than 
anywhere else in Japan—one scientist for every 6,784 residents. The 
rate for Osaka, an average region, was 1:18,750, and second-place 
Tokyo's was 1:6,849. 
Kagoshima-Satsuma made a very poor showing, though several of its 
daimyo had an interest in science. Shimazu Nariakira, who ruled the 
area in the 1850s, was acquainted with Philip Franz von Siebold and 
Udagawa Yoan. Shimazu read scientific works in Japanese transla­
tions. He sponsored the translation of Pompe van Meerdervoort's trea­
tise on vaccination and established a translation agency (1855). In 1856 
he created a scholarship fund for Satsuma youth who wished to study 
outside their region, and in 1864 his successor established a full-
fledged Western academy. But there was less to this than might appear. 
Satsuma suffered greatly from a rebellion against Tokyo (1876-77), 
industrial development mostly passed the region by, and it lagged be­
hind in creating modern schools. Although 40 percent of Japanese 
adults had elementary literacy by 1868, most Satsuma adults could not 
read or write even in 1884. If this were not enough, formal education for 
samurai in Satsuma did not encourage science. 
Consider the anti-intellectualism and controls on free time imposed 
by an institution called goju. Goju were neighborhood confraternities of 
samurai youth six years of age and above common throughout many 
parts of the country and usually dedicated to academic work and mili­
tary training. But the goju of Satsuma had a different program. Formal 
education was not much emphasized. Unlike the rules of other domain 
goju, those of Satsuma ignored all book learning. They instead encour­
aged their members to excel in martial arts, morality, recreation, and 
obedience. Samurai youth could not escape the system byretreating to 
their homes because goju activities had penetrated the home.27 Their 
freedom was restricted, and personal autonomy, including time for ac­
tivities and interests apart from the peer group, is an important element 
in socializing youth who later enter science.28 The Satsuma system did 
not provide this freedom—or many scientists. The pattern was noted at 
the time. As Takagi Kanehiro told another leading figure in the medical 
community, "Since the Restoration, we Satsuma men have been promi­
nent in the Army and government But our record has not matched that 
of other domains in the scholarly or learned professions."29 
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Tokugawa education's contribution to the modem research tradition 
can also be seen from the scientists' fathers' occupations. A large per­
centage (certainly over half) of Meiji scientists had fathers in traditional 
intellectual roles. Kampo physicians formed the largest single group 
(perhaps 46 percent) with Confucian scholars (jusha) in second place 
(7 percent). A few sons of wasan mathematicians and of Rangaku 
scholars became scientists. Most doctors' sons went, predictably, into 
medicine, but they also turned up in physics, chemistry, biology, for­
estry, and engineering. Confucian scholars' sons were most numerous 
in engineering but also studied medicine, geology, and forestry. 
Rangaku scholars' sons chose mathematics, zoology, and medicine in 
particular, while one son of a wasan mathematician became professor 
of mining and metallurgy at Tokyo University. 
Sons of officials were numerically second to the sons of kampo 
physicians. About 21 percent of scientists came from the families of 
Tokugawa or Meiji bureaucrats. They were relatively scarce in the large 
medical community (about 9 percent) but in other categories ranged 
from 14 (agriculture) to 40 percent (engineering and basic science). 
Officials' sons entered every field, but they were especially active in 
physics. About 40 percent of the physicists had fathers in official posi­
tions; the rest came from doctors' families and various other back­
grounds. 
Tokugawa traditions aided formation of the entire modern scientific 
community, but they certainly did not affect every field equally. Medi­
cine received considerable stimulus. There were important linkages in 
biology and chemistry. Mathematics received at least some benefits; 
physics derived rather few. Individual cases of recruitment to science 
help to shed light on the situation. 
The first to consider are three recruits into medicine. Neither 
Kitasato Shibasaburo, Takagi Kanehiro, nor Noguchi Hideyo was the 
son of a kampo or Western-style doctor. Each came to the field 
through personal contacts. Three physicians influenced Kitasato: his 
great-uncle, Hashimoto Ryu'un, a teacher named Tanaka Shiba, and a 
Dutch navy doctor, C. G. von Mansveldt. Kitasato, who was born in 
1852, lived with Hashimoto and studied with Tanaka. In 1871 he en­
tered Lord Hosokawa's Kumamoto Medical Academy (Igakko) where 
he spent about three years with Mansveldt. Mansveldt's influence was 
greatest, as Kitasato was not close to Hashimoto personally and ig­
nored admonitions from Tanaka to study. Mansveldt made him an 
Igakko assistant and took pains to teach him German. The Dutchman 
also taught him medicine and introduced him to studies of bacteria 
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through microscopy. He told Kitasato to study at Tokyo University and 
then go to Germany.30 
How Kitasato came to study with Mans veldt is not at all clear. His 
early interests were in soldiering and martial arts; he was initially unin­
terested in book learning, and his parents had hoped he would farm. 
Moreover, the young Kitasato could not be easily disciplined and was 
not very close to his parents.31 His enrollment at the Igakko was proba­
bly the result of contradictory conditions. A friend dissuaded him from a 
military career. His parents encouraged his ambitions, and he appar­
ently came to view Rangaku as the "basis of European culture."12 Local 
choices for formal education were limited to two schools, the Igakko and 
the Ydgakkd, whose images differed greatly Kumamoto residents con­
sidered the Ydgakkd avant-garde, even radical. Its curriculum—phys­
ics, history, English, and the rest—was quite out of the ordinary, 
whereas the Igakkd's was more familiar. The two student bodies also 
differed. Ydgakkd students were mostly young teenagers facing obliga­
tory lectures on Confucian morality, an antidote to Westernization.Ai 
Igakko students were older (from eighteen to twenty-four years of age) 
and had the choice of skipping these lectures.*4 One cannot know 
particular reasons for Kitasato's choice, but a number of factors were 
operating. He was already eighteen when the two schools opened. He 
had always disliked Confucianism, and he had already had exposure to 
medicine. The Igakko offered more advanced training and an easier 
adjustment to the future. 
Considerations of status, worldly ambitions, and Rangaku contacts 
were important to Takagi Kanehiro (1848-1920). Takagi was the son of 
a low-ranking Satsuma samurai who also worked as a carpenter. He 
reportedly decided on a medical career as early as the age of thirteen. A 
local physician aroused his interest in part because of his high status. 
Commoners, before the Restoration, could not wear white tabi (socks), 
but the doctor was among those who could. Takagi's parents were 
impressed by this fact and commended the man to their son. Another 
physician'was also influential. Ishigami Rydsaku had studied with 
Ogata Kdan in Osaka and became a mentor to Takagi. Ishigami taught 
him medicine, arranged his marriage to another doctor's daughter, and 
got him a job in a government bureau.35 
Noguchi Jlideyo's was a different sort of case. He came from the 
peasantry instead of the samurai, and his contacts were wholly with 
medicine from the West Noguchi would certainly have gone into farm­
ing had a childhood accident not made this impossible. In 1878, at the 
age of two, he severely burned his left arm in the family's hearth. 
Several years later the principal of his school sent him for treatment to a 
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doctor in Wakamatsu. The doctor had credentials that impressed young 
Noguchi. Watanabe Kanae had taken his M.D. at the University of 
California. He had also traveled extensively in Europe and owned many 
books on medicine and science. Noguchi spent two weeks at his house 
and decided to go into medicine.36 
Modern Japanese biology was significantly influenced by Tokugawa 
developments. The largest single group of biologists came from the 
families of government officials, but about 40 percent came from kampo 
medical families. Moreover, 20 percent of the biologists (12 of 57) came 
from just one area—Aichi-Shizuoka, the former Owari province. The 
advances made by the men from Owari could have been predicted. The 
intellectually tolerant Asai family had dominated local medicine from 
the late eighteenth century. The local Shohyaku society encouraged 
scholarship in botany from the early 1820s. And Owari was one of the 
first areas in Japan to obtain the Linnaean system. 
These advantages help to explain why ltd Keisuke became a biolo­
gist. I to was born in 1803 to a prominent Nagoya medical family. His 
father, commended by the daimyo for his medical work, was a schol­
arly man with an interest in botany, and Keisuke's older brother, who 
later became head of the domain's medical academy, also dabbled in 
botany. Ito's exposure to medicine and botany was all-pervasive. From 
1810 to 1815 he studied with his father. In 1815 he began Chinese 
and Western-style medical studies in earnest and later studied botany 
with Mizutani Toyobumi. Subsequent studies and research took him 
from one end of Japan to the other, including some months' study in 
Kyoto and Nagasaki (1827-28). The high point of his early education 
was his association with Siebold. ltd originally met the German physi­
cian at Nagoya in April 1826 with his father and brother. Two years 
later Siebold gave him a comprehensive explanation of Linnaeus' clas­
sification, and much later, in 1861, they resumed their discussions.37 
ltd was far from typical, as contemporary evaluations show clearly. 
From 1828 to 1861 he practiced medicine and carried out and pub­
lished botanical studies. In 1861 he became lecturer at the Bansho 
Shirabesho in Edo. In 1870 he was named consultant in biology to what 
became the Ministry of Education and in 1881 became professor of 
botany at Tokyo University. But I to never attended a university or went 
abroad and became professor at 78 years of age! On the other hand he 
published many important works, helped found the Tokyo Academy of 
Sciences, and was awarded the Silver Medal of the Royal Swedish 
Academy. A career like Ito's, mixing traditional and modern roles, 
evoked varying evaluations from peers. An influential group of scien­
tists, including the mathematician Kikuchi Dairoku and the chemist 
Nagai Nagayoshi, successfully blocked an important academic award to 
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Ito on the grounds that he was "not a real university man."38 On the 
other hand, the minister of education Inoue Kowashi praised ltd pub­
licly for his "contributions to knowledge. "39 
Itd's route into science was hardly unique, though his career was 
very unusual. The zoologist Ishikawa Chiyomatsu (1860-1935) came 
from Ito's area and was similarly encouraged by his father. The elder 
Ishikawa was an official in the Shizuoka domain with ongoing interests 
in science and was personally acquainted with the anatomist Sugita 
Gempaku (1733-1817), with Sugita Gentan, the student of electricity, 
and with Philip Franz von Siebold. He was an ardent bibliophile, and his 
hobby was natural history. The son was close to the father and shared 
his interests in science. From collecting and pressing leaves between 
the pages of books, Ishikawa Chiyomatsu progressed to butterfly col­
lecting and to notable studies on crustaceans. After graduation from 
Tokyo University he studied at Berlin and Freiburg, where he worked 
with August Weismann.40 
Other important biologists came to their work by much the same sort 
of pattern. ltd Tokutaro, who studied at Cambridge University, was the 
son of ltd Keisuke and became professor of biology at Tohoku Univer­
sity. Mitsukun Kakichi, founder of the Misaki Institute for Marine Biol­
ogy, was the son of a doctor who taught European studies. The Tokyo 
University zoology professor Tsuboi Shdgoro had an even more im­
pressive pedigree. His father was physician to the Fukui daimyo, and 
his grandfather was the renowned Tsuboi Shmdo (1795-1848), physi­
cian, Rangaku scholar, and teacher of Ogata Koan. 
Generalizations about chemistry are much more difficult The field 
did not have the high status in Japan that it had in Britain, France, 
Germany, or the United States, but the number of chemists (177) was 
still substantial.41 Chemists were the third largest group of scientists, 
surpassed by only the medical and engineering communities, with 
which they overlapped. There were 54 chemists among the 366 Japa­
nese holding engineering doctorates and 19 biochemists or medical 
chemists among the 656 with degrees in medicine. There were also 25 
chemists from the basic science group, 48 pharmacological chemists, 
and 31 chemists among the 108 holders of the doctorate in agriculture 
(see table 3.3). 
Many chemists were not from samurai or professional families, al­
though the scarcity of data makes it difficult to tell. Samurai percent­
ages varied from 72 percent among chemists with D.Sc. degrees to 32 
percent of agricultural chemists and just over a quarter of biochemists. 
Physicians' sons were numerous among the basic chemists, pharmaco­
logical chemists, and biochemists. Chemists m engineering came from 
a cross-section of professional families—teachers, officials, military of­
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TABLE 3.3 
Class Origins of Chemists 
CATEGORY NUMBER % SAMURAI *Jo COMMONERS 
Basic chemistry 25 72 28 
Pharmacology 48 42 58 
Engineering 54 39 61 
Agriculture 31 32 68 
Medicine 19 26 74 
Total 177 43 57 
Sources Iseki Kurd, ed . Dai Sihon hakushi roku, 5 vols. (1921-30); Jtnji 
koshin roku. 1903-37 eds.; Tsunesaburd Kamesaka, ed . Who's Who in 
Japan. 1014-37 eds. 
ficers, Confucian scholars—while the agricultural chemists contained 
a high proportion of men from farming families. Though fragmentary, 
the data indicate the range of recruitment motivations. Basic chemists 
came to the field from samurai families and for intellectual reasons. 
Recruits to chemistry through agriculture or engineering were proba­
bly concerned with practical problem solving in the interests of soci­
ety.42 An unspecifiable number must have been prompted by desires 
for higher social status. 
As for individual cases, the decision of Takamine Jokichi, discoverer 
of adrenalin (1900), to enter chemistry was primarily the result of en­
couragement from his father, a domain physician with an interest in 
science. The father studied Chinese and Dutch medicine with Koishi 
Genzui in Kyoto and later worked in Dutch studies with Tsuboi Shindo 
in Edo. After 1849 he carried out a number of scientific studies, man­
ufacturing gunpowder for his domain, making nitric acid from silk­
worm cocoons—and gaining a reputation as a clever inventor. These 
activities had their impact on the son, as attested by his biographer, 
Takamine's involvement in the work of his father, and his later 
research.43 
Paternal influence also figured in the recruitment of a number of 
chemists at Tokyo University. Majima Toshiyuki was the son of a sam­
urai physician in Kyoto who had studied Dutch medicine with Ogata 
Koan.44 Shibata Yuji was the grandson of a kampo physician and the 
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son of a chemist His father served as professor of pharmacology and his 
brother as professor of botany, both at Tokyo University.45 Nagai 
Nagayoshi's father was a Tosa domain physician who made a point of 
taking his son on nature walks in which he explained the medical uses 
of local plants. Nagai went into the subdiscipline of pharmacological 
chemistry, where he pursued these interests.46 One can see still other 
patterns in the choices of Sakurai Joji and Suzuki Umetard. Sakurai 
became a theoretical chemist (Japan's first) only after entering the 
Daigaku Nanko, later part of Tokyo University. The pathology professor 
Miyake Shu, later dean of the medical faculty, had just relumed from 
Europe and aroused the young mans interest in chemistry.>T Suzuki 
Umetaro, who also became a professor at Tokyo, was a farmer's son who 
first came to study agriculture in 1893 and then chose agricultural 
chemistry out of a desire to "do something for agriculture."48 
Physics had fewer ties with the cultural past than did chemistry or 
any other field. A number of physicists came into the discipline by 
accident, and relatively few had fathers in related occupations. But the 
field did have some links to the past. Samurai representation among 
chemists and medical men was only 43 percent of recruits, while 
among physicists it rose to 60 percent (among the earliest to well over 
80). Tokyo natives were far more numerous among physicists than 
among chemists or other scientists. One-quarter of physicists were bom 
in the capital, compared to 12 or 13 percent of chemists. Sons of officials 
made up nearly half the physicist community, compared to a quarter 
among chemists or scientists in general. 
The gulf between physics and society could be put down to the earlier 
absence of a role for physicists, but the absence of a "modem" profes­
sional role was hardly confined to physics. A more plausible reason for 
the gap is the earlier suspicion of physics as an adjunct of Catholicism. 
Some Tokugawa officials linked the diffusion of physics to social unrest 
or political dissent and imposed restrictions on it. Access to books on 
physics had been limited to certain samurai officials, and information 
about physics could not be published or taught in schools. Predictably, 
since acquaintance with physics was restricted to bureaucrats, it was 
divorced from advanced mathematics, lacked any place in the schools 
or on the job, and had an exceedingly narrow base for recruitment. Most 
physicists came from the samurai because most Meiji officials belonged 
to that class. Physicists were heavilyrecruited from Tokyo because of its 
role in the political system and its high concentration of samurai 
families. 
Yamakawa Kenjiro illustrates some of these patterns. He was born 
into a family of high-ranking officials and came into physics largely by 
accident He received a standard Confucian education in Aizu's domain 
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school between 1862 and 1868 and then studied privately while wan­
dering around the country. He began studying Western subjects at the 
domain's academy in Tokyo and was sent abroad in 1871. (The govern­
ment chose him to study abroad because he came from a very cold 
region and thus was thought capable of working where it wanted peo­
ple, in Hokkaido.) His commitment to physicsresultedfrom events on 
this trip. For example, witnessing a preannounced exchange of mail 
between two ships sparked his interest in geometry and physics, and he 
happened to read a magazine article by Herbert Spencer that stressed 
the importance of physics.49 
Yamakawa found areas of agreement between his own way of think­
ing and Spencer's ideas. Confucianism explained the achievement of 
moral perfection as theresult of education for particular individuals and 
society as a whole. Spencer argued that political improvements rest on 
social reforms, which depend on sociology, biology, and ultimately on 
physics. Yamakawa was attracted to physics because of its place among 
academic disciplines. As the field of learning basic to the rest, it clearly 
should serve as the basis of morality. By committing himself to a career 
in physics, Yamakawa felt he could contribute not only to science but to 
social morality as well.50 
Tanakadate Aikitsu's decision to go into physics grew from a syn­
thesis of influences. Early upbringing in the pro-Tokugawa domain of 
Morioka pushed him toward politics and government service, but the 
political alliances of the Meiji Restoration made it impossible to fulfill 
these ambitions. He considered engineering as a way to make a living 
but abandoned this plan under two teachers' influence. Tanakadate 
believed strongly in national service and looked for a way to combine his 
ideals with the prospects open to him. Physics was the solution because 
he thought it "basic" and "pure."51 
From Tanakadate's earliest upbringing one could not have predicted 
this outcome. He was the grandson of a Shinto priest and the nephew of 
a Kokugaku (national learning) scholar. His father was a martial-arts 
teacher openly skeptical of book learning.52 But in the large extended 
family where he grew up, others made a deeper impression on him, and 
he developed the usual samurai affection for scholarship and martial 
arts. The family's move to Tokyo in 1870 was a turning point in his life. 
There hereada Yamakawa essayrepeating Spencer's arguments about 
physics, and he entered the Keio academy of the science enthusiast 
Fukuzawa Yukichi. Fukuzawa having taught him that education must 
begin with the most basic studies, and the taint of disloyalty having 
ruled out politics, he followed his interests in a scholarly direction. 
'Tanakadate," wrote one historian, "rationalized his isolationfrom pol­
itics and turned it in a creative direction."53 
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Nagaoka Hantaro and Honda Kotaro came to physics by more con­
ventional routes. They grew up in or adjacent to major urban centers 
(Nagasaki and Nagoya) and in their youth received Western-style train­
ing. Both attended Tokyo University and then went on to study at the 
University of Berlin. Beyond these similarities were a number of dif­
ferences. Nagaoka's father was a well-connected official; Honda was 
the son of a commoner and a farmer. Nagaoka's upbringing led directly 
to physics; Honda's led, if anything, solely to farming. Nagaoka is best 
known abroad for theoretical work, Honda for experimental studies.54 
Nagaoka was encouraged to study science at an early age by his 
father, who traveled to the West with the Iwakura mission (1871-72). 
When the father returned, he gave his son a book and an influential 
piece of advice. The book was the Eton and Harrow text by Balfour 
Stewart entitled Physics, and the recommendation was to study it thor­
oughly. Nagaoka Chisaburo explained that the early education his son 
had received would not be adequate in the Japan of the future and 
stressed the importance of scientific study. The father went on to be­
come a leading science educator, eventually president of the Tokyo 
Prefectural Normal School, and wrote a well-known statement of sci­
ence education policy for the Tokyo metropolitan government.55 None 
of this spared Nagaoka Hantaro from a year of anxiety over physics. In 
1884 he left Tokyo University for about half a year. He seems to have 
been troubled by the odd belief that Caucasians alone were creative in 
physics and only abandoned this belief after months of reading on the 
history of science in China.56 His later work made him the leading 
physicist of the period. 
Honda Kdtaro, the third son ofa farmer, had a low self-image and was 
considered a dullard. The origin of his interest in science is unclear, but 
we do know that a samurai teacher encouraged his interest and gave 
him self-confidence. After elementary and middle school in the early 
1880s, Honda followed one of his brothers to the First Higher School 
and Tokyo University with the declared plan of studying agriculture. 
But he changed his plans when he finished higher school. His brother 
convinced him his interests in agriculture were shallow, and his read­
ing included an essay on physics thatreflectedSpencer.57 These influ­
ences led Honda to physics and a lifetime career. 
Foreign Teachers and University Training 
Except for Yamakawa Kenjiro and Noguchi Hideyo, trained at Yale and 
Pennsylvania, respectively, the scientists discussed in the preceding 
section, like 70 percent of their peers, were trained at Tokyo University 
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or one of its predecessors. This was not fortuitous, for Keio closed its 
medical school in 1882 and did not reopen it until 1917; the Harris 
School of Science at Doshisha, opened in 1882, closed in 1892; Kyoto 
University produced no graduates until after 1900; and Waseda's En­
gineering College began only in 1907. Tokyo University's monopoly on 
science education was all but complete in the Meiji years. At the same 
time, the university had to hire foreigners since formation of an indige­
nous scientific community took time. Who were these foreigners, and 
what influence did they have? 
Having foreign scientists in the universities was vital to Meiji refor­
mism. In 1877-78 salaries paid to foreign professors were a third of the 
budget of Tokyo University, and during the 1880s they were usually 
even more.58 Wide gaps appeared between Japanese salaries and for­
eigners'. Ernest Tiegel and Josef Disse. who taught physiology and 
pathology, were paid 350 and 380 yen per month in the early 1880s, 
while their successors. Ozawa Kenji and Miura Moriharu, received just 
120 and 100 yen.59 Similarly, Edward Divers earned 650 yen per month 
teaching chemistry in the 1890s, while Haga Tamemasa received 105. 
This did not commend instruction by foreigners to numerous percep­
tive critics. In July 1875 Nagayo Sensai, chief of the public health 
bureau, wrote the chemist Nagai Nagayoshi complaining that many 
people the government had hired to teach chemistry were "ignorant 
impostors" impeding the field.60 Mori Rintaro, as a medical student at 
Berlin University, protested geologist Edmund Naumann s assertion 
that Japan was succeeding because of the foreigners, not by their own 
initiative.61 Nakamura Yaroku, who had a degree in physics from the 
University of Munich, proposed in 1892 to dismiss the foreigners at 
Tokyo University on grounds of intellectual senescence, saying, "I have 
heard that the present scholarly competence of these men is about 
where the level of scholarship was in their own countries in 1883. 
Needless to say, today's science is much more advanced. So far indeed 
has scholarship progressed that none of these foreigners would be able 
to hold jobs if they should return to their homes."62 Wakizaka Gyozo 
told the Diet in 1897 that employment of foreign professors should be 
solely a last resort, since communities of scientific specialists were 
emerging in Japan.63 
The foreigners teaching at Tokyo University were the elite of all 
foreign employees. The larger group of 8,000 or so foreigners em­
ployed by the government over time did include some incompetents 
and troublemakers, but this was not true of the university contingent. 
A few were cantankerous, but nearly all came from distinguished in­
stitutions and continued their careers after leaving Japan, a few to the 
summit. E. S. Morse, a zoologist from Bowdoin College, and T. C. 
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Mendenhall, a physicist from Ohio State University, both became 
members of the National Academy of Sciences. C. O. Whitman be­
came professor of zoology at the University of Chicago. Josef Disse 
became professor of anatomy at the University of Marburg. W. E. 
Ayrton became professor of physics at Cambridge University. J. A. 
Ewing became professor of physics at the University of London. And 
John Milne essentially founded seismology. They were on the whole a 
highly competent group.64 
Considering the haphazard methods of selection, the degree of com­
petence was rather remarkable. By 1870 it was common for medical 
men to be chosen in Germany, whereas British subjects and to a lesser 
extent Americans reigned in physical science. Germany s Ambassador 
Maximilian von Brandt was an influential gatekeeper in the early 
1870s. but Japanese officials stationed in Berlin took over the process in 
1874. Ambassador Aoki Shuzo. a scholarly man married to a German 
and fluent in the language, began to consult various leading professors. 
In 1874 he recruited Wilhelm Schultze for anatomy and surgery, in 
1876 Ernest Tiegel to teach physiology, and in 1880 Josef Disse for 
pathology. There were, of course, other procedures The bureau chief 
Nagayo recruited F W Donitz in 1873 following his trip to Europe with 
the Iwakura mission. In 1875 Erwin von Baelz began teaching internal 
medicine and pathology at Tokyo University following a chance contact 
with a Japanese official who became his patient. And in 1876 Bernhard 
Gierke began lecturing in anatomy on the recommendation of Albrecht 
von Kolliker at Wurzburg.65 
Hiring of British and American experts worked somewhat differ­
ently. Since the 1856 Consular Act forbade U.S. diplomats to recom­
mend Americans for jobs overseas, recruitment in the U.S. was es­
pecially chancy.66 E. S. Morse was recruited for the zoology post at 
Tokyo because Toyama Shoichi, once a student at Michigan and a 
ranking education ministry official, had heard him lecture in Ann Ar­
bor.67 Mendenhall was recruited by Morse while Morse was passing 
through Columbus on his way to California and Japan.68 Recruitment 
procedures in Britain were only slightly more structured. Hugh Mathe­
son of the Jardine Matheson Company arranged Henry Dyer's appoint­
ment in mechanical engineering and John Milne's in geology at ltd 
Hirobumi's request and on the recommendation of W. J. M. Rankine at 
Glasgow. Chemists Edward Divers and R. W. Atkinson were recom­
mended by Ito's friend Alexander W Williamson, professor of chem­
istry at the University of London, where I to had studied in the 1860s. 
And the Japanese Embassy found J. A. Ewing with the help of William­
son and his physicist friend Lord Kelvin of Glasgow University.69 
Foreign instructors in engineering or physical science had more 
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influence on students than medical colleagues had. Dyer, Milne, Ayr-
ton, Mendenhall, Ewing, and Divers took pains to involve students in 
research projects. MendenhalTs students built their own equipment 
and used it to measure the sound emitted by a fired cannon, to detect 
and measure geomagnetic waves, and to study the forces of gravity over 
different latitudes and elevations.70 Divers undertook twenty-seven dif­
ferent studies in organic chemistry with four different Japanese collab­
orators including Haga Tamemasa, Shimizu Tetsukichi, Ogawa Mas­
ataka, and Haneda Kiyohachi.71 Ayrton was a leading student of 
electricity, an unabashed workaholic, an active publisher, and an in­
spiration to all of his students. In a practically minded academic setting 
he stressed theory, together with the cultivation of scientific attitudes, 
over memorization of facts, noting Japan's need for generalists able to 
solve many different problems.72 Dyer's contribution was mostly in­
stitutional. As director of the Imperial College of Engineering (Kobu 
Daigakko), he built an innovative program modeled on that of Zurich's 
Polytechnic Institute. His college offered curricular depth and diversity 
along with three years' practical experience. Later merged with Tokyo 
University's engineering faculty, it graduated a number of important 
engineers and was imitated abroad.73 
Milne, Morse, and Ewing were particularly influential. Milne spent 
almost twenty years in Japan (1876-95) and trained a substantial 
number of students. He stimulated their interest in earthquakes, in­
vented several seismographs, and instigated construction of seis­
mological stations. Morse stayed only three years, but his influence was 
long-lasting. He was the first active exponent of Darwin's theories in 
biology, and his research in Japanese anthropology gave that field a 
physicalist bias that it has only begun to transcend.74 Ewing was a 
highly accomplished physicist and an inspiring mentor. He constructed 
a model based on Weber's theory of magnetism, wrote several papers on 
seismology, and received a medalfrom the Royal Society for his obser­
vation of magnetic hysteresis. His age (just twenty-five when he arrived 
in 1878) affected his relations with students, whom he treated like 
peers and strongly supported in their researches. These efforts clearly 
paid off. Ewing's pupils, instead of choosing careers in government or 
business, mainly became university professors.75 
While physical science and engineering flourished, basic medicine 
faced problems. The government was primarily interested in producing 
medical clinicians, not basic researchers. Facilities for research were 
poor or nonexistent in the 1870s and early 1880s. Several of the German 
medical professors had difficult personalities, and most returned home 
as soon as they could. Theodor Hoffmann and Karl Mueller were the 
first to arrive and stayed onlyfive years between them. F W. Donitz left 
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after two years because of a dispute with the Japanese authorities. 
Bemhard Gierke came to teach anatomy in 1876 but became seriously 
ill and died in a mental institution. Wilhelm Schultze, who taught 
anatomy and surgery, had come highly recommended but did little of 
importance. Despite his brilliant academic record and studies with List­
er, his students disliked him, and he published no papers. Even the 
better-endowed clinical side was not exemptfrom such problems. A. L. 
Wernich, who taught internal medicine and obstetrics in 1874-76, 
published a number of scientific papers, but became hypercritical of the 
Japanese and left in a fit of pique.76 
The negative effects on students, however, were less than one might 
have expected. Physiology had an excellent mentor figure in Ernest 
Tiegel, who stayed six years (1876-82). The paper he pubbshed with 
Ozawa Kenji in 1877 on nervous systems in reptiles marked the first 
appearance of a Japanese investigator's work in a European medical 
journal.77 Pathology had noreal specialist before Josef Disse's arrival in 
1880 but still developed a distinguished research tradition, and even 
anatomy was not much harmed by erratic leadership from the Ger­
mans. There were eight advanced anatomy students during the period 
of direct German tutelage; three won their doctorates and continued in 
research.78 
Foreign professors influence, then, had its limits. Foreigners often 
affected students choice to study overseas but rarely the places they 
went Von Baelz influenced Aoyama Tanemichi to study pathology (in 
Germany), and James A. Ewing induced Tanakadate Aikitsu to study 
physics (at Glasgow).79 But usually the influence of foreigners was 
limited in this area. Japanese decisions to study medicine in Germany 
did not result from contacts with German professors; the German pro-, 
fessors were invited to Japan because the government had selected j 
German medicine as the model for Japanese medicine.80 Students in 
other fields did not necessarily pursue advanced studies in the coun­
triesfrom which their professors had come. Mendenhall was an Amer­
ican, but only Yamakawa studied physics in the U.S., and that well 
before Mendenhall reached Japan. Shibata Yuji's chemistry professor 
in Tokyo was from England, but he chose to study in France and 
Switzerland.81 Nagaoka Hantaro went to Vienna and Berlin to con­
tinue his research on magnetism even though the teacher who sug­
gested this study to him and sponsored his publication on it in English 
had come to Japan from Great Britain.82 In another area where influ­
ence might have occurred, there is little or no indication of it: few 
Japanese chose foreign scientists working in Japan for role models, nor 
did foreigners much influence Japanese commitments to particular 
lines of research.83 
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The Foreign Study Experience 
Foreign study (ryugaku), however, did inspire commitment to particu­
lar kinds of research. It gave Japanese scientists professional role mod­
els and values, and it affected establishment of research activities. 
Nevertheless, the research tradition was not merely a result of overseas 
study and scientists views. The government and the public had opin­
ions of their own, especially on the issue of overseas study. There was a 
compelling need to reduce Japan's backlog of knowledge. Professors 
were required to staff the universities. Experts were needed for facto­
ries, experiment stations, bureaus, and commissions. Technical skills 
were also essential for military and diplomatic reasons. There were 
limits to what could be done: research demanded a level of support that 
was not in all cases forthcoming, developmental priorities sometimes 
led scientists away from research, and complex, hybrid roles emerged 
in response to local demands. Past experience delimited how far West­
ern values and norms were adopted. Foreign study certainly affected 
development of the researcher role, but so did other priorities and 
traditions. 
Officials generally saw foreign study as a means of acquiring new 
knowledge. An 1872 document declared that only foreign study offered 
the prospect of gathering the technical expertise the country desper­
ately needed. Inoue Kaoru, as public works minister, spoke in 1879 of 
foreign study as a means of "acquiring strength in various fields."84 In 
1897 Education Vice Minister Makino Nobuaki declared, "We will not 
go forward unless we send people to study in the advanced countries, 
observe things, and study the ideas of leading (foreignl scientists.'*85 
Putting knowledge to use was equally important Officials put major 
emphasis in the 1870s and 1880s on training Japanese to replace costly 
foreigners, but this priority had shifted by the late 1890s. The establish­
ment of Kyoto University in 1897 and its sister institutions at Sendai 
(1906), Fukuoka (1910), and Sapporo (1918) required major expansion 
of the university professoriat, and overseas study was the means to 
achieve it In 1898 the vice minister of education cited need for pro­
fessors as the main reason to increase spending on overseas study,86 
and in 1901 Education Minister Kikuchi Dairoku answered a hostile 
question about it by stating that almost every university professor or 
higher-school teacher had studied abroad.87 
Administration of overseas study was designed to further the aim of 
training professors and technical experts. In 1869 the Meiji govern­
ment resumed support for students sent abroad by the shogunate and 
quickly expanded their number. When an 1873 inspection tour by the 
Ministry of Education turned up widespread abuses and poorly pre­
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pared students, the students were ordered home and the rules rewrit­
ten. Even then, some compromises had to be made. For example, it was 
not initially possible to demand extensive precoUegiate training of all 
students selected, and few had the language skills to enter a foreign 
university. Students were required to attach themselves to a govern­
ment school in Japan and to pass a formal screening.88 Beginning in 
1885 the mandatory school affiliation was dropped, but all Japanese 
pursuing foreign studies still had to follow rigid rules: they had to 
register with the foreign ministry in Tokyo, send annual progress re­
ports to the local ambassador, and, if using government money, pledge 
two years' public service for every year of support.89 
Because growing numbers of critics thought spending on overseas 
study came at the expense of domestic research, it is a useful—though 
difficult—task to estimate the cost of ryugaku. Unfortunately, records 
were kept haphazardly, several different ministries were involved, stu­
dents sometimes switched their status from public to private or private 
to public, and estimates of numbers vary widely among sources.90 But 
estimates of the minimum expenditure are possible if certain assump­
tions are made. By accepting my definition of scientist, together with 
the figures for time spent abroad and (average) levels of expenditure 
reported below (table 3.4), it is clear that Japan could not have spent less 
than 6,303,350 yen on overseas study in the fifty or so years being 
TABLE 3.4 
Foreign Study Expenditures (Doctorate Recipients) 
ANNUAL 
STUDENT YEARS EXPENDITURE/ 
ABROAD ( #  ) STUDENT (AVG.) COST 
1867-77 138 600 yen 82,800 yen 
1878-82 163 1,650 yen 268,950 yen 
1883-1914 2,842 1,800 yen 5,115,600 yen 
1915-20 418 2,000 yen 836,000 yen 
Totals: 3,561 6,303,350 yen 
Sources: NKGST 8/1: 350-53; Uzaki Kumakichi, Aoyama Tanemichi, p. 54; Watanabe 
Minoni, "Japanese Students Abroad and the Acquisition of Scientific and Technical 
Knowledge," pp. 254-93. 
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discussed. Whether this estimate is reasonable or not, it is at least 
compatible with another. In the early 1960s, Sato Kenzd of the Ministry 
of Education conducted a study of this period that estimated 7,108,054 
yen as the cost of supporting government-funded students (only) in all 
fields of study.91 
Foreign study costs at first had simply to be borne, but later they 
caused serious disagreements. One Diet member attacked the govern­
ment for excessive spending in 1898. Another that year said that the 
idea was good, but students should pay more.92 And in 1901 a third 
representative quoted unnamed others as believing the program to be 
"of little [or no] value."93 Criticisms intensified as expenditures rose 70 
percent in the 1890s and very nearly doubled in the next decade. A 1914 
editorial called foreign study spending "foolish," "unbeneficial," and "a 
drain on foreign exchange."94 Others demanded outright termination 
of the program to improve academic morality. According to them, for­
eign education was so highly valued that potential nominees were 
bending the rules and "selling their friends for selection.'*95 
These criticisms were not true in all cases. Selection procedures 
emphasized grades, good character, and faculty recommendations—in 
about that order. By 1879, when the program was fully developed, to be 
a ryugakusei (foreign-study student) one usually had to have graduated 
first or second in one's class, and even that was no guarantee. In 1882 
Aoyama Tanemichi, the number three man, was chosen for pathology 
and internal medicine along with the number two man because the 
number one man had a reputation for drinking to excess.96 In 1884, 
Kitasato Shibasaburo, eighth in his graduating class, got to go because 
his employer, the Bureau of Public Health, introduced a tax plan to the 
government which yielded more revenues.97 The stipends paid to the 
ryugakusei did not assure opulent living. Nagayo Mataro, studying 
pathology at Freiburg in 1908, got additional moneyfrom his brother.98 
Nagaoka Hantaro, studying physics in Vienna in 1894, had to do his 
own cooking and lacked money for books.99 Aoyama could barely live in 
Berlin on his stipend. 10° And Kitasato in his first year "saw nothing of 
the city but the street which ran between his boardinghouse and the 
University of Berlin."101 Honda Kotaro, studying physics at Got tin gen 
in 1908, and Nagai Nagayoshi, in chemistry at Berlin in 1879, found 
they could Live quite well, but each had an assistantship, a stipend, and 
a landlady who kept his rent low.102 
Ryugakusei problems were a matter of concern to the officials in 
charge. In 1897 Vice Minister Makino pointed out how inadequate were 
the stipends for Europe. "Students want to buy books and reference 
materials but often cannot. They always ask for more money."103 
Oyama Kenzd, chief of the Bureau of Vocational Education, told the 
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Budget Committee of the House of Representatives in 1898 that the 
foreign students "really have to scrimp," explaining that many had 
formerly benefited from favorable exchange rates but no longer did 
so.104 Toyama, the minister of education, had this to say: 
Ryugakusei sponsored by the Ministry of Education are prac­
tically beggars. They have to live in shabby boardinghouses and 
cannot go out in society freely. I talked with Prime Minister ltd 
[Hirobumi] about this when I was president of (Tokyo] University. 
He had seen some of these places in Europe and said we have to do 
something.. . . The Ministry of Education's stipends for foreign 
students are much too meager. When I and others went to Europe 
during the time of the shogunate, we got £200 sterling a year, and 
even that amount was not adequate for living in Cambridge or 
Oxford. Our present foreign students do not even have stipends 
sufficient for them to live in the moreremote areas of Germany.105 
It was appropriate for Toyama to make reference to Germany, since 
so many of the ryugakusei went there. In the 1870s Germany attracted 
only 27 percent of Japan s budding scientists, but the percentage climb­
ed in the following decades. In the 1880s it reached 59 percent, in the 
1890s 69 percent; and in the first decade of the twentieth century it 
topped out at just under 74 percent. Overall two-thirds of the man-years 
of study were spent in Germany during the period 1869-1914. Prior to 
the outbreak of war in 1914, no other country did nearly so well. Britain 
and the United States attracted between 20 and 35 percent each in the 
1870s but rapidly lost ground after Germany became popular. France in 
its best year attracted only about 19 percent and was minor for the 
period as a whole. In the same forty-five-year period, France got just 
under 7 percent of the Japanese ryugakusei, the United States and 
Britain got about 11 percent each, and theremainder were scattered in 
other countries—Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and 
Austria 
The pattern was the same for nearly every field. Among scientists 
who took agriculture degrees, 43 percent had previously gone to Ger­
many. Two-thirds of all chemists went there, 69 percent of the phys­
icists, and 90 percent of the medical men. Engineers were less over­
whelmed by Germany, but even they made it first choice. While their 
pattern of movement makes calculation difficult, a reasonable estimate 
says that Germany got 30 percent of their time abroad, the U.S. about 28 
percent, Britain 26 percent, and France 14 percent Only a few en­
gineers studied or worked abroad in other countries.106 
The reasons for Germany's popularity may seem obvious, but this is 
deceptive. Certainly German science and engineering were outstand­
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ing in this period. Wilhelm Roentgen discovered X-rays in 1895. Max 
Planck founded quantum theory in the early twentieth century. Adolf 
von Baeyer did important work in the chemistry of organic dyes, and 
Rudolph Diesel invented the diesel engine. German medicine also at­
tained a preeminence unequaled before or since. Robert Koch provided 
the first hard proof of the pathogenic specificity of a particular micro­
organism. Max von Pettenkofer founded modern public health studies. 
Emil von Behring helped establish immunology. And by some esti­
mates, in the 1880s a majority of major medical discoveries worldwide 
were the work of German scientists.107 
Nevertheless, the Japanese inclination to study in Germany could 
not have resulted just from intellectual factors. Other countries were 
doing good science. Spontaneous radioactivity was discovered first in 
France, and the theory of electrolytic dissociation was developed by a 
Swede. The chemistry of radioactive substances was most notably in­
vestigated by Lord Rutherford of Britain. The structure of the nervous 
system was elucidated by an Italian and a Spaniard. Besides, German 
preeminence, in medicine at least, was actually in decline. The putative 
majority of world medical discoveries in the 1880s dropped to 32 per­
cent in the 1890s and to 20 percent between 1910 and 1919 because of 
diminishing opportunities for younger researchers.108 
But Germany had its advantages. It was more willing than most other 
countries (especially Britain) to relax the special privileges accorded its 
nationals under the system of unequal treaties (1857-99).109 German 
political philosophy had won considerable favor with the majority of 
Japanese officials. In particular, the German academic system made it 
easy to collect information. Unlike the French or British systems, where 
students studied at one institution, the German system encouraged 
migration. A student could attend lectures at Leipzig one term, at 
Munich the following term, and finish at Berlin in the term after that. 
Registration was easy, requiring just a letter, the array of courses im­
pressive, and the number of German universities (almost two dozen) 
more than twice that of any other European country. Even so, we really 
know little about individuals' motives. Noguchi Hideyo studied with 
Simon Flexner at Pennsylvania because of the accident of their having 
met in Tokyo. Kitasato worked with Robert Koch in Berlin because of 
Koch's work with various microorganisms. Shibata Yuji moved suc­
cessively from Leipzig (Arthur Hantzsch) to Zurich (Alfred Werner) 
and on to Paris (Georges Urbain) in pursuit of a single research theme: 
stereochemistry, initiated by Hantzsch and developed by the others.* 10 
But most of thetime neither government records nor biographies report 
the reasons for these choices. 
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Widely held conceptions of the ryugakusei role may be part of the 
reason we know so little. Ryugakusei were supposed to go abroad when 
sent, study particular subjects, work with particular professors, come 
home when directed, and assume the positions the government gave 
them. For many things did work this way. Sakurai Joji quietly complied 
with an order to return home from London in 1881 despite his exem­
plary record and the excellent work he was doing.'11 Similarly, Shibata 
returned to Tokyo in 1913 at Sakurai's insistence even though his 
research in Paris had hardly begun to bear fruit.112 Considering how 
powerful the government was, it is remarkable that any scientists defied 
it. Nagai Nagayoshi, studying chemistry in Berlin in 1874, simply told 
his supervisors he would pay his own way when he was ordered to 
return home as a result of the 1873 survey by the education ministry.113 
Yamakawa Kenjiro wrote Ambassador Mori Arinori a flat rejection to 
the same request, partly because a wealthy New Haven widow had 
offered to pay his expenses at Yale.'l4 But the most salient example of 
student noncompliance involved Kitasato Shibasaburo, who in 1887 
shocked his superiors by refusing their order to transfer his studies from 
Berlin to Munich. 
Kitasato's experience is important because it identifies knowledge 
gathering—not research training—as the primary purpose of foreign 
study for officials. In 1884 Kitasato graduated from Tokyo University 
and entered the Bureau of Public Health, which sent him to Germany. 
In keeping with the needs of the public health program, it was decided 
he should spend most of his time at Koch's laboratory in Berlin but be 
prepared to move if conditions required. In 1887, the bureau's other 
ryugakusei, Nakahama Toichiro, who had been studying public health 
with Pettenkofer in Munich, asked the bureau to study with Koch. The 
government ordered Kitasato to move to Munich to trade places with his 
colleague Nakahama115 
But Kitasato refused on professional grounds, telling a local official 
who relayed the order that the plan took no cognizance of medical 
research. Pettenkofer claimed that diseases resulted exclusively from 
poor sanitation; Koch defended the pathogenic significance of discrete 
microorganisms. Kitasato also insisted that he needed more time to 
learn the methods of bacteriological research. Fortunately, Mori Rin­
taro urged Tokyo to accept these arguments, and the order to transfer 
was canceled. Two years later Kitasato isolated the bacterium causing 
tetanus and then helped to found immunology by his discovery of natu­
ral immunity.116 Because of Pettenkofer's bitter opposition to the germ 
theory of disease, these discoveries might not have occurred had 
Kitasato consented to study in Munich. 
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It must be stressed, however, that Japanese officials did sometimes 
recognize and support research as a legitimate component of ryugaku. 
In 1891 the Ministry of Education sent three junior faculty members 
from Tokyo University to Koch's laboratory to investigate his claim that 
tuberculin could help to treat tuberculosis.] 17 In 1894 it granted 1,000 
yen to physicist Tanaka Shohei in Germany for research in musical 
acoustics. The same year it underwrote Nagaoka Hantaro's studies of 
magnetic phenomena. But officials were inconsistent, and their re­
sponses to requests for research support could not be predicted. Tan-
aka's study was funded apparently because prominent German musi­
cians endorsed it, Kitasato's work through the German instructional 
budget. Nagaoka s 1893 request for money to study magnetic distortion 
was rejected.l l  8 The Tokyo tuberculin mission proved abortive because 
Koch rejected the "students."119 The education minister, Toyama, was 
asked directly in 1898 whether the ministry ever paid the expenses of 
Japanese invited abroad for research. Toyama stated that ltd Hirobumi 
and Okuma Shigenobu favored this policy, but he admitted it was prac­
ticed erratically. The pertinent conditions, he said, were that someone 
be officially invited, that Tokyo University professors not object, and 
that no ryugakusei already abroad be affected adversely if a researcher 
were sent!120 
Toyama's remarks show how solicitous of ryugakusei officials could 
be on occasion. Nagaoka s stipend was increased in 1894 after he com­
plained of currency devaluations, hunger, and cold.121 Kitasato was 
permitted to remain in Berlin even after his fellowship expired in 
1888.122 Tanakadate was given extra money for travel in 1886 despite 
his having gone to Britain for physics at his own expense.123 Nagai 
Nagayoshi received personal loans and lucrative commissions in the 
1870s and 1880s from a number of prominent officials. Nagai s case is 
particularly instructive. In June 1875 he was given 2,300 yen to buy 
books and equipment for the Tokyo Medical Academy (later the medical 
faculty of Tokyo University). A month later he was asked to help recruit 
professors in chemistry and physics. In 1878 the Bureau of Agriculture 
began paying him a consulting fee of 30 yen per month (which became 
50 yen only two years later). In 1881 the Bureau of Public Health sent 
him money to cover travel costs, and in 1883 he got 100 yen in commis­
sions for arranging the sale of pharmaceutical manufacturing equip­
ment Officials, of course, had excellent reasons to treat ryugakusei 
well There were not very many of them, in the early years especially, 
and the country was greatly in need of their services. Nagai noted that 
Ambassadors Shinagawa and Aoki in Berlin treated him very much like 
a personal friend and observed that his status as the only "full-fledged 
Japanese chemist" (1878) made him a "prominent person in Japan."124 
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The Meaning of Overseas Study 
Initiation of specific traditions of research was among the important, if 
predictable, results of studying overseas. Physicist Honda Kotaro cre­
ated a major metallurgical research tradition at Tohoku University fol­
lowing three years at Gottingen with the physical chemist Gustav Tam­
mann, founder of modem metallurgy.125 Ishikawa Chiyomatsu helped 
establish zoological research at Tokyo University after a close collabora­
tion with the influential Darwinian August Weismann at Freiburg.12(> 
Ishihara Jun made notable contributions to theoretical physics at 
Tohoku after studying with Albert Einstein (Zurich) and Arnold Som­
merfeld (Munich).127 Nagai Nagayoshi did significant work in pharma­
cological chemistry at Tokyo that followed closely from his studies with 
Hofmann.128 Tanakadate Aikitsu s researches paralleled those of his 
teacher, Lord Kelvin, in ranging from geophysics to magnetism.I29 And 
Kitasato Shibasaburo discovered the plague bacillus and established a 
tradition of bacteriological research after having studied six years with 
Koch.130 
Mentor-pupil relationships clearly contributed to many such re­
search endeavors. Honda worked diligently under Tammann for three 
years at Gottingen, Nagai was Hofmann s assistant for four years in 
Berlin, Ishikawa did much of the actual research for the myopic, debili­
tated Weismann,131 and Kitasato s closeness to the very reserved Koch 
exceeded that of any of Koch's German pupils.'}2 The exceptions high­
light the more typical pattern: bacteriologist Kitajima Ta'ichi took a 
strong dislike to Emil von Behring and considered his years at Marburg 
a waste;133 Nagaoka Hantaro, critical of the aged Hermann von 
Helmholtz and the beginner Max Planck, moved from an early interest 
in theoretical physics to concentrate on experimental studies;' ** Ogata 
Masanori, professor of hygiene at Tokyo, ignored the antibacterial views 
of his teacher Pettenkofer to make his career in the field of bac­
teriology; 13S chemist Shibata Yuji found Georges Urbain at the Sor­
bonne more congenial than Alfred Werner at Zurich, and whether for 
that reason or some other, abandoned his work in stereochemistry to 
study, like Urbain, the various rare earths.136 
Relations with European mentors also shaped the scientists' concep­
tions of their roles. Shibata's evolution as an exclusively academic 
chemist paralleled the careers of his European teachers.137 Sakurai 
Joji's career in theoretical chemistry was certainly influenced by the 
later interest of his teacher A. W. Williamson in theory.138 Tanakadate's 
interest in research, teaching, and the nonacademic world approxi­
mates Kelvin's career pattern, except that the British physicist worked 
with commercial interests on telegraphic communications and his Jap­
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anese pupil with the military on air power.139 Gustav Tammann and 
Honda Kotaro were both interested in pure research and business ap­
plications. 14° Nagai Nagayoshi shared his teacher Hofmann's commit­
ment to experimental results and their utility in industry.141 Kitasato 
modeled his career directly on Koch's, founding a comparable institute 
where research was done, serums manufactured, and patients given 
treatment.142 
At times, Japanese scientists even adopted the personality traits of 
their teachers in Europe. Nagai Nagayoshi, who spent fourteen years in 
Germany, took on Hofmann's cosmopolitan style and became Ger­
manicized to the point of marrying a German woman, converting to 
Catholicism, and adding WUhelm to his name.143 "I (consciously] pat­
terned myself after Einstein from the time I first came to Zurich," wrote 
the physicist Ishihara Jun.144 Colleagues said Honda Kotaro had the 
same blunt manner as his German mentor, Tammann.I45 Sakurai Joji 
imitated the aristocratic, refined style of his British teacher, William­
son.146 Students often called Tanakadate "Lord Kelvin" behind his 
back.147 And Kitasato adopted the extreme neatness, punctuality, and 
fatherly manner typical of Robert Koch. "His actions and gestures are 
just like Koch s," according to the German scientist's wife. "They even 
hold a pointer the same way when they're lecturing!"148 
Kitasato's emulation of Koch was particularly striking to associates. 
In 1908 Koch paid a six-week visit to Japan, and during that time 
Kitasato managed to obtain a lock of his hair from a barber. When Koch 
died in 1910, Kitasato, thou gh not a believer in life after death, asked the 
Shinto priests of the Izumo Grand Shrine to pray for the soul of his 
teacher. The following year he built a small Shinto shrine on the 
grounds of the Institute of Infectious Diseases, the lock of hair and 
photograph of Koch indicating the scientist's presence at the site. On 
the anniversary of Koch's death (May 27), he always requested that 
prayers be offered at the shrine.149 Nor was this his sole form of re­
membrance. Every year on Koch's birthday (December 11), Kitasato 
sponsored a conference to commemorate his mentor's contributions to 
medicine. 15° "Dr. Koch's soul may no longer exist," Kitasato declared. 
"But through our work he is still very much alive."151 
Many of the German professors had strong authoritarian tendencies. 
Kitajima described Behring as "quick-tempered," "secretive," "stern," 
and "always the military man."152 The pathologist Nagayo Mataro ob­
served in 1907 that some German professors assumed a "haughty at­
titude" toward ryugakusei.153 Shibata Yuji said Alfred Werner could be 
"mean, explosive, and sarcastic" if he became angry with a student.154 
Koch was seen by many as cold and rather forbidding.155 Paul Ehrlich 
was described by a Japanese student as supervising students so re­
lentlessly that their work invariably reflected his way of thinking.156 
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Tanaka Minoru says students were reprimanded by their German pro­
fessors if they failed to address them correctly.157 
The French were seen differently. The mentor of astronomer Terao 
Hisashi, the Sorbonne professor Francois Tisserand, is described as 
"modest," "kind," and 'Very solicitous toward young astronomers."158 
Shibata recalled that his teacher, Georges Urbain, criticized the Ger­
man professorial style. "He forbade us to address him by the French 
equivalent of 'Herr Professor' He said, 'We do not use such German 
forms here. You are to call me 'Monsieur Urbain' like Louis, our labora­
tory custodian."*159 Britain probably resembled the French pattern 
more closely than the German. Williamson is described as the "natural 
choice" as a mentor for Japanese students.160 James A. Ewing of 
Cambridge, formerly of Tokyo, spent a great deal of time with visiting 
Japanese students or colleagues.161 Lord Kelvin treated anyone sent to 
his laboratory by Tanakadate, even for a short visit, as if he were the 
Scotsman's own student.l62 
Where authoritarian behavior was present (and it was not an unvary­
ing feature of German academic culture), it did not always repress 
creativity. Koch's laboratory produced a succession of brilliant discov­
eries including his own isolation of the tubercle bacillus (1882), 
Friedrich Loeffier's discovery of the diphtheria bacillus (1884), Georg 
Gaffky's cultivation of the typhoid bacillus (1885), Kitasato's pure 
culture of the tetanus bacillus (1889), and the brilliant work on antitox­
ic immunity done by Kitasato and von Behring (1890).163 Nor was the 
Franco-German group founded by Werner at Zurich wholly closed 
minded and authoritarian. G. Schwarzenbach speaks of the infectious 
enthusiasm of Werner's students, an excitement that transcended 
every difficulty.164 Shibata says that Werner was "unstinting in his 
kindness toward and willingness to help dedicated, capable students." 
"He respected and praised those who had the courage to stand up to 
him."165 
Authoritarianism in German science did not spring solely from in­
clinations inherent in German culture. Joseph Ben-David and 
Awraham Zloczower argue that the senility and dependency of junior 
scientists toward senior ones appeared in the last quarter of the nine­
teenth century as a result of systemic rigidity. Because the universities 
allowed only one chair per field, institutional expansion could occur 
only by dividing an existing field, by founding new universities, or by 
creating a hierarchy of institutions and laboratories. After a certain 
point only creation of institutions and laboratories remained viable for 
growth. Younger men found themselves increasingly dependent on the 
help of their seniors for advancement and were forced to assure their 
preferment by obsequious behavior.166 
One should also remember that German science, like that of the 
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West as a whole, inherited the values and ideals of creative research. 
"First, completeness and thoroughness; second . . . community, and 
[last] cooperation" was the description of John Theodore Merz: 
The German man of science was . . . not an isolated thinker 
He lived mostly at a university, surrounded by others, whose la­
bours came in contact with his own, or who treated the same 
subject from a different point of view . . . His object could not be 
to produce simply a work of individual greatness or of finished 
artistic merit; his work was an integral portion of one great sci­
ence. . . .The German man of science was a teacher; he had to 
communicate his ideas to younger minds . . . not to teach une 
science faite, but to draw out original talent in others, to encourage 
cooperation in research, to portion out the common work to the 
talents which surround[ed] him.167 
Merz went on to say that the German (or Western) man of science had 
"generally come under the influence of some . . . school, the teaching 
of which he desired either to uphold or to combat."168 
Foreign study in this sense aroused behavioral commitments in Jap­
anese scientists and affected the ways they conceived of research. Resi­
dence in Europe exposed them to the traditional values of European 
science in ways that working at home never could have. They learned 
directly what cooperation, community, and uninhibited criticism meant 
in the laboratory setting. They experienced first hand the criticisms of 
academic "inbreeding" or sociopolitical involvements which, however 
infrequently observed, were normative ideals in Europe. They inter­
nalized—or were at least exposed to—both respect for teachers and 
willingness to defend scientific truths whenever occasion demanded. 
And they learned to defend their ideas in a professional forum. Foreign 
study also inspired loyalties to certain conceptions of science. Medical 
study in Britain encouraged a clinical approach to disease; study in 
Germany placed greater stress on research. Mentors affected the 
growth of ideas and careers. 
Takagi Kanehiro's work on beriberi shows the importance of where 
one studied in Europe. Takagi, a career physician in the navy, had gone 
to Britain in 1875 because he wanted an alternative to German-style 
training.169 Following the advice of William Willis, an associate of gov­
ernment leaders, Takagi, a Satsuma native, enrolled in the St Thomas 
Hospital Medical College of London and spentfive years studying anat­
omy and clinical medicine. In November 1880 he returned to his work 
in the navy, becoming chief of the Bureau of Medical Affairs about a 
year later. He also began doing research on beriberi. His compilation of 
data on its occurrence in particular settings suggested that diet was a 
differentiating element. Takagi obtained funds and authorization for an 
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enriched diet that produced striking results. The new diet focused on 
fresh vegetables, meat, fish, and barley in contrast to rice and pickled 
vegetables, greatly reducing the incidence of disease or even eliminat­
ing it. Internal opposition, inadequate reporting abroad, and the popu­
larity of the germ theory of illness delayed recognition of his work, but 
Takagi was the first researcher anywhere to link beriberi convincingly 
to dietary factors.170 
Takagi might have done this work had he studied in Germany or 
France, but his having studied in Britain encouraged such research 
more. His conception of beriberi was basically physiological. From actu­
al trials he argued that 310 grams of carbon were required in the mili­
tary ration for every 20 grams of nitrogen; that is, the ratio of nitrogen to 
carbon is 1:15.5.171 Physiology was more highly developed in France 
and Germany than in Britain when Takagi was there, but itsrelation to 
clinical treatment was different in Britain, far more intimately linked to 
practice than on the Continent.172 At the time he did his research, 
Takagi's approach was unusual. Researchers were sensitive to the 
clinical aspects of beriberi, but many looked exclusively for a bacterial 
explanation. This was as true of Japanese beriberi researchers trained 
in Germany as it was of Germans.173 Takagi seems to have benefited 
from the particular combination of physiological research and clinical 
treatment then found only in Britain. 
A quarrel between Nagai Nagayoshi and Sakurai Joji shows that 
overseas study could also produce divergent conceptions in chemistry. 
From 1873 to 1884 Nagai worked with Hofmann in Berlin. Sakurai 
studied in London with Williamson (1876-81). Both attempted to fol­
low in the footsteps of their European mentors. Hofmann and Nagai 
were basically organic chemists interested in experimental work and its 
industrial applications, whereas Williamson and Sakurai, despite ear­
lier experience, shared an interest in chemical theory. In 1881 Sakurai 
returned to a professorship in theoretical chemistry at Tokyo Univer­
sity; Nagai stayed in Germany for three more years. When he did re­
turn, in October 1884, he received an appropriate joint appointment in 
the faculties of medicine and science. But Sakurai took offense at this, 
insisted on other arrangements, and in November 1885 secured Nagai's 
dismissal from the university on the grounds that his interest in phar­
macological chemistry was not academic in nature.174 Nagai was 
forced to resign and pursue a career elsewhere. From 1885 to 1888 he 
worked for the Ministry of Education, and from 1888 to 1891 he held a 
technical appointment in the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce. 
His professorship at Tokyo University was restored in 1893, but 
Sakurai's control of the science faculty deanship relegated him to a 
position in medicine alone.175 
In the case of Nagai and Sakurai, it seems that resentments between 
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Williamson and Hofrnann (stemming from professional differences) 
were either transferred to their Japanese pupils, or else some nonprofes­
sional jealousy led to Sakurai's actions. It is possible that nationalistic 
rivalries complicated relations between the two senior chemists. 
Williamson and Hofrnann had pursued very similar careers for part of 
their professional lives, both studying with Justus von Liebig at Giessen 
(Hofinann from 1839 to 1843 and Williamson from 1844 to 1846). Both 
were active for a time in the same general area of chemistry. Williamson 
used Hofrnann s work in his theory of etherification, and both per­
formed experiments whose results were important to the theory of 
chemical types.176 Both were also concerned with industrial applica­
tions of chemistry. Hofmann made a fortune from his work in the 
chemistry of dyes; Williamson made his students visit chemical facto­
ries and helped found a chair of practical chemistry at London. In 
London they were practically colleagues for a number of years, from 
1849 to 1863.177 
Their coincidental tenure in London and Williamson's medical prob­
lems helped fuel the conflict. Both laboratories—Hofrnann s at the 
Royal College of Chemistry and Williamson's at Imperial College— 
were flourishing in the early 1850s, but in 1855 poor eyesight and a 
paralyzed arm forced Williamson to give up research, and students 
began flocking to Hofrnann instead.178 In 1863 Hofrnann went to 
Berlin, and by 1870 Williamson was "devoting his time to high-flown 
theorizing while posing as a statesman of science."179 Whether or not 
the two wererivals, their pupils imputed this to them. Sakurai was not 
only a brilliant student of chemistry; by the late 1870s he was just about 
Williamson's only student. Similarly, Nagai worked as Hofmann's as­
sistant and even consulted with him in choosing a wife.180 The facts 
suggest two explanations for the quarrel. Sakurai either transferred to 
Nagai a resentment that Williamson felt toward Hofmann or identified 
so closely with him that he imagined arivalry that had never existed. In 
either event, the quarrel influenced how chemical research was estab­
lished in Japan. 
Kitasato's career in bacteriology provides an even more momentous 
example of the impact of study in Europe. In 1886, at Koch's instiga­
tion, he became involved in a controversy over beriberi that became an 
object lesson in the values of science, and in 1893 he repeated Koch's 
experience in founding a laboratory of his own for research. Both affairs 
conflicted with Japanese values and were resolved in striking ways. The 
beriberi dispute required Kitasato to criticize the work of a supposed 
professional superior directly. The laboratory affair was seen as a chal­
lenge to the preeminence of Tokyo University (see chapter 4). In nei­
ther case did the conflict result exclusively from conditions in Japan. 
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Foreign study provided both the occasion and the logic for how they 
turned out 
As we saw in the case of Takagi's career, beriberi research had gener­
ated controversy. Medical literature of the period offered five kinds of 
explanations, and the true cause—vitamin B deficiency—was not fully 
established until well after World War 1.181 Kitasato and others incor­
rectly favored a bacterial explanation but disagreed on major details. In 
1886 Ogata Masanori claimed to have isolated a beriberi pathogen but 
failed to convince Friedrich Loeffler and Robert Koch, in whose labora­
tory Kitasato was working at the time. Koch asked Kitasato, as a Japa­
nese national, to publish a rebuttal in Japanese, but Kitasato expressed 
reluctance: Ogata was considered Kitasato's senior because he had 
graduated from Tokyo University a year earlier, and Kitasato said that 
Japanese colleagues would reject open criticism from an ostensibly 
junior man. When Koch and Loeffler nonetheless insisted that scien­
tific professionalism required frank discussion of scientific issues, 
Kitasato wrote two reviews for medical journals. The reviews were 
objective and moderate in tone, but they aroused exactly the reactions 
he had feared.182 Kato Hiroyuki, the president of Tokyo University, 
declared him ignorant of how to behave toward superiors. Two medical 
faculty graduates employed in the Ministry of War privately circulated a 
pamphlet that accused him of jealousy. Mori Rintaro, chief of the 
army's Bureau of Medical Affairs, said that Kitasato was guilty of "exag­
gerating science and neglecting human feelings."183 
Kitasato's understanding of research arrangements was also affected 
by his friendship with Koch. Koch was professor of hygiene at Berlin 
University during the years that Kitasato first knew him, but in 1891 he 
demanded—and got—a laboratory separated from the university. The 
immediate cause for the demand was a setback in his tuberculosis 
research that he thought academic colleagues had sabotaged, but for a 
more adequate explanation one must refer to his career as a whole. 
Koch was a maverick in the German profession. Most German medical 
scientists concentrated on research to the exclusion of outside involve­
ments, but he was socially engaged and concerned with clinical treat­
ment He had only an M.D., and most of his peers held Ph.D.'s. He 
espoused the germ theory of disease, while many retained affection for 
Virchow's cellular theory. He stressed the need in bacteriology for inti­
mate relations between clinical and basic medicine—in an era of grow­
ing separation between them.184 Academic associates at Berlin were 
especially disturbed by his contacts outside the academy. Impractical 
research lines and a medical theory like cellular imbalance, which pre­
cluded effective treatment, were a means of assuring autonomy in an 
authoritarian political setting, so Koch's germ theory, which opened up 
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possibilities for effective medical intervention, and the unwelcome at­
tention the theory attracted, made professors apprehensive. Koch's con­
nections outside the university explain his appointment to the direc­
torship of the physiological laboratory of the Imperial Health Office 
(1880) and his hygiene professorship at the University of Berlin 
(1885).185 
Ironically, external connections also led Koch to abandon his pro­
fessorship. Trouble began with an announcement at the Tenth Interna­
tional Medical Congress in 1890 that he had discovered tuberculin, a 
substance elaborated by the tubercle bacillus. Such announcements 
were routine, but this one was not quite typical, because Prussia s 
Ministry of Education, which acted as host for the congress, wanted the 
propaganda value of a spectacular announcement. Tuberculosis and 
efforts to cure it were matters of intense concern to the public, and 
Koch s findings suggested a cure but were actually inconclusive. The 
situation began to unravel when tests raised serious questions. Tuber­
cular patients and physicians specializing in treating them, who had 
come to Berlin with high expectations, were angered and greatly disap­
pointed. The Prussian Ministry of Education was embarrassed. And 
Koch was publicly ridiculed.I8G 
Heresponded byresigning as professor. Heretofore Koch had been a 
consultant to the Prussian Ministry of Education and as a professor 
subject to its authority. But academic string-pulling in the bureaucracy 
and university led him to seek another arrangement: the establishment 
of a new laboratory' and a transferal of his consulting function in public 
health to his former employer, the Imperial Health Office. In this way 
he surmounted the characteristically German separation of basic re­
search from clinical medicine that had long troubled him, for example, 
when as a professor of basic medicine, he had been required to sur­
render the testing of tuberculin to two colleagues in clinical medi­
cine.187 This was standard procedure in German academic medicine, 
but earlier experience made it unacceptable to Koch, who asked a com­
pliant government to build an independent laboratory designed to his 
standards.188 This laboratory, called the Prussian Institute of Infectious 
Diseases, provided the kind of inspiration for Kitasato's laboratory, just 
as Koch's example molded his career as a whole. 
Creating the Role for Research in Japan 
Japan in the Meiji and Taisho years created an establishment for scien­
tific research without quite creating the researcher role. Universities 
were founded, laboratories built, and academic societies established; 
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but the researcher role remained vaguely denned, inchoate, and sur­
rounded by hostile forces. Though a paradoxfrom the view of Western 
experience, this circumstance was explicable historically, because no 
prior analogue existed for the researcher role. While research had been 
done, it had followed no pattern. The country also had a tradition of self-
conscious borrowing and a need to overcome the effects of seclusion. 
Officials deemed foreign study a means to that end, and scientists 
generally concurred, seeing their ends well served. 
But demands for expertise also impeded the establishment of a role 
for the researcher. Government needed consultants; business, techni­
cians; the public, medical treatment and various other services. Univer­
sities provided support for research, but their commitment was ambigu­
ous. Economic factors caused delays in establishing the researcher role. 
Deprivation (real or imagined) and a commitment to maintaining status 
led professors to take on extraneous work, while officials cited shortfalls 
of income as an excuse to delay founding laboratories. Scientists found 
it difficult to organize professional societies. Mathematicians had to 
deal with the legacy of wasan. Chemists and physicists were divided for 
a time by different languages of instruction, and medical men were 
sometimes distracted by factional infighting. 
Some saw overseas study as a threat to the researcher role. Bac­
teriologist Sata Yoshihiko contended shortly before World War I that 
foreign study was undercutting "a genuine respect for research." There 
was "no clear reward" for those who didresearch, nor "anyreal penalty' 
for those who did noL Another writer said ryugaku mostly encouraged 
the ability to expound Western scientists' theories. A third charged 
foreign study with making Japanese scientists lazy and professionally 
complacent As a result of the ease with which one could gain the 
"sinecure" of a professorship and a doctorate by publishing "one or two 
small papers abroad," many scientists were living "half asleep and [no 
more than] half awake."189 Foreign study was superfluous in the opin­
ion of such critics, because the technique of how to copy had already 
been learned, and Japanese scientists had finally surpassed the 
achievements of the foreigners who had taught them at home.190 
Debate naturally produced suggestions for change. One was that 
ryugaku be drastically reduced in all fields and eliminated entirely in 
medicine. Any who did go abroad should spend one year at most in 
Europe or America and meet stringent selection criteria. They should 
be under thirty-five, fluent in German, French, or English, scientifically 
competent, and avoid too much deference to foreigners. The govern­
ment shouldreformits priorities for science, too. Students sent abroad 
should receive larger stipends and be permitted after returning to 
choose their place of employment.191 Physicist Yamakawa Kenjiro took 
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another approach. As president of Tokyo University, he recommended 
in June 1914 that the three-year program be cut down to one, with the 
savings to go toward research.192 While Yamakawa planned to spend 
savings on facilities, Sata Yoshihiko was thinking ofresearchgrants.193 
Even some officials favored changes in priorities. In 1899 Kabayama 
Sukenori, then education minister, had proposed some reallocation of 
funds from ryugaku. Prime ministers I to Hirobumi and Katsura Taro 
later advocated reexamining the matter, and Aoki Shuzo as foreign 
minister had actually drawn up a plan for reform. But none of these 
proposals went into effect until World War I forced a change. As Ikai 
jiho noted ruefully in October 1914: "(Foreign study] is less an educa­
tional concern [for science] than an administrative and political 
problem."19** 
Consulting work and other side jobs (naishoku) were also a threat to 
research. Noting the large number of professors working in govern­
ment ministries part time, a former vice minister of education, Kubota 
Yuzuru, in 1899 lashed out at the practice in a speech to the Peers. 
"What research have these professors done? What discoveries have 
they made? What have they written?"195 "A large number of university 
professors," wrote a commentator in 1914, "are in effect social liaison 
officers who ljust] teach society how to apply imported knowledge."196 
A physician member of the House of Representatives even argued that 
if professors did not do moreresearch, they should be forced toretire to 
make room for those who would.197 Moonlighting was definitely wide­
spread. The vice minister of education Makino Nobuaki admitted in 
1897 that most professors of physics and chemistry were holding down 
extra jobs,198 and Ikai jiho reported that 26 of 30 professors in the 
faculty of agriculture were doing so in 1898.199 Strong demands for 
engineering talent were said to have "corrupted" most professors in the 
faculty of engineering, whereas most professors of clinical medicine 
were giving the bulk of their time to treating private patients.200 
Discussion of the problem focused on salaries and incentives for 
research. Many thought that salaries were at fault The minister of 
education Toyama Shoichi described salaries as "very meager" in 
1898,201 and in 1900 the former vice minister Kubota said professors 
needed "two or three jobs" to make a decent living.202 But salaries were 
in fact not all that bad. The range for assistant professors at Tokyo 
University in 1893 was 500 to 1,100 yen per annum (42 to 92 yen 
monthly), which compared very favorably with the starting minimum 
for management trainees at the Mitsui Bank (45 yen per month) or 
Shibusawa Eiichi's Dai-Ichi Bank (35 yen per month).203 And fiill pro­
fessors got much more—1,300 to "1,900 yen annually in 1893, and 
about the same in 1898.2O4 
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But although professors were reasonably well positioned in 1893 and 
even in 1898, their progress slowed later on. Subtracting incentive 
payments for research achievements, which ranged from 500 to 700 
yen, the base salaries were from 800 to 1,200 yen for full professors in 
1893 and in 1907 ranged from 800 to 2,000 yen. The range for assistant 
professors increased from a maximum of 600 yen to 1,000 yen in that 
period.205 But these sums were just not enough—that is, to alter behav­
ior, blaishoku continued because incentives were strong and obstacles 
weak. One has only to look at professorial incomes in the faculty of 
medicine to see what was really at stake. In 1909, when the average 
medical professor's salary was a mere 1,800 yen, the actual total in­
comes of selected individuals were: 35,400 yen for a professor of der­
matology; 41,000 yen for a professor of otorhinolaryngology; more than 
30,000 yen for one of the professors of internal medicine and 16,850 for 
another; more than 35,000 for a professor of ophthalmology; and 11,050 
yen for a professor of pediatric medicine.206 Professors of basic medi­
cine were forbidden to treat patients and so earned far less than their 
clinical colleagues. The total income for one professor of hygiene was 
3,400 yen, and a professor of biochemistry earned 2,500 yen. Signifi­
cantly, the leading researcher in the faculty of medicine, the pathology 
professor Yamagiwa Katsusaburo, who nearly won a Nobel Prize (see 
chapter 6), had an income that year of just 2,350 yen—the lowest in the 
faculty of medicine.207 
Nevertheless, prior to the war in 1914 little or nothing was done. 
Hamao Arata, the president of the university, did try to terminate out­
side employment in the 1890s, and Yamakawa Kenjiro tried once again 
in 1913,208 but the professors fought back. Toyama Shoichi tried to buy 
them off in 1898 with promises of higher salaries, but few of his col­
leagues at the Ministry of Education shared his concern. Kikuchi 
Dairoku, president of the university in 1900, said it was "not necessary 
to make Tokyo University a majorresearchcenter."209 Ichiki Kitokuro, 
the education minister, in 1914 conceded that professors "should not 
fall behind in the progress of scholarship," butflatlyrefused to take any 
action.210 
Besides the better pay, why else did naishoku continue? After all, the 
practice was never explicitly authorized, only tolerated,211 and it ob­
viously clashed with official views of the professor's role in society. "The 
professor," wrote Inoue Kowashi in 1893, "will deliver lectures, instruct 
students, and carry on research in his [particular] field."212 Three fac­
tors explain the persistence of naishoku. Men came into academic life 
not only because of their talents but because of .the prestige, and in the 
earlier years they were paid well directly and made part of the elite. 
Demand for theif-services was great The number of providers was 
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small. In thirty-eight years (1877-1914) Tokyo University had pro­
duced just 14,192 graduates in all fields of study, and none had to face 
unemployment.213 As late as 1920, the vice minister of education de­
clared that professorial side jobs might be desirable, "considering the 
[need for services] in Japan."214 
Professional societies also contributed to the researcher role, though 
their impact had its limits. The Tokyo Mathematical and Physical Soci­
ety, founded 1877, was the oldest of its kind and the most unusual. A 
majority of early members (83 of 117) were wasan practitioners, and 
the earliest leadership was extremely diverse, including military of­
ficers, wasan mathematicians, university professors, and undergradu­
ate mathematics majors. Apart from the prospects of cultural enhance­
ment, the society wished to "communicate with the public." This issue 
of utility led to reform. In 1882 a navy mathematics instructor chal­
lenged the society's role in its journal. Pointing to the continuing popu­
larity of the traditional uasan-style problem, he described such topics 
as the number of circles of X diameter inscribable in a certain sized 
polygon as irrational, and their devotees as 'small-minded and petty." 
He emphasized the need for technological application and greater prac­
ticality, predicting major gains once these changes occurred.215 The 
instructor's essay had a potent effect. Most wasan mathematicians left 
the society. Several adopted the new notation and sense of problematic 
of Western mathematics. The society's journal abruptly changed con­
tent, and university professors took control of the leadership. In this 
way, the Tokyo Mathematical and Physical Society became a typical 
Western-style learned academy. 
Westernism thus appeared to triumph completely, but the society's 
achievement award was designated the Seki Prize after the founder of 
wasan, an open-minded wasan mathematician donated space in his 
home for the society's first headquarters, and the wasan community 
gave the society its critical early momentum. Unlike most Meiji scien­
tific societies, this one was founded by Japanese practitioners. Wasan 
was not simply replaced by Western mathematics; it faded into it and 
was largely absorbed.216 
Societies for physics and chemistry conformed more closely to West­
ern models. The Tokyo (later Japan) Chemical Society was founded in 
1878 by foreign professors and Tokyo University students; the Physical 
Society branched off from it just after World War II, in 1946.217 Each 
society published a Western-style journal. The Physical Society's jour­
nal appeared quarterly from 1903; the journal of the Tokyo Chemical 
Society commenced publication in 1880, expanding in 1887 from four 
to ten issues yearly.218 Founders of both societies had Western-style 
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training. Nearly all had studied in Europe at the doctoral level. Practi­
tioners in all subspecialties joined one of the groups, and virtually all 
members published papers. 
The societies' growth and development were not just a product of 
Western conceptions. Many founding figures in both were the sons of 
Rangaku scholars and kampo physicians, and local conditions helped to 
shape institutions.219 The key local factor was the need for instruction. 
Because no single country held the palm in physics and chemistry as of 
1868, the Japanese for some years carried on instruction in three Euro­
pean languages. Physics had a French-language course (1875), an 
English-language course (1873), and a German-language course 
(1877), and there was no overarching structure until Tokyo University 
opened. This situation naturally led to overseas study in each of the 
three language areas. Yamakawa Kenjiro, Tanakadate Aikitsu, and 
Sekiya Seikei studied in Britain or the United States in English. Kitao 
Jiro, Muraoka Han'ichi. and Shiga Taizan studied in Austria or Ger­
many in German. Terao Hisashi, Nakamura Kiyoo, and Miwa Kan­
'ichiro studied physics in France or Belgium in French 220 Returned 
foreign students with lecture notes in English found it easiest to lecture 
in English. Those with notes on their subject in French could most 
efficiently teach in French, and those with German-language notes 
preferred to teach physics in German. 
Tokyo University's founding initiated a sorting-out process. Tanaka­
date was appointed to its faculty of science because instruction in that 
unit was in English. Muraoka was appointed in medicine because Ger­
man was dominant there. Terao joined the astronomical observatory 
because its work was conducted in French.221 Publication of Japanese-
language technical dictionaries finally overcame these divisions. In 
1883 the Butsungaku jutsugo jisho (Dictionary of physical terms) ap­
peared, and in 1891 the Kagaku yakugo shu (Compilation of chemical 
terms) was published. These events made lecturing in Japanese possi­
ble and marked the beginning of professional traditions.222 
Medicine developed a number of practices that differed from German 
ideals. After the middle of the nineteenth century, it was common for 
researchers and clinicians in Germany to have separate professional 
societies,223 and Japanese medical men also formed specialized so­
cieties, for example, for anatomy, pathology, and internal medicine, but 
directed much energy elsewhere. Many preferred to take part in one of 
the two comprehensive associations whose organizing principles were 
strictly political. The Meiji Medical Association (MMA), founded in 
1893, included virtually all the clinicians and basic researchers who 
had graduatedfrom Tokyo University or one of the two military medical 
academies.224 The Great Japan Medical Society, created at the same 
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time but often knowrn by other names (for example, Japan Federation of 
Medical Societies), included ordinary practitioners trained by private 
and provincial medical colleges and researchers with ties to Kitasato.225 
Japanese medicine rejected Germany's exclusion of clinicians from 
access to research facilities.226 In Japan, ordinary practitioners could 
use academic research facilities, at least when they had the right politi­
cal connections. Clinicians with degrees from an imperial university 
could do research at Tokyo University, Kyoto University, Kyushu Uni­
versity, or one of their affiliated hospitals; those who had trained at 
private or public medical colleges used the facilities of these and related 
institutions.227 
But German influence on the formation of medical roles in Japan was 
not wholly absent. Following a system pioneered by the Germans and 
later adopted by others, the Japanese Ministry of Education did sharply 
segregate basic and clinical medicine within the academic setting. 
Clinical professors (as we have seen) were allowed to treat private pa­
tients, while those in basic medicine were forbidden to do so.2 2 8 Prac­
tice in Japan, however, did not conform strictly to practice in Germany. 
Professors of basic medicine, while barred from clinical practice, were 
not excluded from organizations like the MMA that were seemingly 
limited to clinicians. Several professors at Tokyo University served as 
presidents of the MMA, and the first president of the Great Japan Medi­
cal Society was a professor of anatomy at Tokyo.229 None of this implied 
separation between the roles of practitioner and clinical researcher. 
German professors of clinical medicine, while treating private patients, 
nevertheless honored the academic ideal.230 Clinical professors at Japa­
nese universities gave most of their time to treating private patients.231 
CHAPTER FOUR 
LAYING THE INSTITUTIONAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE 
Japan took its time creating institutions for research. The research 
conducted in the Tokugawa period had followed no discernible pattern. 
By 1868 some technical studies were stronger than others, but none 
were established securely. So wide was the gap between Japan and the 
West that just catching up would consume vast resources. But catching 
up began once the new regime was in place, and Japan in due time built 
its own institutions. Many difficult questions arose in the process. 
Should research be linked to industrial development? What purpose 
could it serve in manpower training? Should it be concentrated in high­
er education? Was original research necessary? If it were true, as many 
believed, that everything could be copied, perhaps Japanese needed 
only to absorb what the scientists of Europe had discovered. > 
Debate focused at the time on policy essentials. Could one build on 
Tokugawa achievements? Who should initiate and carry out policies7 
After all, traditionally the government had controlled scholarly activity 
Privateresources were arguably so weak in Meiji Japan that the govern­
ment had to be active.2 But even assuming government sponsorship, 
the question was how it should act What Western models could Japa­
nese adopt? What should inform specific application? Should academic 
growth be based entirely on enrollments? Should other factors also be 
taken into account? 
Japanese debate about research institutions was very sophisticated, 
all things considered. Decision makers followed European develop­
ments, but they never adopted Western models unchanged. They never 
proposed to build laboratories solely because foreigners had done so. 
NOT did they introduce features of foreign universities—privat­
dozenten, the one-chair rule—simply because they worked well (or 
were thought to work well) in their country of origin.3 One is constantly 
impressed by the quality of discussion on how these features would 
work in Japan and whether they were needed at all. Officials sometimes 
realized that science had needs separate from society's. They did not 
base decisions about academic institutions solely on enrollments or 
what business wanted. 
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The salient issue in institution building was the country's need for 
original research, and the history of this issue was mixed. Alternate 
Attendance had diffused information. Daimyo domains had competed 
with each other. Tokugawa physicians had had some autonomy and 
occasional incentive to promote innovations. But private institutions 
had often been weak, deficient in funding, and coopted by government. 
Tokugawa scholarly institutions all had significant defects: unspecific 
programs, inefficient operations, and restraints on real competition. 
Nevertheless, the motivations and views of Meiji decision makers were 
varied and wide-ranging. A mainstream view minimized research, but 
its premises were frequendy challenged. Scientists who had worked 
abroad for some years insisted that Japan must conduct its own re­
search. Commercial organizations that were challenged in the mar­
ketplace decided that research must be part of their strategy. Physician 
politicians with scientific training promoted the cause of research while 
in office. The role of these groups in building institutions was important 
at the time but transcends their own era. With the outbreak of war in 
1914, the proresearch movement became the new mainstream. 
Early Post-Restoration Developments 
Institutional developments in the earliest Meiji years (1868-73) were 
ad hoc and poorly coordinated. Political confusion impeded most 
changes in 1868, but some initiatives were launched in the next two 
years. At Numazu, site of the first Western-style military academy, 
Japan's first program for science education was established early in 
1869. The Osaka Medical Academy opened its doors in December, 
while the former Bunseki Kyuri Jo of Nagasaki was reorganized in 
Osaka as the Osaka School of Chemistry. In December 1870 a compara­
ble institution started up in Kyoto with the aim of fostering scientific 
techniques in the ceramics and lacquerware industries of that city. 
Dutch instructors staffed the two schools and attracted several pupils 
later active in research.4 
Poor coordination and ad hoc efforts had their historical cause in the 
relatively decentralized scientific activities of the Tokugawa shogunate. 
Individual domains controlled their own schools, diffusion of knowl­
edge in somefields was restricted, there were no national organizations 
of scientists or physicians, and the fields of mathematics and physical 
science, related in Europe, in Japan belonged to different classes.5 The 
society valued each technical discipline differently. Medicine enjoyed 
broad social support, widespread official encouragement, a network of 
supporting institutions, and the beginnings of Western-style profes­
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sionalism.6 Chemistry, biology, and botany were modestly prosperous 
because of their links to medicine but were not yet recognized as dis­
tinct fields. Mathematics, despite remarkable progress before the mid-
eighteenth century, had consigned itself to cultural irrelevance. Phys­
ics was subject to suspicion.7 
Meiji officials confronting this legacy soon adopted anractivist pos­
ture. They terminated the system of traditional statuses and began to 
create scientific institutions. Especially active were Okubo Toshimichi, 
grandson of a distinguished Tokugawa physician, and ltd Hirobumi, 
sometime pupil of A. W. Williamson. Okubo concentrated primarily on 
medicine, ltd on engineering and much of basic science. Using the 
control of public health afforded him as home affairs minister, Okubo in 
1877 developed Japan's first program for attacking contagious disease, 
together with a campaign to counter beriberi.8 I to helped develop the 
Imperial College of Engineering (Kobu Daigakkd) and later exerted his 
influence on Tokyo University.9 
Okubo's initiative was not routine, since bacteriology was still in its 
infancy. "Much controversy existed as to whether contagious diseases 
were even caused by bacteria."10 It6 also was very forward-looking. On 
the recommendation of Williamson s friend Lord Kelvin, he invited the 
young British engineer Henry Dyer to Japan in 1871 and gave him a 
free hand and sufficient funds to develop one of the world's first com­
prehensive institutions for basic science and engineering. Dyer's four-
year program included physics and chemistry, mechanical, civil, and 
mining engineering, and courses in the strength of materials. It relied 
almost entirely on a British teaching staff.'' No one graduated from it 
until 1879, but its founding was still remarkable. Only France and 
Switzerland had comparable institutions. There was nothing like the 
college in Dyer's own country nor even in Germany before the Franco-
Prussian War (1870-71).l2 
The most important innovation was Japan's first university. In April 
1877 Tokyo University emerged from a combination of Tokugawa 
schools, and it gradually expanded.13 In 1886 it acquired the Imperial 
College of Engineering, a school of graduate studies, and the formal 
appellation "imperial university." Widely referred to as saiko gakufu, or 
"supreme institution of learning," Tokyo University became Japan's 
leading "window for the importation of Western knowledge" and gradu­
ally a center for research as well. This was not smooth transition, since 
many wished to restrict the university to educating undergraduate stu­
dents, while others had a broader conception. 
Establishing a comprehensive university was far from simple. Meiji 
leaders had inherited three institutions from the Tokugawa state—the 
Kaisei Gakko, Igakko, and Shoheiko—but did not agree on their 
92 LAYING THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS

futures. The Kaisei Gakko had been created under the name Bansho 
Shirabesho after the Perry expedition (1853) but actually traced its 
lineage to the Office of Astronomy (Temmongata, founded 1684). It 
primarily taught foreign languages and natural science.l4 The 1 gakko 
had existed under various names from the middle of the eighteenth 
century and had taught kampo medicine. But the seventeenth-century 
Shoheiko, with its Confucian curriculum, was seen as the most basic 
unit. The prior history of these institutions implied a role for the univer­
sity different from Western conceptions. In 1868-70, the government 
envisioned a university that would censor newspapers and books; inves­
tigate (kokyu) and teach languages, mathematics, geography, science, 
history, medicine, and kokugaku and Confucian studies as guarantors 
of social harmony and national power; and administer state-owned edu­
cational facilities in Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagasaki.15 This scheme proved 
totally unworkable. Confucian scholars hated its Westernizing aspects, 
the censorship functions were reassigned elsewhere, and the plan was 
finally abandoned.16 
Mindful of the need for Western-style experts, some officials favored 
higher professional schools (semmon gakko). But others, including the 
Kaisei Gakko director Kato Hiroyuki and the vice minister of education 
Tanaka Fujimaro. championed the idea of the comprehensive univer­
sity. In 1875, Tanaka proposed—and the government nearly ap­
proved—establishing a comprehensive university in rural Chiba pre­
fecture, on the grounds that Western universities were generally built 
in "elegant, secluded places far from the commotion of urban environ­
ments." In February 1877. Kato asked the Ministry of Education to 
change "Kaisei Gakko" to "Tokyo Daigaku," or Tokyo University, to 
convey the school's function more accurately. "It is misleading to use a 
name for our institution so [fundamentally] different from those in the 
West"17 
Kato's letter raised an issue of importance. In the early years, the 
university was clearlyregarded by many as a "training school for offi­
cials," somewhere between a middle school and a German Universitdt. 
The Gakusei edict of 1872, which envisioned a network of eight univer­
sities, mentioned only teaching as the purpose. Research is hardly ever 
mentioned in the earliest official documents, but interest in it gradually 
developed.18 In 1880 Kato, citing the absence of a graduate school, was 
able to establish a special research course at Tokyo University for uni­
versity graduates who wanted further study. Returning ryugakusei 
brought research interest with them. And prominent officials like ltd 
Hirobumi began to see that research activities could divert professors 
from involvement in politics.19 
Policies toward particular disciplines continued to differ during the 
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early Meiji period. The Kaisei Gakko from which the faculties of letters, 
science, and law derived represented a basic, new concept in Japanese 
education; but the I gakko and its modern successor, the faculty of 
medicine, were seen to some extent as a single tradition. The post-
Restoration medical school continued for some years to use facilities 
that were built by the shogunate. Some of its Japanese instructors were 
the same as before. By 1869 experimentation (jikken), if not research, 
was described as its function. In contrast, the instructors of the Kaisei 
Gakko were all dismissed by the new Meiji government, new facilities 
were built in a wholly Western style, and any conception of genuine 
research was subsumed under the tepid "inquiry" (ri o kiwame).20 
None of this mattered in the early Meiji years, but it did make a dif­
ference later on, when research conditions, poor in most fields, were not 
quite so bad in medicine. 
Tokyo University was institutionally innovative in more than a Japa­
nese context. Its inclusion of engineering (1886) and agriculture 
(1890) in the curriculum indicates a forward-looking policy rarely en­
countered in Europe. Engineering acquired prestige in Japan because 
of its connection with the Japanese government and origin in advanced 
Western countries,21 but its formal position in the academic system was 
higher than in Europe. When the university was founded in 1877, its 
college of science had departments of chemistry, mathematics, physics 
and astronomy, biology, geology, and engineering all together on a basis 
of equality.22 
The government gave considerable support to other institutions, as it 
did to Tokyo University. The first nonacademic technical agency estab­
lished (in 1871) was the navy's Hydrographic Department, charged 
with coastal and ocean surveying. Creation in 1884 of a similar land 
survey department affiliated with the army may suggest that military 
considerations were of primary concern, but most officials were more 
interested in the resource base for civilians. The Tokyo Meteorological 
Station and Central Meteorological Observatory were established in 
1875; the home ministry's Geological Survey materialized in 1878, and 
the Geological Survey Institute in 1882. Agriculture programs were 
especially well supported. The Naito Shinjuku Testing Station opened 
in 1872, the Mita Plant Nursery in 1877, the Forestry Experiment 
Station in 1878, and the Tokyo Agricultural Experiment Station in 
1882. Rounding out the list were the Drug Control Station (later Tokyo 
Hygiene Institute [1874]) and the Komaba and Sapporo agricultural 
colleges (1876).23 
Anxiety about manpower skills was a potent incentive to activism. 
Foreign experts could be hired to carry out vital tasks, but nationalism 
and finances made their long-term use unpalatable, so additional strat­
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egies were devised. One early effort relied on feudal coercion. In 1870 
the government ordered all daimyo territories according to size and 
wealth to dispatch students to the Kaisei Gakko, only to discover that 
insufficient student motivation—and less preparation—made this 
strategy ineffectual.24 More realistic policies followed this so-called 
tribute (koskin) system. In 1873 the government began granting 
scholarships to students in technical fields. Many, sometimes a major­
ity, of students at the Imperial College of Engineering, Komaba Agri­
cultural college, Sapporo Agricultural College, and the College of Sci­
ence at Tokyo University in the 1870s and 1880s received not only 
tuition and fees but access to the refectory, free lodging, and a clothing 
allowance.25 
Other new programs were also created. Within the new engineering 
faculty special departments of arms technology and explosives were 
established in 1887. These initiatives were taken to secure engineers 
for military arsenals and were unprecedented in Western countries.26 
The government, of course, was intent on results. Until 1897 students 
in technical programs had no electives in their academic major, and the 
level of performance demanded was high. At Tokyo's science depart­
ment failure on a single examination meant cancellation of the schol­
arship; failure on a second, dismissal.27 
The poor state of research facilities was one reflection of the bias 
toward training. It has even been argued that Japanese universities and 
schools were established in this period only to import foreign science, 
not to create knowledge.28 In 1878 the physicist Tanakadate Aikitsu 
was unimpressed with the physics laboratory at Tokyo University, 
whose equipment comprised a professor's desk, three small tables, 
three instrument cabinets, a heliostat for light experiments, and a cur­
tain to make a darkroom.29 In 1879 T. C. Mendenhall and his four 
students "built everything with their own hands" because there was 
"no experimental equipment at all."30 In 1880 the physicist Yamakawa 
Kenjiro was only slightly more hopeful. "Unfortunately we are depen­
dent on foreign supplies. . . . While poorly equipped for work in elec­
tricity and magnetism, we do have equipment for optics, acoustics, and 
heat studies."31 
Other laboratory facilities were also inadequate. German professors 
in Tokyo's medical school constantly complained of the lack of equip­
ment in the late 1870s.32 The zoologist Charles O. Whitman lamented 
the deficiencies in marine biology, in 1881 calling Tokyo University 
"inferior in every particular" to European institutions, upbraiding his 
colleagues for their lack of research, and castigating the government for 
indifference. 
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Will any Japanese admit that Dai Nippon, with its 34,000,000 
inhabitants, is not able to support one first-class university? 
Any science that offers small opportunities for pilfering 
squeezers,' makes no promise to improve the rice crop or the 
flavor of the sake, serves none of the wants of sensual pleasure, 
jingles no bells, and refuses to make use of the sop offlattery, may 
be suffered to exist for the sake of appearances, but it is certain to 
be stigmatized as unprofitable.33 
The inglorious fate of the Tokyo Academy appears to support Whit-
man's view. Toward the end of 1878 education ministry adviser David 
Murray had called the attention of Vice Minister Tanaka Fujimaro to 
the contributions of foreign science academies to the development of 
their respective national states and formally proposed that Japan join 
their ranks by creating its own academy of science. Seven members of 
the former Meirokusha society learned of Murray's suggestion and add­
ed their endorsement Tanaka and these seven met together and agreed 
on a number of points: academicians were to choose their own mem­
bers, beginning with the nucleus of seven, up to a total of forty; all the 
arts and sciences were to berepresented; the minister of education was 
to "approve" all appointments; members would meet periodically to 
discuss various topics, including current policies of the Ministry of 
Education; a ministryrepresentative would attend each meeting; mem­
bers would receive annual stipends of three hundred yen; and the 
government would recognize the academy officially. *4 
Nothing went as the sponsors had hoped. The academy lost its most 
committed supporter when Tanaka fell from power late in 1879, and 
few other officials wanted a science academy purely for national pres­
tige.35 Instead, they were concerned with useful results, which were 
not always quickly forthcoming. Observers like the chemist Sakurai Joji 
hinted that this might be due to the small number of natural scientists 
who belonged to the academy—only one in 1879, two in 1885, and 
seven in 1898.36 Kato Hiroyuki said it was because the government 
thought the members were "physical decrepits with no ability."37 
Hasegawa Tai claimed itresulted from the members' "excessive defer­
ence to officialdom," elicited by the overbearing presence of their for­
mer Meirokusha colleague Mori Arinori in the office of minister of 
education.38 A present-day historian attributes the stagnation to cuts in 
support accompanying the Matsukata Deflation (1880-82).39 Kato 
summarized the feelings of contemporary intellectuals when he 
claimed that the failure of the Tokyo academy, was a major disgrace to 
the nation.40 
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But Kato's judgment lacked perspective. Meiji Japan had plenty of 
other problems: a civil insurrection to put down (1876-77), samurai 
indebtedness to resolve, children to educate, technicians to be trained, 
factories to be built. It needed to construct railroads and set up modem 
communications. Military reform demanded attention, as did medical 
care and modern public health. Moreover, Kato's and Whitman's 
charges are based on invidious comparisons, which historical facts do 
not justify. Conditions in Europe's best universities were better than 
those at Tokyo University, but they had reached that level quite re­
cently. Prior to 1800 all European universities were supposed to pass on 
received information, not create knowledge.41 Only in 1827 did Justus 
von Lie big build the first research laboratory in a German university 
(Giessen); Britain had nothing comparable until 1845. There was some 
expansion of facilities in the 1850s and 1860s. but research laboratories 
came to be considered an indispensable feature of the modern univer­
sity only after the Franco-Prussian War.42 
Nor was the desirability of a science academy clear for Japan at that 
time. Men like Galileo, Sprat, and Colbert had promoted them in the 
seventeenth century because the universities of their day were hostile 
to science, and they spread because the conditions that spawned them 
persisted.43 Even in the eighteenth century science remained a modest 
component of European culture, despite its growing reputation. Scien­
tists were either wealthy or practiced another occupation, and patrons 
belonged to the aristocracy or the affluent, rising middle class. Univer­
sities continued to reflect the conservative views of the landed elite, and 
governments that supported science academies, like that of Russia, did 
so for reasons of national prestige.44 None of this changed before the 
French Revolution; the functions of academies changed first Rather 
than performing contract research at official (or private) instigation, 
their primary mission was now to honor scientists. To the founders' 
dismay, the American National Academy of Sciences, created in 1863, 
served only this honorific function.45 The St Petersburg Academy of 
mid-nineteenth century Russia lost some of its research to the reformed 
universities.46 
The late 1880s brought changes in conditions for Japanese research. 
During Tokyo University's first eight years the college of science had 
functioned with makeshift quarters, but in September 1885 new facili­
ties were completed at the main Hongo campus. The two new buildings 
were described by one physicist as elegant Modeled on the buildings at 
Berlin University, they had red brick facing and slate-tiled roofs. Chem­
istry laboratories and classrooms filled the second floor of one of the 
buildings, while physics and mathematics occupied the first47 The 
following year was equally momentous, with three major changes on 
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the Tokyo campus. The Imperial College of Engineering was moved to 
Hongo and merged with the engineering component of the college of 
science to form a new faculty of engineering. The science and medical 
colleges also became faculties, and the graduate school was established. 
Creation of several nonacademic laboratories further expanded Japa­
nese capacities for research. The Nishigahara Silk Experiment Station 
was built in 1886, the Experiment Station of the Bureau of Forestry and 
the Misaki Institute for Marine Life Studies requested by Whitman in 
1887, and the Tokyo University Observatory in 1888. 
These developments were part of a quest for useful knowledge. The 
prominent statesman Okuma Shigenobu declared in 1884 that tech­
nical research would help Japanese industry, and the Imperial Univer­
sity Ordinance (1886) made the same point.48 For thus reason a number 
of facilities for applied technical research were established. In 1891 the 
Electrotechnical Laboratory appeared, followed by the Central Institute 
for Weights and Measures (1903), the Fermentation Laboratory (also 
1903), and the Railways Research Institute (1907). Their direction and 
the timing of their creation were affected by several different factors. 
For one thing, German achievements with scientific institutions 
were arousing some interest in Japan. The German technische Hoch­
schulen (higher technical schools) were teaching engineering in a sys­
tematic, straightforward manner. British-style hands-on experience 
was valuable, and Japanese did work in Britain to acquire it, but the 
schoolroom approach was faster and generally more efficient. Second, 
Germany had more industry-oriented laboratories, with higher levels of 
funding, than any other country. Because of this, W. H. Perkin, founder 
of the modern dye industry, left Britain for Germany in 1856. Germany's 
chemical industry surpassed Britain's.49 Third, the German univer­
sities had established the world's first advanced training programs in 
medicine and basic science, attracting students from many other coun­
tries and eliciting fulsome praise from foreign academic reformers. 
Nevertheless, officials in Japan were unwilling to adopt the German 
system wholesale. The Germans gave insufficient recognition to disci­
plines that they valued highly. Applied technicalfields like engineering 
and agriculture were established in German academic institutions, but 
they were not accepted in German universities.50 They were taught 
instead in the higher technical schools and had an implied lack of 
prestige. Japanese complained also about German organization. By the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century there were some twenty-eight 
German-speaking universities adhering more or less to a common set of 
traditions. Each field of knowledge at each university was represented 
by a single full professor, and professors had almost total control over 
the internal affairs of their institutions. Auxiliary, subordinate faculty 
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members were appointed as needed. Private lecturers were allowed to 
offer courses as a means of stimulating academic competition, and they, 
together with the students, moved almost at will from university to 
university. Japanese officials were ambivalent about this system. Some 
praised its freedom of movement. Others thought itrevealeda commit­
ment to learning. But most just considered it far too expensive for Japan 
to adopt. 
Universityrelations with the German imperial government were also 
a source of objections. Although Germany by the last quarter of the 
century was a unified nation, the states stillretained extensive authori­
ty, including much power in the area of education. The Universities of 
Berlin, Munich, and Heidelberg were state institutions, but the 
provinces controlled them, not the central government. Because the 
Meiji leaders wanted a highly centralized state, they investigated other 
models and were attracted to the French. French education had two 
major virtues from their point of view. It was highly centralized, with 
the University of Paris and the Ministry of Public Instruction at the top 
of a bureaucratic hierarchy, and the makeup of each component al­
lowed professorships to be created as needed. 
Meiji leaders efforts to centralize also had their centripetal effects. 
Many wealthy farmers, now freed of the daimyo, preferred to befree of 
Tokyo as well. Christians and certain intellectuals often aspired to a 
higher moral end than the Meiji state and its all-pervasive cult of Shinto 
and the emperor. Some physicians cherished the freewheeling tradi­
tions of a loosely regulated profession. Samurai from formerly pro-
Tokugawa domainsresented the Satsuma-Choshu leadership for block­
ing their political advancement. Such attitudes matter here because 
they impinged on research: groups with otherwise disparate interests 
would conspire in the areas of research and academic policy. 
Diet Politics and Science in the 1890s 
The 1890s was a watershed period for Japanese science in the years 
before World War I. Professors from Europe and North America had 
returned to their homes by 1900. Gaps in basic knowledge, which had 
previously loomed so large, were in most cases bridged by the end of this 
decade.51 The university chair system was created in 1893, Kyoto Uni­
versity was founded in 1897, and the government began making com­
mitments to basic research. Government initiatives—replacing for­
eigners with Japanese professors or founding new chairs—were 
particularly conspicuous. But by no means did officials take every for­
ward step. Private individuals and groups were also active. 
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The Imperial Diet, founded in 1890, was the principal instrument 
they used. Given the parliament's character and subsequent history, 
this is rather surprising, but circumstances made using the Diet effec­
tive in this period. The creation of a representative assembly as a coun­
terpoise to the leadership and the imperial bureaucracy had been a 
central demand of the popular rights movement in the 1870s and 
1880s. After the general election of 1890, the first under the new con­
stitution, many rich farmers, businessmen, and professionals (includ­
ing several physicians) became members of the Diet and began to 
oppose the leadership. In 1890 the new parliament cut the budget by 
about 10 percent In 1891 it filibustered legislation. In 1892 it almost 
impeached the cabinet, and in 1893 it sent a letter to the emperor which 
sought dismissal of Prime Minister ltd.32 Some of this behavior was 
motivated by a desire to establish its place in the constitutional system 
of an autocratic state, but some of it also reflected commitments to 
particular policies. 
Advancing research in Japanese agriculture was one of the goals of 
the Diet. Reflecting the size of the agricultural economy and the Ameri­
can Morrill Act precedent (1862) that established agricultural colleges, 
the Meiji government had awarded small subsidies for testing and re­
search in 1886 and in 1890 had expanded the Agricultural Experiment 
Station at Komaba in Tokyo. In 1895 it established a seven-facility 
network, but this failed to satisfy the need or demand for a much greater 
effort in agricultural research. Further expansion was limited by finan­
cial commitments and allegedly by staff shortages, and the way was 
open for private individuals to launch their own proposals. A group of 
Shizuoka tea growers began agitating for a tea industry experiment 
station in 1895. The same year saw legislation introduced to provide 
modest subsidies to eighteen local and prefectural facilities. And Naha 
Kiyoshi, who had founded an entomological laboratory in 1896, re­
quested a subvention in 1899. 
Private proposals for research in agriculture were all rejected at first. 
In part this was because of costs. Naha's backers requested only 3,000 
yen over afive-year period, but the tea growers' proposal and that for the 
additional experiment stations called for much larger sums—10,000 
and 150,000 yen each year, respectively. As the chief of the Bureau of 
Agriculture declared during the Sino-Japanese War: "The government 
recognizes the need for these experiment stations but cannot grant 
subsidies because of heavy military spending."53 But cost was just one 
of the problems. Did the country have enough agricultural researchers 
to manage an expanded program? The Bureau of Agriculture chief 
claimed in apparent good faith (but contrary to fact) that research work­
ers were not sufficiently numerous.54 Could they work with farmers 
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and officials? Representative Nakamura Yaroku, who had a B.S. degree 
in physics, a D.Sc. in forestry, yet was an opponent of subsidies, said the 
researchers who were already working talked over farmers' heads, 
while a colleague who favored expansion noted accusations of re­
searchers' condescension toward officials.55 
The major obstacle in the 1890s was fear of the national government 
Most officials approved of subsidies and considered them desirable in 
principle; the private sector wanted them desperately but was divided 
on the probable effects. Some farmers and their representatives put 
economic interests ahead of political concerns; others did just the re­
verse. Throughout the 1890s members of the Diet who had either taken 
part in the popular rights movement or were actively sympathetic de­
picted agricultural research subsidies as a means of intervention by 
Tokyo. As Representative Komatsu Sanshd declared in 1896: "When 
the government exerts itself to help in such matters, it almost always 
creates unendurable interference. . .  . If we want to promote popular 
rights at all. if we truly wish to defend local autonomy, I am firmly 
convinced that we cannot ask for state support and at the same time 
avoid the interference by government that [usually] accompanies such 
proposals."56 Government finances eased by 1900, and these scruples 
were partially overcome. Local experiment stations' first subsidies were 
awarded that year; and the Naha Laboratory got support two years later. 
But the tea growers had to wait until 1919. 
Medical research was also of concern to both private and public 
sectors. In the latter seventeenth century government sponsorship had 
launched Western studies of anatomy, and in the eighteenth century, 
studies of smallpox vaccination. But subsequent breakthroughs in dis­
section and anesthesia were made by private physicians, creating a 
mixed history that set the stage in Meiji Japan for a complex set of 
relationships. The predominant tendency was for the private sector to 
be the innovator, while government agencies provided the research 
infrastructure and financed important separate projects. But some new 
research projects were launched by government agencies, and some 
private agencies wanted their own infrastructure. These political trends 
led to bitter conflicts between those who wished to keep public and 
private separate and those who wanted to merge them. 
The establishment of the Institute of Infectious Diseases in 1893 
illustrates these crosscurrents. The institute was the most important 
research facility built in Japan before World War I, and its legal spon­
sorship and initial funding came from the private sector, but the Diet 
provided a subsidy, approved only after a plan for full state funding had 
been rejected. Executive direction of the laboratory was vested in 
Kitasato Shibasaburo, a scientist and low-ranking official at that time. 
LAYING THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS IOI

The leading parliamentary sponsor of the subsidy was an irascible phy­
sician who had moved freely between the public and private sectors; the 
subsidy plan's leading opponent had previously been president of Tokyo 
University. All this begins to show the complexity of the forces at work, 
but to explain the outcome one must consider the social position of 
Tokyo University, the effects of the popular rights movement, and the 
impact of German precedents in organizing medical research. 
The Institute of Infectious Diseases resulted from spectacular 
achievements by bacteriologists in the 1870s and 1880s, but its imme­
diate inception traces to the discovery of tuberculin by Koch (1890). As 
noted earlier, his description of the substance as a cure for tuberculosis 
proved highly controversial and inspired further efforts to clarify the 
issues. The bureaucratic structure of medicine in Japan strongly influ­
enced these efforts. One program to study tuberculin was initiated by 
physicians in the Ministry of Home Affairs, where public health pro­
grams were housed, and a second was directed by several university 
professors—subject to control by the Ministry of Education. The two 
agencies then developed plans for follow-up research as the testing 
proceeded. Inevitably, each ministry submitted plans to the cabinet for 
a research facility of its own.57 
Kitasato's role in the subsequent conflict was a major and enduring 
complication. Adamantly opposed to any affiliation with the Ministry of 
Education, he had rejected Tokyo University's invitation to join its fac­
ulty upon returning to Japan late in 1891 and instead sought private 
support for his work. With the backing of Fukuzawa Yukichi, indus­
trialist Morimura Ichizaemon, and a private medical foundation called 
the Great Japan Hygiene Society (Dai Nihon Shiritsu Eisei Kai), he 
managed to open a small laboratory for bacteriological studies in Sep­
tember 1892. It soon proved too small. Lacking the money for expan­
sion, the society persuaded one of its members, Hasegawa Tai, also a 
member of the Diet, to request a subsidy from the national govern­
ment In the meantime, the cabinet of Prime Minister ltd Hirobumi 
had decided to seek approval of the education ministry's proposal, 
which would have created a bacteriological laboratory in conjunction 
with Tokyo University.58 This line-up offerees set the stage for a long-
term struggle. 
Sponsorship and control were the issues. Both proposals called for 
Kitasato to be named research director, but with varying definitions of 
authority. Hasegawa's bill assigned him control over budget and staff 
appointments and made him a consultant to the Bureau of Public 
Health. TTie proposal of the Ministry of Education made no mention of 
consultancy and denied him executive independence.59 Particularly 
intense debate focused on the role of Tokyo University. Hasegawa 
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wanted to exclude it completely. According to him, the university did 
not need an infectious diseases laboratory because it already had a small 
laboratory for hygiene directed by Ogata Masanori. Moreover, the sepa­
ration between basic and clinical medicine in the faculty was likely to 
obstruct Kitasato's work just as the same structure at Berlin had done 
with Koch s. Finally, he argued, the Ministry of Education would proba­
bly interfere with Kitasato's work, given the history of conflict between 
them.60 
Opponents, however—especially the former university president 
Watanabe Koki—insisted that the university's role should be large and 
argued that private sponsorship was wrong. According to Watanabe, 
Tokyo University was Japan's pacesetter for all advanced learning. Gov­
ernment sponsorship was necessary because of Kitasato's background 
of employment in public health and support from a government schol­
arship. Koch's laboratory in Germany was government-funded, so 
Kitasato's should be as well. Private sponsorship of such an important 
facility might give foreign countries the idea that Japan did not value 
research too highly, and supporting someone whose ties with the Minis­
try of Education were so strained seemed inherently undesirable.61 
The government lost the debate. At the conclusion of formal argu­
ment the Diet rejected the education ministry's request for 34,659 yen 
and instead awarded the Kitasato group 20,000 yen for construction 
and 45,000 yen for three years' operations. This decision did not end the 
conflict. Watanabe was so bitterly opposed to what he called the "pri­
vate" development of science that he led a campaign to block construc­
tion of the new institute. He became a leading spokesman for residents 
of Tokyo's Shiba Park district, where the facility was to be built. They 
objected to its presence in their neighborhood for a variety of aesthetic, 
financial, and hygienic grounds and tried to block implementation of 
the enabling legislation. Their opposition failed for a number of reasons. 
Kitasato was indispensable—Japan really had no other bacteriologists 
at that time—and his supporters proved politically adept Hasegawa 
and other backers explained the work of the similarly constituted Koch 
and Pasteur institutes in lectures for the general public, they gained the 
active support of several Tokyo newspapers, and Kitasato himself held a 
series of meetings with delegations of Shiba Park residents. Their suc­
cess was assured when the press called Watanabe's movement irra­
tional and subjected his actions to "indiscriminate ridicule."62 
The legacy of ties between government and variousfields of learning 
gave Watanabe's views greater currency than his failure suggests. At­
tempts to control certain disciplines were by no means eliminated by 
the collapse of the Tokugawa shogunate in 1868. Public discussion in 
the Meiji period regularly featured conflict between the so-called 
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shigaku (private learning) and kangaku (state learning) perspectives, 
focusing on the extent or incidence of private-sector initiative to be 
permitted in technical studies.63 Meiji leaders frequently inclined to­
ward kangaku but had to accept alternatives. Fukuzawa Yukichi thus 
created a medical school at Keio (1874), Okuma Shigenobu an en­
gineering program at Waseda (1882) and Niijima Jo a full-fledged sci­
ence and engineering college, the Harris School of Science, at Doshisha 
(1889). But these actions were only grudgingly tolerated, and all three 
programs foundered. The Keio medical program closed down in 1876, 
Okuma's engineering course terminated in 1884. and the Harris School 
shut its doors in 1897.64 While their circumstances differed, govern­
ment refusal to grant these institutions legal equality with Tokyo Uni­
versity was a common factor 65 
Other aspirations and views also contributed to the conflict. Activists 
in the popular rights movement, which had directed public anger 
against the leadership's power monopoly, took a strong position in favor 
of private education and consistently opposed efforts by the education 
ministry to restrict freedom of action. Shimada Saburo, Kono Hironaka, 
and Hasegawa Tai, who had helped to found the Liberal and Pro­
gressive parties (Jiyuto and Kaishinto), all sponsored the subsidy legis­
lation for Kitasato's laboratory, criticizing the views of the Ministry of 
Education. Hasegawa ran a private medical academy, the Zaisei 
Gakusha, which the ministry repeatedly tried to close.66 
Confronting them were the government's constitutional advisers 
from Germany and their like-thinking Japanese followers. Lorenz von 
Stein in 1882 and Herman Roesler in 1890 warned Japanese officials 
about what they considered to be the political dangers of private educa­
tion. Roesler prepared a memorandum for the education ministry prof­
fering this advice: "Ideas and opinions based on science [emphasis 
added] determine the nature and the scope of people's knowledge and 
exert great influence on their ideas about. . . law, politics, religion, the 
state, and society. . . (For this reason] higher education should never 
b e . .  . private."67 To their credit, however, many Japanese officials 
rejected this basic philosophy. In a celebratedriposte to an 1879 memo­
randum on the same subject by Emperor Meiji's Confucian lecturer, I to 
Hirobumi had dismissed the notion of ineluctable "spillover" from sci­
ence to society, arguing that it was actually the politicizing tendency of 
Confucianism rather than the rationalism of science that encouraged 
seditious or subversive activities.68 
Decisions about infrastructure, however, continued to generate con­
troversy. Was the level of spending correct? How many universities 
should there be? How should they be organized? Was an upgraded 
science academy desirable? If so, what should it do? Could the German 
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private-lecturer system invigorate the learned establishment? How 
should professorships be allocated by fields? The cleavages created by 
these issues were sharp, and they differed from their common por­
trayals. They did not center on which models to adopt, but on how to 
combine elements of a number of models. Nor was the conflict between 
officials—allegedly advocating German models—and spokesmen for 
the private sector favoring modelsfrom Britain or France. Instead Ger­
man experience set parameters for debate over a "mixed Continental" 
system.69 
These debates were also ironic in view of the apparent firmness of 
policy. A broad array of well-funded programs was supposed to exist, 
with access dependent on and proportional to the number of high 
school graduates. Professors were supposed to carry on research and 
teaching together. And the Ministry of Education was supposed to 
supervise a network of seven or eight institutions.70 But serious prob­
lems existed in each of these areas and others. There were comprehen­
sive programs, but funding was precarious. Many more students 
qualified for university admission than one institution could possibly 
accommodate. Faculty members wereregularly accused of indolence or 
lethargy in research, and only one university—Tokyo—was actually 
operating. These difficulties, however understandable, gave critics 
more room for maneuvering. Representative Kamino Ryo attacked the 
concentration in Tokyo of educational resources.7' The education jour­
nal Kokka kyoiku deplored the lack of competition among both pro­
fessors and students.72 Hasegawa Tai, criticizing the relatively high 
ratio of professors to students, labeled Tokyo a "caricature of a foreign 
university."73 Such attacks were more than rhetoric. In 1890 the Diet 
tried to cut the university's budget by 17 percent—and did reduce it 6 
percent in 1892.74 
In 1893 the Ministry of Education took steps to respond to outside 
pressure. Acting on a proposal from the former university president 
Kato Hiroyuki, Minister Inoue Kowashi decided on a change in the 
university's structure. Hisreform called for establishment of a faculty 
chair system. Before this time, Tokyo University had operated under a 
department structure that many had attacked for inefficiency. Pro­
fessors in a given academic unit—law, medicine, engineering—had 
been responsible for teaching any of its courses. This encouraged intel­
lectualflexibility, but it impeded specialization and was thought to raise 
costs. Inoue wanted a sharper demarcation of professorial responsibility 
so he couldreplace costly foreigners and reduce expenses. After study­
ing university organization in Germany and France, he created a chair 
system suited to Japan. Each professor wasresponsible for a specialty. 
Multiple chairs were established in certain high-demand fields. Occu­
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pants of chairs exercised formal academic and financial control over 
younger faculty and graduate students in their areas, and a two-part 
compensation system awarded extra funds to the more productive pro­
fessors and laboratories.75 
Short-term results from these changes were mixed. Some money 
was saved. The initial scheme presumed creation of 152 chairs for the 
university. Inoue reduced this to 125, but even this number allowed for 
expansion of the teaching staff and a 12 percent cost reduction.76 The 
provision (after the French model) for multiple chairs in high-demand 
fields offered the possibility of greater competition in science. But most 
critics of higher education remained unimpressed. Some attacked the 
un-German use of full-time university administrators. Why should 
deans hold office full time? Could the university president not hold 
down two jobs? "At the University of Berlin, the president changes 
office every year."77 Others said competition was still insufficient. Pro­
fessors would improve their lectures if, as in Germany, students paid 
them fees to attend. The same result might follow from appointing 
privatdozenten to the faculty.™ Better still would be to create more 
imperial universities. As things stood, professors were too often neglect­
ing their main duties to attend sessions of the House of Peers in the 
Diet, do private consulting, or otherwise pursue side employment. 
"Those engaged in scientific research [and teaching], whether medi­
cine or physical science, cannot finish anything by working only one 
hour a day or three days a week" was the contention of Hasegawa Tai.7<( 
Education officials in the 1890s showed a flexible response to these 
charges. In some cases they maintained that solutions were in place. 
Professors' salaries, for example, were said to be docked if three weeks 
of classes were missed.80 In other cases they repeated earlier argu­
ments. Throughout the 1890s—and beyond—officials rejected such 
German practices as lecture fees, frequent rotation of administrators, 
and appointment of unsalaried lecturers on the legitimate grounds that 
the necessary conditions were lacking in Japan. Referring to the ab­
sence of a large corps of academics or of a national university network, 
Vice Minister Kubota Yuzururemarked that Tokyo University's organi­
zational framework was created "step by step," that officials had tried to 
develop organizational forms that were "suitable to Japan," and that the 
"foreign devices" suggested by critics would be "difficult to imple­
ment"81 But in other situations these same officials were strongly in­
clined to equivocate. Asked late in 1893 whether the government 
planned to establish a second imperial university anytime soon, Makino 
Nobuaki, Kubota's successor, declared to the House of Representatives 
Budget Committee: "We do have to consider whether or not we should 
establish another university, whether the government or students 
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would have a need for it. On that basis we might build another one. But I 
am not going to promise we will build one this year. There is no real 
obstacle if the need exists. If the question is what would be best in 
absolute terms, then of course a multiplicity is better."82 
Establishment of a second imperial university was, in fact, a major 
event. Kyoto University began with faculties of science, engineering, 
and medicine which greatly enlarged infrastructure. In 1896 Japan had 
85 university chairs in technical fields: 18 in basic science, 24 in en­
gineering, 23 in medicine and pharmacology, and 20 in agriculture, 
forestry, and veterinary medicine. By 1898 basic science had 25 chairs, 
engineering 41, medicine 23, agriculture and the rest 20, for a total of 
109. Expansion of this sort was probably inevitable, but its execution 
and timing were not. Cost was always one deterrent. In 1898 it cost the 
government 3,074 yen to maintain a chair at Tokyo but 4,445 yen for the 
same chair at Kyoto, and operating costs per student differed by a ratio 
of 28 : 73.83 Moreover, educational philosophy was another deterrent 
for some in positions of influence. Academic administrators like Kiku­
chi Dairoku and Kato Hiroyuki saw university education as a route to 
power and for a time opposed expansion in order to maintain elitism.84 
But the forces in favor of expansion were irresistible. Political de­
mands for educational opportunities naturally had an effect. Tokyo Uni­
versity reached its mandated capacity of 460 students per graduating 
class as the chair system came into being. But the five higher schools 
were annually graduating about three times that number, and most 
wished to go on.85 Furthermore, industry, which grew rapidly with the 
Sino-Japanese War, consistently demanded more engineers and tech­
nical specialists. Engineering enrollments mushroomed at all levels, 
and the educational system was hard pressed to respond. As early as 
1894 Minister Inoue referred to the problem in a speech to the Diet. 
Vice Minister Makino in 1897 stressed the difficulties both of finding 
and of keeping engineering professors in his testimony before the 
House Budget Committee, and Representative Shiba Sankuro noted 
complaints from Tokyo students about academic engineers' neglect of 
their duties.86 Such criticisms were justified. Prior to World War I, 
academic engineers rarely held one post for long. Universities com­
peted for their services with government and business and were fortu­
nate to keep them five years.87 
But the principal reasons for founding Kyoto University were much 
more strictly academic. For example, many believed that Tokyo Univer­
sity had stagnated. Suzuki Manjiro, a physician, based his case to the 
Diet for a second university on the need to eliminate the "academic evils 
that derive from the monopolies of a single institution."88 Toyama 
Shoichi, later minister of education, said a second imperial university 
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would shake Tokyo University out of the "torpor into which it has 
tended to drift"89 Hasegawa Tai in 1891 called the establishment of a 
second university in the Kansai region "indispensable to the develop­
ment of education in Japan," adding: "Attentive observation shows that 
because of the lack of competition, [Tokyo University] professors have 
ceased to try to discover new scientific theories, and the students have 
ceased to pursue their. . . objectives.tygo Many, if not most, in authority 
agreed. Inoue in 1894 spoke favorably of Hasegawa's views in a letter to 
ltd Hirobumi.91 Others commented approvingly on the rivalries be­
tween Cambridge and Oxford in Britain and between Yale and Harvard 
in the United States.92 Vice Minister Makino underscored this theme at 
the time that Kyoto was founded, saying: "|Kyoto University] was cre­
ated out of practical necessity We [in the Ministry of Education] hope 
competition between the two institutions will yield many benefits. 
Our hopes for progress had diminished with only the single universitv 
in Tokyo . . . (However), both institutions will have chairs in matching 
fields. So if one of the professors invents something, he will become 
widely known and trusted, and the students will greatly respect him. '^:i 
The university chair system Inoue had instituted also elicited con­
cern. Hasegawa was a vigorous defender of the one-chair rule and was 
in principle opposed to large faculties. In December 1891 he had com­
pared Tokyo with its 316 professors and 2,590 students unfavorably 
with Berlin (324 and 6,626) and Munich (172 and 3,646), citing the 
case of physics as a subject taught in two different colleges. "If first-
year engineering students are weak in physics, they should enter the 
science college and study it for a year with a specialist. "94 After the chair 
system came into existence, he continued to insist on this view It was 
"ridiculous" to have three chairs in pharmacology.95 There should be 
no duplication of programs for applied chemistry.96 Multiple chairs in 
physiology were not needed.97 The Ministry of Education and it allies, 
of course, had their own views. Not only was it cheaper to expand by 
adding chairs as opposed to whole universities, one had always to con­
sider objectives. "Our need for knowledge," said Representative 
Nakamura Yaroku in reference to mathematics, "is one of the reasons 
for the large number of university professors." Vice Minister Tsuji Shin­
ji declared, "Scientific knowledge in Japan lags far behind that of other 
countries. For that reason we have to do a great deal of research. It is 
completely erroneous to say that there are too many professors for the 
number of students. . . .The professors must first investigate the theo­
ries of the leading foreign scientists. . . .Our scientists study their work 
and are making it known here."98 Theresult—Kyoto University—was 
a compromise that allowed the country to develop a university network 
while avoiding fixed limits on chairs. 
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Founding a second university was difficult; making it function was 
more so. By imperial ordinance universities were supposed to be com­
prehensive and had to have at least two faculties. Because of the intense 
demand for more engineers and physicians, having faculties in those 
areas was a foregone conclusion, but little else was certain. Some mem­
bers of the Diet favored faculties of agriculture and commerce; some 
officials were partial to letters and law." The education ministry's basic 
plan called for a university two-thirds the size of Tokyo with space for 
1,250 students: 400 in science and engineering, 400 in medicine, 300 
in law, and 150 in letters. But the cost of this plan was too great for the 
limited resources. President-designate Kinoshita Hiroji estimated that a 
four-faculty institution of this size should cost 10 million yen, at a time 
when the government's entire budget for postsecondary education was 
only 1.5 million yen. l0° As a result, the decision was made to begin with 
engineering, science, and medicine and shortly thereafter add law. 
Lack of funds caused other adjustments, too. Basic science and en­
gineering were combined in a single faculty that excluded geology and 
the biological sciences. Maximum use was made of existing academic 
facilities. Because higher school programs paralleled those at the uni­
versity level, for only 300,000 yen facilities for applied chemistry, metal­
lurgy, and mining engineering were added to the physical plant of the 
Third Higher School, located in Kyoto, and the whole transferred to 
Kyoto University.l01 The government also got outside support. After 
lengthy negotiations, the Kyoto prefectural authorities donated 16.2 
acres of land to the new university and 31,000 yen for construction.102 
Similar plans for the faculty of medicine, however, could not be fulfilled. 
One called for locating the faculty in Osaka and using the physical plant 
of the Osaka Prefectural Medical College. This had partisans in the 
Diet, the Ministry of Education, and the office of Osaka's prefectural 
governor, but the prefectural assembly balked, and the Kyoto au­
thorities opposed it.103 A second plan was to build the faculty in Kyoto 
and use the facilities of its prefectural medical college, but this ran afoul 
of the college's dean, Inoko Shikanosuke, who argued that the 51,000 
yen budgeted was wholly inadequate. The upshot was an additional 
land purchase and the establishment of new facilities in Kyoto.104 
Another difficulty in founding the university was a serious shortage 
of professors. One solution was to send more ryugakusei abroad to 
qualify themselves for professorships. Vice Minister Makino estimated 
in March 1897 that a hundred professors should be hired just to open 
the first two faculties. Only about half that number were available, so 
the government requested 39,166 yen to support foreign study for 25 
more.105 Another solution was to appoint some foreigners. According to 
proponents, foreigners would not just compensate for a shortage of 
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Japanese, but their employment would shorten the time needed to 
"raise Japan to the level of [advanced] foreign countries." The for­
eigners would stimulate their Japanese colleagues. "There is a chance 
for renewal with the foreigners here since they bring new ideas . . . and 
present them to students."106 Other solutions—to delay the com­
mencement of programs or to hire private school graduates—were also 
proposed, but not with any enthusiasm. 
Although none of these solutions got wholehearted support, some 
were less offensive than others. Increasing the number of students 
abroad was described as unnecessary, too expensive, and embarrassing 
to the academic community. Japanese universities were probably "not 
very good" if so many new professors were needed. Hiring the gradu­
ates of Doshisha or Keio would "weaken private education." Delay in 
starting up academic programs would be "highly unfair to the stu­
dents."107 People particularly resisted hiring foreigners, saying that it 
would cause "friction with less educated (Japanese] professors,"1O8 that 
linguistic problems would impede intellectual exchange, and that Japa­
nese surely could cope with the complexities of 'newfangled sci­
ences."109 After much debate, the government decided to postpone 
academic programs scheduled to begin in September 1899 to January 
1900 for science and engineering and March for medicine and law. The 
proposal for expansion of overseas study was approved when the vice 
minister of education testified: "There is nothing more important for 
our country than implanting these advancing fields of science. We will 
regret it a hundred years from now if this effort is frustrated. . . .It is 
quite impossible to push scientific research ahead by merely relying on 
foreigners."110 
The university's problems raised serious issues of quality. Diet mem­
bers worried that inordinate haste in appointing professors might pro­
duce an inadequate faculty. An education ministry spokesman said the 
library was much too small. Two years after the formal opening the 
university president complained that Kyoto had "no books, no equip­
ment, no specimens, nothing." The greatest problems by every account 
existed in physical science. The physics section needed gas purification 
machines to break down water. The physical chemistry laboratory had 
no generators. The research facilities in general could not stand foreign 
comparison, and returned ryugakusei had few colleagues. Officials 
thought that the reasons for this were largely historical "Quite a 
number of people have carried on scientific research in the thirty years 
since the Restoration took place," the vice minister of education noted. 
"But we Japanese have little experience with any of the physical 
sciences."111 
Public debates on the science academy were even more forceful and 
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pointed. The academy had originally been conceived of as an adviser to 
government. Ministers of education were supposed to seek members' 
counsel on a wide range of issues, especially those important to policy. 
But after Mori Arinori's tenure in office (1885-89), the academy was 
pushed aside, and its influence declined. Instead of advising govern­
ment officials, members devoted their energies to private consulting, 
translation activity, and editorial work for one journal. Each received an 
annual stipend of 300 yen for these tasks. Diet members once active in 
the popularrights movement deeply resented the changes, arguing that 
the academy had lost its guiding inspiration and had nothing substan­
tive to say. They charged that some academy members were "senile," 
that only "sycophants" could become members, and that what little the 
academy did do was "inconsequential" and a waste of money. Rather 
than spend money on this kind of "almshouse," the government should 
give it to Tokyo University or direct it to some other purpose.'12 
Education officials rejected these charges and developed a defense 
claiming that the actual cost of the academy was rather small, that it 
was producing "good results for a backward country," that other coun­
tries with academies of science were receiving "significant benefits," 
that the Tokyo Academy of Sciences was "not really an academy in the 
foreign sense." and that one should never forget how far Japan had 
come in the years since the shogunate ended.113 
Ministry officials also came up with an argument of greater impor­
tance: the Academy of Sciences was desperately needed for scholars 
who were academic misfits.114 Their case in point was ltd Keisuke 
(1803-1901), the noted physician and botanist As mentioned earlier, 
ltd did botanical research before the Restoration and remained quite 
active after it. He helped to found a group dedicated to scientific studies 
(the Ydydsha), became director of Tokyo University's botanical garden, 
helped found the Tokyo Botanical Society, and joined the Tokyo Acade­
my of Sciences as one of its earliest members. Between 1881 and 1886, 
ltd also served as professor of botany at Tokyo University. In 1888 he 
received the first doctoral degree.! 15 
Nevertheless, I to was not fully a part of the academic mainstream 
and was rejected by some (see chapter 3). This implied a need for other 
support, and options were not very numerous. A sinecure with the 
Tokyo Museum paid him 480 yen per year, while the botanical garden 
post and university professorship brought in 600 more yen.116 The 300 
yen ltd got from the academy was essential for a middle-class life. 
Minister Inoue Kowashi explained the situation this way: "There are 
still people [from Tokugawa times] with considerable experience who 
have made valuable contributions to the progress of knowledge. One 
such person, ltd Keisuke . . . would be reduced nearly to poverty if the 
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300 yen we give him were taken away. It would not beright to treat this 
eminent scholar in such a [cavalier] way."117 The Diet was only partly 
convinced. It authorized payments of money to ltd but dismissed all 
plans to expand the academy. 
The Struggle to Define a Research Posture 
By the end of the nineteenth century the Japanese scientific and tech­
nical community had entered a new steady state, with support guaran­
teed but at minimal levels. Facilities were inadequate, budgets inse­
cure, and expectations low except in medicine, where infrastructure 
and research activity occasionally reached the levels of the West. The 
fifteen years preceding World War I saw several major efforts to im­
prove the situation. The imperial university system expanded with new 
foundations in Kyushu (at Fukuoka) and the Tohoku region (at Sendai). 
The government decided after all to expand the Tokyo Academy of 
Sciences and restate its objectives. Several commercial organizations 
became actively interested in research. A slow but significant trend in 
government laboratories away from testing and toward genuine re­
search showed itself. Various elements of society besides the research 
community sought to build up the physical sciences. 
Some groups wanted more imperial universities, since such institu­
tions could help to raise local levels of development In 1901 Represen­
tative Noma Itsuzd, from the Tohoku region, claimed that economic 
development in the Japanese islands was deformed and stressed that 
universities were "important for inducing civilization locally."118 Es­
tablishing additional universities would also make education more ac­
cessible to Japanese youths outside Tokyo. In 1900 Representative 
Sugawara Den called the contrast between a vigorous Japanese military 
buildup and the neglect of higher education a "shameful circum­
stance," noting that Japan had only two universities for forty million 
people, whereas Germany had over twenty, and even Britain had at least 
five.119 In 1902 Representative Ozaki Yukio, proponent of an imperial 
university in Tohoku, compared the small number of Japanese univer­
sity students unfavorably with far larger numbers in Europe and insist­
ed that students were the wealth of the nation.120 
Other proponents of university expansion were concerned for aca­
demic well-being. In 1902 Tokyo law professor Takane Yoshito pub­
lished an influential book claiming that five years with two univer­
sities—Tokyo and Kyoto—had done little to promote competition. Since 
academic researchers become "lethargic and slack off," he argued, 
unless stimulated by external forces, it was imperative to found more 
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chairs and universities and to involve graduate students in their pro­
fessors1 research.121 His view was both popular and justified. In 1901 
Representative Hiraoka Manjird embarrassed the Ministry of Educa­
tion by charging that Tokyo University was full of professors who "took 
ten hours to do two hours' work."122 In 1911 the Kawakita shimpo 
newspaper in Sendai published a major editorial declaring that univer­
sities had a duty to compete with each other and deserved to be crit­
icized severely if they "catered slavishly to society" or neglected 
research.123 
For the government, universities were expensive to start up, and 
more so to maintain. On the other hand, the founding of Kyoto in 1897 
had broken the ice for expansion, and basic public policy would never 
again restrict access to universities on principle. Both Yamagata 
Aritomo's second cabinet and the first cabinet of Okuma Shigenobu 
developed plans for serious expansion in 1898, and in 1900 ltd 
Hirobumi's new Seiyukai party made a similar declaration of intent.124 
The government had promised university admission to every student 
with a higher-school diploma, and it had to make good on its promise. In 
1894 there were only about 1,400 university students, but by 1898 the 
number of higher-school graduates had reached 2,400, and it was ex­
pected to growfivefold in a decade.i2S 
Fortunately outside support for added facilities was available. Almost 
before planning had begun, Yamagata's minister of education, Ka­
bayama Sukenort demanded and received commitments of 500,000 
and 350,000 yen, respectively, from Fukuoka and Miyagi prefectures, 
where the new institutions would be. Tohoku University became possi­
ble only in 1906 through support from a wealthy industrialist One other 
factor also deserves to be stressed. Certain ministry officials were con­
cerned about the obstacles faced by university researchers and were 
determined to improve conditions. Referring in 1897 to the difficulties 
faced by Japanese scientists who had come back from Europe, Vice 
Minister Makino Nobuaki noted that in Japan their "level of perfor­
mance falls behind because of their lack of opportunity to debate issues 
with prominent scientists and the [poor] facilities they have for 
research."126 
Even so, the government could not take up these problems simul­
taneously and was obliged to set priorities. On the basis of purely objec­
tive need, the case for engineering was most compelling. Makino noted 
in 1897 that the worst situation of neglect of students by professors was 
in engineering, that there were "not nearly enough facilities for en­
gineering research in Japan," and that in some engineering fields there 
were scarcely any professors.127 Conversely, the facilities in anatomy at 
Tokyo University were described at the time as "comparable to those in 
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European and American universities," whereas two years later (1899) 
hygiene, physiology, and pharmacology at that institution were said to 
have "the kind of equipment needed for research, in fact, the best 
available today."128 And engineering facilities were cheaper to build. 
Startup costs, excluding land purchases, were estimated at 350,000 yen 
for engineering and 604,000 yen for medicine in 1901; annual mainte­
nance costs for an engineering faculty were a fraction of those for a 
faculty of medicine.129 But medicine still got priority in this phase of 
expansion. To the dismay of Diet members from the Tohoku region, 
Ito's cabinet in 1901 decided to build a faculty of medicine in Kyushu 
while shelving indefinitely a faculty of engineering proposal for 
Sendai.130 
Decisions in favor of medicine were common. The cause of medical 
research benefited from the prominent role in the imperial Diet of phy­
sicians—Suzuki Manjiro, Wakasugi Kisaburo, Yagi ksuro, Tsuchiya 
Seizaburo, and especially Hasegawa Tai. Hasegawa was the era s lead­
ing parliamentary expert on educational and technical matters, and 
while he sought to promote all technical fields, he definitely favored 
some over others.13! In 1893 he criticized the vice minister of education 
Kubota Yuzuru for his apparent lack of interest in the needs of en­
gineering even as he himself proposed eliminating funds for an applied 
chemistry laboratory in Tokyo's engineering faculty and building in­
stead a biochemistry laboratory* in the Tokyo faculty of medicine.132 
Second, the favorable publicity that Kitasato and other medical re­
searchers received aided the cause of medicine. Such achievements as 
the discovery of the plague bacillus in 1894 and the dysentery bacillus 
in 1897 captured widespread attention and made support of medicine 
attractive to government and public alike. Engineers and physical sci­
entists had less to boast of in the pre-World War I era and could not 
arouse this kind of interest. Third, the government always tried to use 
existing facilities as a way of cutting the costs of university expansion. 
When Kyoto was built in the 1890s, the engineering and science faculty 
initially used the facilities of the Third Higher School, and major 
(though abortive) efforts were made to use those of a prefectural college 
for the faculty of medicine. In the second wave of expansion, the gov­
ernment proposed to convert the Sapporo Agricultural College into a 
university-level faculty of agriculture for Tohoku University and to turn 
an existing prefectural medical college in Kyushu into a university-level 
faculty of medicine.133 
This short-term practice of preempting facilities for imperial univer­
sities' use points to a more permanent one. Medicine expanded with 
particular rapidity in the Meiji period because it began from a position of 
strength. When the Yamagata cabinet decided to build the Kyushu 
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faculty of medicine in 1901, it was able to expand facilities for medical 
education that had been in Fukuoka from the end of the Tokugawa 
period.134 Few thought that using such facilities was unusual. (By 
contrast, the building of engineering and science facilities had earlier 
been seen as a radical, though necessary, move.)135 The bias toward 
medicine and the desire to use existing facilities were so deeply en­
trenched that the minister of education Kikuchi Dairoku, trained in 
mathematics and physics, not only endorsed them but at political cost to 
himself intervened with cabinet and Diet in their favor.136 
After 1901 the cause of expansion entered a period of stasis. Continu­
ing military buildup prevented any budget increases for science or 
higher education in 1902 and 1903. In 1904 and 1905 government and 
public concentrated their attention on the Russo-Japanese War. Finan­
cial dislocations at the end of the war brought retrenchment in all 
ministries, and in 1906 the Saionji government was mosdy concerned 
with the nationalization of the country's trunk railways. But at what 
seemed an unfavorable moment, interest in expansion revived. Saion­
ji's finance minister. Hara Kei, a Furukawa Corporation director and 
native of the Tohoku region, asked a wealthy friend and industrialist to 
help build a university in Tohoku. Hara reminded Furukawa Torano­
suke of the public's bitterness against his corporation for polluting agri­
cultural waterways in the Ashio copper mine scandal and suggested 
that contributing to the cause of an imperial university might help to 
reduce the ill will. Furukawa assented to Haras proposal and donated 
1,060,000 yen. As a result, the Saionji cabinet decided to build an 
imperial university in Sendai.137 
Tohoku University's internal constitution may seem as unlikely as 
the factors which led to its founding. Despite public demands for more 
engineers and better trained doctors, and earlier planning by the Minis­
try' of Education, Tohoku did not begin with faculties of engineering or 
medicine but with a faculty of science and a faculty of agriculture. 
Behind the founding of a faculty of science was a desire to achieve 
regional balance in facilities. The existence of applied science faculties 
in Kyushu (medicine from 1903, engineering projected for 1911), 
Kyoto (engineering and medicine from 1897), Hokkaido (the Sapporo 
Agricultural College, now transferred in jurisdiction to Tohoku), and 
Tokyo made these programs initially less essential for Tohoku. Another 
factor was vagueness. Unlike university proponents in Kyushu, neither 
Ozaki Yukio, the Miyagi prefectural government, nor anyone else from 
the region was ever specific about what they wanted in a university. 
Seemingly most important were the views of the minister. Giving cre­
dence to the criticism that "policy changed when the minister 
changed," Makino Nobuaki, upon assuming office in 1906, decided to 
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proceed with a faculty of science. Makino considered mathematics, 
physics, and chemistry the proper basis for all applied sciences and 
decided to organize the university accordingly.138 
Makino's decision may appear remarkable for the time. According to 
many observers, the Japanese public and government viewed basic 
science with indifference. A 1907 editorial in a professional journal 
complained that basic researchers were considered "eccentrics whose 
work is a form of dissipation."139 But Makino's decision was not so 
peculiar as such evidence would suggest. Certainly there was a connec­
tion between industry and the academy favoring applied science. Minis­
try officials or their constituents frequently requested government 
funds on the basis of enrollment or social demand. 
Motives behind decisions about infrastructure, however, were never 
so simple. They were sometimes dictated by notions of how science 
functioned or where it was heading. In February 1901 a ministry coun­
cillor, Terada Yukichi. told the Budget Committee of the Diet's lower 
house that biochemistry at Tokyo University had not been accorded a 
separate laboratory in 1896 because it was then a mere "part of phys­
iology" but must now be so established because it had become mature. 
In December 1901 Okada Ryohei, later minister of education, denied 
that growth in the number of students was the only criterion for ex­
pandingresearch facilities and insisted that electrical engineering must 
have additional space at Tokyo University because of "scientific pro­
gress [which has occurred) in that field."140 
The role of notions about scientific progress is especially clear when 
we compare the number of chairs with changes in student preferences. 
Imperial university faculties of science produced only 5.2 percent of the 
graduates in 1900 yet contained 14.1 percent of the chairs, whereas the 
faculties of engineering held 23.8 percent of the chairs while turning 
out 32.7 percent of the graduates. Faculties of medicine had 17.8 per­
cent of the chairs and produced just 8.3 percent of the graduates, 
whereas faculties of law held 21.6 percent of the chairs while turning 
out 31.7 percent of the graduates. Nor were the figures for 1900 
atypical. Table 4.1 indicates that "overrepresentation" of basic science 
(and in part, medicine) was common before World War I. High student 
enrollment in some fields paid the costs of low enrollment in others. 
Early developments in the new universities show the strengths and 
limitations of this policy. Kyushu University began in 1911 with the 
medical faculty transferred from Kyoto and, following the request of 
local industrialists, with a faculty of engineering as well. Both faculties 
were popular and reasonably well funded. Spme 1,300,000 yen was 
spent on the faculty of medicine, and about a third of Furukawa's 
1,060,000 yen went to the faculty of engineering.141 Kyushu's first 
TABLE 4.1 
Imperial University Chairs and Graduates (% of Totals) 
1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 
LAW 
-Chairs 17.7 21.6 22.3 19.8 18.0 
-Graduates 37.5 31.7 34.5 33.4 41.7 
SCIENCE 
-Chairs 14.5 14.1 12.6 10.8 12.8 
-Graduates 7.8 5.2 3.7 4.2 4.1 
ENGINEERING 
-Chairs 16.9 23.8 20.2 16.4 21.9 
-Graduates 21.6 32.7 31.3 22.9 19.2 
LETTERS 
-Chairs 16.1 10.8 9.2 14.5 12.1 
-Graduates 11.2 18.9 11.4 12.3 7.0 
MEDICINE 
-Chairs 18.6 17.8 25.6 22.9 20.7 
-Graduates 10.8 8.3 14.9 18.3 16.9 
AGRICULTURE 
-Chairs 16.1 11.9 10.1 15.5 14.5 
-Graduates 11.2 3.2 4.1 9.0 11.1 
Sources. Tokyo Teikoku Daigaku goju nen shi, 2 vois. (Tokyo Teikoku 
Diagaku. 1932); Kyoto Teikoku Daigaku shi (Kyoto Teikoku Daigaku, 
1943); Kyoto Daigaku nanaju nen shi (Kyoto Daigaku, 1967); Tohoku 
Daigaku goju nen shi, 2 vols. (Tohoku Daigaku. 1960); Kyushu Daigaku 
goju nen shi, 3 vols. (Kyushu Daigaku, 1967). 
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president, Yamakawa Kenjird, a physicist serving concurrently as presi­
dent at Tokyo, was effective politically, securing two new chairs from 
the ministry. The first group of 55 engineering students completed 
their studies in 1914, and in the same year some 83 finished in medi­
cine. 142 Conditions at Tdhoku were not quite so good. No money came 
to it from the national treasury in its first year, and only 361,262 yen of 
Furukawa s money was available to the faculty of science, since the rest 
was devoted to agriculture. Money for equipment was scarce, and at 
first there was concern among the basic science professors whether 
students would actually appear for instruction.l43 
Nevertheless, professors at Tohoku University were happier than 
their colleagues at Kyushu. Tohoku had an excellent first president in 
Sawayanagi Masatard. Though trained in humanities. Sawayanagi was 
fully trusted by the scientists because he deliberately took over their 
administrative burdens and paid for their research-related travel. 
Tdhoku students showed an interest in mathematics, physics, chem­
istry, and geology, and twenty-four graduated in 1914. The Ministry of 
Education managed to allocate another 60,000 yen for equipment in the 
faculty of science after the mandated funds were exhausted.I44 And a 
vigorous climate for basic research developed in most fields (see chap­
ter 6). 
Kyushu University, by contrast, had no basic science program at all. 
Its engineering faculty (apart from the engineering chairs) contained 
one chair in mathematics and mechanics, to which Yamakawa in 1912 
added a chair for chemistry and another for physics. Program building 
efforts all failed in this period, and this structural weakness dismayed 
the Kyushu professors. Mano Bunji, a mechanical engineer, considered 
the inability to solve it his biggest failure as dean. Upon hearing that the 
ministry had decided to build a faculty of science at Tdhoku and an 
engineering faculty at Kyushu, pharmacology professor Hayashi Haruo 
accused the authorities of giving Tdhoku the "brains" and Kyushu the 
"remains." Similarly, the Kyushu anatomy professor and medical fac­
ulty dean Goto Motonosuke said it was wrong to give engineering pri­
ority over basic science because applied sciences like his were so depen­
dent upon i t 1 4 5 
Ambivalent government actions can also be seen in the movement to 
reform the Tokyo Academy of Sciences. Although reform had failed in 
1898 conditions had changed by 1905. The Russo-Japanese War may 
have aroused deeper appreciation for science in some quarters, but a 
desire to achieve national prestige as reflected in science was clearly the 
proximate cause.146 Prior to becoming minister pf education and estab­
lishing the faculty of science at Tdhoku, Makino Nobuaki had served as 
ambassador to Austria when its government invited Japan to a con­
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ference (1906). The Austrians proposed a meeting in Vienna of the 
world's science academies and hoped that Japan could attend. This, of 
course, created a problem, because Japan did not have a real academy. 
Makino saw the invitation as an important opportunity and proposed to 
establish such a body. The government responded by deciding to up­
grade what it had, and the Tokyo academy was officially renamed the 
Imperial Academy of Sciences.147 
The reforms that followed had a twofold result. They first served to 
enhance the prestige of scientific studies. Academy membership had 
been fixed at forty, with the majority of the membersfrom law and the 
humanities. Membership in the new institution was expanded to sixty, 
with the sciences to constitute half. In keeping with what was then the 
dominant view, the term sciences was broadly defined. Thus imperial 
academy members represented medicine, engineering, and agriculture 
as well as mathematics, biology, chemistry, and physics.148 Reform had 
another at least equally important result: it helped the academy attract 
outside support for research and other activities. Fulfilling expectations 
that were voiced from the start, the heads of two business conglomer­
ates (zaibatsu) and the imperial family in 1911 donated modest sums 
that were used to fund prizes for published research. 
What was the meaning of all thesereforms? Beginning in 1912, the 
academy launched five new journals as it had money to pay their ex­
penses. It provided a more substantial way to give scientists recognition 
than anything previous. After a member of the Diet contrasted the 
substantial recognition accorded in Germany to Paul Ehrlich for work 
on syphilis with the modest recognition in Japan of hisresearch partner 
Hata Sahachiro, the government proposed to award the Blue Cordon to 
prominent scientists and to recognize their achievements more pub­
licly. 149 A development with great potential took place in 1913. Using 
small sums donated by Furukawa Toranosuke, Sumitomo Kichizae­
mon, the wealthy expatriate chemist Takamine Jokichi, and a handful 
of others, the academy was able to announce its support for scholarly 
research in progress.150 
But these developments meant less than one might imagine. The 
academy's operating budget was only 10,000 yen a year. Supporting 
research in progress was important as a precedent but could be done 
only very modestly. Until 1919 members alone could apply for the 
funds. The amount of money spent was small—2,460 yen in 1914— 
and the funds were divided among six projects that year, only three of 
them being in natural science.151 Lack of funds forced termination of 
the journals after only a handful of issues.152 Such disappointments 
disturbed the academy. Theoretical chemist Sakurai Joji observed 
plaintively that science academies in Europe usually had budgets of 
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more than a million yen.l53 Even the academy's more optimistic presi­
dent, mathematician and former minister of education Kikuchi 
Dairoku, conceded that economic factors had prevented the academy 
from fully achieving its objectives.154 
But economic factors relating to overseas competition were already 
producing new support for research related to Japanese industry. 
"When people, especially university professors, leave Japan on indus­
trial inspection tours nowadays, (the foreigners] are said to be secretive 
and afraid to show them anything," Kikuchi Dairoku told the House of 
Peers in February 1900. "Because of this secrecy, the benefits to be 
obtained have been greatly reduced. . . and national needs can no 
longer be met merely by relying on foreign information. "I55 At least 
some in the Diet agreed. In February 1899 several members represent­
ing banking and other business interests had criticized both the private 
and public sectors for their neglect of commercially applicable research, 
demanding that attitudes change. They contrasted European manufac­
turing and export success with Japan's stagnant exports and outmoded 
techniques and insisted that only greater commitment to technical re­
search could repair this growing imbalance.156 
Establishment of the Industrial Experiment Laboratory (Kogyd 
Shiken Jo) in June 1900 was an immediate result of these pressures. 
This new Tokyo facility was charged with general "testing, analyses, 
and industrial appraisals"; but it specialized from the start. The Indus­
trial Experiment Laboratory was basically a facility set up to do applied 
chemical research for private industry on a contract basis. The govern­
ment's commitment was constrained by cost, so the laboratory began in 
a small way with two divisions, chemical analysis and industrial chem­
istry, and a research staff of eleven (four technical experts or gishi and 
seven technicians or gishu).157 Institutional growth was slow for its 
first five years, but the war with Russia proved a turning point. As one 
member of the Diet later declared: "The Russo-Japanese War provided 
a solemn warning to us from the Western powers. After it, our citizens 
were refused entry to their factories and [laboratories] because of the 
alleged relationship between these tours and the commercial practices 
[of Japan]. They said we would just tum around and copy (their de­
signs] if they showed their facilities to us."158 
For this reason, the government was obliged to increase support for 
the Industrial Experiment Laboratory. In 1906 the research staff 
jumped to twenty-nine positions from the earlier ceiling of twelve. In 
1911 two more positions were added and new divisions established for 
ceramics, dyeing, and electrochemistry. A drawback was that laborato­
ry staff members were not so well trained as their colleagues in imperial 
universities. Only two had doctorates, and most were technicians (nine­
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teen of thirty-two in 1912). Nevertheless, the work they did was of value 
and was publicly praised by professors. In 1910 Osaka Yukichi, pro­
fessor of chemistry at Kyoto University, declared that investigators at 
the Industrial Experiment Laboratory were doing "systematic re­
search" and had achieved some "useful results."159 And in 1912 Kamoi 
Takeshi, professor of chemical engineering at Tokyo University, noted 
that the laboratory was conducting some of the research needed to 
reduce Japan's unfavorable trade balance in chemical products.160 
It was all a matter of perspective. Conditions in Japan for industrial 
research in chemistry had improved somewhat from the late 1880s, 
when Takamine Jokichi had to emigrate to the U.S. for his work, but 
they were far from meeting Western standards.161 Most Japanese in­
dustrial chemists had too many extraneous duties to devote themselves 
to research. Even when assigned to research tasks, they rarely had the 
equipment they needed.lt>2 And the Industrial Experiment Laboratory 
did not nearlyfill the gap. In 1911 it was visited by a member of the Diet 
who said it appeared to be doing "important, valuable work" despite a 
number of problems: its staff was too small; its capacity was limited; the 
work it did took too long to complete; and few in business even knew it 
existed.163 
Government officials acknowledged these deficiencies and promised 
to remedy them. The vice minister of agriculture and commerce, who 
supervised the laboratory, declared a need to expand the industrial 
chemistry and dyeing sections, and in early 1914 his ministry requested 
200,000 yen in new funding for research in dyeing, electrochemistry, 
and the testing of iron and steel. Some of this money was earmarked for 
work on color fastness in silk textiles where, according to Minister 
Yamamoto Tatsuo, long-term deficiencies had produced major export 
losses to French and Italian producers. The situation had become so 
bad that only the Mitsui Bank would even finance sales overseas of 
finished Japanese silk textiles.164 
Despite these increases in funding for research, the old inclination to 
copy died hard. In 1913 the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce 
requested 20,000 yen to expand a facility called the Commercial Exhi­
bitions Hall located near the Industrial Experiment Laboratory. Influ­
ential members of the Diet attacked (but could not defeat) this request 
on the grounds that exhibiting Western designs and prototypes in the 
hall would overshadow the work of the laboratory and encourage copy­
ing by Japanese producers, which was certain to embarrass the 
country.165 
The Meiji record of research in agriculture shows many of the same 
ambiguities. By 1900 Japan had the nationally sponsored Agricultural 
Experiment Station at Nishigahara, Tokyo (with nine local branches), 
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and nineteen stations supported by prefectures. The national facilities 
officially—and the prefectural stations unofficially—were assigned 
three major functions: "testing related to the improvement and expan­
sion of agricultural production; itinerant lecturing [to farmers]; and the 
analysis and appraisal of soil, fertilizer, seed, and all other substances 
relating to agriculture."166 But this does not fully explain what was 
occurring on a day-to-day basis. The chief of the Bureau of Agriculture 
thought the national stations should carry on "high-level research" and 
entrust applications to the prefectural facilities.167 But ambiguities pre­
vented execution of such ideas as conceived by officials. Representative 
Suzuki Kizaemon complained in February 1900 that the Agricultural 
Experiment Station was "too small and its budget wholly inade­
quate."168 In fact, the station in 1900 had a total budget of only 39,000 
yen for 10 facilities—less than the average annual expenditure of 4,509 
yen of the prefectural stations.169 The salaries paid to the technical 
experts (gishi) were very low even by Japanese standards In 1900 its 
forty technical experts—including those who had graduated from 
Tokyo University—were receiving just 400 yen per year, which was a 
technician's salary at the Infectious Diseases Institute. I7° The system 
of experiment stations as a whole was substantially cut back later on. 
Though there had been some expansion of formal capacity in the 1900­
05 period, in 1906 Nishigahara's nine branches were cut to three, while 
in 1910 the technical staff decreasedfrom eighty-six to seventy-two.1T1 
Japanese spending on agricultural research was low by European 
standards. In 1899 France reportedly spent 2,760,000 yen for this pur­
pose, and Germany even more (4,270,000 yen). Japan had fewer re­
sources, but that does not explain everything. If one considers total 
agricultural income a measure of capacity to pay, it seems significant 
that even in this sense, Japan's efforts were small. France's effort was 
sustained by an agricultural income exceeding 4.6 billion yen, that of 
Germany by an income of 4.2 billion. Japan, with areported income of 
700 million yenfrom agriculture, was spending at most 250,000 yen on 
research and diffusion—and even this figure is probably too high.172 
The Germans were investing in agricultural research as a function of 
ability to pay at a rate three times that of the Japanese, and the French at 
about a 160 percent greater rate.173 
Nevertheless, one should not assume that the Japanese did nothing 
of importance. To do so would obscure informalredefinitions of formal 
authority by scientists with political sensibilities. Serving as director of 
the Agricultural Experiment Station for the period from 1903 to 1920 
was the agricultural chemist Kozai Yoshinao, concurrently professor at 
Tokyo University. Kozai was both a skilled researcher and a good politi­
cian—in the early 1920s he served as Tokyo University's president— 
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quite capable of exploiting opportunities. In 1903 he proclaimed scien­
tific research to be the principal duty of the Agricultural Experiment 
Station, which was not what its official description had stipulated.174 
And despite the budgetary retrenchment of 1906, Kozai also established 
a horticulture division at the Kinai (Osaka) station and had its staff 
investigate seed varieties of rice.175 From work at Nishigahara he pub­
lished a book in 1906 on the chemistry of fermentation, while 
Daikubara Gintaro did research on the relationships between soil acid­
ity and seed varieties later used to improve yields in Hokkaido, Taiwan, 
and Korea.176 
Informal redefinitions of formal authority were unnecessary at the 
Institute of Infectious Diseases, where "research into the treatment, 
causes, and prevention of infectious diseases" was set forth as the prin­
cipal mission.177 This facility prospered greatly in the 1890s and ob­
tained full government support in 1899. From a budget that year of 
56,036 yen, the institute's authorized spending rose to 60,540 yen in 
1902 and continued to increase thereafter.'78 In 1905 the Institute for 
Infectious Diseases acquired an entirely new physical plant, together 
with full legal control of the home ministry's Vaccine Station and 
Serological Institute; by 1912 its regularly budgeted spending exceeded 
210,000 yen.179 It is clear enough from the staff's small size that sal­
aries were not the main item. Despite the institute's possession of re­
search facilities, animal barns for serum and vaccine production, and a 
hospital ward for human patients, there were only thirteen technical 
experts or technicians in 1900, seventeen in 1902, and twenty in 1912. 
Only eight of that number were gishi, but some of the others earned 
doctorates and managed to upgrade their positions.180 
It is symbolic of medicine s position in the research community that 
the institute was a world-class laboratory. It had superior facilities, an 
excellent staff, and a director of the highest reputation. Japanese and 
foreign contemporaries compared it to the Pasteur Institute in Paris and 
the Koch Institute in Berlin, and the comparison was by no means 
farfetched.181 The Institute of Infectious Diseases achieved major ad­
vances in medicine (see chapter 6), as its clinical work so clearly re­
flects. Kitasato had helped to create serology and serum therapy. As a 
result, Japan became thefirst country in the world to use serum therapy 
against cholera, tetanus, and diphtheria.182 Kitasato called the diphthe­
ria serum his colleagues manufactured the "best in the world" and, in 
fact, exported it to Europe and America.183 
The physical sciences, however, had achieved nothing of compara­
ble importance. As a result, university administrator and physicist 
Yamakawa Kenjiro from 1897 on began urging the establishment of 
major research facilities in physics and chemistry.184 In 1908 his uni­
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versify physicist colleague Nakamura Seiji called public attention to 
such laboratories in Europe as the Physicalische Technische Reich­
sanstalt (PTR) in Germany, the National Laboratory in Britain, and the 
Institut Centrale des Arts et Manufactures in France and urged that 
Japan follow suit by constructing its own facilities.I85 In 1910 Okuma 
Shigenobu, who became prime minister in 1913, wrote an article stress­
ing the importance of "first-class facilities for research" in all fields, 
with special emphasis on chemistry.186 But it took the return to Japan of 
the expatriate chemist Takamine Jdkichi in 1913 to bring these move­
ments together. In addition to promoting research facilities in meetings 
with industrialists, scientists, and government officials, Takamine de­
livered several speeches on the subject. He declared that Japan had 
gone as far as it could in imitating the West and would now have to 
reach a higher stage in science.l87 Several years later, all of these men 
became key players in a major new venture, the Institute for Physics 
and Chemistry. 
Research Capacities on the Eve of the War 
As we have seen. Japanese research capacities grew considerably be­
tween the founding of Kyoto University and the outbreak of World 
War I. Nevertheless, most of these developments were seriously limited 
in purpose, in scale, or in both. Total spending on the imperial univer­
sities did grow in this period, and Kyoto University did overcome its 
financial and other early problems. But the budget for Tokyo Univer­
sity, which had the only comprehensive facilities for research, was cut 
in 1905 and 1913 and grew scarcely at all in other years before the 
war,188 and the university itself was far from ideal. Ikaijiho complained 
that in all the imperial universities teaching came first and research 
second.189 Chemistry professor Sakurai Jqji noted that faculty research 
was nearly always funded surreptitiously as part of the instructional 
budget190 Other observers suggested that the standard for university 
professors was their ability to "name the [prominent) foreign scientists 
and explain their particular theories."191 The Imperial Academy of 
Sciences offered small compensation, since its budget was tiny and its 
research stipends few. 
Despite these significant institutional weaknesses, some areas of 
research fared better than others. Medicine and to a lesser extent en­
gineering were well endowed by Japanese standards. Counting the 
medical preparatory program of Tohoku University, which was estab­
lished in 1912 and achieved faculty status in 1915, each imperial uni­
versity had faculties of medicine and of engineering, whereas agri­
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culture existed at just two schools and basic science at three. Basic 
science was also represented differently. Mathematics, physics, and 
chemistry were each represented by chairs at all four universities, 
though at Kyushu they were stuck in the engineering faculty. Geology 
was established at Tokyo and Tohoku, but biology as established in a 
faculty of science could be found only at Tokyo.192 
1. Shinto memorial service for Robert Koch, held annually at 
the Kitasato Institute on the anniversary of his birth (May 27) 
2. Kitasato's lieutenants at the Kitasato Institute 
Back row, left to right: Otani Morisuke. Umeno Shinkichi, 
Kusama Shigeru, Koga Gensaburo. 
Front row, left to right: Terauchi Yutaka, Miyajima 
Mikinosuke, Kitajima Ta'ichi, Shiga Kiyoshi. Hata Sahachiro. 
Aoyama Tanemichi's gnostics 
4. Tokyo University investigators of tsutsugamushi disease

(August 1915)

Left to right: Mitamura Makujird, Nagayo Mataro, Imamura

Yoshk), Miyagawa Yoneji.

5. The Kitasato Institute (ca. 1921)

6. The Institute of Infectious Diseases, Japan's leading re­
search laboratory in the Meiji period (ca. 1906) 
7. Aoyama Tanemichi 8. Ichiki Kitokuro 
9. Tokyo University physicists and graduate students (1903) 
Front row, far right: Nagaoka Hantard; second from right: 
Tanakadate Aikitsu. Back row, second from right: Honda Kotaro 
10. Yamagiwa Katsusaburo 11. Nagayo M atari 
12. Microscopy training at the In- 13. Ogata Masanori 
stitute of Pathology, Tokyo University 
14. Faculty of Science, Tokyo University (ca. 1905) 
15. Kitasato Shibasaburd (ca. 1920) 16. Robert Koch in Japanese kimono 
(Tokyo. 1908) 
17. Takagi Kanehiro 18. Nagaoka Hantaro (ca. 1934) 
19. Nagai Nagayoshi 20. Yamakawa KenjirO 
21. Kozai Voshinao 22. Sakurai Joji 
23.	 Kikuchi Dairoku 24. Yasui Kono. Japans first woman 
scientist 
25. Nakamura Yaroku	 26. Hasegawa Tai 
27. Makino Nobuaki 28. Okada Ryohei 
29. Okuma Shigenobu 30. Katsura Taro 
CHAPTER FIVE 
SCIENCE AND THE BUREAUCRACY 
It is both intuitively obvious and a matter of record that the establish­
ment and prosecution of scientific research demand procedures for 
mobilizing resources. Without a means of expressing their views or 
making their desires known to the pertinent authorities, scientists 
would be as restricted in their work as if they had no facilities at all.' Yet 
many critics have both faulted the Japanese bureaucracy for failing to 
understand the scientific enterprise and called into question the gov­
ernment's philosophy of management.2 Scientists supposedly found it 
hard to gain access to officials and had communication problems when 
they did. Sakurai Joji, whose career spanned Meiji and Taishd. believed 
that scientists could rarely influence the governments policy even 
when they all joined forces together.3 In such a case, the result was 
totally predictable: decisions inappropriate for science and for society. 
One finds four explanations for the pathology of decision that has 
been imputed.. First, the Meiji government was reluctant to accept 
autonomy or equality for science. It tried to coopt almost even* private 
interest and to make science the servant of the state.4 Then, traditions 
of policy management were highly autocratic. The political culture of 
Tokugawa Japan had been typified by a "preponderance of power," 
according to the Mejji educator Fukuzawa Yukichi.5 Third, the tech­
nically trained came to be excluded from the supervisory ranks of the 
higher civil service. Scientists and engineers "could not hold high gov­
ernment office in areas of the bureaucracy concerned with science," 
wrote W. H. Leonard and H. C. Kelly in a 1948 report for the U.S. 
Occupation. "These posts were reserved for those with legal training 
[who had graduated} from the imperial universities."6 Last, scientists 
failed to protest because of the way they had been socialized. They were 
"citizens first and servants of truth . . . second," wrote Bertrand Rus­
seD in 1931.7 The "medieval spirit of servile solidarity" lay heavy upon 
them, argued Thorstein Veblen.8 Worst of all, insisted Nakane Chie, 
scientists' own loyalty to particular factions disrupted the unity needed 
to check the state's power.9 
One hears echoes in these views of technocratic thought and the 
Enlightenment from which it derives. Diderot, Condorcet, Saint Simon, 
and others thought the rationality of science would eliminate ignorance 
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and political authoritarianism and usher in an era of leadership by 
scientists.10 The disillusionment caused by two world wars and the 
unwillingness of most scientists to resist modem oppressions have di­
minished such views in Western democracies, but they remain influen­
tial in Japan.11 
Meiji Japan's legacy from the Tokugawa period is one reason. 
Tokugawa society had repressed scholars and experts, rarely granting 
them a voice in determining public policy. The shogunate and its im­
itators in the ranks of the daimyo had sought to control political thought 
generally and technical knowledge selectively. These same regimes 
had usually given priority to lineage or personality over "merit" or ex­
pertise in recruiting officials.l2 The Meiji regime abandoned this stance 
but imposed its own priorities. The new leaders were obsessed with 
power and the issue of legitimacy and adopted a strategy of political 
cooptation to impose their control on society.13 They did not at first 
accept foreign ideas of academic freedom and were obliged by circum­
stances to place burdens on scientists that limited their time for re­
search. Partly to satisfy the Western great powers in respect to the 
Unequal Treaties, the leadership carried out its legal reforms in ways 
that affected scientists adversely. 
In fact, the Unequal Treaties were a powerful incentive to change in 
the government of Meiji Japan. Foisted on the country in 1857 and 
remaining in force until 1899, they took away Japan'sright to control its 
own tariffs and usurped jurisdiction over foreigners charged with 
crimes occurring on Japanese soil. Termination of the treaties was a 
cardinal aim of the Japanese government, but the United States and 
Europe imposed a high price. Japan must change its whole legal system 
to look like that of the West. This was no easy task, and it took a long 
time. The civil service reforms that were part of this process were, 
however, mostly in place by 1887 
Japan's civil service was ostensibly based on systems in continental 
Europe. One took an examination to secure appointment, but suc­
cessful performance required formal training in what the Germans 
called Cameralismus (public administration). Frequentlyreferred to by 
the English word law, cameralismus actually included what today 
would be called economics, statistics, law, and police administration.14 
As in Europe, the training and examinations excluded science, mathe­
matics, engineering, agriculture, and medicine. But since no modern 
state could function without them, the Japanese adopted the European 
practice of recruiting the needed experts in these fields by screening— 
and assigning them to inferior posts..15 In one particular the Japanese 
departed from European precedents in their civil service system. The 
Germans and some other Continental nations imposed the requirement 
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of multiyear, probationaJ unpaid service on men who had passed the 
civil service examinations before they could receive a salaried appoint­
ment This was done to assure some level of experience in the hope of 
improving performance in office. But Japan rejected unsalaried proba­
tion as inherently unfair and prejudicial to the cause of recruitment 
based on merit16 
The form of Japan's modern civil service posed significant problems 
for the country's efforts in research. Meiji leaders like Yamagata 
Aritomo, ltd Hirobumi, and Inoue Kaoru were determined to create an 
authoritarian state, and in Europe this was linked to legal training.17 
But they failed to consider all the pertinent ramifications. Japan was not 
Europe. It lacked the array of broadly educated talent found in the most 
developed Western countries. And there was no proof that legal training 
was uniquely relevant to administrative performance. In fact, contem­
porary observers argued that the legalistic bias of the central bureau­
cracy and its correlate, neglect of technical expertise, produced ineffi­
cient management low morale among the technically trained, 
duplication of effort, and bad decisions.18 
Some qualifications are clearly in order here. Most scientists (over 80 
percent) were employed in the prestigious public sector, not at the 
bottom civil service rung, but usually somewhere in the middle. Ten­
ured university professors always held the second of the three major 
ranks (sonin, within the classification system hannin, somn, and 
chokunin). University presidents held chokunin status, the same as 
bureau chiefs, who usually made policy; and a few n on academic scien­
tists like Kitasato, the director of a major state laboratory, also came to 
hold chokunin rank.19 Conditions in some ministries were better than 
in others. The Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce was quite uncon­
genial, and the Ministry of Home Affairs had particular defects. But 79 
percent of the scientists employed in government worked under the 
aegis of the Ministry of Education, and its managerial supervision was 
rather better.20 
Scientists were respected in society. They tended, for example, to 
many well. Kitasato, from a humble family and before becoming fa­
mous, married the daughter of Baron Matsuo Shinzen, later governor of 
the Bank of Japan.21 They were recognized in other ways by the central 
government Several were appointed to the House of Peers, and two 
named to the Privy Council.22 Somefields coped better within the rigid 
system. Medicine was naturally ensconced in the imperial universities, 
but it was also well established in lesser institutions. It was also 
uniquely well positioned in the private sector. This gave medicine a 
political advantage, and medical researchers could fulfill ambitions be­
yond those of colleagues in any otherfield. These patterns were old and 
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deeply rooted, but they were reinforced by contemporary priorities and 
persisted through 1914. 
The Period of Early Decisions (1868-89) 
In the earliest years of the Restoration government, a few leaders took 
major initiatives and had few constraints on their power. There was no 
parliamentary assembly. The bureaucracy was immature, and the 
Council of State (Dajokan) had executive authority. ltd Hirobumi and 
Oku bo Toshimichi were the most influential in science policy matters, 
but they were not alone in their activism. Between 1876 and 1880 
Matsukata Masayoshi came to share Okubo's interest in animal breed­
ing techniques, and through their control over both the Ministry of 
Home Affairs and the Ministry of Finance they were able to force sub­
stantial investment in animal husbandry.Xi These efforts at first relied 
on technical supervision by foreigners. In 1878, however, Okubo 
launched a medical project conducted by Japanese doctors. Pursuant to 
his interest in contagious diseases, he acted on the then common sup­
position that beriberi was such a malady and ordered several university 
physicians to study it.24 This project had Little success, but it did indi­
cate an official interest in the subject that scientists could use to 
advantage. 
Another characteristic of the earliest years was the use of Western 
consultants. The American Medical missionary Guido Verbeck guided 
the leadership away from British medicine and toward that of Germany. 
Henry Dyer had some influence in engineering and physical science 
because of his work at the Imperial College of Engineering. The British 
envoy in Japan, Sir Harry Parkes, helped in recruiting Western tech­
nical experts. But the direction of policy was in Japanese hands, and the 
foreigners were clearly subordinate.25 The government was eager to 
use Japanese experts whenever they could be had. Men like Nagayo 
Sensai and Kanda Takahira, trained under the shogunate, served the 
new regime, which extended equal favor to Western-trained arrivals.26 
While bureaucracy existed in the earliest years (1868-80), its struc­
ture was quite immature. From 1868 to 1885 there existed an agency 
known as the Ministry of Public Works (Kobusho) which controlled the 
Imperial College of Engineering as well as the operations of govern­
ment-owned factories. The Ministry of Education had formal control 
over most government schoolsfrom 1871. The Ministry of Home Affairs 
(originally the Ministry of Civil Affairs or Minbusho) held jurisdiction in 
most other technical matters. At the top were the Ministry of Finance, 
with control over revenues, and the Council of State, which set policy. 
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Lines of authority were naturally subject to change. For example, the 
Ministry of Education controlled all medical affairs from February 1872 
through May 1875, but in 1875 the Council of State gave health admin­
istration to the Ministry of Home Affairs, leaving medical education 
with the Ministry of Education.27 With its jurisdiction over transporta­
tion, telecommunications, industrial promotion, police, agriculture, 
and public health, the Ministry of Home Affairs was a powerful agency. 
Because its authority was also diffuse, it was a target of bureaucratic 
reformers. Following the phasing out of the Ministry of Public Works in 
the late 1870s, the leadership created the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Commerce in November 1880. Because this agency was assigned some 
functions of the Ministry of Home Affairs, disputes between ministries 
were inevitable.28 
A second major feature of the early bureaucracy was the role played 
by technically trained men. In the early and middle years of Meiji, the 
government frequently assigned senior line positions in technical areas 
to men with technical training. Yoshikawa Akimasa, who had studied at 
the Imperial College of Engineering, became chief of the Bureau of 
Telegraphy in 1874. Nagayo Sensai, a physician, was named chief of 
the Bureau of Public Health in the next year. Tanaka Yoshio, a student 
of botany under ltd Keisuke at the former Bansho Shirabesho, in 1881 
became chief of the Bureau of Agriculture.29 Nor were these excep­
tional cases. The appointment of such men at the bureau chief level was 
common before the legal reforms were completed (see table 5.1). 
During the 1870s scientific research was not well defined for the 
leadership. The Naito Shinjuku Testing Station for agriculture, the 
Central Meteorological Observatory, and other institutions of that dec­
ade were seen by officials as instruments for exploiting foreign knowl­
edge; the Imperial College of Engineering and other government 
schools were supposed to produce educated manpower. Tanaka Fu­
jimaro in the Ministry of Education, however, did promote the estab­
lishment of the Tokyo Academy of Sciences and also of Tokyo Univer­
sity. The Ministry of Home Affairs encouraged some work in medicine. 
In 1874 it established the Tokyo Hygiene Laboratory, in 1875 the Bu­
reau of Public Health, and in 1879 the Central Hygiene Commission. 
Only the Hygiene Laboratory didresearch, but all three were important 
for Kitasato's career.30 
Thereluctance of many officials notwithstanding, one could get sup­
port forresearch. As noted in chapter 3, Takagi Kanehiro, a career navy 
officer and a physician trained at St. Thomas Hospital in London, con­
ceived the idea of a link between diet and the incidence of beriberi in 
late 1880 and sought funding to prove his hypothesis. A number of 
barriers stood in his way (apart from the commitment of medical col­
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leagues to bacteriology). One was cost: the process of upgrading the 
diets of numerous sailors and comparing the results was very expen­
sive. Another was resentment from colleagues in the military. A third 
was the tepid interest of superiors in the navy. Takagi's handling of 
these various problems throws light on the making of decisions at the 
time. In essence, he exploited the scarcity of well-trained physicians 
and contacts with three top officials. 
Takagi succeeded because the leadership saw his educational 
achievements as a way to impress Europeans—and because his Sat­
suma origins gave him entree to the minister of finance, Matsukata. 
When Takagi returned from London in 1880, Inoue Kaoru sent a letter 
to the Tokyo diplomatic community recommending Takagi's services as 
a doctor and reminding them of Japanese progress. When Takagi decid­
ed to pursue the beriberi research, he used this goodwill effectively. In 
November 1882, Prince Arisugawa got him an audience with the Em­
peror. In October 1883 he became chief of the navy's Bureau of Medical 
Affairs. In late 1884 Matsukata and ltd got him invited to a meeting of 
the Council of State. These connections were essential because of the 
costs—about 50,000 yen for dietary protocols—and because of the au­
thority he needed to function. Army officials like Yamamoto Gombei 
and Dr. Ishiguro Tadanori opposed his program, and even the minister 
of the navy, Kawamura Surruyoshi, a Satsuma native, was at best 
lukewarm toward the project.31 
Takagi's success in the 1880s undoubtedly aided the cause of re­
search, as did an event of the previous year. The Emperor's Confucian 
lecturer Motoda Eifu charged in an 1879 letter that emphasis on "sci­
ence" was politicizing society and endangering traditional morality. ltd 
Hirobumi, in rebutting these arguments, laid the blame for so­
ciopolitical disputation in the lap of Confucianism and developed the 
notion of research as a weapon. Building on an argument of Otto von 
Bismarck, the Chancellor of Germany, ltd concluded that the most 
effective way to control intellectuals was to encourage them in academ­
ic research. Then they would quickly abandon politics and concentrate 
on specialized topics.32 
But Ito's view of research was not popular everywhere. In the early 
1880s the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce saw very little need 
for significant new research, reflecting the views of their business con­
stituency.33 The sericulture research program of the 1870s based at the 
Naito Shinjuku Testing Station contracted sharply after the ministry 
got control of it, and manufacturing research was completely ne­
glected.34 What did get attention was animal husbandry. The ministry 
imported Shropshire and Southdown sheep and placed them in special 
breeding pastures designed for their needs. The sheep did poorly, but 
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the ministry persisted, spending hundreds of thousands of yen 
uselessly.35 
The most important development in the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Commerce was the creation of the modern patent system. In the 1870s 
patent applications had been handled by the Ministry of Home Affairs 
on an ad hoc basis, but pressure from foreign and local business alike 
soon led to a different procedure. The problem was how to balance 
interests potentially opposed to each other. Japanese business wanted 
to import as much technology as desired. Foreign interests wanted 
protection for their own technology and future inventions. The Japa­
nese government tried to satisfy both interests. Without new tech­
nology the economy would stagnate; but only legal reforms would end 
the Unequal Treaties, which limited Japan s sovereignty.36 The minis­
try reached a solution in the 1880s. Following the suggestions of Taka­
hashi Korekiyo. the chief of the Bureau of Patents, and his technical 
adviser, the chemist Takamine Jdkichi, the patent system of France 
was initially chosen as the basis for Japan's system.37 But in 1888 three 
bureau chiefs criticized its protection of foreign inventions as an imped­
iment to imports of technology. And the result was Japan's adoption of 
Spain s patent system as Western but not too restrictive.38 
By the end of the decade Agriculture and Commerce was rapidly 
taking the lead in other ways, too. It became the first ministry with 
significant interests in science, technology, or medicine to witness the 
takeover of bureaucratic decision making by graduates of the university 
faculties of law. Nakamura Yaroku, who had a B.S. in physics and 
subsequently acquired a D.Sc. in forestry, joined the ministry in 1883 
when he finished his studies at Munich. In 1887 he noted that the 
ministry had "initially needed men with new (technical] knowledge" 
but was now being taken over by those who "lacked the ability to under­
stand this new knowledge." For him the exclusion of technically edu­
cated men from major posts was not just shocking but dangerous. In 
1889 he was fired from the ministry, entered private business, and (in 
1890) got elected to the Diet.39 Nakamura was not alone in his views, 
but there were some countertrends in the ministry. The first minister of 
agriculture and commerce, Kono Togama, in 1881 created an intra-
ministerial committee that later helped to found the Industrial Experi­
ment Laboratory.40 His prescient vice minister, Shinagawa Yajiro, in 
1884 gave private assistance to the chemist Takamine when he left 
government to work in American private industry.41 
The Ministry of Education in the 1880s had a more nuanced posture 
toward research. Motoda s fears about "science" were not dead despite 
Ito's intervention, because influences from Germanyreinforced them. 
In 1882 Councillor Kawashima Atsushi prepared a paper on the subject 
SCIENCE AND THE BUREAUCRACY 133

inspired by Lorenz von Stein of Vienna and quickly found his misgiv­
ings being echoed by the incumbent minister, Fukuoka Takachika 
(1881-83), and even by Mori Arinori (minister 1885-89).42 But these 
two men were quick to take action. Fukuoka advocated Germany as 
Japan's academic model because of the affinity in law and basic out­
look.43 Mori, who shared Itd's views, developed a program for averting 
any problems. 
Active promotion of "practical research" was one of Mori's principal 
strategies. He constantly invoked the applied-science argument, and 
during the years he held office as minister took steps to realize his 
views. Establishment of the faculties of engineering and agriculture at 
Tokyo University (in 1886 and 1890, respectively) can both be at­
tributed to this.44 Even prominent members of the university commu­
nity joined in support of his views. President Watanabe Kdki declared in 
1886 that the level of learning in Japan would be raised not only by 
producing men "learned in the principles of science" but equally by 
those with practical abilities.45 And in 1888 Watanabe insisted that the 
most important part of the research done in Tokyo's college of science 
that year was an eminently practical "magnetic field survey of the 
[Japanese] countryside."46 Some scientists opposed this trend. The 
mathematician Kikuchi Dairoku claimed that science's search for truth 
"produces infinitely more benefits than do the enterprises of the prac­
tical man. "47 And theoretical chemist Sakurai Joji praised the scientist's 
role as "architect of the castle of knowledge. "48 But the applied-science 
movement was sufficiently powerful to win support even here. In 1889 
Terao Hisashi, professor of astronomy and director of the university 
observatory, gave a lecture to a group of young mathematics students in 
which he declared that it was wrong to study mathematics "solely 
because of one's personal interests." One had to use it in service to 
society.49 
Autocratic management was another component of Mori's approach 
as minister of education. Three weeks after he took office, he and I to 
forced Kato Hiroyuki out as university president and installed their ally 
Watanabe Kdki.50 Then the Imperial University Ordinance (1886) 
made their intentions even clearer. This declaration omitted any refer­
ence to an advisory role for the university president in the making of 
policy, authorized the minister of education to appoint faculty members 
to the university senate, and required the president to inform the minis­
ter about the discussions of the senate in detail.51 Of course, there were 
carrots attachedto the stick. Mori tried to flatter individual professors by 
inviting themto the ministry for private conversations. And he sought to 
impress the university as a whole by giving speeches at academic func­
tions. Some observers correctly see a more intimate relationship be­
134 SCIENCE AND THE-BUREAUCRACY 
tween ministry and university during Mori's time in office than at oth­
ers, but the relationship was at best a mixed blessing for professors.52 
The management style of the minister of education finally produced 
a reaction. During the 1880s the routine interests of the scientific com­
munity were well represented in the ministry. Hamao Arata, who held 
the position of chief of the Bureau of Professional Education, while not 
trained in science, was sympathetic. In 1881 President Kato had pro­
posed a necessary division of the undergraduate physical sciences pro­
gram into separate majors for physics, mathematics, and astronomy. 
Hamao had actively supported this initiative and managed to persuade a 
reluctant minister, Fukuoka Takachika, to allow it5 3 Hamao also steer­
ed several able students into the natural sciences when he was univer­
sity president (1893-97) and later helped found the Tokyo Institute of 
Technology.54 But the managerial style instituted by Mori did not en­
courage officials to act like Hamao or professors to be involved in policy 
making, and demands that the university be granted autonomy began 
while Mori was still in office. 
Three aspects of the professors' earliest campaign for university au­
tonomy are worthy of notice. One is the lack of timely agreement on how 
to achieve autonomy. Two major proposals were put forward in 1888­
89, but they differed in important details. One proposal was developed 
by the deans. It called for permanent faculty tenure but envisioned 
appointment of professors and allocation of funds entirely by the deans, 
with the professors to have a mere "right to assent." The other was 
developed by assistant professors who had recently returned from Ger­
many. They requested financial autonomy and election of the president 
and faculty council, with nearly all powers to reside in the council.55 
The second noteworthy aspect is the scientists' role. The impression is 
that most were conformists (the appointment of scientists to sensitive 
posts in the 1930s, at a time of rising military influence, illustrates this 
well).56 But the 1880s were quite another matter. Three of five deans 
active in the movement were scientific professionals at that time. So 
were most (63 percent) of the assistant professors.57 
Less surprising but equally important was society's reaction to the 
autonomy campaign. In early 1889 a small group of professors called on 
the senior statesman Matsukata Masayoshi to argue on behalf of their 
cause. But a meeting of minds did not take place, and their appeal was 
clearly a failure. Matsukata called their request "unthinkable," and one 
young professor described the conversation as "wind in the ear of a 
horse."58 Nor were other commentators much more responsive. Several 
newspapers accused professors of ignoring their place in Japanese soci­
ety, and Fukuzawa Yukichi's Jiji shimpo sanctimoniously declared that 
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a "university that must rely on public support ought not to be opposing 
the will of the public."59 
In truth some of the concern of the young professors and part of the 
reaction against them derived not from the actions of the ministry but 
from the role expected of the Diet. In 1889 the entire country was 
awaiting parliamentary government with a mixture of hope and anx­
iety. Liberal young professors wanting support for their mission feared 
the Diet would cut back their funding. But liberal intellectuals like 
Fukuzawa Yukichi expected it to check the power of the leadership and 
resented what seemed like a threat to its power. These reactions show 
the importance of the Diet, and in fact, the emergence of the Diet in 
1890 fundamentally changed how decisions were made. 
Decision Making about Science in the 1890s 
Several new trends came to the fore in the 1890s. The Imperial Diet 
asserted itself vigorously in matters of science and higher education. 
The Ministry of Education maintained a highly intimate—some would 
have said incestuous—relationship with Tokyo University that gave 
professors some voice in policy but occasionally cost them in scholarly 
research. Under the auspices of competent officials in the Ministry of 
Home Affairs, Kitasato's leadership produced a flourishing tradition of 
scientific research defended by allies and political maneuvering. The 
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce came under the control of law 
faculty graduates whose actions were a scandal to some of the scien­
tists. There were, of course, some negative trends in all of the ministries 
involved with science, but they were strongest in the Ministry of Agri­
culture and Commerce. 
The Diet was a partial corrective to such trends in the various minis­
tries. As in any system of parliamentary government, it had to approve 
the spending of money, but this was by no means the extent of its 
power. The Diet had the authority to summon officials to explain recom­
mendations and justify their policies. It could invoke the authority of 
technical experts by inviting scientists and others to testify. It could 
organize special commissions of inquiry. And it could offer its own 
legislative proposals. The Imperial Diet did all of these things, some­
times with stunning results. Since few of the members knew much 
about science, one would not have predicted this behavior.60 Neverthe­
less, it is important to stress that a handful of members were well 
informed. Elected in the first general election of 1890 and continuing to 
serve for a number of years were the physician Hasegawa Tai and the 
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former official Nakamura Yaroku, with his degree in physics from 
Munich. These two men were very well informed and invariably raised 
major policy issues.61 
Especially typical of the 1890s Diet was a tendency to originate legis­
lation. Later proposals with a chance of success came from one of the 
ministries, but in the Diet's first years it was active on a number of fronts 
in the hope of making its mark. Policy toward science was one such 
arena. The Diet overrode the ltd cabinet's proposal for a medical labora­
tory at Tokyo University and instead voted to favor a Kitasato-backed bill 
(see chapter 4, above). In 1892 the Diet funded the Ministry of Educa­
tion's modest proposal for the Seismological Research Commission by 
cutting the budget for the army.62 These were quite spectacular inter­
ventions, but they were not historically unique. During its first decade 
the Diet took up seven privately sponsored proposals for science. Three 
were approved and implemented.63 
While the Diet routinely summoned officials to discuss their policies, 
it called on scientists rather sparingly. But in May 1892 it did invite 
Noro Kageyoshi, professor of metallurgical engineering, to explain the 
technical details of a steel mill proposal the government wished to see 
funded.64 And in December 1893 it heard testimony from Koganei 
Yoshikiyo, professor of anatomy, about subsidizing charity patients at 
Tokyo University Hospital as a way to gain the necessary research 
material.65 On no occasion during this decade did it summon a member 
of the faculty of science, although the mathematician and physicist 
Kikuchi Dairoku when education minister gave expert testimony in 
1901 on the work of the Seismological Research Commission.66 
Other than supporting Kitasato and needling officials, the greatest 
contribution of the Imperial Diet was its appointment of a number of 
special commissions. The most important such body established in the 
period was the Committee to Investigate the Academic System 
(Gakusei Chosa Kai). Originally created in the House of Peers by the 
former education vice minister Kubota Yuzuru in 1894, the committee 
did little in itsfirst three years because most Diet members trusted the 
educational leadership of the government In 1897 and 1898, however, 
the cabinets of Matsukata Masayoshi and Okuma Shigenobu showed 
some inclinations toward educational reform, and a lively debate en­
sued. This debate focused on a number of issues, among them the role 
of research.67 
Stress on research is surprising despite the support that I to Hirobumi 
and Mori Arinori gave it Certainly the ministers of education of the 
1890s gave consistent backing to the research ideal. In 1890 Yoshikawa 
Akimasa declared that the "flourishing or decline of a country has much 
to do with the flourishing or decline of its science."68 In 1891 Oki 
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Takatd maintained that the "investigation of basic theoretical principles 
and the advancement of high-level knowledge in all disciplines are the 
factors that bring about progress."69 In 1897 Hachisuka Mochiaki 
praised Tokyo University as a "place for investigating basic princi­
ples."70 But the gap between rhetoric and action made research support 
a big issue. The Ministry of Finance was extremely parsimonious in its 
funding of higher education.71 University scientists were under pres­
sure from the Ministry of Education to help build professional institu­
tions.72 The Diet itself was committed to reducing the level of public 
expenditure. It was symptomatic of the general situation that one of the 
strongest proponents of scientific research, Hasegawa Tai, was also a 
leading budget cutter.73 
The combination of such contradictory stances made the education 
ministry both defensive and aggressive. For example, in 1890 Kitasato 
Shibasaburo requested support for an additional year of research in 
Germany. Because of his accomplishments and general reputation his 
request should have been routine. But Kitasato had previously (in 1886) 
criticized the work of a university professor. Sensitive as ever to the 
university's reputation, Katd Hiroyuki apparently retaliated. Using his 
authority as university president, he decided to oppose Kitasato's re­
quest, and the ministry withheld its approval.74 This was to prove a 
momentous decision. When Kitasato returned to Japan fifteen months 
later, he refused to cooperate with the Ministry of Education, and their 
hostility was fixed for life. The ministry relentlessly pursued control 
over Kitasato's laboratory and launched a campaign to gain control over 
nonacademic laboratories in general.75 In 1890 it took the Forestry 
Experiment Station over from the Ministry of Agriculture and Com­
merce, in 1896 the Central Meteorological Observatory from the Minis­
try of Home Affairs, and also in 1896, the Tokyo Astronomical Obser­
vatory came under its aegis. While the Ministry of Education controlled 
just five percent of nonacademic laboratories in 1893 (see table 5.2), by 
the end of the decade it had nearly a quarter. 
The Ministry of Education's administrative imperialism aroused 
more than a little resentment. Hasegawa Tai in 1893 described the 
ministry as "feudalistic" and "good at holding its [political] ground" and 
attacked it for treating Kitasato as an "irreconcilable enemy" and for 
"constantly plundering the resources of others."76 The education jour­
nal Kyoiku jiron in 1897 criticized it for employing "too many [Tokyo] 
professors as administrators."77 And Representative Ichijima Kenkichi 
in 1899 deplored the university's "inordinate influence" in the ministry, 
claiming that relations between the two were "self-serving."78 
A demand for general reform arose. In 1897 the ministry took the 
lead by creating the Higher Education Council (Koto Kyoiku Kaigi). 
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TABLE 5.2 
Bureaucratic Affiliations of Nonacademic Scientific 
Laboratories 
1885 1893 1900 
MINISTRY N 7c N % N c/c 
Home Affairs 7 47 8 42 7 23 
Agriculture and 
Commerce 5 33 7 37 11 35 
Public Works and 
Communications 1 7 1 5 2 7 
Navy 1 7 1 5 3 10 
War 1 7 1 5 1 3 
Education 0 0 1 5 7 22 
Totals1 15 101 19 100 31 100 
Sources Yuasa Mitsutomo. Gendai kagaku gijutsu shi (Tokyo. 
1962 •; TCS/G. various numbers. 
'Percentage totals may be slightly higher or lower than 100 due to 
rounding. 
This body had members (including ten scientists)from a broad profes­
sional spectrum, but its accomplishments were few. It had no guide­
lines.79 Its members were named by the minister of education.80 And it 
could only give advice on request81 In fact, the president of the House 
of Peers, who opposed reform, described it approvingly as an in-house 
committee.82 
For just this reason the Diet insisted that there must be an outside 
commission. It was not acceptable for a commission to report to the 
Ministry of Education; it must have access to the prime minister di­
recdy. But this did not have to mean confrontation. "The Diet's Com­
mittee to Investigate the Academic System will try to assist the ministry 
and encourage its work." Since Tokyo University was a source of the 
problem, the minister and the Imperial Diet might want to form an 
alliance against it. Putative reformeis had differing views. Some wanted 
to shorten the total course of study. Others wanted encouragement for 
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private education. Still others favored diversion of resources to the vari­
ous higher professional schools.83 There was little consensus on what 
should be done, but on one point ten were agreed. "The imperial univer­
sities should become institutions where research . .  . is the principal 
function."84 
Actually the ministry was committed to promoting research by en­
larging the size of the faculty. Between 1893, when the chair system 
was established, and mid-1901, when new efforts were launched, eigh­
teen chairs in science were added at Tokyo University. But progress in 
building research infrastructure was never uniform over time. During 
the presidency of Hamao Arata six chairs were added, while one more 
was established during Toyama Shdichi's eighteen months in office. 
But the most rapid growth came under Kikuchi Dairoku. During the 
thirty-eight months between April 1898 and June 1901, eleven chairs 
were founded in the sciences, and all the faculties were represented.85 
No comparable growth took place again on the Tokyo campus until long 
after World War I. 
Chairs were not established by one mans fiat. Article 14 of the Impe­
rial University Ordinance had given faculty appointment powers to the 
minister of education. But exercising these powers required much con­
sultation, and the president's role was important. It was. after all. Presi­
dent Kato Hiroyuki who in 1890 had actually proposed the system of 
chairs. Minister Inoue consulted fully with Kato's successor (Hamao 
Arata) on which chairs to establish.8*7 The presidents themselves did 
not have free rein. While legally they could proceed as they wished 
(since their authority had not yet been challenged), they could not 
ignore the professors' advice.87 When Inoue requested Hamao's views 
on chairs in 1893, Hamao immediately sought opinions from the fac­
ulty.88 The Ministry of Education made a point of underscoring pro­
fessors* involvement In March 1897 Vice Minister Makino Nobuaki 
told the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives: "We [in 
the ministry] hold meetings with faculty members at the university to 
determine whichfields are most urgently needed. I cannot tell you what 
they will be in advance because this is decided periodically."89 
Nevertheless, the skill of the president was very important in deter­
mining the pace of expansion. Presidents Hamao and Kikuchi had both 
served extensively in the Ministry of Education before becoming presi­
dent at Tokyo University, while Toyama moved, conversely, from uni­
versity to ministry. All had extensive high-level connections and knew 
how to play the administrative game well. Hamao's accomplishments 
were limited by the financial pressures of the war with China; Kikuchi 
had the advantage of serving in peacetime. Even so, one has only to 
compare Kikuchi's accomplishments at Tokyo with those of his coun­
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terpart at Kyoto to appreciate the importance of the president's role. 
Kyoto had been created on a wave of enthusiasm. Its first president, 
Kinoshita Hiroji, had been chief of the Bureau of Professional Educa­
tion (1893-97). But Kinoshita complained bitterly of financial neglect 
and managed to add only eight chairs in technical fields between 1898 
and 1901. Kikuchi had excellent support and was able to found eleven. 
One cannot know all the pertinent factors, but their backgrounds were 
probably important. Kinoshita was a lawyer with no technical training, 
while Kikuchi was a scientist.90 
In the 1890s scientific progress at the imperial universities benefited 
from sympathy at the Ministry of Education. Each of the chiefs of 
Professional Education was overtly sympathetic, and several were par­
ticularly helpful.91 Professors had access to most top officials and were 
closely involved in the bureau.92 Individual professors or academic 
units could propose a chair or laboratory, obtain support from the higher 
authorities, and hope to find it established in due time However, an 
important point to note in comparative context is the formal nature of 
these ties. The Bureau of Professional Education was officially charged 
with promoting "all of the sciences and the arts" as well as with super­
vising the imperial universities.93 
Ostensibly, the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Bureau of Public 
Health had a similar relationship with the Institute of Infectious Dis­
eases. Under the terms of an 1893 letter to Kitasato from Minister Inoue 
Kaoru, all regulations of the institute, together with any revision or 
diversion of budgeted items, had to be approved by the minister of home 
affairs. The laboratory's activities were supposed to be supervised by the 
public health bureau's chief. The minister of home affairs had to be 
informed about activities in writing annually. The Board of Audit was 
empowered to inspect the institute's accounts whenever it wished.94 
But in some respects the relationship was rather anomalous. Before 
nationalization (March 1899), the Institute of Infectious Diseases was 
legally private, and Kitasato just a consultant. No restrictions or audits 
were ever in fact imposed, because Kitasato had the power to prevent 
interference. Shortly after nationalization, Ikai jiho declared: "Mr. 
Kitasato is the dominant force in the Bureau of Public Health. Every­
thing it does is based on his views."95 
Kitasato's friendships with successive bureau chiefs bolstered his 
status. Nagayo Sensai, in office until August 1891, was Kitasato's first 
major patron. In 1884 he gave Kitasato his first job (bureau technician 
and Hygiene Laboratory researcher) and in 1890 got additional funding 
for the now famous scientist after the Ministry of Education refused its 
support ^  Kitasato was even friendlier with two of Nagayo's successors. 
He and Goto Shimpei met in 1883 when both were working in the 
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bureau and became close friends in Berlin about 1887 while studying 
bacteriology together. In 1892 Goto became chief, and in 1893 he 
helped Kitasato found the institute.97 Gotd left office in 1898 and was 
succeeded as chief by Hasegawa Tai. Hasegawa had served as legisla­
tive architect of the institute subsidies in 1893 and remained through­
out his life Kitasato's ardent ally. Neither man was trusted by university 
professors. They called Hasegawa 'Kitasato's puppet," and Goto an 
"oppressor."98 
These epithets symbolize the reality of factions in Japanese medi­
cine. Sources disagree on their number and structure. One common 
depiction put graduates of the Tokyo University medical faculty in the 
"university faction," while Kitasato's associates were said to form an­
other faction.99 Whatever the validity of particular descriptions, polar­
ization between factions was real. The Ministry of Home Affairs even 
respected these hostilities when it decided to sponsor a venture in re­
search. In spring 1894 the Japanese consulate in Hong Kong informed 
Tokyo by cable of a plague epidemic afflicting the city. A brief consulta­
tion between a section chief in the Bureau of Public Health and one of 
Kitasato's research associates established that plague was not extinct, 
as had been thought, and that prestige would accrue to any country 
whose scientists succeeded in discovering the cause. Accordingly, the 
bureau recommended a medical expedition to Hong Kong. After due 
deliberation, the minister chose the university's Aoyama Tanemichi for 
the clinical work and Kitasato for the basic research. 10° 
The scientific outcome of the Hong Kong expedition was important 
in at least two ways. Kitasato managed to isolate the bacillus and an­
nounced his success in The Lancet.101 This, of course, was very big 
news, and when the expedition returned to Tokyo, a welcoming recep­
tion was held—ironically at Tokyo University. Prominent public figures 
heaped praise on the mission, and the Emperor's cousin captured the 
mood. According to Prince Konoe Tokumaro, the discovery by Kitasato 
of the plague bacillus "reflects credit on Japanese medical science and 
makes our civilization shine to the heavens. . .. Such achievements can 
only raise the level of our nation and bring it [universal] acclaim."102 
Prince Konoe's words had policy implications. In 1894 Kitasato be­
gan accepting short-term special students (denshusei) at the Institute 
of Infectious Diseases. Because most were public health officials, the 
home minister in 1895 requested—and the Diet authorized—prefec­
tural governors to recommend candidates with the government to pay 
for their training. These state-supported students, and others who paid 
their own way, studied bacteriology, epidemiology, toxic prevention, 
microscopy, culture making, and methods of clinical treatment.103 By 
nationalization, this public program at a private institution had pro­
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duced 450 graduates who had their own organization and were political 
allies of Kitasato.104 
Kitasato's objectives were simple enough: maintenance of his auton­
omy and political independence, bolstering of funding, and above all 
protection of the Institute of Infectious Diseases from formal annexa­
tion by the Ministry of Education. He used service functions to protect 
his research, taking advantage of the institute's structure and ostensi­
ble mission—research, clinical treatment, and public health consulta­
tion. The denshusei program meshed well with this mission, as did most 
of his other activities. Kitasato and his staff gave lectures for physicians, 
traveled to epidemic-infested areas at the home minister's request, and 
took even.' opportunity to publicize their work.105 The results were 
impressive. Not surprisingly, a long-time associate was able to write: 
"Ordinary people considered Dr. Kitasato a (typical] oyabun [boss] or a 
common politician"106 
If scientists' influence was greatest in the Ministry of Home Affairs, it 
was lowest in the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce. This ministry 
hadresponsibilities in forestry and industry as well as agriculture, and 
in virtually even1 bureau the "lawyers" were powerful. After Maeda 
Masana retired as chief of the Bureau of Agriculture in July 1890, 
nonexperts controlled the office for thirteen years. In the Bureau of 
Forestry, one expert had three months' control in 1897; in the Bureau of 
Industry no technical man was ever bureau chief after October 
1889.l07 Of course, control was not wholly definitive, for all three bu­
reaus employed technical experts, and some of them made a significant 
difference. Some of the laboratories under the ministry had more auton­
omy. But technical projects were hard to advance, given the bureau­
cratic climate. 
Consider the Bureau of Agriculture. With chiefs who were lawyers or 
even politicians, and technical men who were sometimes professors, 
there was a serious possibility of failure to communicate. Some mem­
bers of the Diet criticized the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce's 
concept of agricultural research, its deployment of resources, and its 
application of results. "The ministry's development plan was inade­
quate." "We need moreresearch!" (Imai Isoichiro). Trie ministry was 
"sacrificing export profits by failing to stress agricultural research" 
(Nakamura Yaroku). The ministry was wasting money at the Agri­
cultural Experiment Station by putting up Western-style buildings; 
traditional styles would be much more appropriate (Nakamura Yaroku). 
Technical experts were not used effectively because so many were at 
work in the ministry's headquarters (Fujita Magohei). Experiment sta­
tion experts talked over the heads of the farmers; their extension pro­
grams were totally "haphazard" (Nakamura Yaroku). Ministry officials 
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could not explain the technical work of the station even to the members 
of the Imperial Diet (Fujita Magohei).108 
Responses to these chargesfrom the chief of the bureau were par for 
the course. Since money was insufficient, the bureau had to rely on the 
cooperation of various private groups which "often do not follow 
through." It was difficult to obtain foreign seeds and plant species. The 
extension program needed "time to evolve." One had to proceed "slowly 
and cautiously." The research programs of the experiment station were 
"just a beginning."109 But the bureau chief was willing to concede that 
many of the charges were valid. The number of technical experts at 
ministry headquarters was quite large but at the same time essential for 
"administrative purposes." The number of truly well-rounded agri­
culture experts was admittedly "not very large." The chief confessed 
that he was a "novice" in scientific agriculture, did "not understand 
much of farmers' conversations," and "did not know the scope of the 
[experiment station's] work in any real scientific sense"!110 
In the 1890s the bureau's performance at the topmost level showed 
marginal improvement at best. Technical experts, for example, were 
never deployed in a manner suitable for research. In 1896 the bureau 
had thirty-one technicians and technical experts at its administrative 
headquarters, but only thirteen at the experiment station at Nishiga­
hara. In 1899 twenty experts worked at central headquarters and elev­
en at Nishigahara, both located in the city of Tokyo. •'! The chief of the 
bureau for most of this period (March 1893-May 1898), Fujita Shiro, 
was the first "lawyer" to hold the position and was undoubtedly appoint­
ed for reasons unrelated to agriculture. In 1896 he tried to meet the tea 
industry's demand for a research program by simply transferring 1,372 
yen from the already modest budget for sericulture.112 In February 
1899, while serving as vice minister, he brushed aside requests for more 
research support saying it was "wrong to spend money. . . just to en­
courage agriculture."113 This came at a time when Japan's spending on 
agriculture research was embarrassingly small. 
In the Bureau of Forestry in the 1890s the problems were about the 
same. Technical and nontechnical men had to communicate, and bar­
riers between them were real. Worse, the technical men were divided 
among themselves. In 1891 Shiga Taizan, who was both professor of 
forestry at Tokyo University and an expert employed in the Bureau of 
Forestry, recommended forestry conservation policies based on re­
search, but these had to obtain the ministry's approval before the Diet 
could debate them, and that gave rise to two big problems. One was the 
composition of the ministry's review committee, the other the status of 
the technical men. Making up the committee were seventeen "lawyers" 
and two technical men. Other technicians were wholly subordinate. 
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The "lawyers" reacted with incomprehension, and the other technician 
challenged Shiga s findings. When Shiga protested at this reception, he 
was "warned directly by the minister himself."114 
Indications are that the Bureau of Forestry had serious morale prob­
lems. Many well-trained experts worked there, but they never had any 
real authority. No matter how many years of commendable service they 
had or how much the administrative system was supposed to be based 
on scientific knowledge, they could never rise beyond section chief. 
Later this became a big issue (see chapter 8).115 
Then there was the Bureau of Industry. The same kinds of people 
who served as bureau chiefs in agriculture or forestry were present 
here, too, and the men with technical degrees who did the major work 
were, like everywhere else, subordinate. Yet in other respects the Bu­
reau of Industry was an exception. Its staff was small. In 1897 the 
Bureaus of Agriculture and Forestry hadfifty-nine and forty-eight men 
on their staffs, respectively, while the Bureau of Industry had a mere 
twenty-three.'l6 Other things being equal, an engineer or scientist 
employed in this bureau stood a somewhat better chance of obtaining a 
hearing. Moreover, the private-sector clients of the Bureau of Industry 
were more powerful than those of its rivals. Most forested land was 
government owned, so there wererelatively few clients for the Bureau 
of Forestry, and the wealthy farmer clients of the Bureau of Agriculture 
were no political match for industry's wealthy businesses. 
The real problem for science in the Bureau of Industry was the 
complacency of most clients. Before 1895, most private firms were 
uninterested inresearch and maderelatively few demands for it on the 
government.!I7 But once they saw the need to take action, they were 
powerful enough to get things done. After Japan's victory in the Sino-
Japanese War, European facilities for industrial research and sophisti­
cated manufacturing became less accessible to Japanese visitors.! 18 In 
1897 a bureau expert made a systematic effort to dispel business com­
placency. Takayama Jintaro, a chemical engineer, began publicizing 
the need for industrial research after officially touring facilities in Ger­
many. The Japanese private sector responded to his efforts by organiz­
ing a group to carry on lobbying.! 19 
The aim of this group, the Association for the Chemical Industry— 
and the major scientific project of the Bureau of Industry—was to 
establish what became the Industrial Experiment Laboratory. In Oc­
tober 1898 the bureau recommended the plan to the intraministerial 
committee of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce. This body 
consisted of the ministry's eight bureau chiefs and had been created in 
1881 by Minister Kono Togama. Committee approval was necessary 
before any official proposal could be reviewed by the Ministry of Fi­
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nance or the Diet Given the different backgrounds of the bureau chiefs, 
this procedure could easily have posed a problem, but in 1898 the 
committee contained an influential and atypical member, Watanabe 
Wataru, who had a B.S. degree in chemistry, was professor of metal­
lurgical engineering, and had for some months been chief of the Bureau 
of Mining.12° His presence may have made the difference. The commit­
tee decided to back the proposal.121 Private business also tried to lobby 
the ministry. When the matter went to the Diet in February 1899, it was 
under private sponsorship, with the ministry's assent.122 Of course, 
European precedents were critical in persuading the government to 
found the Industrial Experiment Laboratory.123 
Decision Making for Science in the Prewar Years 
Decision-making trends in the years before the war did not simply 
replicate earlier patterns, although changes may have been more appar­
ent than real. The Imperial Diet was still influential, and the influence 
of the "lawyers" became more pervasive. In the Ministry of Education 
in the 1890s and in the opening years of the twentieth century, a few 
professors held major offices and could make decisions themselves, but 
they were succeeded mostly by "lawyers," who tended to delegate sig­
nificant decision-making powers. Changes of this kind could also be 
latent, not perceptible to contemporary observers. Kitasato had as much 
power in the Ministry of Home Affairs after as before 1902, when "law­
yers" replaced doctors in the Bureau of Public Health. But his position 
did change, and changes were partly due to the actions of "lawyers." 
But "lawyers" had not completely overrun the bureaus. In the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Commerce, where they were most entrenched, an 
agricultural chemist became agriculture bureau chief in 1903 and an­
other vice minister in 1908. 
The year 1900 saw intensified concern over higher education and 
science, with the Ministry of Education again under attack from politi­
cians and educators. Representative Shimada Saburo accused the 
ministry of having a "closed-country mentality" and of lacking interest 
in reform.124 Kyoikujiron claimed the ministry's approach to manage­
ment was "shallow and prejudiced" and attacked it for carrying on 
administration in secret12S Even Kato Hiroyuki saw the ministry as a 
{dace where accomplishments were few because officials were "preoc­
cupied."126 But the sharpest criticisms in these early years had more 
to do with research by professors. On thefloor, of the House of Peers, 
the former vice minister of education Kubota Yuzuru charged that 
university professors had done too much consulting and not enough 
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research. After denouncing their neglect of research, he laid the blame 
on the ministry itself, saying it was largely "indifferent to higher 
education."127 
Responses to Kubota's charges varied. The incumbent minister, Ka­
bayama Sukenori, who agreed, criticized what he considered an exces­
sive emphasis on overseas study, with its implied drain on funds and 
consequent diminution of faculty research, and proposed a program to 
turn this around.128 His successor, Matsuda Masahisa, backed a 
number of ad hoc projects for scholarly research.129 But some pro­
fessors at Tokyo University took a far less favorable view of the 
charges. The former university president Toyama Shoichi had his own 
reform ideas and reportedly used "vituperative language" in his re­
sponse. 13° Physics professor Yamakawa Kenjiro thought Kubota's 
statements only made it more difficult for scientists to function profes­
sionally. n  i The definitive reply came from mathematician Kikuchi 
Dairoku. Using the House of Peers as a forum, he stated that faculty 
were actually doing plenty of research (see chapter 6). Kubota had just 
failed to grasp its meaning. Foreign scientists had cited university 
publications for their research results, and faculty consulting was an­
other form of research.l32 
Over the next five years these views were tested by four different 
ministers. The first was Kikuchi himself. Appointed to office in June 
1901. he served two years and was then forced to resign. After an 
interim successor who served just two months, the office of minister 
was filled by Kubota. Kubota served two years and was also forced to 
leave office (in December 1905), after which the prime minister filled 
out the term. In the modem administrative history of Japanese science, 
nothing else resembles these five turbulent years. Continuity was sup­
plied by the prime minister, who held office for the entire period, and his 
views gave some coherence and unity. 
This man, Katsura Taro, was atypical among Meiji prime ministers. 
He was a career military man who had also lived seven years in Berlin. 
He had an "extraordinary understanding of science" and was deter­
mined to promote it effectively.133 Katsura saw two major problems in 
higher education and science. One was what he identified as the "com­
mon evils of the academic community."134 The other was what he 
considered an excessive reliance on Europe for technical and scientific 
information.135 But science and higher education were not his only 
interests. He was even more dedicated to strengthening Japans inter­
national position, and for this reason he signed the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance (1902), launched a major military buildup (1903), and went to 
war with Russia (1904-05). Unfortunately the domestic and foreign 
objectives of the Katsura cabinet were in basic conflict. The Diet would 
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not allow higher taxes to pay for the military buildup and war,136 and 
this led inevitably to major retrenchment, the issuance of bonds, and 
the deferment of new spending. 
The prime minister aggravated his problems by his choices for minis­
ter of education. Kikuchi and Kubota appeared to be qualified, but they 
offended their major constituencies. Kikuchi's tenure was troubled 
from the start. In June 1901 he announced a plan to promote competi­
tion by instituting lecture fees, pooling the funds, and redistributing 
them to professors with large class enrollments. This lacked appeal for 
most scientists since their enrollments were usually small.137 In Sep­
tember he proposed a two-track preprofessional education system that 
academic colleagues managed to defeat at a regular meeting of the 
Higher Education Council.l38 In November he denied any need for an 
imperial university in Kyushu, even though he had previously endorsed 
it.139 
Of course, Kikuchi did some things his colleagues liked In De­
cember 1901 he gave a masterful defense of the Seismological Re­
search Commission, which some Diet members had opposed because 
the work it had done had not yet led to long-term prevention of earth­
quakes!140 In 1902 and 1903 he did propose and help to secure signifi­
cant budget increases for the imperial universities. But in March 1903 
he tried to prevent Waseda from acquiring the title university, saying it 
was in most ways inferior to Tokyo University.141 Kikuchi favored re­
search, but his policy views were unusual. Unlike most concerned 
Japanese, he wanted to stress education in the imperial universities and 
concentrate research in the Tokyo academy.142 
Considering his past record and the prime minister's expectations, 
Kikuchi's term was a failure. Kyoiku jiron had criticized his admin­
istrative abilities in 1897 when he was serving as chief of the Bureau of 
Professional Education, but his overall record had belied i t 1 4 3 He was 
the only scientist ever to serve at this highest level of the government. 
He had served not only as professor of mathematics and dean of the 
science faculty but as university president and vice minister of educa­
tion. Unfortunately his training and views made him politically un­
qualified to serve in the post of minister. Kikuchi had done university 
work in mathematics and science at St. John's College, Cambridge, 
from 1873 to 1877, and he came under the influence of Isaac 
Todhunter, a capable mathematician of reactionary views.144 Cam­
bridge was peculiar even in Britain, and Todhunter peculiar in 
Cambridge. While most British universities were institutionalizing sci­
ence, the classical legacy was very strong at Cambridge. This implied 
vigorous opposition to experimental science and strict adherence to 
aristocratic values. Todhunter saw Cambridge as training members of 
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the elite. He rejected aspirations for upward mobility and especially 
aspirations for changing society.145 Kikuchi's views were not wholly 
Todhunter's, but they were closer to them than expediency dictated. In 
July 1903 the House of Representatives voted no confidence in Kikuchi, 
partly over the issue of university expansion.146 The prime minister 
then appointed the home minister, Kodama Gentaro, as acting minister 
of education. Kodama proposed, and Katsura even supported, a scheme 
to abolish the Ministry of Education.147 Kikuchi had gravely offended 
the Diet and the cabinet. When the Privy Council blocked this radical 
scheme, Kikuchi's long-time enemy Kubota Yuzuru became minister of 
education. 
Ultimately, Kubota fared little better. A graduate of Keio, he had few 
connections at Tokyo University. Because of the military buildup and 
the war, he could not promise to allocate more money. In fact, funding 
for the two universities was frozen in 1903, and Tokyo took cuts in 
1905.148 Professors and scientists hated Kubota because he demanded 
so much and delivered so little. In 1905 they were given their chance. 
Seven Tokyo professors criticized the modest gains that came to Japan 
in the settlement with Russia, and Kubota imprudently sought their 
dismissal. This "Tomizu Affair" brought massive opposition from the 
university community, which was seeking to achieve institutional au­
tonomy.149 Many scientists joined the movement ostensibly in support 
of their colleagues but soon made their true feelings known: the issue 
was not upholding a principle but eliminating a foe. Once Kubota had 
been forced to leave office, their interest in politics faded. 15° 
This turbulent era eventually gave way to greater stability. Makino 
Nobuaki became minister of education in March 1906 and set out to 
accomplish what his predecessors could not Both imperial universities 
got significant funding increases for 1906 (13 percent for Tokyo, 14 
percent for Kyoto) and decent ones for 1907 (5 and 10 percent, respec­
tively).151 The number of chairs in technical fields grew more rapidly 
than it had in some years.152 The Tokyo academy was radically re­
organized, and the decision was made to launch Tohoku University. 
Formal establishment of the Tohoku science faculty offers a salient 
example of the "new" decision making. Under the rules of the higher 
civil service, scientists were not to hold policy positions, but they were 
allowed to contribute their views when officials considered them essen­
tial. Since Makino's administration embodied both views, he dispatched 
his subordinate to the Tokyo campus.153 In early 1907 the vice minister 
Fukuhara Ryojiro, who was also chief of the Bureau of Professional 
Education, conferred with the physicist Nagaoka Hantaro about inter­
nal details of the proposed new faculty. This all-day meeting yielded two 
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principal results. Nagaoka proposed names for academic appointments, 
and the two men agreed on an organizing committee.154 
As proposed, this committee would monitor developments, and for 
that reason it was made up of prominent scientists.155 In fact, once it 
was known who would be the new professors, it was they who did most 
of the actual work. Their most important task was to allocate money for 
facilities and equipment. Four programs were to be funded—in geol­
ogy, mathematics, physics and chemistry—and the government im­
posed a limit on spending (150,000 yen). Unfortunately, the efforts of 
the young professors yielded a budget twice that size, but over some 
months the problems were solved. The professors reached a formula for 
allocating their funds. The geology program was postponed for a year. 
The ministry decided to reward them with additional funds for 
equipment156 
Of course, Makino and his successors could make such commit­
ments because military spending was dropping. But the success he 
achieved while holding this office cannot fully be explained in this way 
Makino Nobuaki had a profound understanding of w hat one would now 
call the sociology of science and higher education. During his four years 
as vice minister of education in the 1890s he had pointed out Japan's 
special lack of experience with the physical sciences, expressed sympa­
thy for the difficulties of Japanese research scientists after they re­
turned home from Europe, defended the hiring of foreign academics as 
a stimulus for Japanese professors, supported university expansion as 
"best for the progress of learning." and stressed the importance of 
competition between chairs as beneficial to scientific research.157 
Makino had other qualities few colleagues could match. He was the son 
of Okubo Toshimichi, one of the Meiji state's founders, he had spent 
much time abroad in his formative years (primarily in the United 
States), and he had more than a modicum of political judgment. In 
1908, when the Beriberi Research Commission was established with 
money from the Ministry of War, he refused to support professorial 
demands that the Ministry of Education be granted control on the 
grounds that this was not a fight he could win.l M Makino s efforts were 
greatly appreciated by the scientific community. Tokyo University's 
president, the physicist Yamakawa Kenjiro, said in 1911 that Makino 
Nobuaki was "among the ministers of education who accomplished the 
most"159 
Certainly no one said this of the three who succeeded. Komatsubara 
Eitaro (1908-11) was described as a "used-up official with neither the 
capacity nor the inclination for administration." His successor, Haseba 
Sumitaka (1911-12), was called "deficient in the ability to understand 
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anything about education." And the third, Shibata Kamon (1912-13), 
was said to represent the "quintessential bureaucratic style."160 The 
evidence supports such remarks. None of these men had served in the 
Ministry of Education before becoming its head. Haseba had never 
been to college, and Komatsubara had spent just one year at Keio. None 
of the three had taught in a school, and none was known for intellectual 
interests.161 
Other trends in the higher bureaucracy made the situation, if any­
thing, worse. Komatsubara's appointment (he was concurrently minis­
ter of agriculture and commerce) epitomized a tendency to assign 
someone to the Ministry of Education as a kind of secondary duty.l62 
Shibata's appointment marked the definitive takeover of the ministry by 
university graduates of the faculties of law. So conspicuous was this 
trend that Kyoiku jiron, which in 1897 had editorialized against the 
appointment of technical men to administrative offices, in 1913 re­
versed its judgment to argue that men with legal training were "not 
necessarily qualified to serve as bureau chiefs, [at least] in the Ministry 
of Education. "lt>J 
But it was in the area of policy decisions that the effects were most 
glaring. The period 1908-14 was a period of lost opportunities, al­
though substantial institutional growth did occur at the two new re­
gional campuses. Tohoku's science faculty with its twelve chairs was 
inaugurated in 1911, and the faculty of engineering at Kyushu Univer­
sity commenced the same year. Partly this expansion was based on 
policy Yamakawa Kenjiro, serving as president at Kyushu in 1911, got 
Haseba to agree that the two new universities must be made equal to 
their peers in Tokyo and Kyoto,164 but education ministers in this peri­
od were otherwise not much involved. Makino had committed the gov­
ernment to the Tohoku project before leaving office, and Kyushu's 
expansion was owing to decisions under Kikuchi and to the political 
intervention of industrialists. The price that was paid for this regional 
expansion could be, and certainly was, challenged. Between 1908 and 
1914 Kyoto University managed to add only one chair in a technical 
field (internal medicine in 1909) while Tokyo added just four (miner­
alogy, 1909; geography, 1911; agricultural engineering, 1911; mining 
engineering, 1912). How they did it at all is not clear, since their bud­
gets were virtually frozen.165 Not surprisingly, Chuo koron in 1913 
called the Ministry of Education a "place long lacking in accomplish­
ment"; while Kyoiku jiron in 1914 considered it the "principal victim of 
the government's cuts in spending."166 
The pattern of government spending justified this criticism. Meiji 
Japan had never spent lavishly on higher education. In 1900 Kubota 
Yuzuru reminded the House of Peers that France and Germany were 
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spending about 8 percent of their budgets on public education, as com­
pared to 5 percent in Japan.167 Kikuchi Dairoku testified in 1901 to 
education's status as a lower-ranking item on the financial agenda of 
the country.168 The reasons for this are both comprehensible and in­
comprehensible. Historically, the samurai class had linked education 
not only with morality but also with frugality. The Meiji leadership was 
inevitably committed to a high level of spending on the Japanese armed 
forces. The tax base was narrow for a good many years, and much of the 
Diet was vigorously dedicated to a relatively low level of public 
expenditure. 
But one should not overlook the Ministry of Finance and its role in 
the budget process. This ministry was a conservative agency whose 
officials invariably chopped budgets. It was also an agency of consider­
able prestige, where many university graduates of the faculties of law 
first got their footholds 169 Ministers and vice ministers were not law 
graduates until after the Russo-Japanese War, but several had been 
bureau chiefs before the turn of the century. The predilection for ap­
pointing law graduates worked against science. In 1911 Yamakawa 
Kenjiro lamented the small number of competent generalises among 
university graduates and especially deplored the "ignorance of science" 
that typified the modern legal man. I7° The ministry had in fact blun­
dered badly in 1906 when it blocked a plan by electrical engineers in the 
Ministry of Communications to standardize frequencies of electrical 
transmission.171 Coincidentally Yamakawa had lashed out at the basic 
posture of the Ministry of Finance. The ministry's worst feature, ac­
cording to him, was a tendency to support proposals from the military 
uncritically while inclining to "meddle in educational [and technical] 
matters where they wrongly think they are competent."172 
Predictably the last man to serve as minister of education before 
World War 1 was a person who fit the legal mold closely. Not that Okuda 
Yoshindo lacked pertinent expertise, for in 1899-1900 he had served as 
vice minister of education, and he had some understanding of higher 
education. He was a staunch promoter of Tokyo University and had 
graduated from its law faculty in 1884. In 1913, as minister of educa­
tion, he rejected proposals for privatdozenten and lecture fees because 
the conditions needed to support them were lacking in Japan.173 
But Okuda Yoshindo was above all else an expert in law and finance. 
He never served in the Ministry of Finance, but he had held a compara­
ble job in 1900-02, when he was chief of the cabinet Bureau for Legal 
Affairs. There he developed the plan for cutbacks that Katsura had 
endeavored to follow. But Okuda was largely unaware of technical is­
sues. He claimed that Tokyo University "set the standard for scientific 
research in Japan" and recommended transfer of Kitasato's institute to 
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the university.174 Despite major opposition he proposed this again (un­
successfully) in 1911 and in 1913. 
But in 1914 Kitasato's laboratory was transferred, though many con­
temporary observers attributed the transfer to Dean Aoyama s machina­
tions. Professor of internal medicine from 1887 and dean of Tokyo's 
faculty for sixteen years (1901 -17), Aoyama Tanemichi was a Kitasato 
rival who was powerful, well-connected, and politically informed. He 
helped add six new chairs during the years of his deanship and avoided 
budget cuts during the years of no-growth funding.175 In 1908 he 
managed to get a member of the medical faculty on the war ministry's 
Beriberi Research Commission.176 He was also a close friend of Okunia 
Shigenobu, one of the country's most powerful politicians.177 Many 
thought this connection led to the transfer. Since Okuma was prime 
minister at the time (see chapter 7), and since the two men dined 
together nearly even1 Friday evening, it was plausible that the dean had 
persuaded the prime minister to carry out this action. 
In fact, Aoyama was neither responsible for the transfer nor capable 
of achieving it by those means.17" Before he authorized the transfer, 
Okuma had supported Kitasato, and in any case Aoyama had other 
priorities. Certainly he did medical research, but his principal interests 
were treatment of patients and finding positions for academic clients. 
To that end he tried to influence the selection of students for overseas 
study, involved himself intimately in faculty appointments, and con­
vinced the people holding the pursestrings to create new positions for 
university-trained doctors.179 Aoyama was more adroit than other 
deans and held office longer, but his career was typical. Sakurai Joji as 
dean of science, Watanabe Wataru as dean of engineering, and Kozai 
Yoshinao as dean of agriculture all used this same strategy. 
Institution building on behalf of research required more than these 
sorts of talents, for one had to have support from laypeople and control of 
resources simultaneously. In 1914, before the war began, members of 
the faculty of science had neither. An effort to engender support by 
delivering lectures at the Tokyo School of Physics, a very poorly funded 
private institution, yielded no lasting results.180 The faculty of science 
produced a relatively small number of fully trained graduates. The 
private money received to support basic science was not used entirely 
by that faculty. Private business had limited interest, and no basic 
scientist's name was a household word.181 
Agriculture's situation was, in principle, different, because it was a 
traditionally strong field that had some support for nonacademic re­
search and a capable leader in Dean Kozai Yoshinao. Kozai had access 
to the powerful. In 1913 he was invited by the cabinet to discuss a 
proposal for agricultural research at one of its regular meetings. In­
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terestingly enough, this proposal—for an animal husbandry institute-
was never adopted despite a favorable reaction.I82 But the Yam am o to 
cabinet whose initiative it was soon fell from power, and the proposal 
could be faulted on the merits. Did Japan really need an animal husban­
dry institute when it had so many other needs? It is likely that the 
principal difficulty was lack of external support. Such a facility would 
have benefited only a few wealthy farmers, a clientele not organized 
politically. Agriculture generally had few academic support groups, and 
those that it did have were formed late.l83 
Academic engineering faced similar obstacles. Professional and 
other support groups existed, but their influence was small,18*' and 
Japanese business's bias toward foreign technology made it disinclined 
to give money. About 1909 the metallurgical physicist Honda Kdtaro— 
who did raise private money after 1914—described the relationship 
between private business and academic research as "like that of part­
ners in a very late marriage."185 Aoyagi Eiji. professor of electrical 
engineering at Kyoto University, in 1912 complained in print that aca­
demic engineers had "very few contacts in the business communi­
ty."186 Even having such contacts was not always enough. In 1911 the 
Ministry of Finance managed to block a proposed mining research 
laboratory despite support from academic engineers, their business al­
lies, and the DieL187 
Kitasato's career in the Ministry of Home Affairs showed quite a 
different pattern. In 1899 he secured the dismissal of a section chief in 
the Public Health Bureau, apparently on personal grounds.188 In 1903 
and 1912 he defeated proposals from the Ministry- of Finance to reduce 
the budget of the Institute of Infectious Diseases.189 In 1914 he insti­
gated the founding of a national network of sanatoria and hospitals for 
victims of tuberculosis.190 The size of his "empire" grew steadily. In 
1905 the government built new facilities for the laboratory and hospital 
and added new agencies to them. Attaching the Vaccine Station and 
Serological Institute for vaccine and serum production to the Institute 
of Infectious Diseases significantly increased Kitasato's power, because 
such production was a government monopoly.191 Not surprisingly, the 
Bureau of Public Health was then said to be little more than an "exten­
sion of the Institute of Infectious Diseases," and the bureau chief 
"could never take action without consulting Kitasato in advance."192 
Kitasato took steps to hold on to his power. In about 1901 he got 
control of the Central Hygiene Commission, whose function was medi­
cal consulting. He exploitedfriendships with Tanaka Giichi (later prime 
minister) and Fukuzawa Yukichi to gain regular access to their two 
publications. He made extensive use of the Japan Federation of Medical 
Societies and later served as its president. And he threw lavish parties 
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for the federation's members on the grounds of his private estate.193 
Kitasato could do this because of his wealth. Beginning in 1893 he had 
established a private sanatorium for tubercular patients, and it proved 
exceedingly lucrative.194 
The major bureau chiefs were also Kitasato's friends. Kubota Seitaro, 
who served as chief of the Bureau of Public Health for about seven 
years, was the first of many lawyers to hold this position. After graduat­
ingfrom Tokyo University's faculty of law, he worked as an attorney in 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce and as a councillor with the 
Court of Administrative Appeals. In 1903 he was named chief of the 
bureau, where he consistently supported Kitasato's proposals.I95 His 
immediate successor was a lawyer-politician who was Kitasato's child­
hood friend. Kobashi Ichita (1910-13) went from Kumamoto to Tokyo 
University, then to the Bureau of Public Health, the Bureau of Civil 
Engineering, and the vice ministership of home affairs. In 1929 he 
became minister of education. Some considered Kobashi an effective 
bureau chief because in 1912 he got significant new funding for the 
Institute of Infectious Diseases when the Ministry of Finance was de­
manding cuts everywhere,196 but others were less happy with him. 
These critics stressed his lack of influence in 1911, when Saionji's 
cabinet proposed to transfer the institute to the Ministry of Education, 
and his seeming ineffectiveness in 1913, when Okuda Yoshindo want­
ed to abolish the bureau.197 
The most interesting aspect of Kobashi's performance is how his 
background in law contributed. Since he was Kitasato'sfriend and tried 
to support him, it is tempting to conclude that it made little difference. 
But the editor of the medical journal Ikai jiho was not convinced this 
was true. This man, Uchigasaki Tojiro, himself a graduate of the Tokyo 
law faculty, made two criticisms of his fellow alumnus. According to 
him, Kobashi had fallen short because he lacked institutional loyalty 
and because he was insufficiently familiar with the matters he con­
trolled. "The chief of the Bureau of Public Health should be a physi­
cian," he wrote. "But since the changes were made in the higher civil 
service, they are no longer being appointed."198 Interestingly enough, 
Uchigasaki was not the only lawyer who considered the system too 
rigid. Bureau Chief Kubota once noted that Kitasato had never held a 
post with much formal power and attributed this record to "bureaucrat­
ic defects."199 
A bureaucratic lawyer eventually caused Kitasato to lose his position. 
The laboratory transfer of 1914 was primarily the work of Ichiki 
Kitokuro, from 1894 to 1905 professor in the Tokyo law faculty and for 
several years thereafter a career civil servanL Ichiki came to dislike 
Kitasato after having been in posts where he could observe the scien­
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tist's maneuvering. In 1899, as a member ex officio of the Central 
Hygiene Commission, he watched Kitasato use the commission to fire 
an obnoxious civil servant In 1903 and 1911 he had to tolerate 
Kitasato's destruction of the bureaucratic reform plans drafted by 
Okuda Yoshindo, who preceded him as cabinet bureau chief for legal 
affairs. During the period from 1908 to 1911, while serving as home 
affairs vice minister, Ichiki became particularly incensed by the grow­
ing national power of the "Kitasato faction" and their consistent ability 
to disrupt administration he thought appropriate and reasonable.200 
But Ichiki could act only after Kitasato was weakened (see chapter 
7), which happened for at least three different reasons. One was the 
diminished role of the Ministry of Home Affairs in supervising scientific 
laboratories (see table 5.3). 
TABLE 5.3 
Post-1900 Affiliations of Nonacademic Scientific 
Laboratories 
1900 1909 1915 
MINISTRY N N N c/c 
Home Affairs 7 23 7 17 6 13 
Agriculture and 
Commerce 11 35 15 37 15 33 
Public Works and 
Comm u nications 2 7 2 5 2 4 
Navy 3 10 4 10 4 11 
War 1 3 3 7 3 7 
Education 7 22 8 20 13 28 
Railways 0 0 1 2 1 2 
Finance 0 0 1 2 1 2 
Totals 31 100 41 100 45 100 
Sources: Yuasa Mitsutomo, Gendai kagaku gijutsu shi (Tokyo, 
1962); TGSIG, various numbers. 
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One year after Kitasato's institute was nationalized, the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Commerce had a 35 percent share of all nonacademic 
laboratories controlled by the government, with Education running 22 
percent and Home Affairs 23. This in itself was alarming enough; the 
longer-term trend was much worse. By 1909 the Ministry of Home 
Affairs controlled only 17 percent and the Ministry of Education about 
20, and by 1915 Home Affairs had dropped to 13 percent, while Educa­
tion s share had risen to 28. A trend so momentous did not pass un­
noticed. As early as 1901 a member of the House of Representatives 
remarked that the decline of the home affairs ministry had "created 
difficulties for various projects" and demanded to know why. In re­
sponse, the chief of the Bureau of Civil Engineering testified that the 
Ministry of Home Affairs indeed "lacked backbone" and had no "special 
plan for carrying out (its) programs."201 
The growing numbers of bacteriologists also eroded Kitasato's posi­
tion. There were only seven bacteriologists in Japan when the Institute 
of Infectious Diseases was founded. Within a year of nationalization, 
the number had increased to twenty-four, and there were thirty-one 
Japanese bacteriologists when Okuda first recommended the institute's 
transfer. By 1910 there were forty-two, and another crucial one was 
added by 1914.2O2 The percentage of bacteriologists working for organi­
zations controlled by admirers of Kitasato was declining (see table 5.4). 
In 1893, four of Japan's seven bacteriologists worked with Kitasato, and 
three worked in the hostile environments of Tokyo University and the 
TABLE 5.4 
Employment of Bacteriologists 
IN PRO-KITASATO IN OTHER

ORGANIZATIONS ORGANIZATIONS

YEAR N % N % 
1893 4 57 3 43 
1900 13 54 11 46 
1910 18 43 24 57 
1914 18 42 25 58 
Sources: Iselci Kuro, ed, Dai Nihon hakushi roku, vols. 2,3 (Tokyo: 
Hattensha, 1930), and various biographies. 
SCIENCE AND THE BUREAUCRACY I57

Tokyo Hygiene Institute.203 In 1900, 54 percent of the bacteriologists 
in Japan still worked in institutions or for organizations controlled by his 
allies, but by 1910 thisfigure had dropped to 43 percent, and by the eve 
of the war to 42. 
Erosion of skill monopoly and loss of political leverage made the 
decline in Kitasato's bacteriologists an important development. Most 
Japanese bacteriologists before 1900 were both loyal to Kitasato and 
employed in organizations where they were free of conflicting loyalties, 
but their movement into organizations controlled by hostile elements 
changed this pattern substantially. In 1898 Yokote Chiyonosuke be­
came an assistant professor of bacteriology at Tokyo University, in 1908 
Ishihara Kikutard left the Tokyo Higher Normal School to assume the 
same position, and in 1909 Futaki Kenzd accepted a junior faculty post 
at Tokyo.204 But the move that damaged Kitasato most was that of 
Saizawa K6zo in 1913 to the faculty of the Army Medical College, where 
he was subject to the authority of a long-time critic, Mori Rintaro, chief 
of the Bureau of Medical Affairs in the Ministry of War. Saizawa's move 
was particularly damaging because of his special combination of skills. 
Yokote, Ishihara, and Futaki were competent researchers, but none had 
a prior Kitasato connection or the range of qualifications required to 
replace him. Saizawa, who had worked two years with Kitasato (1907­
09) and two more at Koch's laboratory (1910-12) was not only trained 
in research and clinical treatment but was formally qualified to super­
vise production of serums and smallpox vaccine.205 Because Ishihara, 
Futaki, Yokote, and Saizawa were reasonably well trained, and because 
Saizawa held a politically vulnerable post, the Ministry of Education in 
Okuma's government, by allying itself with the Ministry of War, was 
able to assemble a pool of talent that could formally replace the Kitasato 
staff in October 1914 when they resigned to protest the institute's trans­
fer. None of this was apparent beforehand. According to Ikai jiho, 
Kitasato until that moment continued to occupy a "very special position 
in the Ministry of Home Affairs."206 
No scientist had any such position in the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Commerce, but there were two or three with more than average influ­
ence. Sako Jomei studied in Germany and taught in the faculty of 
agriculture at Tokyo University before joining the ministry in 1892. 
During the next ten years he established himself as a leading agri­
cultural chemist, received his doctorate, and held two section chief 
posts in the Bureau of Agriculture. In a highly unusual move, Katsura's 
government in May 1903 elevated Sako to the post of bureau chief, 
which he occupied for three and a half years. The reasons for his ap­
pointment are not completely clear, but a number of factors were at 
work. For example, Katsura was more interested in science than most 
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prime ministers, Sako had impressive credentials, and afriend of Sako, 
Hirata Tosuke, who had more formal education than most of his peers, 
had become minister of agriculture and commerce. Hirata was the first 
Japanese to obtain a Ph. D.from the University of Heidelberg; and while 
his degree was in political economy, he had also translated medical 
works into Japanese and was a friend of Shinagawa Yajiro, a prominent 
lay promoter of the chemical industry.207 
If Katsura and Hirata wanted radically new leadership, Sako did not 
disappoint them. He built on his own research in setting directions. In 
the 1890s he developed, and as bureau chief promoted, the "dry rice 
field thesis," which called for leaving at least some paddy land fallow 
when cultivating rice. He drafted legislation for agriculture. Under 
Sako, laws governing fertilizer use, regulating agricultural societies, 
and attempting to minimize damage from insects were all approved by 
the Diet. He also took initiatives in several other areas, giving new 
emphasis to livestock breeding, agricultural research, and taxation of 
imported grain.208 
Sako Jomei's striking contribution was to make the best use of re­
sources. Critics had attacked the wasteful policy that appointed law 
graduates as chiefs of bureaus with technical duties and then hired 
experts to act in their place.209 Earlier chiefs of the Bureau of Agri­
culture had clearly been guilty of this. In 1896 there had been only 
thirteen experts in agricultural research and thirty-one pushing papers 
at headquarters. But this ratio changed after Sako took office, and by the 
end of his tenure it had been reversed. Unfortunately for the bureau, 
the change was not permanent. Sako could evaluate technical matters, 
but his successors, trained in law, had to rely on subordinate experts, so 
that the number of experts working at headquarters once again exceed­
ed those in research (see table 5.5). Sako's leadership was quite suc­
cessful. Contemporaries called him the "famous bureau chief," and 
Katsura in 1909 offered him the post of vice minister.210 
After Sako, the bureau again came under the control of lawyers and 
other nonexperts. Maki Naomasa (1906-07), Oda Hajime (1907-08), 
and Shimo'oka Chuji (1908-12) were all from the Tokyo law faculty, 
while Doke Hitoshi (1912-20) was a liberal arts graduate. Certainly 
these men had good intentions. They proclaimed the need for Japan to 
increase food production, sought to reduce dependence on imports of 
cotton and wool, and tried to boost exports of silk. But their policy 
priorities did not always build on comparative economic advantage. 
Sericulture was seriously neglected, while animal husbandry research 
was stressed. There was no serious interest in a silk research laboratory 
until 1909, and even then it developed quite slowly. (Because of sharp 
price declines in the two prior years, private producers were the ones 
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TABLE 5.5 
Agriculture Bureau—Deployment of Experts 
BUREAU NISHICAHARA

YEAR HEADQUARTERS EXPERIMENT STATION

1896 31 13

1899 20 11

1904a 50 46

1906* 51 52

1910 52 54

1913 52 46

Source Naikaku InnatMikvoku. «J . Shokutnroku 
•Years lhai Sak6 Jdmei t D Sc Afcr ) was chief of the Bureau of 
Agriculture. 
wanting research; the ministry was not in the vanguard of action, and 
legislative progress was slow.) Only in 1911 did the Diet get a bill 
proposing the Silk Research Laboratory, and the actual foundation was 
delayed two more years.211 Complacency figured largely here. When 
scientists employed in the ministry recommended in 1909 immediate 
research on synthetic fibers, their superiors did not respond well. Igno­
rant of foreign progress, they considered the challenge to silk insignifi­
cant212 In 1912 such attitudes prompted a member of the Diet to 
contend that the ministry was behind current needs.213 
But the lawyers did not make even decision. Interest in animal 
husbandry was longstanding, beginning with Matsukata and Oku bo in 
the 1870s, and annual imports of wool exceeded thirty million yen.214 
In the late Meiji years Kozai Yoshinao exercised great influence in favor 
of animal husbandry. When he spoke before the cabinet, an agriculture 
expert who attended the meeting said that just "two or three members" 
understood all the issues, but that Kozai's "sincerity and reputation" 
had been decisive.215 Moreover, this use of Kozai was by no means 
unique. Trie ministry also tried to promote the use of new strains of rice 
by featuring him at a conference.216 
This raises the issue of the role of experts in determining sound 
public policy. There were serious arguments against a domestic sheep 
industry. Foreign sheep adapted poorly to the humid Japanese climate 
and did well only in Hokkaido. Much of their food was imported from 
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Europe. Dense rural population made traditional grazing impossible. 
Costs of production typically exceeded the resources of individual farm­
ers. The financial salience of these arguments was especially apparent. 
As we have seen, the immediate prewar years were difficult, and many 
programs were cut in funding. For 1914 the ministry proposed to re­
duce sericulture research by 35,000 yen.217 Tokyo University had to 
accept a modest cutfrom the Ministry of Education, and even Kitasato's 
funding was seriously threatened in the Ministry of Home Affairs. In 
this situation the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce designated 
animal husbandry research a target for major new funding (50,000 
yen). 
Certain members of the Diet were greatly displeased by the minis­
try's action. One got Vice Minister Hashimoto Keizaburo to acknowl­
edge the successes of the sericulture program. Hashimoto noted that a 
university zoologist had returned from Europe with the news that Ja­
pan's progress had eliminated the need to ape foreign models. But the 
chief of the Bureau of Agriculture took a different position when asked 
about the breeding of sheep. He admitted a lack of progress in the 
ministry's program but attributed it to ignorance of animal diseases, the 
difficulties of animal raising in a crowded environment, and neglect of 
systematic crossbreeding. He also insisted that progress was occurring, 
citing modest successes in the Hokkaido region as a reason to increase 
support218 
Technical experts' views were only one factor in generating sound 
public policy. As dean of Tokyo's faculty of agriculture, Kozai Yoshinao 
could hardly be expected to oppose his own field's interest. Animal 
husbandry was an integral part of the agriculture program and had 
intrinsic interest for agricultural scientists. In the Ministry of Home 
Affairs money was even allocated for medical research that turned out 
to be based on error. Kitasato, in the last twenty years of his research 
career, spent a large but undetermined sum of the ministry's money on 
an unsuccessful effort to cure tuberculosis.219 The real problem with 
the Bureau of Agriculture was its structural imbalance. It kept its tech­
nical experts totally subordinate and relied on academic authorities 
with self-interested motives. 
The Bureaus of Forestry and Industry did not even do this. Forestry 
after 1900 used "lawyers" to supervise experts, making use of their 
work but denying them recognition.220 Industry promoted only lawyers 
and assigned them the task of advocating research. Oka Makoto, chief 
of the bureau for a decade, was considered a competent official by 
scientists, but he actually knew nothing of scientific matters. One of his 
duties was to present his budget to the Budget Committee of the Diet. 
Because he had control over the Industrial Experiment Laboratory, Oka 
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had to meet its director on occasion. These conversations were a chal­
lenge to them both. On one occasion Oka grilled Director Takayama 
Jintaro about minute details without being able to understand the an­
swers he was getting. Takayama believed the questions were ridicu­
lous, and the discussion became an emotional struggle.221 
The worst manifestations of the bureaucratic system were not yet 
fully apparent In early 1914 technical experts continued to work in the 
ministries, and there was some expansion and greater autonomy in the 
imperial universities. Kitasato's network of influential friends seemed 
intact A major proponent of scientific research became head of the 
government in April. Prime Minister Okuma Shigenobu was at least as 
knowledgeable about science as Katsura Taro, and some of his actions 
in office (1914-16) proved it Okuma increased spending for science 
and higher education, helped found a major new laboratory', encour­
aged research in private institutions, and proclaimed the need for in­
volvement in government by prominent members of the scientific com­
munity. Ironically, his government also transferred the Institute of 
Infectious Diseases to the Ministry of Education, damaging signifi­
cantly in just a few weeks what it had taken Kitasato many years to 
create (see chapter 7). 
The fate of Kitasato is an instance of government's coopting science. 
By awarding subsidies for appointments or research, and monopoly 
status for production of serums, officials had hoped to control his ac­
tivities, and by moving his laboratory to the Ministry of Education, this 
control could surely be strengthened.222 Of course, these policies had a 
much broader context As part of its plan for maintaining legitimacy, 
the government tried to deflect competition by emphasizing rules, im­
partiality, expertise, and bureaucracy as crucial to the making of proper 
decisions.223 Not that these strategies were simple to execute; scien­
tistsresisted in various ways, the academics demanding autonomy and 
Kitasato constructing a political support group. The bureaucracy could 
rarely act as a unit More than one ministry was often involved (or 
aspired to involvement) in projects for science, and scientists could 
make them compete with each other. The results were beneficial for 
research.224 
CHAPTER SIX 
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN 
ITS SOCIAL SETTING 
Among the problems Japanese research had to surmount in its for­
mative years, few aroused greater interest than the values of the re­
search community. Could Japanese scientists be equally faithful to the 
Western scientific norm of impersonal criticism and to Japanese soci­
ety's expectations of loyalty to mentors? Would Japanese academics 
willingly ignore clique affiliations to choose the man who was best for 
the job? Could they respect the public nature of science by sharing 
information and other resources? While scientists everywhere confront 
these issues, they were particularly salient for Japan because the formal 
structures of Japanese feudalism, samurai privileges, had disappeared 
so recently and because the experience of studying abroad had exposed 
Japanese scientists to the ethos and values of the Western scientific 
tradition. In July 1898 the journal Koshu iji (Public health) noted that 
professors in the faculty of medicine at Tokyo University were being 
accused of giving more thought to who should marry their daughters 
than to what they might contribute to knowledge.1 In August Ikaijiho 
declared that many Tokyo professors "fear and try to resist the develop­
ment of new forces, respond to those who flatter them, suppress people 
with vitality who antagonize them, ignore morality and scholarship, and 
only seek influence for their cliques."2 
One of the principal issues was favoritism in recruiting professors. 
Becoming a professor was said to require an undergraduate degree from 
the institution where one wished to work, a relative on its faculty, or a 
powerful patron who would execute "underhanded, crafty maneuvers." 
According to a leading daily newspaper: "Professorial posts are ac­
quired by inheritance. A professor with a daughter will choose a son-in­
law from among his students. He will then send that student abroad 
even if another to whom the opportunity has been promised must be 
kept at home. Upon the student's return, the father-in-law will appoint 
the son-in-law to succeed him, even if he has to remove some inconve­
niently placed assistant professor."3 Other observers showed greater 
interest in the allegation that the imperial universities recruited faculty 
solely from the ranks of alumni. In a 1905 essay, Ikaijiho praised the 
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appointment of Sudd Kenzo as assistant professor of biochemistry at 
Tokyo University on the grounds that his undergraduate association 
with Hasegawa Tai's Zaisei Gakusha medical academy presaged a trend 
toward "merit" appointments.4 
Another contention was that scientists had created self-sufficient, 
isolated enclaves that blocked most cooperation across factional lines. 
Critics thought researchers should compete to discover new knowledge 
yet willingly share facilities and information with rivals. In 1902 
Nakahama Toichiro asserted that "nothing could be further from the 
behavior of a scientist than what he saw as an effort by Kitasato to 
extend his "privatefiefdom" to Tokyo University.5 In 1914 an anony­
mous writer in Ikaijiho claimed that the university itself was no more 
than an "accumulation of individual cells" where every research group 
was demanding a separate laboratory, specimen room, library, and 
other facilities.6 In the same year Yagi Itsuro persuaded the Diet to 
reject a special university appropriations bill on the grounds that pro­
fessors who "refuse to cooperate and confine themselves to small do­
mains" were really not scientists at all.7 The problem with such behav­
ior, according to critics, was really intellectual in nature. It harmed 
science by inhibiting the synthesis of knowledge and experience.8 and 
it could keep vital information from those who most needed it. In 1913 
physicist Nishikawa Masaharu investigated hemp and asbestos fibers 
that would have interested a number of chemists, but university re­
strictions on cross enrollments kept them in ignorance for seven more 
9years.
Critics remarked less frequently on behavior uithin groups. 
Tokutomi Soho in 1902 did say that the atmosphere at Tokyo University 
was "suffocating" and warned that "disputes between the authorities 
and learned circles opposed to feudalism" would continue if nothing 
were done about i t 1 0 Similarly, Wakasugi Kisaburo in 1914 referred in 
the House of Representatives to "decrepit professors" whose presence 
at the university was discouraging younger scientists from doing more 
research. Another Diet member said much the same thing in 1918.n 
The issue of free discussion was very important to Japanese scientists. 
During the controversy over beriberi, Kitasato wrote in a medical jour­
nal: "If a theory is deemed false, it must be publicly criticized whether 
the scientists involved are father and son, brothers, teacher and stu­
dent, or friends. This is a great responsibility for scientists {To do 
otherwise] would reveal a spirit of servility counter to the spirit of scien­
tific journals."12 
Kitasato was the most influential critic of Japanese science in this 
period A prodigious investigator with a broad reputation, he himself 
professed strong commitment to open recruitment,free discussion, and 
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cooperation with other professionals. In 1910 he denounced scientists 
who "accept the theories of others uncritically" and declared that it was 
in the nature of science to cause conflict between teachers and stu­
dents. 13 From the founding of his laboratory in 1893, he recruited his 
staff from many institutions and criticized the university for lack of 
professionalism. In 1892 he cited these alleged misbehaviors as his 
reason for declining an appointment and even said they negated the 
attempts of the Tokyo faculty to carry on research.l4 For twenty years 
he resisted the Ministry of Education's attempt to tie his laboratory to 
Tokyo University, and in 1914 he left government service rather than 
accede to the change. 
The institutional focus of this conflict over values reflected the state 
of science in this period (1870-1914; see table 6.1). On the eve of World 
War I, Tokyo University employed 38 percent of the country's research 
scientists. The Institute of Infectious Diseases ranked first among non-
university facilities. Kyoto University was second among the four uni­
versities, with Kyushu University in a distant third place. Tohoku Uni­
versity ranked last in professors with doctorates but was actually second 
in chemistry' and physics. 
Medicine dominated Japanese research in numbers and quality. By 
early 1914 there were 147 medical researchers working in four univer­
sities, thirteen government colleges, two government laboratories, and 
one private academy. Medical men had received 300 of the 652 docto­
rates in technical fields conferred before 1914 and obtained seven of the 
twenty-six prizes of the Imperial Academy conferred before 1921.15 
Physicists also received seven of the prizes awarded in this period 
(1911-20), but neither physics nor any other field matched medicine's 
overall record. By January 1914 Japan had produced only 30 physicists 
with doctor's degrees, of whom 27 were employed in three universities, 
four government laboratories, and one normal school. Research chem­
ists of all kinds numbered 96 at the time; they worked mostly in applied 
fields. Of the 16 with degrees in basic chemistry, 12 were employed in 
universities, two at the Tokyo Higher Normal School, one at the Tokyo 
Higher Technical School, and one at the Sixth Higher School.16 The 
state of chemical research in Japan is to some extent indicated also by 
the small number of Imperial Academy prizes it received—just three in 
the prizes' first decade.17 
These figures help in evaluating the criticisms referred to above. 
Information on whom university professors married and where they 
studied makes it possible to discuss academic recruitment with some 
precision. But reliance on literary sources requires selectivity in dis­
cussing concrete cases. Among the independent laboratories, the In­
TABLE 1 
Institutional Affiliations of Research Scientists (1913) 
INSTITUTE OF OTHER HIGHER 
TOKYO KYOTO KYUSHU TOHOKU INFECTIOUS GOVERNMENT MEDICAL TECHNICAL 
UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY DISEASES LABORATORIES COLLECE SCHOOLS OTHERS 
N % N % N % N % N % N N % N % N % 
Pharmacology 4 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 21 7 37 0 0 4 21 
Forestry 4 57 0 0 0 0 2 29 0 0 1 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Veterinary 
medicine 6 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 30 
Medicine 38 24 35 22 9 6 1 1 8 5 1 1 63 40 1 1 0 0 
Engineering 36 43 24 29 14 17 1 1 0 0 4 5 0 0 4 5 0 0 
Science 47 55 10 12 0 0 11 13 0 0 8 9 0 0 10 12 0 0 
Agriculture 12 46 0 0 0 0 « 23 0 0 3 12 0 0 0 0 5 19 
Totals 147 38 69 18 23 fi 21 5 9 2 21 5 70 18 15 4 12 3 
Sources: Dai jinmei jiten, 10 vols. (1957). Dm Ninon hakusht rvku. !> vols. (1921 .10) Jmji koshtn roku. 1st ed. (1903); 2d ed (1908); 4th ed. (1915); 
7th ed. (1925); 8th ed. (1928); 9th ed (1931); 11th ed (19.17) Who's Who in Japan, id cd (191.1), 17th ed. (19.16) The Japan Biographical 
Encyclopedia and Who's Who, 1st ed. (1958) 
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stitute of Infectious Diseases is a compelling place to begin. Tokyo 
University is represented by four laboratories because it employed 38 
percent—and trained 70 percent—of the Japanese scientists active in 
the period. Within the university, I discuss laboratories in physics and 
chemistry because of their importance for a developing tradition, those 
in pathology and internal medicine to represent varying accomplish­
ments in medicine. I also analyze conditions at Tdhoku because of their 
meaning for Japans basic science and to illustrate transmission of val­
ues from Tokyo University to sister institutions.18 
Kitasato and the Institute of Infectious Diseases 
Kitasato Shibasaburo was impartial in recruiting his staff when he is 
judged by the usual standards. The permanent members of his re­
searcher corps came from several different schools and rarely, if ever, 
had "connections." His first appointment (Umeno Shinkichi) was a 
graduate of the Tokyo School of Veterinary Medicine, while the second 
(Asakawa Norihiko) came from the undistinguished Zaisei Gakusha 
owned by Hasegawa Tai. Kitajima Ta'ichi was the first graduate of 
Tokyo University to be hired and Shiga Kiyoshi the second. After the 
Institute's first few years, about half theresearchers camefrom Tokyo 
University and the rest from other institutions. For example, Shiba­
yama Gorosaku's appointment (Tokyo) was balanced by that of Hata 
Sahachiro (Okayama Medical College) in 1898; in 1900 Terauchi 
Yutaka (Tokyo) and Toda Toranobu (Morioka College of Agriculture 
and Forestry) were hired. Between 1901 and 1914 Kitasato added six 
men from Tokyo University, twofrom Okayama Medical College, and 
one each from Kyoto University, Nagasaki Medical College, and the 
Zaisei Gakusha. None of these appointments was nepotistic. Asakawa 
married one of Kitasato's daughters, and Shibayama married Kitasato's 
wife's sister, but this was after, not before, they entered the institute. 
Kitajima married the daughter of a prominent physician, but only one 
staff member had a father in medicine.19 
Kitasato was as careful in developing his talent as he was in recruit­
ing it. He encouraged the diligent,reprimanded the lazy, stimulated the 
curious, and challenged the skeptical. His objective was always to en­
courage independence. Hata Sahachiro says he told them to work hard 
and accept only the research results they hadreplicatedthemselves.20 
"Dr. Kitasato wanted us to develop strong personalities," wrote Miya­
jima Mikinosuke.21 Shiga Kiyoshi states: "Kitasato never gave us de­
tailed instructions. Instead, he followed Koch's method. That is, we 
were supposed to compile our own bibliographies and perform our own 
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experiments as a way of learning responsibility and advancing by 
ourselves."22 
At the same time, Kitasato was a disciplined man and demanded the 
same of his colleagues. He was a stickler for punctuality, order, and 
routine. He arrived at the laboratory by eight in the morning and worked 
energetically untilfive in the afternoon.23 "He took a very strict attitude 
toward research students," according to Shiga, "and showed no mercy 
if anyone slacked off." Students and staff members secredy dubbed him 
"kaminari oyaji" (Papa Thunder) for the way he bawled out lack­
adaisical colleagues, and Shiga says he could sometimes be heard sev­
eral doors away venting his anger on a hapless researcher.24 Asakawa, 
when approaching Kitasato's office, would look at thefloor as a way of 
deflecting criticism if he thought the director was angry with him.25 
Miyajima tells of a photographer visiting the institute who became so 
rattled by Kitasato's angry voice that he snapped his picture of the 
incubating room with the lens cap still on the camera!26 
But it seems unlikely that Kitasato's explosive character damaged 
staff morale. Evidence suggests that colleagues used the nickname 
"kaminari oyaji" more to imply affection than to express discontent. 
Kitasato was the quintessential oyabun (boss), and Kitajima said a 
conversation with him was often like "talking to my father."27 The 
director had a deep personal affection for the people working under him 
and was highly adept at getting the response that he wanted. He se­
cretly lent students money to finance their studies, entertained mem­
bers of the staff and their families at an annual picnic, and constantly 
used his influence to advance their careers in research. He never actu­
ally criticized members of the staff publicly even though his voice was 
sometimes overheard, and, according to Miyajima, he constantly 
praised to outsiders even those he privately criticized.28 
The institute's contributions to science under Kitasato show that his 
leadership helped creativity. As we have seen, he himself discovered the 
causative agent of plague at Hong Kong in 1894. In 1897 Shiga Kiyoshi 
isolated the pathogen of dysentery (Shiga bacillus) in Tokyo. In 1901 
Umeno Shinkichi proved that a species of streptococcus bacteria causes 
lymph gland disease in horses. After 1900 the group divided its atten­
tion about equally between clinical and basic research. Hida Otoichi in 
1902 produced a diphtheria serum much superior to its predecessors by 
adding sugar and peptone to a burdock culture base. In 1905 Umeno 
developed an improved inoculation technique for smallpox that diluted 
the antitoxin by passing it through animal bodies before it was adminis­
tered to humans. After 1905 Kitasato himself worked primarily on a 
never-found cure for tuberculosis, while Miyajfma, Asakawa, and Kita­
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jima, among other things, clarified the relationship between field mice, 
chiggers, and tsutsugamushi disease.29 
Recruitment to Professorships in Japan's Universities 
Notwithstanding the claims of some critics, marriage to the daughter of 
a professor was not particularly common in the Meiji and early Taisho 
periods. Of thefifty-one men who by 1920 had served or would serve as 
full professors in Tokyo's faculty of medicine, only five had done so, and 
three of these were cited by Tokyd Asahi Shiminin in a 1914 expose. 
The assistant professor Kakiuchi Saburo in biochemistry was said to 
have secured his appointment by marrying the daughter of Koganei 
Yoshikiyo, professor of anatomy. Mitamura Makujird reportedly be­
came assistant professor of pathology by marrying the daughter of the 
ophthalmology professor, Komoto Jujird; while Manabe Kaiichiro was 
said to be in line for a post in internal medicine by virtue of being the 
son-in-law of Hirota Tsukasa, the professor of pediatrics.30 
But family connections were numerous in medicine and could cer­
tainly help a career. Koganei Yoshikiyo became assistant professor in 
anatomy after marrying the sister of the army's medical affairs bureau 
chief (Mori Rintaro), and Ogata Masanon got an appointment in 
hygiene after he married the sister of a professor of psychiatry (Sakaki 
Hajime). Not all connections were established through marriage. 
Nagayo Mataro (pathology) was the son of Nagayo Sensai, one-time 
chief of the Bureau of Public Health. Ozawa Gakutaro (anatomy) was 
the adopted son of Ozawa Kenji, physiology professor and at one time 
dean of the faculty. Miyake Koichi (psychiatry) was the son of Miyake 
Shu, professor of pathology and dean of the faculty in the 1880s.31 
Asahi Shimbun singled out Miyake, since his maternal grandfather 
(Sato Susumu) had also been physician to the Emperor, and two of his 
brothers-in-law were active in medicine.32 If true kinship relations are 
added to relations by marriage, thirteen of thefifty-one doctorate hold­
ers who served on the faculty of medicine in this period had significant 
family connections.33 
Tokyo University was hardly unique in this sense among its sister 
imperial universities. At Kyoto, five professors (out of seventy-one) in 
the faculty of medicine had married the daughters of professors, three 
in medicine at Kyoto, one in medicine at Tokyo, and one in engineering 
at Kyoto. Of the five, however, only one was adopted by the father-in­
law—Asayama Chuai (internal medicine), who married the daughter of 
Asayama Ikujiro (ophthalmology). Besides thesefive, one professor was 
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the son ofa professor in medicine at Tokyo, and one had a brother on the 
engineering faculty there. Two of the Kyoto medical faculty, Ozaki 
Yoshitane (orthopedic surgery) and Ozaki Yoshizumi (pharmacology), 
were brothers. In addition, two had married sisters of a Kyoto medical 
professor, and two other professors' sisters. 
Professors of medicine at the newer institutions had more connec­
tions than those at the older ones. At Kyushu University, relationships 
established through marriage undoubtedly influenced the appoint­
ments of Ishizaka Tomotaro in pharmacology and Sakurai Tsunejiro in 
anatomy. Each one's father-in-law was both a Tokyo professor and in 
the same field. The professors Mochizuki Daiji and Takayama Masao 
married the daughters of Tada Gakusaburo and Nakahama Toichiro, 
both doctors of science in medicine. Kure Ken (internal medicine) was 
a nephew of Kure Shuzo, professor of psychiatry at Tokyo. Ogawa 
Masanaga (bacteriology) married I to Keiko, daughter of the Tohoku 
zoologist ltd Tokutaro and granddaughter of the Tokyo botanist I to 
Keisuke. Sakaki Yasusaburo married the sister of Kato Terumaro, 
D.Sc.Med. and physician to the Meiji emperor. 
At Tohoku University Kimura Onan (pathology) apparently bene­
fited from his marriage to the daughter of Kure Shuzo, as did Sato Akira 
(pediatrics) from marrying the sister of Tokyo's professor of otorhino­
laryngology, Okada Waichiro. Two other Tdhoku professors, Yama­
kawa Shotaro and Inoue Tatsuichi, had close relatives with doctorates 
in medicine. Ohara Hachiro (surgery) married the niece of Kumagawa 
Muneo, professor of biochemistry at Tokyo. Three more of the Tohoku 
faculty had brothers who were professors in technical fields at Tokyo. 
But the professor whose family connections evoked greatest comment 
was Kumagai Taizo (internal medicine) whose appointment allegedly 
resulted from the fact that his brother (Kumagai—now Aoyama— 
Tetsuzo) had become yoshi (adopted son) to Tokyo's powerful dean 
Aoyama.35 
The real issues are not the pattern per se but its typicality and im­
plications for academic quality. Consider the scientists with engineer­
ing (kogaku) degrees. In Japan, kogaku included not only such stan­
dard fields as civil, mechanical, mining, or electrical engineering, but 
also applied chemistry, applied physics, and applied mathematics. Al­
though basic physics, geology, mathematics, or theoretical chemistry 
were generally excluded, it was common enough for men in those fields 
to have begun their studies in an engineering subspecialty or to have 
done basic research under the engineering label. This fact gives us 
some understanding of intermarriage among scientists with basic sci­
ence (rigaku) or agriculture (nogaku) degrees, even where the 1923 
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loss of Iseki Kuro's data on the subject in the Kanto earthquake and fire 
precludes more precise estimations. 
Certainly "engineers" married into academic families. While only 
one man at Tokyo University (Kamo Masao in mechanical engineering) 
married the daughter of a Tokyo engineering professor (becoming the 
son-in-law of Watanabe Wataru [mining and metallurgy]), three mar­
ried daughters of Tokyo law professors, one the daughter of a professor 
of physics, and another the daughter of a professor of medicine. Be­
cause the fathers-in-law of three of these men became university presi­
dents, the career benefits of their marriages should be obvious (Terano 
Kanji (applied chemistry] married the daughter of Yamakawa Kenjird, 
who was president at Tokyo from 1901 to 1905 and 1913 to 1920; 
Tawara Kuniichi (metallurgy] and Kondo Toragoro (civil engineering] 
each married a daughter of Kato Hiroyuki, president from 1877 to 1886 
and 1890 to 1893). Other engineering professors were equally fortu­
nate. Inoue Jinkichi (applied chemistry) married the sister of Araki 
Torasaburo, D.Sc.Med., who became president of Kyoto University in 
1914. And Ishii Keikichi (architecture) became brother-in-law to Mano 
Bunji, D.Sc.Engr. and president at Kyushu from 1913. Several others 
had useful connections. Sakurai Seizo (naval architecture) was the 
brother of the chemist Sakurai Joji, dean of Tokyo's science faculty. 
Suehiro Kyoji and Terano Seiichi. both also naval architects, had broth­
ers in the faculty of law at Kyoto and in applied chemistry at Tokyo. 
Marrying into an academic family from Tokyo aided several men in 
their careers in engineering at Kyoto. Takeda Goichi, in architecture— 
an engineering discipline in Japan—married the daughter of Sakata 
Teiichi in mechanical engineering. Matsumura Tsuruzo(also architec­
ture) married the sister of Kinoshita Seichu (obstetrics and 
gynecology). Ogura Kohei (electrical engineering) and Otsuki Chiri 
(chemistry) both married daughters of Kikuchi Takeo (Tokyo faculty of 
law), while Yokobori Jisaburo (mining and metallurgy) married the 
daughter of Watanabe Wataru, a prominent figure in his field. Two of 
the Kyoto men had relatives on the Kyoto faculty. One was Nakazawa 
Yoshio in chemistry, whose father, Nakazawa Iwata, was also professor 
of chemistry; the other was Tomonaga Shozo (mechanical engineer­
ing), whose brother, Tomonaga Sanjuro, was professor of philosophy. 
His nephew, Tomonaga Shin'ichiro, later won a Nobel Prize (physics, 
1965). 
At Kyushu and Tohoku universities, professors of engineering more 
commonly had relatives on the Kyoto faculty. Ono Akimasa (Kyushu, 
mechanical engineering) married the daughter of Miwa Kan'ichiro, 
professor of mathematics at Kyoto. The brother of Torikata Uichi 
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(Kyushu, electrical engineering) was Torikata Ryuzo, professor of sur­
gery first at Osaka Medical College, then at Kyoto. At Tdhoku, as we 
have seen, Inoue Jinkichi (chemistry) married the sister of Araki 
Torasaburo (physiology). The main Tokyo connections of Kyushu pro­
fessors were those of Yoshimachi Taroichi (civil engineering), who 
married the daughter of Hiroi Isamu, a Tokyo professor in his field, and 
of Nonaka Sueo (naval architecture), whose father-in-law, Yoshimura 
Chosaku, was professor of civil engineering. 
Thus, a significant percentage of professors with pre-1921 docto­
rates had connections in academic society (see table 6.2). But the 
meaning of these connections is far from self-evident. Critics implied 
that men with connections not only advanced professionally, but did so 
undeservedly. This assumption is open to doubt: academic families 
wereremarkably strict about whom they accepted into their ranks. 
A principal mechanism for recruiting both sons-in-law and pro­
fessors for Tokyo's faculty of medicine was arigorous, comprehensive 
examination, administered to all graduates of the four-year M.D. course 
regardless of family or prior performance. Achievement determined 
both a student's rank in the graduating class and which sections of the 
graduate program would be accessible to him. Those who did well were 
eligible for admission to one of the prestigious clinical laboratories; 
those who performed less impressively could anticipate acceptance by 
Ogata in hygiene, Kumagawa in biochemistry, or some other professor 
TABLE 6.2 
Personal Connections of University Professors (% 
FIELD 
UNIVERSITY ENGINEERING MEDICINE 
Tokyo 19 (N = 85) 25 (N = 51)

Kyoto 22 (N = 36) 24 (N = 71)

Kyushu 17 (N = 35) 32 (N = 41)

Tdhoku 33 (N= 6) 32 (N = 28)

Averages 20 (N = 162) 27 (N = 191) 
Source: Iseki Kuro, ed., Dai Nihon hakushi rokik, 5 vols. (Tokyo: Hat­
tensha, 1921-30). 
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in basic medicine. Examination performance also determined the select 
fewfrom whom professors chose their sons-in-law or successors. So far 
as possible, they confined their choices to men placing first, second, or 
third in the examinations. The talented young medical man—as de­
fined by the examination—might then marry a professor's daughter 
and, through that means or another, proceed with a career in academic 
medicine.36 
The resulting keen competition among the students presumably as­
sured that any potential recruit to the faculty had attained a standard of 
excellence. One successful veteran of the examinations, M ana be Kai­
ichiro, recalled that when he graduated at the top of his class in 1904, 
the competition was "unbelievably severe," because the examination 
"determined a person's fate for the rest of his life."37 Nor was competi­
tion confined to the students, as professors also competed for the most 
promising sons-in-law and successors. Professors in prestigious fields 
of clinical medicine had the advantage.38 Dean Aoyama, for example, 
was able to get the number two man in the class of 1907, as his Internal 
Medicine Section was particularly well regarded.39 Ogata, whose 
Hygiene Section ranked considerably lower in student estimation, tried 
but failed to marry his daughter to the top man in the class of 1902.40 
Family ties undoubtedly helped men get appointments in basic sci­
ence and agriculture, but we cannot know how far this went The 
marriage of Suzuki Umetaro to the daughter of Tatsuno Kingo, pro­
fessor of architecture at Tokyo, may well have helped him become 
professor of chemistry in the Tokyo agriculture faculty.41 Similarly, 
Shibata Keita and Shibata Yuji, professors respectively of zoology and 
chemistry in the Tokyo faculty of science, probably benefitedfrom their 
father's having been professor of pharmacology.42 At Hokkaido Univer­
sity, founded in 1918, Hemmi Takeo's appointment to the faculty of 
agriculture was probably helped along by the prior appointment of his 
brother (Hemmi Fumio) to the faculty. But examination performance 
didn't hurt: Tanakadate Aikitsu, Nagaoka Hantaro, and Honda Kotaro 
became professors of physics at Tokyo and Tohoku, and each man had 
held first place in his graduating class.43 Recruitment procedures in 
agriculture or basic science probably did not differ significantly from 
those in other technical fields. 
The prevalence of academic inbreeding in all universities and fields 
of science supports this conclusion. The editor of Ikaijiho was wrong in 
claiming that the 1905 Sudo appointment in biochemistry at Tokyo 
would set a trend for the future. Except for three professors educated 
under the shogunate (Hashimoto Tsunatsune, Miyake Shu, and Tagu­
chi Kazuharu), two educated abroad (Ikeda Kensai and Ozawa Kenji), 
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and one educated at Kyoto (Nakamura Hachitaro in pathology), Sudo 
was the only Japanese appointed to the Tokyo medical faculty in the 
entire forty-three-year period between 1877 and 1920 who did not have 
a Tokyo undergraduate degree—and he was appointed in a poorly 
funded field and failed to receive tenure.44 
Kyoto, Kyushu, and Tohoku were about as faithful as Tokyo in ap­
pointing only from among themselves. Between 1897 and 1921 Kyoto 
hired only two men without imperial university degrees: Shimada 
Kichisaburo, graduate of Kanazawa Medical College (to an assistant 
professorship of anatomy in 1908), and Matsushita Teiji from Nagasaki 
Medical College (to a chair in bacteriology in 1903). During its first 
decade, Kyushu made only one such appointment. Hikita Naotaro. 
graduate of Okayama Medical College, who held an assistant pro­
fessorship in ophthalmology for only two years. Tdhoku chose two non-
imperial university men. both in 1915: Suzuki Tatsuo from Niigata 
Medical College (assistant professor of pathology) and Shikinami Ju­
jiro, graduate of the Kanazawa Medical College (assistant professor of 
anatomy).45 
Medicine was not the most inbred field. Between 1877 and 1921. 
only four non-Tokyo graduates received academic appointments in 
Tokyo's faculty of engineering, but three of them had foreign degrees— 
Yamamoto Nagakata (Glasgow), appointed in naval architecture in 
1917, Dan Takuma (MIT), assistant professor of mining engineering, 
1881-84, Yamada Yokichi (Stevens Institute of Technology), professor 
of mechanical engineering, 1886-90—and only one a degree earned in 
Japan. Miyahara Jiro, who graduated from the Imperial Naval Academy 
in 1875 and pursued further studies at the Royal Naval College, Green­
wich, became professor of naval engineering in 1888. In the other 
imperial universities, no outsiders were appointed to positions in 
engineering. 
Basic science was a special case, since so few places taught it. D6­
shisha University in Kyoto had offered chemistry and physics at its 
Harris School of Science (1889-97), but bureaucratic hostility killed 
the program. Neither Waseda nor Keio managed to establish a basic 
science program.46 Since only the imperial universities could produce 
fully trained basic science graduates, anyone contemplating a career in 
physics, chemistry, biology, geology, or mathematics had few choices. 
Of course, the same was true in reverse. Imperial universities obtained 
all basic science professors from sister institutions, except for those 
trained abroad. Between 1877 and 1893, seven non-imperial university 
graduates were appointed: Nagai Nagayoshi and Matsui Naokichi in 
chemistry, Yamakawa Kenjiro and Kitao Jiro in physics, Harada 
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Toyokichi in geology, I to Keisuke and Yatabe Ryokichi in botany. All 
but ltd had foreign degrees, and all went to Tokyo when candidates 
47 were scarce.
Agriculture, forestry, and veterinary medicine had the largest 
number of professors who did not fit the pattern. There were nine 
outside appointments nationwide in these fields between 1877 and 
1918: six at Tokyo, two at Hokkaido, and a single nomination at 
Tohoku. Two of these men (Kato Yasuharu in veterinary medicine, 
Miyawaki Atsushi in animal husbandry) had foreign degrees; four had 
graduated from the Tokyo School of Agriculture and Forestry (Tdkyo 
Norin Gakko). If one excludes the foreign-educated and those trained 
under the shogunate, the fields by degree of inbreeding would be basic 
science (126 appointments, all from an imperial university), engineer­
ing (166 appointments, one outside), medicine (217 appointments, five 
outside), and agriculture (105 appointments, six outside). 
"Academic inbreeding" also includes preference for one's own alum­
ni, and by that definition was very widespread. Except for the earliest 
years, when one could become an assistant professor merely by gradu­
ating from Tokyo University or one of its parent institutions, possession 
of a doctor's degree became essential for those who were seeking full 
rank. Because 70 percent of all doctorates awarded before January 1921 
went to graduates of Tokyo University, reliance on the doctorate as a 
condition of appointment gave them an edge. Theirrepresentation in 
the professoriat ranged from 52 percent in agriculture to 89 percent in 
engineering. Nevertheless, each university preferred to employ its own 
graduates whenever possible (see table 6.3). 
Consider the proportions of alumni on the faculties of each institu­
tion. Column A indicates the percentage of all doctorates, B that of 
professorships held by the alumni of each university; preferential hiring 
is shown when B over A is greater than one. Graduates of Kyushu 
University accounted for only 2 percent of all doctorate holders in medi­
cine, but 13 percent of its medical faculty had obtained degrees there. 
Only 6 percent of doctorate holders in basic science had obtained their 
degrees at Tohoku University, yet 19 percent of the Tohoku basic sci­
ence faculty were alumni. Graduates of Kyoto University accounted for 
just 5 percent of basic science doctorates, yet 25 percent of the pro­
fessors in that area at Kyoto held degreesfrom it And 82 percent of the 
Tokyo agriculture faculty had Tokyo degrees even though the percent­
age of all agriculture degree holders from Tokyo was substantially 
smaller (52 percent).48 Nitobe Inazo, D.Sc.Agr., graduate of the Sap­
poro Agricultural College (later the faculty of agriculture at Tohoku, 
then Hokkaido, University) did serve for many years at Tokyo Univer­
TABLE 6.3 
Preferential Hiring in the Imperial Universities (1877-1920)* 
AGRICULTURE 
FORESTRY 
\FIELD VETERINARY 
MEDICINI MEDICINE SCIENCE ENGINEERING 
UNIVERSITY\ A B A B A B A B 
N * 72 N = 44 N - 70 N = 89 
Tokyo 62 90 52 82 72 90 89 94 
N - 72 N - 2 N - 24 N - 39 
Kyoto 21 35 0 0 5 25 4 15 
N = 40 N - 4 N - 5 N - 33 
Kyushu 2 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N • 25 N - 25 N - 27 N = 6 
Tdhoku 0 0 26 76 6 19 2 17 
Total N,

A Columns N - 622 N = 161 N = 177 N = 365

Sources. Dai jimmeijiten. 10 vols. (1957). Dai Nihon hakushi wku. 5 veils (1921-30) Jtnji kdshin roku, Isted (1903). 2ded. (1908); 4th 
ed. (1915); 7th ed. (1925); 8th ed. (1928), 9th ed. (1931); 1 lth ed < 1937) Who's Who m Japan. 2d ed. (1913). 17th ed (1936) The Japan 
Biographical Encyclopedia and Who's Who. 1st ed (1958) 
•Figures exclude Hokkaido University 
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sity, but he was one of just three Sapporo men to do so—and he had at 
one time studied at Tokyo.49 
Once the pattern was established, it never changed. Aspirants to 
professorships in imperial universities needed first to hold a doctorate or 
get one fast. They usually must have graduated high in their class from 
an imperial university, preferably the one where they wanted to work. 
They ought to have connections with an academic family. Only 8 per­
cent of those in medicine had married a professor's daughter at Kyoto 
and about 10 percent at Tokyo, compared to about 6 percent of those in 
engineering at Kyoto and 12 percent in the same field at Tokyo. But the 
proportions of those with valuable connections ranged from about 17 
percent in engineering at Kyushu to a third in medicine or engineering 
at Tohoku—and these estimates are probably low.50 The prominence of 
such connections at Tohoku and Kyushu suggests that inbreeding be­
came more important, not less, over time. 
More to the point is whether this mattered. Were the principles of 
scientific universalism really compromised by personal connections? 
Not, it would seem, if examination scores had the importance that the 
evidence implies. When a young scientist had to pass an examination to 
qualify' for an academic marriage, it seems that achievement was con­
trolling ascription, not ascription achievement. But caution is war­
ranted inreaching conclusions. It could be argued, and was at the time, 
that examination scores were dubious indicators. Kitasato, who became 
world-famous, ranked only eighth in his graduating class. Yamamoto 
Tatsuo had to leave Japan for the Pasteur Institute because he ranked 
fiftieth. But the system also helped others advance. Yamagiwa Kat­
susaburo graduated first in 1889 and nearly got a Nobel Prize (1926), 
while Nagayo Mataro, who had finished second in his class, did impor­
tant work on viral diseases.51 
The Research Atmosphere in Academic Laboratories 
Men from the past cannot be observed, much less interviewed, and 
literary evidence supplies most of what we know about atmosphere in 
the laboratories. But descriptions are not always numerous, and even 
when they are available, they probably show bias. Who wants to admit 
that his mentor was really a tyrant who suppressed creativity? Extant 
accounts may have been atypical, and the availability of sources may 
vitiate typicality. If a man had many students and dedicated coworkers, 
we may learn much about his group. If students were few and col­
leagues indifferent, we may be able to learn very little. Problems not­
withstanding, the existing documentation should not be overlooked. 
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Bias can be controlled using concrete examples (as opposed to charac­
terizations), and by focusing on Tokyo, which trained most scientists. 
Tokyo's Physics Laboratory. With the departure of Mendenhall 
(1882) and Ewing (1883), physics became a Japanese enterprise. 
Though there were only one full professor (Yamakawa Kenjiro), one 
assistant professor (Tanakadate Aikitsu), and two lecturers (Muraoka 
Han'ichi and Nagaoka Hantaro) for most of the decade, changes began 
toward its end. In 1888 Tanakadate left for Europe, and Nagaoka as­
sumed his duties.52 Sekiya Seikei joined the group in 1889, and 
Tsuruu Kenji in 1894, but Sekiya died young (1896), and Tsuruta was 
inactive.53 Yamakawa was senior and at first set the pace in spite of his 
inadequate training and few publications.M His contribution was to 
stimulate students and give them professional confidence. Yamakawa 
once asked a student to discover how to use equipment employed by 
Fresnel in work on the conical refraction of light He told the man he 
would be the first in Japan to observe the phenomenon if only he could 
learn how to use it The procedure worked well, and the student suc­
ceeded. By spending long hours of effort in the laboratory's darkroom, 
he repeated this classic experiment.55 
Some questioned Yamakawa's effectiveness as a mentor. One called 
his loud voice intimidating, like "a general chewing out an army."56 
Takagi Teiji, Japan s leading mathematician of the pre- World War II 
era, said his lectures were unorganized and his manner distracting.57 
But others thought differently and praised them quite highly, and even 
those who thought Yamakawa intimidating also said he was kind.58 
Well before Tanakadate returned from Europe in 1904, Yamakawa 
had slacked off and resigned his professorship, becoming university 
president in 1901. Muraoka took a position at Kyoto (1897), and Tana­
kadate assumed supervision. Partly because of his work under Kelvin, 
Tanakadate was interested in magnetism. He and Nagaoka had super­
vised a geomagnetic survey of Japan beginning in 1887, publishing 
their results in the following decade.59 The work had continued despite 
his absence and contributed to seismology. Tanakadate published forty 
papers in the course of his career, gave many public lectures, made trips 
abroad, and attended a number of scientific conferences. After 1905 he 
turned more toresearch and was a pioneer for Japan in aeronautics (see 
chapter 7).60 
Tanakadate was an excellent mentor. Like Mendenhall and Ewing 
before him, he involved students fully in his own work and tried to teach 
them whatever he knew. The physicist Nakamura Seiji wrote that stu­
dents were grateful for Tanakadate's "appreciation of their ideas and 
their questions." Imamura Akitsune, later professor of physics at Tokyo, 
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was impressed by his poise and control. "He would never lose his com­
posure the way we did if some piece of equipment were missing but 
would always try to solve the problem with something on hand in the 
lab." Tomoda Chinzo remembered his patience and tolerance. "He was 
quite different from many professors in the way he responded to ques­
tions. Some would just observe that the answer could be found on such-
and-such page of a book, but Tanakadate always gave his own an­
swer."61 But Tanakadate, like his teacher Lord Kelvin, was hard on 
advanced students if they made many errors. 
His affability, sense of humor, and basic egalitarianism were what 
made Tanakadate successful as a mentor. He was informal with his 
coworkers, a characteristic that may have come from research trips or 
dormitory life with students before he got married. In any event, he 
continued the pattern as a senior professor. At five o'clock every after­
noon, the physics researchers generally gathered by a largefireplace for 
physics discussions, storytelling, and a general socializing that 
Nakamura called "thoroughly agreeable." Perhaps Tanakadate's style 
was summarized best by physicist Tomoda Chinzo. "Dr. Tanakadate," 
he wrote, "always gave an impression that he was learning right along 
with us."62 
Before Tanakadate fullyretired (1916), Nagaoka took over and set a 
new tone. Despite the misgivings he had had as a student (see chapter 
3), his stance was one of self-confidence. In 1888 he hadridiculed his 
teacher, C. G. Knott, in a letter to his friend Tanakadate, and he was 
known to hold no one in awe.63 Nagaoka impressed some as cynical, 
cold, and unfriendly, and was famous for criticizing those he disliked. 
'Dr. Kinoshita Suekichi [later professor of physics at Tokyo] almost 
trembled around him," wrote physicist Matsuzawa Takeo.64 'The stu­
dents feared his [intellectual] acuteness and strict demeanor," accord­
ing to Ishikawa Teijiro.65 Some were annoyed by his management 
style: "Every half hour," Matsuzawa recalled, "Dr. Nagaoka would 
come down to the basement [where I was working] from his office on 
the secondfloor and yell out, 'What's happened?11 wasflabbergasted by 
this, but my sempai [older graduate student] finally yelled back, 'He 
just started the project!'"66 
But Nagaoka had another side in his dealings with physicists. "He 
always tried to draw out the students' ability and enthusiasm," wrote 
Ishikawa, "and he could explain things to them when Tanakadate 
could not"67 Unquestionably Nagaoka favored the more competent, 
more motivated students. The Nobel laureate Yukawa Hideki was fa­
miliar with Nagaoka'sreputation as.a "rather forbidding individual'1 and 
met him with some initial trepidation. "But after I became secure in my 
work, we often talked physics, and I felt like his grandson."68 Mat­
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suzawa himself recalled, "On one occasion I had to see Nagaoka with 
Miyamoto Kyuichiro about the experiments we were doing that term. 
[When we met him at his house] his expression was totally different 
from the impression he gave in the laboratory. He acted like an easygo­
ing father and ate peanuts and fresh fruit with us. After disposing of 
business, he never mentioned work."69 
Whatever was thought of Nagaoka's style, his professional lead­
ership was clearly effective. He was an excellent physicist, and by 1905 
his wide-ranging work in geomagnetism, acoustics, metals, tidal wave 
action, optics, and atomic structure constituted the fulcrum of physics 
at Tokyo. Aichi Keiichi (later professor at Tdhoku) took a casual obser­
vation by Nagaoka about the diffraction phenomena of the telescope 
and developed it in work on rainbows. Honda Kdtaro's important work 
on metals, though assisted by Tammann. actually began during his 
days with Nagaoka. Terada Torahiko wrote a paper on the acoustics of 
the Japanese flute (shakuhachi) that Nagaoka also inspired. And few 
dissertations were directed by either of the other full professors.70 
Nagaoka never ceased being critical about work. August Kundt, pro­
fessor of physics at Berlin University, had mildly disparaged Japanese 
physics in 1894; Johannes Stark was harsher twenty years later.71 The 
Germans insisted on fundamental research and expected that the Japa­
nese would adopt their standard. This was a viewpoint Nagaoka shared. 
Like Stark, he thought Japanese physicists must stop doing what he 
called the "dull, mechanical" work exemplified by the national geomag­
netic survey and instead offer findings of broad general interest "It 
shows the backward state of our physical sciences that | Kundt and 
Stark] would think this [geomagnetic stuff] appropriate for us," he 
wrote in a 1913 essay. "It is very lamentable for the scientific communi­
ty that information imports from Europe to Japan exceed our exports by 
several thousand times."72 
Actually, his view was too harsh. Three recent historians of physics 
have noted that Japanese physics by 1913 was not all "mechanical" or 
"dull." Graduate student Kuwaki Ayao, later professor of physics at 
Kyushu, was aroused by Einstein's 1905 paper on special relativity and 
began to work on relativity theory. Tamaki Kijuro of Kyoto University 
(later the mentor of Yukawa Hideki) joined this work in 1909. Ishihara 
Jun introduced quantum theory about 1913 after working with Einstein 
and Sommerfeld. Nishikawa Masaharu delivered a famous paper on x-
rays at about this same time.73 
Chemistry in the Tokyo Faculty of Science. Chemistry lacked a 
dominant figure, but it had important pioneers. One of these was 
Sakurai Joji, who had studied in London with A. W. Williamson from 
l8o SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN ITS SOCIAL SETTING 
1876 to 1881. Sakurai was an excellent chemist. Though a normative 
speaker of English, he led his class in chemistry and physics and pub­
lished two major papers while studying in Britain. Two British histo­
rians of science have even called his papers (dealing with iodide deriva­
tives of methane) the "only important research done in Williamson's 
laboratory after 1855."74 In 1881 Sakurai returned to Tokyo as the first 
Japanese chemist to become full professor. The work he did justified his 
rank. He investigated the molecular weights of substances in solution 
and developed a new technique for determining their boiling points. 
Samejima Tsunesaburo, later professor of chemistry at Tokyo, called 
this the "first truly significant chemical research in Japan."75 Although 
Sakurai continued to do research, his administrative duties often inter­
fered. From 1907 to 1918 he served as dean of the faculty of science and 
in 1914 as acting university president He was also at that time presi­
dent of the Imperial Academy and represented Japan at international 
meetings. 
Scanty information complicates our assessment of Sakurai as a direc­
tor of research. Colleagues and acquaintances considered him the es­
sential English gentleman because he was dignified, well-mannered, 
and always impeccably dressed. He was also a stickler for form and 
publicly reprimanded students who came late to class or failed to polish 
their shoes. He also defended his version of the Williamson legacy by 
removing a colleague from a chemistry professorship (see chapter 3), 
but he did not consistently foist his ideas on others. In 1900 he arranged 
for Majima Toshiyuki to study organic chemistry in Zurich and then to 
join the Tokyo faculty even though Majima rejected Sakurai's advice 
about his career.76 
Sakurai was not the only senior chemist in Tokyo's faculty of science. 
Edward Divers served as full professor for more than a quarter of a 
century (1873-99), and Haga Tamemasa for thirty years (1883-1913). 
There were six assistant professors in the early 1880s, but four trans­
ferred to the engineering faculty in 1886, and the other two (Kuhara 
Mitsuru and Yoshida Hikorokuro) left when Kyoto was opened, creat­
ing a place for a new senior man, Ikeda Kikunae. For the next twenty 
years there were very few changes. Matsubara Koichi joined the group 
after Divers went home (1899), and Majima took a post in 1903. Shibata 
Yuji was appointed in 1913, and Katayama Masao in 1919.77 
Haga Tamemasa was Sakurai's opposite. Sakurai Joji was elegant 
and imposing, Haga Tamemasa rumpled and ordinary. Sakurai was 
strict and slightly aloof, Haga open and readily accessible. Sakurai 
worked alone, Haga with others. Sakurai was ever the efficient admin­
istrator; Haga played the role of the lovable Mr. Chips. Samejima re­
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membered Haga as "erudite but guileless"; Shibata called him a "very 
kind man."78 But how effective was he as a model for students? He 
neither repressed nor threatened them. He even went so far as to con­
fide in students. Though his work on acids was described as "unrivaled" 
by Japanese peers,79 Haga in other ways was not so effective. He stut­
tered so badly that listeners could scarcely take notes on his lectures. 
His cooperative research took another kind of toll, for Shibata argued 
that Haga worked so much with Divers that he never really learned how 
to do his work alone.80 
Ikeda Kikunae, one of only two noted scientists to hail from Satsuma, 
was probably the best research director of the faculty's three senior 
chemists. He was trained at Tokyo and Berlin universities and joined 
the department in 1896. Shibata testifies to Ikeda s effectiveness: 
Ikeda had a particular character as an educator. He was not the 
type of professor who could present lectures adroitly or guide us 
according to some kind of model.. .. Nevertheless, he inculcated 
the essence of scholarship in us. Using simple scalar containers 
like burettes and pipettes as equipment, he patiently helped us 
greenhorn students to trust the results of our experiments while 
discussing the spirit of observation, explaining the methods and 
results of our calculations, and making us aware of our errors.81 
Ikeda s success as a mentor in research might explain his attraction for 
students, but that attraction also had other causes. Ikeda was a physical 
chemist who developed an interest in the chemistry of taste. In 1908 he 
discovered and patented a technique for producing monosodium gluta­
mate by hydrolyzing protein. Production of thisflavor-enhancing item 
became a major Japanese industry (Ajinomoto Ltd. is one of the com­
panies) and made Ikeda Kikunae rather a wealthy man. Students in­
terested in using their research to succeed in the marketplace would 
naturally have flocked to one who had already done so.82 
While physics or physical science has usually been considered pro­
gressive and open, medicine is perceived as conservative and closed. 
The physicist John D. Bernal attributed the conservatism of medicine to 
its preservation of medieval traditions.83 Bernhard J. Stem thought it 
derived from the reliance of medical men on authority in the face of 
conflicting theories and methods.84 Others, including some so­
ciologists, explain thefields' characteristics as a function of client rela­
tions, arguing that physicists or chemists, unlike medical men, escape 
the particularizing effects of nonprofessional judgment by manufactur­
ing no product for laymen.85 Of course, medicine is not scientific the 
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way physics is, but some of its patterns are not very different. Bernard 
Barber, in an essay called "Resistance by Scientists to Scientific Discov­
ery," noted that the physicists Helmholtz and Kirchhoff resisted 
Planck's ideas on the second law of thermodynamics as strongly as 
medical men of that period opposed Lister's theory of antisepsis.86 
Thomas S. Kuhn showed long ago that scientists in all fields cling to 
tradition.87 
Pathology at Tokyo. The Pathology Laboratory at Tokyo Univer­
sity, however, was a model for innovative research. Its senior and junior 
professors were open to students, accepting new ideas, and encouraged 
creativity. Several of its publications were praised overseas, and one was 
a breakthrough in cancer research. In 1916 Yamagiwa Katsusaburo 
achieved one of the most important advances in cancer research by 
demonstrating that tumors can be produced in animals by prolonged 
application of tar to their skin. This work was important for theory 
because it placed Virchow s doctrine of chronic irritation as a cause of 
cancer on a sound experimental basis, and for methodology because it 
enabled researchers to induce tumors in host animals more easily.88 
The Lancet declared: "It is impossible to over-estimate the importance 
of Yamagiwa's discovery for the study of cancer," and in 1926 he be­
came a leading candidate for the Nobel Prize in medicine.89 
Actually Yamagiwa's work is worthy of attention for both social and 
scientific reasons. Colleagues remembered him as persistent and in­
domitable, and some mention his strong will and straightforward man­
ner.90 Students considered him a source of fatherly encouragement and 
responded with feelings of loyalty. Yamagiwa later said the paper could 
not have appeared without their support, and the evidence corroborates 
this. As a long-term victim of pulmonary tuberculosis, Yamagiwa suf­
fered from very poor health. Lacking the support of colleagues and 
friends, he could scarcely have done research at all.91 
Yamagiwa was a true pioneer, but he was not thefirst man to serve at 
his rank. Erwin von Baelz was professor for three decades (from 1873 to 
1902), and Josef Disse and Miyake Shu taught pathology in the 1880s. 
Nagayo Mataro taught the subject beginning in 1907. But the Japanese 
pathologist who first built a program was an unassuming man named 
Miura Moriharu (full professor from 1887). Miura was neither brilliant 
nor energetic, but he was effective with students. His younger col­
league Nagayo Mataro quoted him as saying in 1909 that the laboratory 
could do without electric lights because scientists "need to work only 
during the day and should rest their brains at night"92 Another col­
league told lkaijiho that Miura was capable of filling an hour's lecture 
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN ITS SOCIAL SETTING 183

in pathology by reading half a page of a book!93 He is also remembered 
as a kind, dignified man who appreciated good humor and enjoyed 
leisure time. On research trips outside Tokyo Miura often patronized 
geisha establishments, and on Saturday afternoons he took laboratory 
members on walking trips and to dinner at a Western-style restaurant. 
Such outings usually concluded with a drinking party at which, in 
Yamagiwa's words, "reserve between professors and students was com­
pletely set aside."94 Lunch-hour socializing within the laboratory was 
equally common as a means of easing tensions. "Every day," according 
to Sata Yoshihiko, "the entire staff and Professor Miura would gather at 
lunch time for o-bento (box lunches] and pleasant conversation, no 
matter how busy we were . . . . Dr. Miura would discuss his views on 
everything from scientific matters to world affairs and expected us to 
express our opinions, too. We all looked forward very much to these 
gatherings."95 
Miura encouraged criticism from colleagues and students. Between 
1896 and 1899 he published several papers and a book on ben ben. all 
erroneously calling it a paralysis of the peripheral nervous system 
caused by a toxin in freshwater fish. On one occasion he asked Sata to 
read and criticize this work and to collect pertinent material on a re­
search trip to Hokkaido. Both men expected the material to confirm 
Miura's work, but the results badly damaged it. Miura accepted the 
verdict quite calmly and continued using Sata as a critic of his research. 
but Sata's reaction was not nearly so calm—he thought he had betrayed 
his own teacher.96 
Since Yamagiwa was sick for much of the time, and Miura was not in 
good health either, Nagayo directed routine affairs nearly from the day 
he entered the group. A quiet but imposing man from a prominent 
family, he provided excellent leadership in all his endeavors. He be­
lieved in group solidarity and egalitarianism and sought to instill them 
in the members of the group. He cultivated the members by drinking 
tea and eating cakes with them every afternoon, and he tried to prevent 
the graduate students from deferring to him—especially when they 
were nearly his age—by levying small fines on the use of honorifics. 
Mitamura Makujiro, later professor of pathology at Tokyo, wrote that 
Nagayo hoped in these ways not only to develop solidarity but to incul­
cate his views about scientific objectivity: "Professor Nagayo was never 
inhibited in criticizing other scientists' work, including theories identi­
fied with his own teacher [Ludwig Aschoff], and was not at all bothered 
if students opposed his ideas . . . . He always emphasized the need to 
respect truth, freedom, and especially impartiality/'97 Because of the 
patterns he helped establish, Nagayo and his staff became very close 
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and undertook several projects together. In 1908 and 1909 they did 
work in serology and cytology that sought to relate changes in the bodily 
constitution to secretions in the intestines, and in 1914 they "pointed 
scientific investigation in a new direction" by anatomical and patholog­
ical studies showing cirrhosis of the bver existed in two forms.98 But 
their greatest achievement was the conquest of scrub typhus (Ricket­
tsia tsutsugamushi), whose pathogen they found and confirmed." 
Nagayo Mataro was both able and self-confident. One acquaintance 
says he had a "will of iron" and admired historical figures like Martin 
Luther who never admitted defeat. Another recalled the time he told 
Dean Aoyama to mind his own business after the dean contradicted one 
of his explanations while attending his class as a visitor. This self-
confidence probably resulted from having a father (Nagayo Sensai) who 
was a pioneer in modern Japanese medicine and an older brother 
(Nagayo Shokichi) who was both a prominent Tokyo internist and a 
member of the House of Peers. Whatever the source of this quality, 
Nagayo's career was impressive. In 1933 he became dean of the faculty 
of medicine and in 1934 president of the university. In 1936 he declined 
Prime Minister Hirota Kola's invitation to serve as minister of 
education. I0° 
Aoyama's Laboratory of Internal Medicine. Aoyama Tanemichi 
was Tokyo University's senior internist for much of the period dis­
cussed here. Joining the faculty in 1887 after his studies at Berlin 
University, he became dean of medicine in 1901 and held the position 
for about sixteen years. He was an enigmatic figure at best, an out-and­
out tyrant at worst. Contemporaries remember the mature Aoyama as a 
proud, even arrogant man, self-confident and paternalistic; but Aoyama 
as a youth was exactly the opposite. His father had considered him an 
economic burden. He stuttered badly in his earlier years, and his confi­
dence was low. But appointment to the faculty made his career and 
changed his personality. Aoyama gained friends and patients who were 
wealthy and powerful, became the confidant of Okuma Shigenobu, 
moved into a large house, and spent 100 yen a month on Cuban 
cigars.101 
Aoyama mixed little with underlings. One acquaintance says he con­
fined socializing with coworkers to an annual dinner at a Chinese res­
taurant Another states that alcohol was very rarely served. Given the 
rarity in Japan of attitudes like this, it is important to consider what their 
motivations were. Aoyama as a young man was quite fond of drinking, 
but later in life his opinion changed. Mitamura attributed the change to 
Aoyama's sympathy for Protestantism, and another associate agreed.102 
Takahashi Akira, a student of Aoyama who later joined the faculty, 
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recalls Aoyama's scolding students who he thought drank too much and 
telling him to "supervise them closely" once he became a professor.103 
Disagreements complicate any assessment of the climate in his labo­
ratory. Some sources depict Aoyama as a paragon of professional virtue, 
but others imply that he was a tyrant. Imamura Yoshio wrote that 
Aoyama "disliked absolutist ways of thinking" and "respected the rights 
of the student."104 Fujita Shuichi stated that Aoyama's skill in diag­
nosis won the respect of all internists, and added that he was "meticu­
lous in teaching his students."I05 Other reports say Aoyama "showed as 
much interest in the professional success of his students as if they were 
his children" and tried to encourage their labors by eating supper with 
them on occasion.I06 
An evaluation by Mitamura is especially noteworthy. In 1959 
Mitamura praised the "mutual competitiveness" and "flourishing re­
search spirit" he thought pervaded the laboratory, and he assigned most 
of the credit to Aoyama. By his telling. Aoyama was indeed "arrogant" 
and "haughty" but was also "resolute," "manly," "dignified," and "fa­
therly." He says Aoyama never assigned research topics to students, but 
allowed them to study whatever they wished and seldom interfered 
once their work was under way. Upon its completion, he would offer a 
"few criticisms," and he readily supported publication. As a result, 
talented men "gravitated to Aoyama's laboratory" and produced a "suc­
cession of scientific publications."107 
But Mitamura's assertions are suspect. The laboratory did attract a 
respectable number of students—156 during the thirty years of 
Aoyama's professorship—including many of the more capable. But the 
lucrative nature of internal medicine and the career benefits of the 
dean's patronage, rather than a particularly favorable research climate, 
probably accounted for this.108 Much of the evidence suggests that the 
atmosphere inhibited creativity. Arai Tsuneo says students "reacted 
sharply to Aoyama's slightest smile orfrown" and would hardly ever 
venture an opinion that was known to run counter to his.109 Yamada 
Jiro wrote that the only way to pass Aoyama's oral examination was to 
"expound to him nothing but his favorite opinions on any particular 
disease." *10 Of his leadership in the research laboratory, his biographer 
wrote: 
Whenever a student wrote a paper and submitted it to Aoyama, he

would scrutinize it with great care and criticize it sharply. He

seldom accepted a new thesis atfirst reading. In the event that a

student presented a particularly bold idea, Aoyama would scold

him, saying, 'Are you certain you want to write something so

audacious?' Moreover, if the student had contradicted a leading
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authority, Aoyama always warned him he must reconsider that 
part of the argument.!'l 
Significantly, the Aoyama group made few contributions to knowl­
edge. The most important one by Aoyama himself was his anatomical-
clinical work on plague at Hong Kong (1894). Other members of the 
group worked on beriberi, investigating its effects on the kidneys, mus­
cles, and diaphragm; on acute and chronic myelitis; on liver disease; 
and on diseases caused by the leptothrix and salmonella families of 
bacteria. But none of this matched the standards of other laboratories, 
and the situation improved substantially only "after (1918 when] Dr. 
Inada [Ryukichi] took over the laboratory."112 
Tohoku's Science Faculty and Honda's Physics Laboratory. The 
faculty of science at Tohoku University had a good intellectual climate 
from the start. Professors did complain at first of cramped quarters and a 
scarcity of colleagues, but in general they were very well pleased. The 
equipment they had was new, in fact, "had just been imported from 
Germany."113 For several years there was no other on-campus faculty 
to compete for funds and resources.114 The university president was 
unusually supportive. Sawayanagi Masataro held the job only from 
1911 to 1913. but he managed to ingratiate himself with the scientists. 
He was a great believer in the German proposition that professors 
should devote themselves to teaching and research—and keep their 
noses out of everything else. Mentioning teaching and research as the 
"two main duties of the university professor," Sawayanagi called ad­
ministrative service by them undesirable and declared that a university 
professor "who cannot do research is a professor in name only."115 
Thus a strong esprit de corps, with a powerful commitment to re­
search, appeared. "Students who came to this university acquired a 
particular outlook," according to one of the early professors. "Producing 
research was the only thing that mattered.. .. Some of the professors 
practically lived in their laboratories. Faculty and students alike worked 
late into the night with hardly any other real concern." This spirit took 
tangible form in journals—Rika hokoku/Science Reports of the Tohoku 
Imperial University, which appeared when the campus first opened, 
and Tohoku sugaku zasshi (Tohoku journal of mathematics), published 
by the mathematicians privately even before it had opened. All the 
groups—mathematicians, geologists, physicists, and chemists—had 
seminars that helped to encourage their work by giving opportunities to 
report on new research, especially work that was still in progress. 
Teachersfrom the Second Higher School, the Miyagi Industrial School, 
and the local medical college as well as the university community at­
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tended. Researchers allowed time at the biweekly meetings to reporting 
on the pertinent literature. The chemists called their seminar the 
Zasshi kai (Journal society) and offered summary reports of papers 
appearing in the international chemical journals. Not surprisingly, in 
view of all this, the professors had high aspirations. "We were filled," 
one of them remarked, "with the idea that we had to impress people at 
even the most prestigious universities abroad."116 
Honda Kdtard's laboratory in physics exemplified these trends. He 
and Nagaoka had "shed their 'inferiority complex' toward Western 
counterparts." Honda aspired to create his own school,'17 and members 
of his group worked exceedingly hard. When a student asked permis­
sion to suspend a project because of equipment failure, Honda told him 
to fix the equipment even if it took all night. On one occasion Nagaoka 
came to Honda's home in Sendai on New Year's Day in hope of explor­
ing an idea but did not find Honda at home—he had already gone to the 
laboratory. Honda and the members of his laboratory had a clear sense 
of purpose. There were no differences of treatment meted out except 
where Honda himself was concerned. This senior professor was the 
rare farmer's son to enter basic science and had little, if any, respect for 
anyone's place in society. Honda treated everyone the same. Wearing 
old clothes, he once arrived an hour late for a talk to business executives 
who supported his work and proceeded to lecture without an apology. 
He was also famous for his placid disposition. "No one ever heard him 
raise his voice or saw him pound the table." wrote Ishikawa Teijiro. 
"Only by his features could you tell he was angry. The students used to 
say his birthmark turned red."118 
But this senior physicist was not very patient, for like his mentor, 
Nagaoka, Honda customarily visited each member of the laboratory 
group at least three or four times a day to discover what the person had 
accomplished since the last conversation. Kaya Seiji stated that Honda 
would even ask a student about his research if they happened to be in 
the men's room. "Once when I was working on iron crystals and the 
influence of magnetism on them, I happened to be standing in the 
men'sroom at the stall next to Honda's, and he insisted on knowing the 
details." Ishikawa thought this kept the students working hard, but 
wKaya found it highly annoying.l
What was the climate in this laboratory setting? Honda was not the 
defender of orthodoxy that Aoyama was in medicine. He would tell 
members of his staff that while the physics literature contained many 
insights and facts, there were also numerous errors needing the correc­
tion of "proper experiments."120 But he never saw his own work as 
needing correction. "Honda's leadership in research was so strong," 
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wrote a colleague in physics, "that researchers under him were not 
allowed to publish results that were incompatible with (his] theory or 
results in similar experiments."121 His biographer wrote as follows of 
those who considered such action: 
If a young assistant professor in Honda's laboratory expressed a 
view contrary to his, Honda might say: "I do not think that is right. 
If you were to do more research you would agree with me." And if 
he thought a personality conflict was present, he might go further 
and say, "I would like to ask how thoroughly you have investigated 
this. Over what temperature range did you test the material? Have 
you published a paper on your findings? I would like to see some of 
your data. I worked on this problem for two years at Tokyo Univer­
sity under Professor Nagaoka. The names of Nagaoka and Honda 
have appeared on research reports. Please read these reports. I 
then continued working on this subject in Germany under Pro­
fessor Tammann's direction and was able to show that my pre­
vious reports were correct. These papers were published in a Ger­
man journal under Dr. Tammann's sponsorship. And they are 
recognized all over the world. If you are suggesting that some of 
what I have said is wrong, you have to prove it with experimental 
evidence." But by this point the younger scientist's head would be 
down.122 
There seems little doubt about Honda's intolerance. After all, his 
research paradigm had a prestigious history. Identified closely with the 
pioneering work of the physical chemist Gustav Tammann, it was basi­
cally classical physics with none of the new quantum theory.123 Honda 
spent three years with Tammann at Got tin gen and Rend Du Bois at 
Berlin (1907-10), where he compiled a record of distinction in re­
search. He published eight papers on the nature and properties of met­
als that extended Tammann's findings, and he studied the relationship 
of temperature changes to magnetic properties of forty-three elements 
when heated to a very high level (about 1000 degrees centigrade). This 
study in particular brought Honda recognition. Cambridge University 
asked if he were interested in a possible appointment to its faculty, and 
Nagaoka said he had made himself immortal.124 
The laboratory results he got in Tohoku continued to be impressive 
for a good many years. After returning to Japan in 1911, Honda as­
sembled a staff of young scientists with training in chemistry and phys­
ics. Many of these men became professors; others took employment in 
industry. While they were working in the Honda laboratory at Tohoku, 
they made important contributions to metallurgy as well as to physics 
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and chemistry. One was the invention ofa calorimeter which came to be 
widely used in mining for estimating the volume of ore in a vein. An­
other was the invention in 1916 of the so-called K.S. magnetic steel, 
then considered the best in the world. Other studies the group con­
ducted dealt with changes in the magnetic properties of metals when 
exposed to temperature extremes. 
As for Honda's personality, the mature man was widely recognized as 
having enormous energy and self-confidence, but the child had been 
just the opposite. Fifth son of a middling level fanner, he was sickly, shy 
and by reputation slow-witted. But he entered the First Higher School 
with his brother's support and later graduated from Tokyo University. 
At Tokyo, he was the top physics major of the class of 1897 He did 
research that eventually got published the 1902 publication of his work 
on magnetic distortions in cobalt, nickel, and steel led Nagaoka to call 
him a capable man. He was extremely hardworking. A young physicist 
once asked Honda what to do when round-the-clock work had ex­
hausted him. Honda's reply was. "You could read a book." "But suppose 
I'm too tired to even read a book?" "In that case, do your experiment. 
That is what I did when I was your age."125 
Unquestionably this climate could be oppressive. The stall con­
stantly complained of overwork. "We have to work too hard." "The 
director is too pushy." "What is life for if we can t let off steam?"126 
Honda was not inclined to socialize He assigned people topics rather 
than letting them choose their own. And the research paradigm that the 
laboratory followed was gradually losing potential. "A characteristic of 
Honda's school |of chemical physics]," wrote Miyahara Shdhei, "was 
the effort to pursue 'how does a substance change?', and not (to ask] 
'what is a substance in its essential structure?'" Indeed, Honda "could 
not understand [the] quantum mechanical theory [of metals and mag­
netism]," according to Kawamiya Nobuo.127 
Despite Honda's views, though, researchers played sports. Kaya Seiji 
(president of Tokyo University after World War II) enjoyed mountain 
climbing. Hayakawa Kazuma was a hunting enthusiast. Others played 
baseball and tennis. No one really gave up on his work. "Mostly they 
just played pachinko while exchanging their discontents." There was a 
certain solidarity in the group—a "mixture of jewels and stones," Ishi­
kawa called it, "rather like a household sharing a common fate."128 
There were also limits to Honda's intransigence. By the mid- 1930s, his 
theory of metals had been exposed as inadequate and had attracted 
many critics. But in many respects Honda himself had helped produce 
this result "The scientists and engineers who developed the science of 
metals beyond Honda," wrote Kawamiya, "were, more often than not, 
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those who had studied [with him] . .  . He . .  . made the most impor­
tant . .  . contribution to the science of metals in Japan by producing the 
driving force for it, a mass of ambitious researchers."129 
One other feature of the Honda group serves to mitigate a harsh 
judgment Despite its affiliation with Tohoku University, his was not a 
purely academic laboratory. The business interests that came to support 
him thought his work theoretical, but academics considered it ap­
plied.130 For applied science his style of direction was appropriate. 
Industrial laboratories often stress directed research, not "pure" contri­
butions to knowledge. Honda's approach to his students may have been 
suited to his fundamental goals. 
Despite Honda's authoritarian behavior, his staff revered him and 
were strongly united. Critics of factionalism in Japanese science have 
usually stressed the role of the professor, but staff solidarity merits 
scrutiny, too. Solidarity probably impeded creativity at Aoyama's labora­
tory. If a student dissented too sharply from Aoyama's views, the others 
would reprimand him.111 On one occasion, Aoyama s students dis­
rupted a student protest movement against the medical administration 
so that their own professor, who happened to be dean, would not lose 
face in the struggle.! 3  2 
Criticism and solidarity could, of course, coexist. The Honda group 
ate meals together, held informal discussions, took part (minus Honda) 
in sports, invented a new calorimeter, developed a new type of steel, and 
did other kinds of valuable research. The Tokyo physics laboratory, 
which socialized every afternoon, did useful studies in geomagnetism, 
spectroscopy, acoustics, relativity theory, and other areas. The pa­
thology section of Miura, Yamagiwa, and Nagayo made basic contribu­
tions to international medicine and developed a "spirit of harmonious 
cooperation and mutuality" by regularly eating, talking, and drinking 
together.133 Solidarity was only one factor. What most seemed to matter 
was the management of tension—to which some use of alcohol could 
make a contribution. 
Indulgence in alcohol is popular everywhere, but not in perhaps the 
same way. Societies may use it to dull sensation or to create certain 
moods. The Japanese use it to restore solidarity.134 In an inebriated 
state, real or feigned, one can speak freely without retribution. 
Aoyama's attitude is a most revealing case, especially because of his 
well-known aversion to alcohol. On one occasion he attended a banquet 
where one of his section members became very drunk. Boasting loudly 
and cavorting around, he ridiculed Aoyama and called him a horse. The 
next day, of course, he regretted his actions and tried to avoid his 
professor. But Aoyama approached him, expressed his forgiveness, and 
told him he knew what had happened.135 
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No consistent pattern of authoritarian behavior existed among the 
Japanese scientists of this period. Aoyama and Honda were frequently 
autocratic, but many of their colleagues were not. Yamakawa Kenjiro, 
Tanakadate Aikitsu, Nagaoka Hantaro, Sakurai Joji, Haga Tamemasa, 
Ikeda Kikunae, Yamagiwa Katsusaburd, Miura Moriharu, and Nagayo 
Mataro were generally tolerant and open. The authoritarianism we do 
find has no obvious source—certainly not "feudalism." "tradition," or 
the prominence of medicine in the research community. Honda, a 
physicist, was at least as hostile to criticism of his work as anyone in 
medicine. Miura, a pathologist, sought out criticism even when it went 
against him. Many of the senior professors were arguably more "tradi­
tional" than either Aoyama or Honda. All were former samurai and 
active patrons of students, trying to instill the traditional value of group 
solidarity by socializing with them. 
Honda and Aoyama were atypical. Each was viewed with indif­
ference by his father. Aoyama s father wanted no more children, and 
Honda's father thought his youngest son was stupid. Both scientists 
suffered disabilities as children: stuttering in one case, adenoids in the 
other. Both were considered unpromising by teachers, and both suf­
fered for a time from low self-esteem. Honda, the farmer's son. ignored 
differences in status. Aoyama rejected drinking with students because 
of his Protestant ideals. In short, when Japanese scientists acted like 
autocrats, it was probably a function of individual psychology. Japanese 
culture and the prominence of medicine should not be made the 
scapegoats.136 
Competition and Cooperation in Japanese Science 
Given the prominence of group solidarity, a kind of "roping off* process 
was probably inevitable. One would expect this result from Tokugawa 
patterns and from their continuation in Meiji society. Students in the 
faculty of science at Tokyo did not dare consult or study pharmacolog­
ical chemistry with Nagai Nagayoshi while Sakurai Joji was serving as 
dean because it was "not regarded favorably and was apt to be dan­
gerous."137 Men belonging to the internal medicine laboratories of 
Miura Kinnosuke and Irisawa Tatsukichi would not use an institute for 
x-ray treatment and hydrotherapy established jointly by the three Tokyo 
internists because the third internist, Aoyama, had made a student of 
his its director.138 During World War 1, researchers from the Tokyo 
laboratories in pathology and hygiene simultaneously worked on tsu­
tsugamushi disease yet did not share information, personnel, or facili­
ties. 139 At Tokyo, information was sometimes not exchanged even be­
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tween the laboratories of physics and chemistry.140 If this kind of group 
solidarity characteristic of feudalism did indeed prevent general cooper­
ation, the critics would clearly beright in accusing Japanese science of 
rejecting scientific values. 
In the more complicated situation that existed, scientific cooperation 
could occur. In 1888 two Tokyo internists admitted a pathology student 
of Miura Moriharu to their beriberi clinic as a way of enabling Miura to 
collect the material he needed for research. In 1889 Miura allowed 
Iijima Isao, from the faculty of science, to use a lecture hall belonging to 
pathology.141 In 1894 Kitasato Shibasaburo established PasteureUa 
pestis as the cause of plague through a major cooperative study at Hong 
Kong with Aoyama Tanemichi even though the two came from hostile 
institutions.142 In 1896 Ogata, from hygiene, and Yamagiwa, from pa­
thology, worked together on plague in Taiwan.143 
Later the patterns changed. After 1900 the physical sciences con­
tinued to cooperate. I n 1913 Jim bo Kotora of geology and Shibata Yuji of 
chemistry at Tokyo shared lectures and laboratory time because of their 
common interest in mineralogy. In the same year Shibata taught Honda 
Kotaro and Ogawa Masataka of Tohoku the use of the spectroscope.144 
In 1916 Tawara Kuniichi, a metallurgist at Tokyo, lent Honda his own 
microphotographs.] 45 But cooperation in medicine became very rare, as 
the behavior of the internists shows. In 1910 Aoyama got his Tokyo 
colleagues to work on tsutsugamushi disease just because other 
schools' researchers had shown interest in it "We must not allow Kyoto 
University and Okayama Medical College to surpass our achieve­
ments," was justification enough for the dean.146 Lively competition 
between the Kitasato and Tokyo groups developed over the cause of the 
1918 influenza pandemic.147 
Consideration of professional societies sheds additional light on com­
petition and cooperation. Professional societies had members from all 
institutions and offered possibilities for close interaction. One could 
freely criticize the work of one's colleagues while receiving the critical 
reactions of others. Medicine led other fields in developing these pat­
terns of criticism. In 1885 the Great Japan Hygiene Society and the 
Tokyo Medical Society sponsored contradictory lectures on beriberi. 
Takagi Kanehiro, at the hygiene society, related beriberi to diet Ogata 
Masanori, speaking to the medical society, attributed it to a bacterium. 
This exchange led to a flurry of research, claims, and counterclaims. 
One development deserves attention. Besides exchanges in letters and 
journals, the debate was pursued face-to-face. When Ogata presented 
his widely heralded yet spurious demonstration of the "beriberi 
bacillus," Takagi not only attended the lecture, but following its conclu­
sion strode to the podium and refuted Ogata's claims in detail.148 
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Open discussion of technical issues was relatively common, particu­
larly in medicine. In the latter 1890s Ogata, Yamagiwa, and Kitasato 
carried on a lively debate over the details of Kitasato's report on plague 
in The Lancet.149 In 1902 another debate unfolded over the question of 
cholera's etiology. The scientific issue was quite modest: whether the 
incriminating bacteria was or was not the komma bacillus of Koch. But 
the professional issue was potentially momentous for the future of Japa­
nese medicine. Should exposure in the dailies or exposition in profes­
sional journals serve as the vehicle for proper debate? Ultimately the 
journals won out, but by no means quickly or easily.150 Meanwhile, 
professional societies played a crucial role in developing the mores of 
science. Not only Kitasato but others as well sought to use their poten­
tial for stimulating debate. At academic meetings, Tokyo pathologists 
Yamagiwa and Miura had sharp exchanges on a regular basis, but they 
set bounds to their argument. "One of them would say after leaving the 
meeting, 'Forgive my rudeness,' while the other replied, 'Not at all. In 
science things must be this way.' "l51 
The physical sciences, especially physics, were slower to develop 
professional patterns of disagreement. In December 1903. at a meeting 
of the Tokyo Mathematical-Physical Society, Nagaoka Hantaro present­
ed an important model of atomic structure that arranged electrons out­
side a central positive charge. The model was purely mechanical, not 
chemical, in nature, and it assumed the adequacy of classical elec­
trodynamics for describing the behavior of atomic-sized systems.152 
But it reflected some cogent analysis and was taken rather seriously in 
Europe. Henri Poincare called it a "very interesting attempt"'53 Ernest 
Rutherford, who received greater credit for modeling work, conceded 
that Nagaoka had partly anticipated the atomic structure assumed in 
his modeL154 In Japan, however, reaction to this work was muted. 
Tomoda Chinzo called it "new" and "credible" in 1905,15S but very few 
reacted at all, and Nagaoka accused Japanese physicists of excessive 
timidity in public.156 However, physicists became more openly critical 
in the years after World War I. In the mid-1920s several meetings of the 
Physical Society were enlivened by a dispute over hydrodynamics.157 
Chemistry was somewhere between physics and medicine: criticism 
flourished at the Chemical Society, but not in so forceful a manner. The 
professional integration of Japanese chemists was one of the aims of the 
group, whose membership came from all pertinent specialties. Some 
represented basic science, but more were recruited from agriculture, 
engineering, or medicine.158 An effort was made to diffuse information. 
Beginning in 1890, the Chemical Society held conferences on foreign 
journal literature. The place and time of the meetings changed often, 
but by 1913 they were fixed. Once a week on Thursday afternoons they 
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convened in Tokyo's chemistry department. Reports were given on 
major foreign papers, and socializing followed the meetings.159 
The Chemical Society also tried to influence how things were pub­
lished in chemistry. Papers by university scientists had often been pub­
lished in European languages, but the society dedicated itself to the use 
of Japanese for this purpose. In the early years (1878-99) publication in 
the society's own journal (Tokyo kagaku kaishi) was determined by a 
vote of the members, l6° but by the turn of the century the society had 
set up an editorial board.161 All this becomes important when we con­
sider that as a "colonial" endeavor, science in areas outside the "center" 
has often lacked firm local moorings. Scientists at work in developing 
societies would concentrate their efforts on pleasing foreign peers and 
neglect to build ties of their own.162 This was not the case in Japan, and 
the Chemical Society is one of the reasons. 
The Chemical Society held monthly meetings, and attendance was 
invariably small. About twenty people would discuss three or four pa­
pers given by members and attend the dinner that followed. The atmo­
sphere was usually polite; one source calls it "pleasant." But a plenary 
session was held once a year, and here things were different. Chemists 
attendedfrom all over Japan and delivered a wide range of papers. Few 
holds were barred in discussion, and the sessions were always quite 
"lively." In fact, the growth of chemistry outside the capital eventually 
changed the society, as in 1921 the Tokyo Chemical Society became the 
Chemical Society of Japan.163 
It is actually not surprising that the physical scientists lagged behind 
colleagues in medicine. Medical men had debated major issues even in 
the Tokugawa period, when students of physical science had to strug­
gle just to obtain information. Physicians had worked more or less 
independently, but physical scientists had been dependent on the gov­
ernment. 164 Moreover, physical scientists were few, their tasks daunt­
ing. For example, they had to spend a great deal of time simply reading 
retrospective and current literature. At Tokyo University special com­
mittees of chemists read and reported on materials in English, while 
others read German, and still others French.165 Similar arrangements 
existed in all fields, including medicine.166 But the pattern of competi­
tion was different because medicine had the most money. 
By 1914 medicine had substantially moreresearchers than any other 
field, with 156 doctorate holders in research positions, compared to 86 
D.Sc. holders for all of basic science.167 It had more facilities for re­
search in upper and lower rank schools, enjoyed leadership with pres­
tige and power, and had major discoveries to its credit. In other ways, 
however, medicine was beginning to lose its clout The number of its 
facilities ceased to expand, and whereas the number of chairs for medi­
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cine had steadily increased in the earlier years, growth greatly slowed 
down later on. Between 1908 and 1917 the number of chairs in medical 
specialties grew from 71 to 99, a 28 percent increase, but all of this 
increase came on regional campuses. Tokyo added no chairs. The 
number of students at the graduate level, however, did consistently rise 
in medicine. In 1897 there had been eight graduate students in pa­
thology at Tokyo University, three in hygiene, and five in Aoyama's 
section of internal medicine. By 1908 these figures had risen to twenty-
four for pathology,five for hygiene, and ten for the Aoyama section. And 
in 1917 there were forty-six pathology graduate students, along with 
fifteen in hygiene and twenty-one in the Aoyama section. Between 1908 
and 1917 graduate enrollment increases ranged from 100 to 200 
percent 
The employment situation was undoubtedly worsened for would-be 
researchers when they considered the true dimensions of the candidate 
pool for university chairs. Professional roles were still inchoate at this 
time. A man did not have to pass through the graduate school to aspire 
to a chair. He needed only a degree. From that point of view, the in­
creases in the numbers of men with degrees must have been truly 
alarming (see table 6.4). Back in 1893 there had been nearly as many 
chairs as candidates to fill them, that is, thirty degree holders and 
twenty-three chairs. In 1900 the situation was still not too bad: thirty-
three chairs andfifty-six candidates. But by the time of the war, condi­
tions were changing. In 1915 there were four potential candidates for 
every chair in medicine, and the ratio of candidates to chairs was about 
5:1 in 1919and6:lby 1920. 
If small-group research in social psychology gives any indication, 
strong uncooperative ingroup-outgroup sentiments are a likelyresult of 
these patterns. Hare and Bales argue that group solidarity is signifi­
cantly affected by size.168 Other things being equal, a large group is 
more apt to avoid cooperation with other groups because increased 
numbers produce greater conformity by individuals and because the 
internal availability of diverse talents reduces the need for contributions 
from others.169 Similarly, Collins, Raven, and Dion suggest that cooper­
ation is apt to be undermined by a "perception of opposed fate" such as 
may arise from the threat of external attack, the sharing of common 
attitudes, or the realization that the demand for resources exceeds the 
supply. In either case, group cohesion increases, and greater suspicion 
of others results.170 Still a third effect of increased numbers is an 
obstruction of the group's ability to reach the difficult decisions that 
may be required in cooperation by scientists. James alludes to this 
problem of reaching decisions; Hare stresses the diminished ability of 
even a strong leader to speed up the process.171 
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TABLE 6.4 
The Changing Academic Marketplace in Japanese Medicine 
NUMBER NUMBER OF LIVING 
YEAR OF CHAIRS DEGREE HOLDERS RATIO 
1893 23 30 
1900 33 56 
1905 61 114 
1910 74 198 
1913 74 287 
1915 84 357 
1917 100 445 
1919 104 510 
1920 105 578 1 
Sources For numbers of chairs see Tdkyd Tetkoku Datgaku goju nen shi. 
2 vote.. 1932; Kyoto Teikoku Daigaku shi. 1943; Kyoto Datgaku nanaju nen 
siii. 1967; Tdhoku Daigaku goju nen shi. 2 vote.. 1960; and Kyushu Datgaku 
goju nen shi. 3 vols.. 1967. The numbers of living degree holders were 
calculated from information contained in the following: Dai jtmmet jtten, 10 
vols 1957; Dai Sihon hakushi roku. 5 vols.. 1921-30; Jinji kdskin roku. 
1st ed. (1903); 2d ed. (1908); 4th ed. (1915); 7th ed (1925); 8th ed. (1928); 
9th ed. (1931); 1 lth ed. (1937); Who's Who in Japan. 2d ed. (1913); 17th 
ed. (1936); and The Japan Biographical Encyclopedia and Who's Who, 1st 
ed. (1958). 
Competition for chairs did not exist elsewhere to anything like this 
extent Tokyo University had six graduate students in physics in 1897, 
the same number in 1908, and nine in 1917. The situation in chemistry 
was similar, except that the numbers were even smaller. In 1897 there 
were four graduate students in chemistry at Tokyo University. There 
were still four in 1908 and just six in 1917. Honda's laboratory at 
Tdhoku University had nine at the end of this period.172 And em­
ployment prospects for academic scientists remained goorjin both phys­
ics and chemistry (see table 6.5). 
In 1893 Japan had two chairs in basic chemistry, both at Tokyo, and 
five living holders of the doctorate*in that field. In 1900 there were five 
chairs and six degree holders. In 1913 there were eleven chairs and 
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TABLE 6. 5 
The Academic Marketplace in Physical Science 
CHEMISTRY PHYSICS 
NUMBER NUMBER 
NUMBER LIVING NUMBER LIVING 
OF DEGREE OF DEGREE 
CHAIRS HOLDERS RATIO CHAIRS HOLDERS RATIO 
1893 2 5 1 :2 2 8 1 4 
1900 5 6 1 : 1 5 11 1 2 
1905 6 9 1 : 2 5 16 1 3 
1910 7 13 1 : 2 7 22 1 3 
1913 11 16 1 : 1 11 28 1 3 
1915 12 17 1 : 1 11 29 1 3 
1917 12 20 1 : 2 11 33 1 3 
1919 13 23 1 :2 14 38 1 3 
1920 13 22 1 :2 14 46 3 
Sources. For number of chairs see Tokyo Tetkoku Datgaku goju nen sht. 2 vols . 1932; 
Kyoto Teikoku Datgaku sht, 1943: Kydto Datgaku nanaju nen sht. 1967. Tohoku 
Daigaku goju nen sht. 2 vols.. I960; and Kyushu Datgaku goju nen shi, 3 vols.. 1967. 
The numbers of living degree holders were calculated from information contained in: 
Dai jtmmei jiten, 10 vols . (1957); Dai Nihon hakushi roku. 5 vols < 1921-30); Jtnji 
koshin roku, 1st ed. (1903); 2d ed. (1908); 4th ed (1915); 7th ed (1925); 8th ed. 
(1928); 9th ed. (1931); 11th ed. (1937); Who's Who in Japan. 2d ed. (1913); 17th ed. 
(1936); and The Japan Biographical Encyclopedia and Who's Who. 1st ed. (1958). 
sixteen doctors of chemistry, and by 1920 these numbers had risen only 
to thirteen and twenty-two. About the same was true of physics. In 1893 
there were two chairs for eight degree holders, but in 1900 chairs in 
physics had increased to five, while only eleven men held a doctor's 
degree. In 1913 the system had eleven chairs compared to twenty-eight 
holders of the doctorate, and in 1920 fourteen chairs and forty-six de­
gree holders. For more than a quarter of a century, the ratio of university 
research and teaching positions to people qualified to hold them re­
mained almost stable (1:2 in chemistry and 1:3 in physics). Younger 
physicists and chemists were much less affected by the state of the 
market They had considerablefreedom and were reasonably assured of 
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positions in their field. Young medical researchers had to conform and 
depend on senior professors. Moreover, the medical community was 
well endowed with talent and resources, while the physical and chem­
ical communities had to stretch theirs. All things considered, it is hardly 
surprising that medical men were less cooperative and more restrained 
than physicists and chemists. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
SCIENCE AND THE CRISIS 
OF WORLD WAR I 
World War I posed a major challenge to Japanese science, as it did to 
science worldwide. 'The war differed from previous wars in that it 
involved whole nations and not only armies," wrote the British physicist 
John D. Bernal. "Agriculture and industry were pressed into . . . ser­
vice and so was science."1 In Japan the war heightened interest in the 
physical sciences. Indeed, one chemist called it a "blessing from heav­
en."2 Nonacademic researchflourished there as never before. A signifi­
cant shift of research activity into private firms and institutions took 
place. Both public and private sectors showed more inclination to spend 
money on science at home. Businessmen and officials who had earlier 
disdained research now became its promoters. Costly projects like the 
Research Institute for Physics and Chemistry, which could not have 
gained a foothold before 1914, now moved to the top of the country's 
agenda. 
The blockade of Germany by Britain and f ranee helped to produce 
these results. Before the summer of 1914, Japan had depended heavily 
on Germany for industrial chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, and precision 
instruments. All of the Salvarsan 606 used to treat syphilis came from 
Germany,3 and most of the thirty-four million yen spent on imported 
Pharmaceuticals also went to that country.4 Much of the information 
used in producing aniline dyes was obtained from German-held pa­
tents.5 About 150 Japanese traveled to Germany each year for medical 
studies.6 Two years of every three spent abroad by Japanese scientists 
were spent in Germany.7 And Germany was the site favored by most 
Japanesefor exhibitions and academic conferences.8 The blockade cre­
ated a crisis. Prices of German-made products soared—when one could 
obtain the products at all. In a matter of weeks, aniline dyes jumped to 
twenty times their previous price.9 Serious shortages developed. By late 
September Tokyo "reportedly had a six months' supply of most basic 
medicines, but Osaka had nearly run out.10 
Panic and fear were the first responses. As early as August 29, before 
Japan had activated its alliance with Britain, Ikaijiho worried: "Some 
[German] universities have adopted an anti-Japanese attitude."11 In 
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mid-September, it wrote: "The shortages are causing great consterna­
tion."12 In May 1915, the vice minister of agriculture and commerce 
declared, 'This blockade has caused major difficulties for many of our 
Japanese industries."13 Fear rather quickly gave way to anger—and to 
a search for appropriate scapegoats. Asahi Shimbun ran an expose se­
ries on Tokyo University's faculty of medicine, charging neglect of 
research by professors.14 Ikai jiho published articles with the same 
theme. A prominent member of the Japanese Diet expressed himself on 
the subject as follows: "Now that our ties with Germany are broken, we 
must establish our own independence. . . But how can we do that with 
professors who pursue their own profit and insist on holding down 
various side jobs? . . . Not only does this hinder research, it destroys 
(academic] discipline all over the country and leads to a loss of profes­
sional authority !"15 Demands were made for basic change. Three scien­
tists who were university presidents saw the prospects for it as great16 
The aforementioned speaker in the House of Representatives wanted 
resignations from lazy professors. Some thought other reforms were in 
order. "For [Tokyo University) to be a place of research, the remnants of 
factionalism \gakubatsu] must be swept out the door."17 
Foreign study was greatly affected and generated bvely debate. Over 
two-thirds of the 155 men studying abroad when the war broke out were 
in Germany, and there was no possibility of their staying. Most were 
able to leave through Sweden, with Britain or the U.S. as their destina­
tions. 1B Some commentators called the cessation in theflow of students 
to Germany a golden opportunity to stop being an "importer of |techni­
cal) knowledge" and become its "creator."19 "We shall have to discon­
tinue our copying of Germany, however distasteful that is.%t2° But others 
thought the estrangement was temporary. After all, the war resulted 
from the "Kaiser's ambitions, and not from hostility between the two 
peoples."21 Moreover, other destinations were not satisfactory. The 
U.S. in particular was thought lacking in scientists.22 Despite the wide 
range of views on the subject, the context of foreign study had changed 
fundamentally. By the time the war ended in 1918, the number of 
Japanese who studied abroad had sharply declined. 
Japan, of course, was not alone in facing this challenge. Britain and 
other countries were also affected, as was Germany, with its strength in 
research.23 Like Japan, Britain faced serious shortages—in dyestuffs 
(90 percent previously imported), Pharmaceuticals, tungsten, and 
zinc.24 Technical manpower was also at a premium. Chemical en­
gineers were few in Britain.25 And even in basic science, talent was 
scarce. But these shortages were relative. England and Wales in 1914 
had three hundred graduate students in all basic sciences. In Japan's 
case, sixty would be a generous estimate.26 Major concerns were also 
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aroused in all three countries about optimum procedures for using 
resources. In 1916 German engineers demanded admission to the high­
er civil service, and their colleagues in Britain and Japan followed 
suit27 
In due time, of course, Japan regrouped and responded to most of the 
challenges. By December 1914 the government had launched a major 
survey of research facilities.28 In 1915 Honda's facilities at Tohoku 
were upgraded. A special program of chemical research was inaugu­
rated at Kyoto University. The Industrial Experiment Laboratory ex­
panded. In 1916 company engineers produced giant turbines, which 
had earlier been imported. In 1917 the Research Institute for Physics 
and Chemistry opened its doors, and it was followed in 1918 by the 
Institute for Aeronautics. A new university (Hokkaido) was founded 
that year, and so was a government program of grants for research. 
Private universities were finally authorized. A project for fixation of 
nitrogen received support. Nor were these efforts the limit of progress: 
private firms also built research facilities, and private foundations for 
research appeared. 
But the progress had limits. University funding increased only slow­
ly. The distribution of benefits brought by the war caused ripples of 
controversy. The position of technical men in the Japanese bureaucracy 
was not upgraded at all. High-handed government interference was a 
problem in medicine that had especially wide implications. When the 
Okuma government gave Kitasato's institute to the Ministry of Educa­
tion in October 1914, it had little understanding of the events which 
would follow. Yet by the time they had run their course, the context of 
scientific research in Japan had changed in major ways. 
The Administrative Transfer of Kitasato's Institute 
The transfer of the Institute of Infectious Diseases marked the end of an 
era. Over twenty years Kitasato had built a famous and effective re­
search program with total control over Japan's public health. But he had 
also antagonized the Ministry of Education by resisting its blandish­
ments and overshadowing its client Tokyo University had long com­
peted with Kitasato's institute and came to control it completely. But the 
government's victory over the "Kitasato faction" proved to be pyrrhic. 
The university did not do well with serum production and attracted 
much criticism. Its political victory had unfavorable consequences for 
the Ministry of Education, further antagonizing a hostile Diet, exposing 
the ministry to attacks in the press, materially affecting educational 
policy, damaging serum production for the duration of the war. 
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Political reasons were behind the transfer, but few would say so 
directly. Leading defenders went so far as to claim that it would actually 
strengthen research. The minister of education, Ichiki Kitokuro, told 
the Doshikai's Government Affairs Study Committee on November 28 
that the transfer would save money, rationalize administration, and 
further the aim of research independence. "Because of the present war 
in Europe," he said, "it has become impossible for us to send students to 
France or Germany. We are drawing up plans for greater autonomy and 
hope the transfer will further them."29 Prime Minister Okuma had 
earlier expressed such views. "Kitasato and his coworkers," Okuma 
claimed, "should be grateful for the association with Tokyo University, 
because it sets the standards for Japanese research."30 
Kitasato s reaction, though tardy, was hostile in every respect He 
gave Okuma a noncommittal answer on October 6, when the prime 
minister first informed him of the transfer and asked that he stay as 
director.31 A few days later he told Ichiki he was "incapable of under­
standing the way a scientist thinks," as he prepared to resign from the 
Ministry of Home Affairs.A2 In a speech to his institute colleagues, he 
gave his reasons for quitting. First, the transfer decision was wrong 
because it assumed the institute to have a nonexistent connection with 
formal scientific education. Then again, it was wrong because it ran 
counter to worldwide trends in health administration. Third, it was 
wrong because it threatened to "destroy comprehensive research \sogo 
kenkyu] at the institute."33 To his mind, the Institute of Infectious 
Diseases was concerned only with combating infectious diseases and 
advising the government about them. Affiliation of the institute with 
Tokyo University would contradict the foreign practice of housing bac­
teriology in separate institutions, while the university's separation of 
basic and clinical medicine would damage vital aspects of the laborato­
ry's mission.34 
Kitasato s resignation (October 19) and those of his colleagues posed 
a serious dilemma for Okuma s cabinet Okuma was openly anxious: 
"Scientists and academics who engage in this kind of [research] work 
are apt to misunderstand simple facts and cling toridiculous ideas. We 
must pay no attention to them.. . It is perfectly apparent to anyone 
with the slightest scientific knowledge that this transfer has been car­
ried out in a reasonable manner."35 Ichiki also admitted that the resig­
nations were "causing certain difficulties," and told a Diet committee 
he did "not care what ministry or bureau qualified successors might 
belong to."36 Both officials were troubled by the shortage of serum 
technicians. After 1905 Kitasato's staff trained various technicians, but 
none wished to work for the Ministry of Education, and few held posi­
tions that could force them to. One, Saizawa Kozo, opposed the assign­
SCIENCE AND THE CRISIS OF WORLD WAR I 203

ment, but his position in the military made him vulnerable. Under 
direct orders from Mori Rintaro, he ignored charges of betrayal from 
Kitasato's pupils and offered his services to the Ministry of Education.37 
Home ministry officials resented the decision to transfer the labora­
tory. For one thing, they had not been consulted. Okuma had personally 
assumed the home minister's portfolio when he organized his cabinet, 
and he excluded ministry officials from the transfer planning process 
out of concern for Kitasato's influence.38 Such maneuverings naturally 
raised anxieties about the ministry's role in the government. Vice Min­
ister Shimo'oka Chuji told Okuma the university might destroy the 
organizational arrangements of the institute after acquiring control and 
raised questions about public health administration.39 Okuma rejected 
the first point while conceding the second. He added provisions to the 
transfer documents stating that the Ministry of Education accepted a 
continuing relationship between the Ministry of Home Affairs and the 
university-con trolled institute. Education guaranteed the laboratory's 
rights to continue consultations in epidemiology.40 
Members of the Diet criticized the transfer and the political moti­
vations of its sponsors. Two members of the House of Representatives 
said the institute's affiliation with Tokyo University would damage its 
research program. Another said it would increase the cost of public 
health. Two more lamented Kitasato's possible subjection to a hostile 
section of the bureaucracy. Wakasugi Kisaburo, a physician who had 
also graduated from Tokyo University, blamed the entire affair (er­
roneously) on political machinations by Dean Aoyama. Yagi Itsuro from 
Nara, also a physician, said Okuma and Ichiki were completely ignorant 
of the "peculiarities of scientific research" and had gravely insulted all 
Japanese scientists by excluding Kitasato from prior consultation. He 
and Representative Yoshiue Shoichiro of Hokkaido further charged the 
cabinet with a lack of political honor. One said the Ministry of Educa­
tion showed no clear logic in its annexation of research facilities; the 
other contended that the transfer was "simply a political act"41 
A Seiyukai party manifesto denounced the transfer in the Asahi 
Shimbun, arguing that Tokyo University and the Institute of Infectious 
Diseases were incompatible institutions, since the one was interested in 
teaching while the other was dedicated to research. The institute would 
suffer from this association because the university was filled with 
cliques, rigidly organized by chairs and deficient in research output 
The Ministry of Education's annexations of research laboratories were 
illogical, inconsistent, and uninformed by the measure of foreign expe­
rience, and new procedures imposed on the institute by the transfer 
would cost more than the old and would probably endanger the produc­
tion of serums and vaccine.42 At the instigation of Seiyukai leaders, the 
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House of Representatives voted to condemn the transfer (187 to 171 ) . 4 3 
Nor were hostile reactions confined to those holding office. Senior 
statesman Yamagata Aritomo expressed grave reservations about the 
transfer a week after the government's announcement.44 
Professional reactions were surprisingly compliant. Several prefec­
turaJ medical societies passed condemnatory resolutions, but most 
medical and scientific colleagues either supported it, stifled misgivings 
in private, or pubbcly feigned indifference.45 Koganei Yoshikiyo, pro­
fessor of anatomy at Tokyo University, came out in favor of the transfer, 
probably because Mori Rintaro was his brother-in-law. He was belatedly 
joined by Hirota Tsukasa, professor of pediatrics.46 Ishiguro Tadanori 
tried to mediate the conflict from his chairmanship of the Central 
Hygiene Commission, but he backed off completely when Okuma re­
buked him.47 Nagayo Mataro, professor of pathology, was also opposed 
to the transfer but decided his university position demanded a public 
show of compliance.48 The most revealing response was that of the 
president of the Great Japan Hygiene Society, Kitasato's sponsor in the 
1890s. Kanasugi Eigoro began by calling the transfer—in private—the 
"result of an insidious plot." He decided to protest to Okuma and orga­
nized a group for that purpose. But once in Okuma's office, his de­
meanor changed markedly. As he told a meeting of Hygiene Society 
members, "It was an extraordinary thing for a mere group of physicians 
to visit His Excellency the prime minister and take up his time discuss­
ing this matter. The members should understand that we did this only 
to save appearances.. . . If you are all dissatisfied and want us to visit 
him again, we will. But we felt overwhelmed to have said as much as we 
did to His Excellency on this subject."49 
Of course, the transfer was not wholly political; it did have some logic 
behind it. The Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce administered 
several research programs with industrial applications. The Ministry of 
Home Affairs controlled some research in medicine. And the Ministry of 
Communications had a foothold in the field of electrical engineering. 
But Imperial Ordinance 279 gave the Ministry of Education an un­
usually broad mandate by authorizing it to "supervise and encourage all 
[my emphasis] the sciences and the arts."50 This meant in practice that 
Home Affairs, Agriculture and Commerce, and Communications con­
centrated on research with known applications, while Education had 
the political upper hand in the area of basic research. Thus Home 
Affairs controlled such facilities as the Tokyo Hygiene Laboratory, the 
Osaka Hygiene Laboratory, and the Institute of Infectious Diseases. 
The Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce supervised the Industrial 
Experiment Laboratory, the Agricultural Experiment Station, and the 
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Sericulture Research Institute. Communications had jurisdiction over 
the Electrotechnical Laboratory and the Railways Research Institute. 
Education had charge of the SeismologicaJ Research Commission and 
the Mizusawa Latitudinal Observatory. Education had used Imperial 
Ordinance 279 to good advantage while enlarging its role in administer­
ing science. 
But anomalies remained and were frequently criticized. Yagi Itsuro 
demanded to know why the Fermentation Laboratory was located in the 
Ministry of Finance rather than the Ministry of Education—if admin­
istrative uniformity were really so important.51 Kyoikujiron suggested 
that the government ought to transfer the Industrial Experiment Labo­
ratory to the Ministry of Education, "if it is really so concerned about 
money."52 Yagi also thought that the ministry s commitment to medical 
research should have given it control of the Bcriben Commission.5* But 
policy decisions were not based solely on reason. In 1903 the ministry 
had denied Hasegawa Taj permission to call his Zaisei Gakusha medical 
academy a "higher professional school." as permitted by law, because of 
his association with and support for Kitasato.5*1 Throughout the Meiji 
period, the Ministry of Education declined jurisdiction over the Fer­
mentation Laboratory on the grounds that its undertakings were "not 
academic," yet in 1914 it took control of the Fisheries Institute, which 
had even fewer pretensions to research activity.55 
Political motivations were behind the transfer of Kitasato's laborato­
ry. Ichiki despised Kitasato and finally admitted this openly.56 He made 
three bizarre statements in his remarks to the House of Representatives 
Budget Committee. He first observed that "private researchers" were 
incapable of improving the "unsatisfactory state of bacteriological re­
search and vaccine manufacturing in Japan." Then he remarked that a 
government laboratory had to manufacture serum and vaccine, be­
cause no private agencies were doing so. Finally he said changes had 
taken place at the institute in 1899, when Kitasato became director of 
this newly established "national laboratory."57 These remarks as a 
whole are logically incoherent because the institute was a government 
facility; Kitasato was its director; and only the institute produced 
serums and vaccine at the time. But if one imputes a political moti­
vation, the statements begin to make sense. Kitasato was supposedly 
employed by the government, but his attitude suggested the contrary; 
the institute was a government laboratory in name but a private labora­
tory in fact; and Kitasato was obnoxious because he wielded an inordi­
nate amount of informal power, not because he had broken the law. 
Ichiki never conceded the transfer's true purpose, but one of his 
colleagues did. In his memoirs, Izawa Takio, the inspector general of 
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the Metropolitan Police in the Ministry of Home Affairs, openly admit­
ted that the real objective behind the affair was the destruction of the 
scientist's power: 
[Before its transfer to the Ministry of Education], the Institute of 
Infectious Diseases was a real barrel of rotten apples. It was sup­
posed to be a state institution, but Dr. Kitasato had made it com­
pletely his own property. The chief of the Bureau of Public Health, 
who was supposed to supervise it, could not do anything without 
consulting him. Everything at the institute was under Kitasato's 
control. Since things had been this way for over a decade, one 
would have to say that the bureaucratic system had been dis­
rupted. The government decided to transfer it to the Ministry of 
Education because its aims were not being realized where it was, 
under the Ministry of Home Affairs.58 
The Ministry of Education got control of the institute, but the price it 
paid was high. Kitasato managed to establish himself in a situation of 
even greater autonomy. The ministry lost prestige because of the in­
stitute's problems after the transfer, and failed to gain control of several 
new laboratories which precedent should have accorded it Fear of 
cooptation by ministry officials was a factor in each of these results. It 
manifested itself in the founding of laboratories as an issue of bureau­
cratic jurisdiction. In the problems of the institute after the transfer, it 
took the form of a heated debate over the quality of serums and smallpox 
vaccine. And in Kitasato's activities, one sees this concern reflected in 
three different ways—his singular estabbshment of a new private labo­
ratory, his acquisition of a government license to manufacture serums 
and vaccine, and his attempts to influence government policy by mate­
rially aiding candidates for office. 
Results and Implications of the Institute Transfer 
Kitasato's reestablishment in a new private laboratory was the first 
major setback for the Ministry of Education. He began planning the 
Kitasato Institute even before he resigned and almost immediately be­
gan research on a temporary basis ac facilities he owned. The new 
institute was somewhat smaller than its well-known precursor, but it 
set itself much the same mission: research, clinical treatment, and 
production of vaccine and serums. It also incorporated two major 
changes, representing simultaneously a broadening of mission and a 
narrowing of focus. The Kitasato Institute directed its research not only 
to bacterial diseases but to human and animal diseases in general, 
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giving special attention to tuberculosis.59 Kitasato's interest in tuber­
culosis was a major reason for his vigorous opposition to the laboratory's 
transfer and his establishment of the Kitasato Institute. Professors in 
the faculty of medicine at Tokyo University had unequivocally stated 
their lack of faith in the efficacy of Koch's tuberculin and their lack of 
interest in the prophylactic approach to the disease that Kitasato had 
tried to advance.60 Establishment of his own laboratory was motivated 
by his desire for both intellectual autonomy and institutional freedom. 
Money was naturally one source of his strength. From 1893 onward, 
he had operated a private sanatorium for wealthy tubercular patients. 
This facility, known as the Yojd'en, was built on Fukuzawa Yukichi's 
land with additional funding from a wealthy industrialist, and it proved 
so lucrative that Kitasato bought out these two in a year. Charges by 
critics that the Yojo'en's treatment of former institute patients con­
stituted a "mixing of public and private interests" prompted secrecy 
about its finances, but word Altered out, and its reputation grew.'1' No 
figures are available on its profits, but they must have been large. Con­
struction of the new Kitasato Institute in 1915 cost 400.000 yen—about 
30 percent of Tokyo University's annual budget.62 Of this amount. 
48,000 yen came from "alumni" and colleagues, another 48.182 yen 
from the Great Japan Hygiene Society, and 4,500 yen from other dona­
tions. The rest of the costs Kitasato bore personally.63 
The Ministry of Education suffered a second major setback when 
Kitasato and his institute got a license to make serums. He was able to 
do this in defiance of the government because he had friends who were 
still sympathetic and powerful. Two days after his meeting with Okuma 
(October 6), he sent Kitajima Ta'ichi, his loyal deputy director, to see a 
certain official of the Metropolitan Police, which belonged to the home 
ministry and had jurisdiction over public health matters in Tokyo. Kita­
jima requested and obtained this official's seal on the request for a 
license and forwarded it to himself as chief of the Bureau of Public 
Health's Section for Preventing Epidemics. He presented the request to 
the chief of the bureau, who promptly agreed to support it The bureau 
chief returned the documents to the Department of Police, which pro­
ceeded to issue the license.64 This set the stage for a bitter public fight 
over the quality of serums and vaccine. 
Battle was joined once the Kitasato group reorganized. The Institute 
of Infectious Diseases had an inexperienced staff, and their products 
were soon questioned. Some medical authorities charged that the im­
munizing capability of the serums had declined, causing a rise in the 
death rate. Others said the Ministry of Education was trying to conceal 
the problem by lowering the price of the Japanese serums and making 
up poor quality by American-made imports. Still others said the in­
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sutute's serum production was operating at a loss because the public 
had no confidence and would not buy the products.65 The Ministry of 
Education tried to blunt these charges by developing a plausible de­
fense. Although the immunization count of the new serums had indeed 
dropped, the cure rates had gone up. Prices had been lowered, but only 
for the purpose of promoting distribution. The amount of American 
serum imported was small and only for "experimental purposes," and 
the loss of income resulted from price-cutting, not the refusal of the 
public to buy.66 
Self-interest played a role in each of these arguments. The judgment 
of education ministry critics, for example, might have been affected by 
ties to Kitasato. Hida Otoichi, who raised the issue of immunization 
capability, was a bacteriologist on the staff of the Kitasato Institute. 
Tsuchiya Seizaburo, who leveled the charges of higher death rates, had 
studied epidemiology with Kitasato.67 The Kitasato Institute had a con­
flict of interest Government subsidies were not available to it, and the 
Yojo'en income was not sufficient Continued operation required other 
income, and most of this came from serum and vaccine production.68 
But the government's claims were just as dubious. A 1915 study assert­
ing the efficacy of the serums is suspect because it was carried out 
under the auspices of the Ministry of Education by a professor of pedi­
atrics at Kyushu University.69 Assertions of improved cure rates were 
supported by only a single hospital study at a Tokyo University affili­
ate.70 The Ministry of Education tried to defend its share of the vaccine 
and serum market by too-strict inspection of the Kitasato Institute's 
production.71 
The ministry's critics were almost certainly right Vice Minister 
Fukuhara Ryojiro denied all allegations of inept performance in serum 
and vaccine manufacturing on the floor of the Diet, but he admitted in 
the privacy of the Budget Committee chamber that the "limited ability" 
of the new serum technicians—including Saizawa Kozo—might very 
well lead to inferior products.72 Others who had also favored the trans­
fer were concerned on this point In the winter of 1914 Tokyo Univer­
sity's president, Yamakawa Kenjiro, told Ichiki's predecessor, Okuda 
Yoshindo, that there was "some concern whether serum manufactur­
ing could be carried on at the university."73 Mori Rintaro wrote in his 
diary of "anxiety" over the professors' total ignorance of the serum 
manufacturing process.74 The chief of the Bureau of Professional Edu­
cation, Matsuura Chinjiro, told the Budget Committee that the pre-
transfer diphtheria serum had a higher immunization level than the 
serum produced by the posttransfer staff.75 Serum production chief 
Saizawa admitted in 1928 that it had been "very difficult" to obtain the 
required minimal level of five hundred immunization units in the first 
years after the transfer.76 In view of such facts, it is scarcely surprising 
SCIENCE AND THE CRISIS OF WORLD WAR I 2Og 
that Vice Minister Fukuhara had pleaded with the Diet in 1914 for a 
cessation of criticism about the laboratory transfer issue, arguing that 
rumors about incompetent performance and higher death rates from 
diseases were "not good for the (reputation of the] Ministry of 
Education."77 
Another result of the transfer decision was an increase in factional 
strife. Aoyama got off thefirst shot even before the transfer's announce­
ment According to him, the Kitasato group had "not accomplished 
much for a number of years," despite a large budget and top-flight 
facilities.78 About the same time, a long-time Kitasato friend and one­
time business partner observed that "jealousy of Dr. Kitasato has in­
creased greatly of late."79 Relations worsened after the transfer. "The 
university and Kitasato groups became (real) enemies as the crisis de­
veloped," Nagayo M atari) wrote. "Aoyama asked me if he should attend 
the wedding of Kitasato's daughter, and I told him he'd best stay 
away."80 In early 1915 Kitasato's associate, Shiga Kiyoshi—discoverer 
of the Shiga bacillus—published an essay in which he said, "Those 
university professors are so lazy they cannot do simple arithmetic!" As a 
retort, Aoyama called Shiga "a petty little man" in his hearing.81 The 
Kitasato camp responded in mid-December 1914, when dedicating the 
Kitasato Institute. Viscount Kiyoura Keigo, who became prime minister 
in the next decade, contrasted the honor shown in Britain toward the 
deceased German scientist Paul Ehrlich with the treatment accorded 
his friend. "In this country, the only world-famous scientist we have, 
Dr. Kitasato, has been driven from his lifelong headquarters, the In­
stitute of Infectious Diseases."82 Not surprisingly, by 1917 the Japa­
nese medical community was more deeply divided than ever.83 
Even at the time, much of the problem was linked to factions in 
medicine. The minister of education, Kikuchi Dairoku, spoke plain­
tively of it even while in office,84 and with good reason, since fac­
tionalism was very widespread. "Each of the genro [senior profes­
sionals] had his own faction," wrote Sakai Tanihei many years later.85 
The press often chimed in by exposing the pattern at Tokyo. "This evil," 
wrote one publication in 1915, "exists throughout the entire univer­
sity."86 University officials, as the war dragged on, showed growing 
concern about the problem, and President Yamakawa decided to re­
spond after several newspapers had featured the subject and linked it to 
poor research output "These so-called gakubatsu [factions] are alleged 
to exist, but it is hard for us to accept this." The university had contrib­
uted to society, and its record was wholly praiseworthy. Of course, it was 
bad if such patterns existed, but one should not take them too seriously. 
After all, talk about factions was just a result of some peoples' "feelings 
of jealousy."87 
It is especially significant that in 1914 the issue got hooked up with 
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politics, that is, the politics of the larger society. Dean Aoyama and 
Tokyo University were linked to Prime Minister Okuma's ruling Do­
shikai party, while the rival Seiyukai was favorable to Kitasato.88 
Aoyama had been afriend of Oku ma, and many saw his influence as the 
cause of the transfer. The Seiyukai had published a manifesto opposing 
the transfer that Kitasato may even have written. Kitasato had ties of 
long standing with Hara Kei and other Seiyukai stalwarts, and one of his 
major colleagues in research called the opening ceremonies of the 
Kitasato Institute "an attack on the Okuma cabinet."89 With the pass­
ing of time, these relations, if anything, polarized more. During the Diet 
elections of 1917. Kitasato campaigned for Seiyukai politicians and 
contributed to their coffers.90 
For the twenty years previous to the transfer, the Ministry of Educa­
tion had been increasing its role in administering science, but in the 
half-dozen years following it, this position was seriously damaged. 
Since the apparent decline in its share was quite small, one would not 
know this from the figures. The ministry's share of research laborato­
ries declined onlyfrom 13 of 46 laboratories (28 percent) in 1914 to 18 of 
67 (27 percent) in 1920. But this indication is misleading, since the 
numbers are somewhat inflated. The Japanese government built five 
new specialized laboratories during the war, and the Ministry of Educa­
tion got control over the three located at imperial universities by default. 
The ministry's control was minimal at one of these laboratories—the 
Institute for Aeronautics—and some opposed it Education had to share 
control with another agency, and the professors in charge made no little 
effort to minimize its voice in the project. Finally, the two other labora­
tories, to which the Ministry of Education could have laid claim, were 
assigned elsewhere. In all of these cases suspicions aroused by the 
transfer affair were a major part of the reason.91 
There remains the question—considering the consequences—of 
how such an event could have happened. Kitasato had offended many 
people, and several were determined to punish him. His government 
base of support had diminished as the power of the home ministry 
waned. The triumph of administrative legalism (hoka banno) worked to 
challenge his reliance on politics. And the growth in the number of 
bacteriologists made his replacement seem at least formally possible. 
The minister of education, Ichiki Kitokurd, represented these forces 
and actively promoted the transfer, but Prime Minister Okuma's sup­
port of the transfer was what actually allowed it to happen. 
This was highly ironic on the face of it Okuma's life experiences and 
interests gave him every reason to admire Kitasato, or at least to leave 
him alone. He was a long-time associate and admirer of Kitasato's pa­
tron, Fukuzawa Yukichi, and had materially aided Fukuzawa in the 
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founding of Keio University. He had himself founded a major private 
institution of learning, Waseda University. He had a deep commitment 
to personal independence and freedom of inquiry, which he expressed 
in Waseda's motto (Gakumon no dokuritsu [independence of learn­
ing]). He was actively interested in scholarly matters, most especially 
engineering and science, working for many years to establish such a 
program at Waseda. Okuma's interests in technical studies went far 
beyond those of most politicians. He frequently proclaimed that physics 
was the "base of all knowledge." He relished attendance at lectures by 
scientists whom the Imperial Academy favored with prizes. And he 
went so far as to state in an essay that scientists—especially medical 
scientists—should be active in secular politics.92 
Okuma admired Kitasato and at first resisted the transfer. "He was 
strongly opposed to Ichiki's plan," according to one source, "because of 
his high idealism."93 He even sent a formal directive on September 3 to 
the Ministry of Home Affairs, in which he called attention to the drug 
production program and stressed its importance for the nation's public 
health.94 Okuma was not one to ignore Kitasato's achievements in his 
Institute of Infectious Diseases. National prestige, after all, did not 
depend solely on military power but also on the power of science. 
Kitasato's scientific contributions had enhanced this prestige and de­
served greater support95 
But Okuma finally approved of the transfer. Why did his views 
change? We cannot be certain of the reason, but a number of factors are 
worth considering. Okuma was deeply committed to enhancing na­
tional prestige. For many years he had criticized Japan for reliance on 
others and stressed the need in matters of science for greater research 
creativity.96 He was also a devout believer in the university model of 
how to organize science. "1 [approved the transfer],1' he told a visitor, 
"because medicine is commonly an academic matter and because of the 
convenience for research."97 The war affected his assessment of na­
tional needs. "We send too many students to Germany each year," he 
told Kanasugi Eigoro, implying that this must be changed.98 Moreover, 
"He was deeply impressed by Germany's ability to contend with several 
enemies at once," wrote Yanagita Izumi. "Upon considering the matter, 
he decided this was due to the strength of German [science and] 
culture."99 
One should also take account of the man's personality. Okuma was 
intellectually curious, convivial, and known for his wide range of con­
tacts. He had an optimistic outlook on life and believed strongly in the 
future. But he was also exceedingly sure of himself and could be down­
right pigheaded. "Once he decided his course, he was even willing to 
make serums and vaccine if he had to," wrote Kitajima in his 
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memoirs. 10° Moreover, Ckuma was never attentive to details and was 
prone to miscalculation,101 and in some ways, this fault explains why 
the transfer took place as it did. 
Founding of the Research Institute for Physics 
and Chemistry 
While the transfer of Kitasato's laboratory did not reflect credit on 
Okuma, the founding of the Institute for Physics and Chemistry owed 
much to his intervention. More than any single figure, Okuma brought 
together the disparate coalition of forces needed to plan and construct 
this facility. Okuma prodded the Diet into approving the necessary 
subsidies, and Okuma, more than anyone else, helped to organize the 
private fund-raising effort. Most of this was done in a quiet, almost 
clandestine manner and attracted little notice, but this in no way ob­
scures the importance of what the prime minister did. Without the 
efforts of Okuma Shigenobu, the institute would have been greatly 
delayed and might not have materialized at all. 
Okuma had not been its original proponent Physicist Nakamura 
Seiji had suggested such a laboratory in 1908, and Baron Mitsui, of the 
zaibatsu family, endorsed the idea in 1909. In 1913 the emigre chemist 
Takamine Jokichi had attracted attention by a major proposal—cre­
ation of a large-scale national laboratory for all fields of science, with a 
price tag of twenty million yen—the cost, as he put it, of "just one 
battleship." This was considered too great a sum by the business com­
munity, and his proposal withered on the vine, to be brought back to life 
in the winter of 1914. Eight university scientists found several allies in 
the business community, drafted a proposal asking for five million yen, 
and approached certain members of the Diet. Nothing was done on this 
occasion, but the first major step had been taken.102 
Japanese proponents of physics and chemistry were in part respond­
ing to trends overseas. In 1887 the Germans, after many difficulties, 
had built the Physicalische Technische Reichsanstalt (PTR). The 
French by century's end had the Institut Centrale des Arts et Manufac­
tures. The British had the National Laboratory. The Americans estab­
lished the National Bureau of Standards. The Germans then upped the 
ante in 1911 with the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft (KWG) network of 
laboratories. Nor were all the pertinent initiatives taken by public au­
thorities. A major new trend in Germany and the U.S. was for industry 
to carry on research. By the turn of the century, facilities for research 
were rapidly appearing in chemistry, photography, transportation, and 
especially the electrical fields.103 
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Nevertheless, domestic stimuli were important to Japanese efforts. 
Japan was simply not well equipped for chemical and physical research. 
Facilities in thesefields were limited in 1914 to the four imperial univer­
sities, the Imperial Academy of Sciences, the Industrial Experiment 
Laboratory, and the Electrotechnical Laboratory belonging to the Min­
istry of Communications. Even they had limitations. "There was no 
special provision for research in university budgets," wrote Sakurai Joji. 
"Professors simply diverted to research money from the budget for 
student instruction."104 And Nagaoka Hantaro recalled in 1933: "I 
turned to theoretical physics for a time because it was so difficult to get 
money for equipment. The research facilities we have now were un­
imaginable then."105 
With the coming of the war. all of this began to change. In October, 
the Association for the Chemical Industry (Kdgyd Kagaku Kai) formally 
asked the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce to establish a larger 
facility for chemical research, and the ministry appointed a committee. 
The committee, known as the Chemical Industry Study Commission 
(CISC or Kagaku Kdgyd Chosa Kai ), was chaired by the vice minister 
and included a number of academic chemists. They promptly took up, 
among other topics, the matter of whether to deal with the problem by 
enlarging the Industrial Experiment Laboratory or to build a new labo­
ratory—and what to do about physics. Significantly, they opted for an 
entirely new facility, with physics an integral part. Agricultural chemist 
Kozai Yoshinao and the chemical engineer Takamatsu Toyokichi were 
especially influential in debate. They argued that chemistry would suf­
fer if separated from physics, and that both must receive greater 
stress.1O8 Takamatsu s views were decisive. He insisted that the pro­
posed institution undertake research in chemistry "as a scientific disci­
pline,1' not primarily in chemistry as an industrial enterprise. Simply 
enlarging the Industrial Experiment Laboratory would not solve the 
problem because of its aim.107 Considering his position as the laborato­
ry's director, his views could be seen as objective. 
In March and April 1915, details were addressed more directly. The 
CISC designated five chemists to approach colleagues in physics and 
solicit their views about the project. Nine physicists, including es­
pecially Yamakawa Kenjiro and Kikuchi Dairoku, contributed ideas. 
After the main commission received thereports it decided to seek not 
less than 10,000,000 yen for the institute, of which 4,500,000 would 
cover construction, the remainder to be invested in research. About 
160,000 yen was expected to sustain annual operating costs. These 
recommendations were drafted as a bill and went to the Diet in May.1O8 
Reactions in the Diet were in many ways posftive. "The present war 
in Europe i s . .  . making us keenly aware of the need for scientific 
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research," a member of the House of Peers noted. "Yet our country 
lacks these [large-scale] facilities."109 A colleague in the House of Rep­
resentatives exclaimed, "We cannot continue to copy foreign countries 
as we have been doing. All the advanced Western countries have estab­
lished high-level research institutions for physics and chemistry."110 
Almost everyone present endorsed the idea and conceded the need for 
the institute, but the real issue was cost. The minister of communica­
tions, Taketomi Tokitoshi, called the proposed ten million yen absurd 
and implied he could never support it. Representative Aijima Kanjiro, of 
the nongovernment Kokuminto party, thought this might be a fatal 
defect, since the cabinet was divided. *11 For the moment the issue was 
shelved by changes in the text of the bill. Instead of requiring that the 
government "adopt an appropriate plan to catch up with advanced 
countries at this time," the Diet added a proviso calling for the plan to be 
developed "in accordance with the present financial situation." This 
was passed by a voice vote.'l2 
At this point Oku ma became more assertive. Probably because 
Yamakawa Kenjiro, Sakurai Joji, and Wa tan a be Wataru had lobbied 
him twice in April, he began to hold meetings of academic scientists, 
industrialists, bankers, and officials at his Waseda home. A small meet­
ing was held on June 3, and a bigger one convened two weeks later. 
Okumareferred to the Anglo-French blockade of Germany as a "major 
problem" and insisted that action be taken. Everyone agreed on the 
need for the institute, but not on the proper procedure. They finally 
decided to appoint a committee in the hope of resolving the matter.J13 
Lengthy delays in reaching agreement showed that the subject was 
far from routine. The attempt had been made—and had failed—to 
establish the institute solely with government funds. Yet proponents 
insisted on five million yen as a minimum, and raising such a sum was 
not easy. Private businessmen would have to come forward. Iwasaki 
Koyata of Mitsubishi showed considerable enthusiasm when Sakurai 
asked him for money and at once pledged 500,000 yen,114 but not all 
businessmen were so forthcoming, and the fund-raising effort was 
slow. "Outside the academic community," Sakurai wrote, "few saw the 
need for scientific research. And funds for research were still 
scarce."115 It was eight months after the June meetings before the 
groundwork was complete. Letters were sent in January 1916 to the 
prime minister, the minister of agriculture and commerce, and the 
minister of finance requesting ten years' subsidy totaling 2,000,000 
yen, with 250,000 yen to be paid the first year. Okuma held two more 
meetings with potential private donors, and a small committee chaired 
by Shibusawa Eiichi of the Dai-Ichi Bank and physicist Yamakawa 
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Kenjiro tried to line up more private contributions.116 These efforts had 
succeeded by February 21; the rest was up to the Diet 
Responses in the Diet were mixed. Members praised the project as 
such and considered the money affordable. "The first thing to learn 
from the present war in Europe is the need for independent re­
search."117 "I am delighted it has become government policy." "If only 
the Japanese Empire had established this kind of laboratory five years 
ago, or better yet, ten." But questions lurked behind the enthusiasm, 
revealing a range of concerns. Had the government truly done its best 
on the issue? A number of members thought not "Last year Mr. Take­
tomi called this proposal absurd." 'The proposal is late, and the scale [of 
the plan] is too small."118 "Does the government really have the for­
titude to carry it out?" Would scientists be available once the institute 
was built? One member claimed that the shortage of research person­
nel exceeded the shortage of money. Another called the situation 
"pitiful." "In (Tokyo University's! faculty of science there are about 
thirty students in chemical research and twenty in physics with various 
professors supervising them. But the money they have is just 4,000 yen, 
which would never be true in a foreign university."119 
Members of the Diet raised several other issues more divisive, if 
anything, than these. What precisely was the institutes mission? "The 
main purpose of the laboratory will be applied research," said the chair­
man of the subcommittee with control of the bill. 12° "This institute is to 
be essentially a place for pure research," claimed a former education 
vice minister.121 Which was it to be? When Representative Suzuki 
Umeshiro sought clarification from the minister of agriculture and 
commerce, he was told in essence that it was both.122 Documents 
drawn up by the legislative sponsors had stipulated both kinds of work. 
The question was politically charged. If applied research were the prin­
cipal aim, then control would be given to the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Commerce, but if basic research were the objective, then the Ministry 
of Education could claim it 
Scientists and some of their supporters in business were determined 
that basic research would come first. "In my laboratory [built in 1916] 
we do only applied research," Iwasaki Koyata told Sakurai Joji. "So I am 
happy that the institute will stress basic research."123 Nevertheless, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce got control of the laboratory. Its 
minister, Kono Hironaka, said it was partly because of the industrialists' 
interests in research applications. The ministry had frequently sup­
ported industrial research, said a political councillor in the Ministry of 
Education, so the industrialists thought this would speed up the pro­
cess.124 Moreover, the idea of control by the Ministry of Education 
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alarmed some. Never mind that the ministry had "not done enough" to 
promote physics or chemistry in the imperial universities, which an 
education official admitted lacked large-scale facilities.125 The real is­
sue was its record in science. The Ministry of Education was "behind 
public thinking in matters of technical research." It had not done 
enough to promote innovation, and it had grossly interfered with long-
established programs. 
This was the decisive reason. "The Ministry of Education drove Dr. 
Kitasato to establish his own independent laboratory," charged Yokota 
Koshi, a pharmacist from a district in Hyogo. "This is an instance of 
[clear-cut] malfeasance."126 Another representative who cited this 
case wanted to know how the Ministry of Education envisioned its role 
in regard to the Institute for Physics and Chemistry.127 A third mem­
ber said the ministry's takeover of the Institute of Infectious Diseases 
showed bureaucratic control, not promotion of research, to be its fun­
damental long-term concern.128 These Diet members were not alone 
in their views. The real reason for the institute's affiliation, according 
to Minister Kono Hironaka, was the concern of unnamed people about 
the Ministry of Education. "It might try to take over the [Institute for 
Physics and Chemistry) the way it did the Institute of Infectious 
Diseases."129 
Education officials were greatly displeased, 'industrial academies 
are all supervised by the Ministry of Education," noted former vice 
minister Okada Ryohei.13° "Tokyo University's science faculty must be 
seen as the foundation for the Research Institute for Physics and Chem­
istry," argued former councillor Egi KazuyukLI31 The Ministry of Edu­
cation certainly did control the faculty of science, conceded the new 
minister of finance, Taketomi Tokitoshi.132 Okada Ryohei—himself 
named minister on October 9—was especially irate. He noted sar­
castically the contradictions in descriptions of the institute's mission 
and denounced its assignment to a rival government ministry as a 
"disruption of procedure" and a "violation of our laws."133 The educa­
tion minister, Takada Sanae, former Waseda president and afriend of 
Okuma, was not too happy himself. He tried to put the best face on the 
matter by stressing industrialists' connections with the Ministry of Agri­
culture and Commerce but with minimal prodding declared that the 
Ministry of Education "should have had control from the outset"134 
What, then, was the institute'srelationship to the Ministry of Educa­
tion? "[Agriculture and Commerce] will necessarily proceed in con­
sultation with the Ministry of Education," the minister offinance prom­
ised. After all, the university's faculty of science "will serve as the 
institute's base."135 In that case, Egi observed, more money would be 
needed at Tokyo University. But would the funds actually materialize? 
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The minister of finance responded, "It is our intention to offer the 
money to assure the [program's] success. In fact, the budget is well on 
its way/'136 The budget had some way to go. In December 1916, 
Sakurai Joji, dean of the faculty of science, noted that just five thousand 
yen was budgeted for research in physics, while chemistry had even 
less (four thousand yen). "Members of the faculty can accomplish very 
little, and promising graduate students are taking other jobs."137 
The Ministry of Finance was not very generous. In June 1916 Presi­
dent Yamakawa began planning the expansion of physics and chem­
istry at Tokyo University in connection with the research institute. 
After seeking the views of Sakurai Joji, he approached the minister of 
education, Takada Sanae. Takada was very understanding, but prob­
lems arose in the cabinet The new minister of finance, Shoda Kazue, 
was not well disposed and demanded postponements in spending.138 
Yamakawa, however, did not waver from his course, and in late 1917 his 
plans were approved. Even then, they were somewhat restricted. Most 
of the money (650,000 yen) went for facilities. No new faculty chairs 
were created, and actual appropriations were delayed twelve months 
139 more.
But the cause of establishing the institute continued to gather mo­
mentum. The entire Diet approved the subsidies on February 27, 
1916, and the corporation to receive them was established in March. 
Prime Minister Okuma began to create a committee of guarantors and 
in just a few weeks had recruitedfifty-five. Thirty of this number pro­
ceeded to organize a Founding Commission, with Shibusawa as chair 
and two chemists, Sakurai and Takamatsu, as members. The indus­
trialists and Okuma did most of the fund-raising, and by March 1917 
had 2,187,000 yen.140 Actual operations were planned by the scien­
tists. One basic scientist and one applied scientist had charge of each 
discipline, and all four were professors at Tokyo University.M • In April 
1917 the imperial family donated 1,000,000 yen, and in September 
operations commenced 
Tokyo University and the Institute for Aeronautics 
Creation of the Institute for Aeronautics at Tokyo University was equal­
ly difficult, or more so. Kitasato's supporters in the Diet and elsewhere 
were intensely opposed to academic ties for it The military establish­
ment came to view the facility as a trophy to which it had best claim. Not 
everyone well placed in the central bureaucracy thought such research 
deserved top priority. But World War I and accompanying develop­
ments placed a premium on military research. A small group of parlia­
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mentarians (especially in the Peers) was dedicated to the aeronautics 
project Prime Minister Oku ma was supportive, and most of all, two key 
physicists were determined to make it succeed. Yamakawa Kenjiro, 
Tokyo University's president, and a retiring professor of physics, Tan­
akadate Aikitsu, were the forces behind its creation. In mobilizing sup­
port for the Institute for Aeronautics they followed Kitasato's strategy. 
Japan's earliest interest in aeronautics had a military basis. Several 
army officers were interested in fixed-balloon reconnaissance and dur­
ing the 1904-05 war with Russia set out to exploit its potential. None of 
them, however, had much technical training, and none of their efforts 
bore fruit This opened the way for academic scientists. In 1905 Fu­
jisawa Rikitaro was serving as professor of mathematics both at Tokyo 
University and at the army's School of Artillery and Engineering, and 
he described the project's failure to his academic colleague in physics. 
Tanakadate agreed to help out, and the army put him in charge.142 
An apparent turning point came in 1909. The army and navy were 
given authority to establish and control a Research Commission on the 
Military Uses of Balloons, whose chairman was an army lieutenant 
general. A number of officers were members. But the services' lack of 
technical expertise once again gave the scientists a role. Tanakadate 
was still the main figure. Between 1909 and 1912, he attended semi­
nars on aeronautics at Got tin gen and Berlin universities, built a small 
wind tunnel back in Japan, and recruited two students of physics to 
help him. It was not enough to assure success. The navy withdrew 
cooperation in 1912 and created its own small program. The army's 
interests were exclusively practical. Basic research made very little 
143 progress.
The outbreak of war gave the program an important, though limited, 
boost Tanakadate and an engineering colleague, Yokota Seinen, pro­
fessor of naval architecture, argued that aeronautics needed a new 
research format that the university alone could provide. President 
Yamakawa agreed with this view and presented it to Prime Minister 
Okuma. Tanakadate and Yokota, at about this same time (March 1915), 
approached three of their friends in the Peers. Furuichi Kffi, Kubota 
Yuzuru, and Okada Ryohei each had an interest in aviation and science 
and promptly agreed to help. Their interest proved valuable. Furuichi 
had been dean of the engineering faculty, Kubota had served as minis­
ter of education, and Okada had twice been vice minister. All belonged 
to the Aviation Society, as did Okuma. As a result of this growing sup­
port, the cabinet took up the issue in May.144 
But 1915 was a year of missed opportunities. Because aviation re­
search was entirely new, its constituency was not very powerful. Some 
businessmen championed the cause of the Institute for Physics and 
Chemistry because the blockade cut off the imports they needed, and 
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government officials were also persuaded by the need to end depen­
dence on Germany. Aeronautical research was quite a different matter. 
One might have expected support from the military, for in European 
countries caught up in the war, such interest in aviation was strong. But 
no such pattern evolved in Japan, since military pressures were few. 
With only three hundred casualties for the whole war, there were far 
fewer military incentives to innovate. 
In 1915 Japan's real interest in aeronautical research was mostly 
confined to scientists, and they were attached to Tokyo University, 
which was controlled by the Ministry of Education. The new minister of 
education, Takada Sanae. was not actually hostile, but neither was he 
actively interested. On December 22, he presented his budget to the 
House of Representatives and commented on the subject as follows: "I 
do believe aeronautical research is needed at this time, and I would like 
to ask the Diet to approve the funding for it. After all, you only get 
something out if you put something in. But we need a lot of things, and 
the financial situation will just not allow it."145 
Forces were mobilizing, however, to bring about change. On June 
13, 1915, Tanakadate met with a groupfrom the Peers. For two and a 
half hours he answered questions about the future of aviation, arousing 
considerable enthusiasm.l46 In December and January Takada was 
attacked in the Diet Baron Kubota Yuzuru demanded a full explanation 
in the Budget Committee of the Peers.147 Dr. Suzuki Manjiro did the 
same in the House. 'The Ministry of Education realized that physical 
[and chemical] research were needed, so they decided to contribute 
some money. But in this case they are very complacent and need to 
rethink their views. We need an aeronautics facility now.148 Okada 
Ryohei told President Yamakawa of the attacks on Takada in parlia­
ment, and Yamakawa began to move. On January 21 he summoned two 
section chiefsfrom the Ministry of Education to meet with him and two 
other scientists, Tanakadate and Yokota. The five of them drew up a 
budget that Yamakawa showed to the vice minister. Bypassing the 
minister of education altogether, the two men met in Yamakawa's office 
on January 24, and the deal was cut1 4 9 Education agreed to support a 
line-item budget request for land and then for equipment 15° 
It is not clear when Takada converted, but he soon did his best in the 
Diet: 
As you [members] all know, aeronautics has made extraordinary 
progress of late. The war especially has given it a boost In fact, 
aeronautics has shown astonishing growth in all the [belligerent] 
countries during the past year. Of course, some design, and con­
struction of airplanes has been done in Japan. . . but we lack 
facilities for basic research. . As a response to this need, we 
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propose to build a laboratory at Tokyo University. I probably do not 
need to mention this, but [foreign] countries are very competitive 
in this field, and their military aircraft [research] is secret.. . We 
cannot wait for what others may do but will have to do our own 
basic work.151 
The minister of education then mentioned the efforts of Britain, Ger­
many, and France and announced that 79,640 yen was requested to 
purchase the site for the laboratory and 103,950 yen for construction. 
On February 28, just five days later, the Diet approved the request152 
For the next two years the major activity focused on Tokyo Univer­
sity. In February President Yamakawa allocated ten thousand yen of 
the university's money to launch aeronautics research. It was initially 
housed in the engineering faculty's department of naval architecture. 
But the faculty of science did the theoretical work, and Tanakadate was 
the head. In April he took charge of a Study Commission to Develop 
Aeronautics, and in August this group found temporary facilities to 
carry out simulated flights.153 But more support was needed than the 
program had thus far received. Late in 1916 the government offered 
fifty thousand yen to build a wind tunnel, and in early 1917 Yamakawa 
drafted plans for a major staff expansion. The university's full-scale 
program for aeronautics research required four new chairs in the en­
gineering faculty and one in the faculty of science.154 At this point a 
group of supporters raised a troublesome issue. How did basic research 
on the campus relate to military needs? "I am concerned," said a mem­
ber of the House on January 29, 1918, "about possible neglect of prac­
tical needs, since the university is controlling the program." The minis­
ter of education denied any problem. "Liaison is working very welL 
Many researchers are at work on the problems. Naturally they are 
working together and helping each other as much as they can."155 
More difficult problems soon appeared on this otherwise clear hori­
zon. With construction completed and a request for new chairs on the 
table, the Diet was obliged to reopen the subject The Budget Commit­
tee of the House of Representatives conducted a major review. These 
sessions were highly contentious. Several of the members had admired 
Kitasato, and they were not pleased by the ministry's plans. In the 
discussions, which lasted several days (from January 30 to February 8, 
1918), three separate issues were raised. How did the professors at 
Tokyo University see themselves as professionals? What was the Minis­
try of Education's conception of the academic's professional role? And 
what should be the proper foundation for the Institute for Aeronautics? 
University professors were said as a group to have at least two major 
pertinent faults. They were described as mostly concerned about teach­
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ing and only sporadically interested in research. 'The purpose of uni­
versities, after all is to pass on received information." Moreover, the 
methods of research they actually use are, for the most part, "very old-
fashioned."156 University professors were also accused of partiality. 
'Too many chairs in imperial universities," said the scholar of Buddhist 
studies Higuchi Hideo, "have been established for particular indi­
viduals." Tokyo University had improbably gotten an unneeded second 
chair in pharmacology because the dean of the faculty wanted to make 
one of his friends a professor.157 Worst of all, the professors at Tokyo 
consistently favored their own proteges: "People are very concerned 
about this constant tendency to form factions inside the campus. The 
professor is the father at Tokyo University; the lecturers and assistant 
professors are treated like sons he's adopted.. . .Even within the uni­
versity, some people think this is wrong."158 
Parliamentary critics claimed that the Ministry of Education had 
views out of tune with the times. Universities have one function, labora­
tories another, according to Tsuchiya Seizaburo. "The United States, 
Britain, and Germany have all found that things work best if some 
professors focus on teaching, while others do only research." A world­
wide trend had developed toward research in specialized laboratories, 
but the Ministry of Education had insisted on "evil uniformity," always 
considering Tokyo University both the "supreme institution for higher 
education" and the principal agency for scientific research. The Okuma 
cabinet had even attached the Institute of Infectious Diseases to the 
medical faculty, thus confusing an agency for scientific research with 
one for scientific education. The "evils" of doing so foolish a thing were 
clearest in exactly this case. Worst of all, according to critics, was the 
ministry's failure to learn from the war. "Why has Germany shown such 
military strength?" Tsuchiya challenged his colleagues. "It is because it 
has succeeded in applying research to the various needs of the war!" 
The universities of Germany were not the ones to make the greatest 
inventions. These inventions have rather come out of laboratories sep­
arated from them. This [relative backwardness of the German univer­
sities] is why the Kaiser donated large sums for a network of specialized 
laboratories."159 
Tsuchiya made yet one more claim that seems pertinent to most— 
but not all—of the others. This was his apparent conviction that cre­
ative research was related to a certain kind of ethos. "Learning in Japan 
has tended to follow the traditions of [classical] China in its concern for 
the health of the state. But it is really the scientific endeavors of private 
individuals which have produced the greatest success. Indeed, this has 
been a major trend in the history of science worldwide." How, then, 
should the institute be organized to achieve its greatest potential? First, 
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it should be entirely free of supervision by university professors. He 
called the idea of establishing the institute at Tokyo University an "ex­
ample of infantile thinking." Second, it should assemble specialists 
from the pertinent disciplines with no involvement in teaching. "The 
Imperial Institute at Munich did not attain its objectives when pro­
fessors from Munich University were appointed to work there occa­
sionally." Last, it should be intimately affiliated with the Japanese 
army and navy. "This research is important for national defense. Aero­
nautical research has made progress undreamed of in the countries 
now fighting in Europe.. . . But our country is lagging behind. To 
hand over this work to incompetent professors is like fighting a war 
from an armchair."160 
Top-ranking officials from the Ministry of Education responded to 
most of these charges. They were somewhat conciliatory on teaching 
and research. Vice Minister Tadokoro Yoshiharu conceded the pos­
sibility of incompetence among professors but refused to comment at 
length. "One always expects the replacement of incompetent [acade­
mics] by those who can help advance knowledge."161 Nevertheless, 
there was no possibility of a laboratory without any teaching. "The 
[Aeronautics] Institute will have to do teaching," according to Minister 
Okada, "because of our lack of aeronautics experts. [Teaching] is as 
urgent as research. Japanese experts must do double duty."162 
Ministry officials were equally tactful on the issue of academic fair­
ness. "The chair system is unique to Japan," said the chief of the Bu­
reau of Professional Education. "We cannot compare the situation here 
with that in various other countries."163 For example, "the German 
universities have few full professors, but they do have lecturers who 
offer various courses." "We have always tried to be fair in our faculty 
appointments and have tried to nominate the person best qualified/1164 
But in regard to the German example and the lessons of the war, the 
ministry's officials showed someflexibility. Vice Minister Tadokoro did 
show surprise at Tsuchiya's opposition to the academic link. "Great 
research has been done in the various universities of Germany." Placing 
the institute at Tokyo University was "especially convenient" for Japan, 
although the ministry suspected that particular care was required. Min­
ister Okada stressed that despite the facility's attachment to Tokyo 
University, it would not belong to any one department The person who 
would be named to serve as director might not even be a university 
professor. Matsuura emphasized this point in the testimony he gave two 
days later. Aeronautics would probably become a separate department 
that would in no way exclude thosefinom outside. The ministry would 
assure that anyone requiring a knowledge of aeronautics could "attend 
its lectures and take part in its programs."165 
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This defense by the Ministry of Education was sufficient to carry the 
day. The House of Representatives gave its approval on February 12, 
and the House of Peers on February 19. By the end of the month the 
issue was settled. But the ministry's approach did not silence all critics. 
While not agreeing entirely with Tsuchiya, the House Budget Commit­
tee had formally called on the Ministry of Education to "eliminate favor­
itism from the imperial universities and promote the development of 
[scientific] research/'166 This caused comment on thefloor of the Diet, 
where a Kitasato ally moved to give it some teeth. "Some members think 
there are various forms of favoritism in the imperial universities. If 
these are not eliminated, no aeronautics laboratory must be established 
at Tokyo University."167 
Although the Ministry of Education appeared to have won over its 
opponents—the institute opened on April 1, while the new chairs were 
funded in July168—its victory was less than complete. Yamakawa had 
originally supported the administrative transfer of the Institute of Infec­
tious Diseases but was later disturbed by its outcome. As a result, he 
began taking steps to prevent a possible recurrence. Yamakawa decided 
that a direct attachment of the Institute for Aeronautics to the Ministry 
of Education would expose the new facility to interference by officials. 
Even having it under his personal control might not be good enough, so 
he established a special account for the Institute for Aeronautics, sepa­
rate from the university's general fund. Yamakawa s biographer called 
it a "clear example of |the president'sl concern."169 
The Research Infrastructure of Academic Science 
Of course, not all new developments in research infrastructure were 
tied to these specialized laboratories. Even aside from one whole new 
faculty, Japan's universities got ten new chairs in technical fields dur­
ing the first three and a half years of the war. In 1915 Kyushu Univer­
sity got a new chair of civil engineering, while Tohoku received chairs 
in geology, mathematics, agronomy, parasitology, and agricultural eco­
nomics. In 1916 a chair in entomology was created at Tokyo University 
and one in bacteriology at Kyoto, and in 1917 new chairs were added at 
Tohoku University in applied chemistry and agronomy. All but two of 
these chairs had traditional definitions, which seems to show that new 
understandings of the need for research took time tofirm up in Japan. 
The motivations for most of these chairs is not clear from the sources, 
but it is almost certain that enrollments were behind them.170 Their 
foundation occurred in a period of fiscal austerity. At Kyoto the faculty 
of science and engineering was divided in 1914 into two faculties, but 
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no new funding went with it. Apartfrom one small increase in funding 
at Tokyo, budgets at Kyoto and Tokyo were constantfrom the beginning 
until nearly the end of the war.m 
Tohoku University was the exception to this pattern of very slow 
growth. It gained seven of the ten new chairs in technical fields and an 
entirely new faculty (medicine) in 1915. In 1916 it became the location 
of a major new laboratory whose mission in part grew out of the war. 
Some of this growth was predictable. Since Tohoku had been the small­
est and worst funded of the four imperial universities, its expansion 
potential was greatest. The faculty of medicine was all but inevitable in 
view of the discipline's status. But the creation in 1916 of the Institute 
for Metals Research was in many ways qualitatively new, and the pro­
cedures by which both it and the faculty of medicine came into exis­
tence show the importance of innovative leadership and the prospects 
for a new land of funding. 
Consider the case of the faculty of medicine. The local prefectural 
assembly had formally asked Tokyo for a medical program as early as 
1881 and actually received it in 1901. But the facilities were modest, 
and quality was suspect Even upgrading in 1913 did not by itself lay the 
basis for a good faculty of medicine. Two interventions were needed. In 
1906 the governor of Miyagi prefecture persuaded his assembly to ap­
propriate 400,000 yen for a new prefectural hospital and attached medi­
cal college. This impressed the Ministry of Education and led it to think 
that a faculty was affordable, so that there was little resistance when in 
1913 it was proposed to make them a faculty. But these facilities had not 
been established with the mission of a university in mind. Most of the 
faculty had no advanced training, and the equipment they had was 
deficient Thus, Hojo Tolataka, the president of the university, insisted 
on fundamental changes. In 1915 he dismissed all but four of the 
twenty-one staff members and won commitments for new medical 
laboratories.172 
Hojo was equally effective in creating the Institute for Metals Re­
search. Before coming to Tohoku University in 1913, he had taken an 
undergraduate degree in mathematics, which he taught at the pres­
tigious First Higher School in Tokyo. Following this, he became prin­
cipal of the Fourth Higher School in Kanazawa and then of the 
Hiroshima Higher Normal SchooL173 Although he lacked a doctorate, 
this background helped him considerably in mobilizing support for 
research. 
The Institute for Metals Research began with a memo to Hojd. Early 
in 1915 the physicist Honda Kotaro asked the president to represent his 
needs in discussions with the Ministry of Education. Honda described 
work he had recently begun on casting procedures for gears and pro­
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peUers, and he expressed the desire to launch several new projects 
relating to quality improvements in the casting of iron and steel and the 
development of various new alloys. Stressing the importance of such 
work for the Japanese military, and its value for private shipbuilding, 
Honda formally requested a budget of fifty thousand yen for basic 
equipment and another fifteen thousand yen for researchers' salaries. 
To this request Hojo was favorable, and he readily agreed to mediate.!74 
The Ministry of Education was also sympathetic, but the proposal 
was not easily realized. Wakatsuki Reijiro, the minister offinance (April 
1914-August 1915), insisted on a 50 percent cut in the funding re­
quested. This, Honda said, could not be tolerated, since he had already 
made verbal commitments. Hojo accordingly continued his efforts; but 
the Ministry of Education finally broke off discussions, saying that the 
Ministry of Finance was not to be moved and no more money could be 
obtained. At this point Hojo conceived a new strategy. During his years 
at the Fourth Higher School he had recommended students for various 
positions and had saved one man's career. The former student was now 
an executive with Sumitomo Metals, and Hojd decided to approach him 
directly. The executive undertook to advance the proposal, and Sumito­
mo agreed to pick up the difference—twenty-one thousand yen—with 
clear indications that more would come later. With the necessary fund­
ing now fully in place, the institute was able to open its doors on April 1, 
1916.175 
Institutional developments on the Tdhoku campus served to stimu­
late activity elsewhere. With the university's acquisition of a faculty of 
medicine, it now possessed the minimum two faculties required of an 
imperial university and no longer needed the facilities in Sapporo to 
justify its legal existence. This encouraged major expansion in the form 
ofa new university. Certain influential people in the city of Sapporo had 
long sought to obtain an imperial university, and the chances for realiz­
ing so ambitious a goal had, nearly overnight, become more realistic, 
although creation of the new Hokkaido University proved to be very 
expensive (see chapter 8). But no one could foresee this, and legal 
approval was readily obtained. 
Demands for a university in this northernmost region were very long 
standing, having scarcely ceased from 1876, when the Sapporo Agri­
cultural College first opened.176 Demands had tended to focus on a 
program in medicine. Because of the climate and the frontier condi­
tions, certain illnesses were unusually prevalent, and the authorities 
had sought to address them. An 1871 mission to the region by an 
American physician had led to the founding of a medical academy, but 
this solution was not seen as permanent The facilities were poor, the 
training deficient, and the location constantly shifting. Permits to prac­
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tice in Hokkaido were occasionally issued to men who could not qualify 
elsewhere.177 
The later campaign to secure a university was not, atfirst, tied in with 
medicine. In 1910 a Hokkaido University Establishment Committee 
was founded by local officials, and their personal views of its constituent 
parts were vague. An influential statement by a Sapporo newspaper was 
only slightly more precise. This declaration, made in November 1914, 
called for adding a technical faculty to the one in existence (agri­
culture), to be followed by law or humanities. Some thought engineer­
ing or basic science should probably come first, but their convictions 
were not firm. Thus when the prefecture got a major new hospital in 
1915, public sentiment shifted toward medicine.178 
Members of the cabinet in Tokyo were generally well disposed but 
raised questions about the details. The Hokkaido committee had pro­
posed a budget of 1,460,000 yen. to be expended over eight years, with 
90 percent to go to the faculty of medicine. To make their proposal 
more attractive, they eschewed any claim on the treasury. According 
to the members of the Hokkaido committee, the sale of certain proper­
ties of the faculty of agriculture, together with contributions from the 
Sapporo government, and, if needed, private individuals, would suf­
fice. This proposition, though superficially plausible, was among the 
more questionable aspects. Would students enroll in a medical pro­
gram located in a place like Sapporo? Did not Hokkaido need a faculty 
of engineering even more than a faculty of medicine? And would the 
financing scheme actually yield enough revenue for the long term? In 
the final analysis the plan was approved because the Ministry of Edu­
cation's three highest officials were solidly behind its key features.179 
Members of the Diet were equally impressed and raised almost no 
objections of substance. One member of the Budget Committee in the 
House of Representatives represented a district on the island of 
Shikoku, and he called it unfair that Kyushu and Hokkaido would each 
now have an imperial university when Shikoku lacked even a high 
school.180 But no one else protested, and the budget was readily 
approved. Thus, on March 30, 1918, the fiftieth anniversary of the 
opening of Hokkaido, the founding of Hokkaido University was 
announced.181 
The last major expansion during the war years took place at the two 
oldest imperial universities. Tokyo University got a chair in genetics in 
its faculty of science and a chair of serological chemistry in its faculty of 
medicine. The first was well enough received, but the other was quite 
controversial Certain members of the Diet were hostile to the field and 
with some justification saw the action as political. Similar new develop­
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merits at Kyoto and Tokyo were also intensely discussed. When the 
Ministry of Education requested major new funding in their faculties of 
engineering, a lively new debate on a very old subject—naishoku, or 
moonlighting, by university professors—showed simultaneously both 
how limited and how unbounded were the prospects for change. 
Genetics was afield in which Japan took the initiative. Gregor Men-
del's epochal studies were rediscovered in 1900, and in 1902 the young 
cellular biologist Fujii Kenjiro arrived in Europe to conduct research in 
the field. In 1905 he returned to Tokyo University's faculty of science 
and began requesting a chair for genetics.182 Related developments 
were occurring in the university's faculty of agriculture. In 1906 
Toyama Kametaro took his doctorate in agricultural chemistry but 
promptly switched to the attractive new field. Toyama used silkworm 
studies to show that Mendel's work applied to insects as well as to 
plants. His valuable research was praised by foreigners, but Toyama 
never studied abroad.l83 He paid a high price for not doing so. 
Genetics did well in Japanese institutions. Plant breeding research 
was conducted at the Agricultural Experiment Station from 1907. In 
1915 Tohoku University got a chair of agronomy whose work focused 
heavily on genetics. From 1911 Toyama began working in the newly 
founded Sericulture Institute while continuing to teach at Tokyo Uni­
versity. In 1912, his colleague Fujii became full professor in the faculty 
of science. Since his doctorate was not conferred until a year later, this 
was clearly unusual. Under ordinary circumstances, a full professor­
ship should have gone first to Toyama, whose degree had been awarded 
six years earlier. But Fujii had spent four years abroad, while Toyama 
had never left the country. It is highly probable that this affected the 
founding of the chair of genetics. On June 12, 1917, the Osaka se­
curities tycoon Nomura Tokushichi gave a partial endowment to Tokyo 
University specifically for genetics.l M While it was not entirely the first 
of its kind, it was the first to be named for genetics, and it went to the 
faculty of science instead of the faculty of agriculture. Fujii was named 
to the chair of genetics, undoubtedly because of his background. 
Toyama, whose work was probably better, soon died an assistant pro­
fessor. The Diet was probably unaware of these facts since it readily 
approved supplementary funds when approached by the Ministry of 
Education.185 
Serobgical chemistry was quite a different matter. The Ministry of 
Education, as we have seen, had badly miscalculated in annexing 
Kitasato's institute. The quality of its vaccine and serums had plum­
meted, and the resulting lost sales had led to a deficit. The education 
minister, Takada, on December 16, 1915, openly conceded a deficit of 
eighty thousand yen, but he insisted that various "reforms" had cut this 
228 SCIENCE AND THE CRISIS OF WORLD WAR I

figure to thirty thousand yen. Hie Diet was asked to make up the loss, 
and after wrenching debate it agreed to cooperate.186 But money was 
not the whole issue; there was also the matter of technical skill. The 
faculty of medicine now running the institute did not have the knowl­
edge to manufacture serums and therefore required a serological 
chemist 
This request did not have smooth sailing. University authorities had 
planned for the chair in 1915, but Minister Ichiki Kitokuro was so 
sensitive to the politics that he refused to endorse i t 1 8 7 Meanwhile, 
problems continued at the institute. By 1917 the issue was critical, and 
Minister Okada decided to act The need for caution was soon appar­
ent Tsuchiya Seizaburo had vigorously attacked the ministry's plan to 
establish aeronautics at Tokyo University and was equally opposed to 
this plan. Noting that serological chemistry was usually considered 
part of toxicology or even bacteriology, he claimed that these subjects 
were already covered in the university's faculty of medicine,188 a long-
standing argument Tsuchiya was loyal to his one-time teacher 
Kitasato and determined to embarrass his opponents. In this case he 
revived an argument once expounded by Hasegawa Tai, the need for 
the one-chair rule, which the university had regularly ignored. 
Tsuchiya claimed that this separate chair was proposed for political 
reasons.189 By this point, however, the one-chair idea was fading, and 
the new chair was easily approved. 
Engineering expansion also caused controversy, though everyone 
agreed that expansion was needed. There were three major issues. Was 
the rationale for expansion properly presented? Were the solutions pro­
posed equal to the problems? And would the solutions themselves not 
breed more problems? 
The need for expansion was patent Because of the war and the 
blockade, companies had begun in-house research in attempts to devel­
op substitute products. Sometimes firms were successful both tech­
nically andfinancially. Marumiya Chemicals built a laboratory in 1915 
and successfully developed soaps, while several zaibatsu firms made 
synthetic dyes.190 But problems remained, and progress was slow. 
There was an insufficient supply of technical personnel. "Our need is 
presently greatest in applied chemistry, metallurgy, and mining en­
gineering," according to the education minister, Okada Ryohei Much 
more research was needed in thesefields. "In the past we thought it was 
all right just to copy the discoveries of foreigners."191 Industries were 
finding it hard to compete withfirms overseas without major assistance 
from imperial universities. "Fields like applied chemistry are nowadays 
the basis for industry, and the university professors are really its 
vanguard."192 
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Recognizing these trends, the imperial universities had developed a 
plan for expansion. In June 1916 Tokyo's president Yamakawa began 
discussions with Watanabe Wataru, dean of the Tokyo faculty of en­
gineering. Once they had reached agreement, they approached not the 
minister of education but the minister of agriculture and commerce. 
Nakanokoji Kiyoshi fell in with their ideas and promised support in the 
cabinet Only three weeks later was the Ministry of Education in­
formed.193 Certain adjustments were made, but the proposal's essen­
tials remained, and it was presented to the Diet in July 1917. Enroll­
ment was to be sharply increased in applied chemistry, metallurgy, and 
mining. Faculty positions could be added, but only at the level of as­
sistant professor. Funding would be considered a supplement, to be 
paid from the general account of the treasury.194 
Members of the Diet focused attention on the rationale advanced for 
expansion. No formal mention had been made of research, and some 
thought this inappropriate. "Surely the Ministry of Education under­
stands the need to expand our efforts in applied chemical research as a 
function of trends overseas."'95 Far more was needed than simply more 
graduates. "Factory engineers engaged in the production of aniline 
dyes are having to cope with problems in which they lack formal in­
struction. There has been progress, but. . . the companies need help 
from imperial universities." Representative Kodama Ryotaro was con­
vinced that more was required even than research. "Do we not need a 
system whereby professors give lectures outside universities for the 
particular benefit of Japan's private industries?"196 
To these views the minister of education was, for the most part, very 
sympathetic. More research was imperative. BASF in Germany had 
manufactured synthetic dyes with no contributions from any univer­
sity, but Japan's situation was different. More off-campus lecturing was 
definitely needed. "We will all recognize even more of a need for this in 
the future."197 Okada candidly admitted that the solutions he proposed 
were inadequate. The additional students whom the funding could 
educate would "probably not meet the private demand," and even if 
Japan could organize better, "The proposals I have made will not be 
enough" to match the Germans in research. Nevertheless, the minister 
stressed that he continued toremain optimistic. A professor at Tohoku 
University had recently produced nonflammable celluloid. Honda 
Kotaro's magnetic steel would now be manufactured by Sumitomo Met­
als. And Salvarsan 606 had been produced in a special program at Kyoto 
University and was already being used in its hospital wards. "When 
[Japanese scientists] carry out research, they are by no means lacking 
in [technical] originality."198 
In the view of some members, the solutions proposed were worse 
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than the problems. Market demand for technicians and scientists would 
be met by fine tuning of major enrollment. Vice Minister Tadokoro 
Yoshiham noted that during the first three years of the war, admissions 
at Tokyo University for applied chemistry, metallurgy, and mining en­
gineering had gone from 35 annually to 105. Things were similar at 
Kyoto and, on the level below, at the nation's higher schools. The minis­
try thought this could not be ignored. "We are looking at patterns in the 
various higher schools," according to Minister Okada, "and trying to 
match them in the engineering faculties." Indeed, the ministry was 
trying to meet the expectations of students with as much precision as 
possible. "Are you not afraid this policy will lead to confusion? asked 
Representative Takami Hidemichi. "No," replied the bureau chief Mat­
suura. "Students must often study their second- or third-place subject 
One would naturally expect this."199 
But the greatest concern of the Budget Committee was outside em­
ployment Strong sentiment existed on the one hand for more, not less, 
consulting (komon) by university professors in various fields. It was not 
simply a question of lectures. Industry's need for assistance was so 
great that professors should probably be doing research (kenkyu) at 
industrial laboratories for two or three months of each year.200 But even 
granted the needs of some firms, such a procedure had drawbacks. 
Representative Takaoka Tadaichiro argued that excessive consulting 
harmed the instruction of university students by removing their pro­
fessors from laboratories and classrooms. "Mathematicians are helping 
insurance companies, and medical professors are treating private pa­
tients People in law and all the technical fields are doing [consul­
ting]. There seem to be norestrictions at all." The minister of education 
could not let this pass. "Most of the consultation is taking place in 
engineering and medicine. Other professors generally work at private 
schools." In any case, it could not be avoided. "For the good of the 
country and the private sector generally, we must allow academic 
consulting."201 
After considerable discussion, the plans for expansion were ap­
proved. By mid-July 1917 the Diet had authorized the expenditure of 
211,740 yen for Tokyo and 122,766 yen for Kyoto. One new assistant 
professor was immediately hired at Kyoto, and two at Tokyo. In 1918 
Kyoto added one chair in applied chemistry, and in 1919 another. 
Tohoku University got an applied chemistry chair in 1917 and an en­
gineering faculty in 1919.202 
Science outside the Academic System 
The emphasis on consulting was predictable given the wartime expan­
sion of science in major corporations and the Japanese private sector 
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generally. A host of firms and other private groups had begun new 
research ventures in many different fields. The Kitasato Institute, 
founded in 1914, was only the first of its kind. In 1915 Takeda Phar­
maceuticals, previously only a marketingfirm, began producing its own 
merchandise by establishing a research division. In 1916 a competitor, 
Sankyo Pharmaceuticals, followed the same strategy. Nor was the trend 
unique to medicine. Several firms active in the chemical industry— 
Marumiya Shoten, Mitsubishi, Mitsui Mining, and Sumitomo Metals— 
developed research programs. In 1916 Osaka industrialist Shiomi Seiji, 
who had made a fortune in the chemical industry, gave a million yen for 
a specialized private laboratory. Known as the Shiomi Institute for 
Physics and Chemistry, this enterprise affiliated itself with the Osaka 
prefectural government and was later taken over by the Ministry of 
Education.203 Many companies and fields benefited from wartime con­
ditions. The blockade initially caused shortages and created a panic, but 
confiscation of German patents and market withdrawal of Western 
competition led to an economic boom.204 Tokugawa Yoshimi was able 
to build the Tokugawa Institute for Biological Research in 1917. Asahi 
Glass could found an applied chemical laboratory in 1918. Tokyo Elec­
tric Company established a research laboratory for applied physics the 
same year, and in 1919, the government-controlled Yawata Steel built 
an institute for research of interest to it.205 
Government officials had come to favor this trend. Between 1914 and 
1920 various bills were presented to the Diet calling for tax reductions, 
cheap credit, export subsidies, special research programs, and the 
like—all proposalsfor helping the private sector generate new technical 
knowledge and more effectively utilize knowledge that already existed. 
Most of this legislation was officially approved and even drafted by 
government officials whose domains were directly affected. Several 
different ministries were active, but the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Commerce was the busiest With control of everythingfrom the Patent 
Bureau to the Bureaus of Industry, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, 
it was inevitably the center of action. But its strategic position in this 
major new movement was sometimes unfortunate. Its traditional re­
liance on direction from outside made it ill-equipped to take risks, and 
its practice of naming lawyers to all line positions made it slow to recog­
nize trends. 
The Bureau of Patents is a case in point After 1905, all patent bureau 
chiefs were trained exclusively in law. Two of the seven who held the 
position before that time had been trained in law. Not one of the bureau 
chiefs was a man trained in a technical discipline.206 Japan's modern 
patent system, as we saw in chapter 4, was heavily based on Spain's. It 
structured regulations and policies to facilitate acquisition of foreign 
technology and minimized any individual's rights to protection. Under 
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Japanese law, for instance, an employee of an imperial university, gov­
ernment laboratory, or publicly supported higher technical school could 
not obtain patent protection for any invention or discovery on the 
grounds that research was part of his job. Income obtained from such 
an invention went entirely to the government employer.207 
This provision was canceled in 1911, but a number of problems 
remained. The patent office was understaffed. The bureau chief, 
Nakamatsu Mono, called attention to this in January 1912, but the 
problem got steadily worse.208 In 1912 the number of applications for 
patents surged as a result of changes in the law, yet in 1913 the Bureau 
of Patents took a 14 percent cut in staff and had to make do with 
"assistant examiners." These assistants worked under qualified spe­
cialists, but most of them lacked university degrees. No relief was forth­
coming until the last year of the war, and even then did not restore all of 
the cuts.209 
Shortage of funds compromised the bureau's mission across the 
boards. Why was the patent office's Exhibit Hall for Inventions com­
bined with the Hall for General Commercial Exhibits? This was indeed 
unfortunate, according to Vice Minister Oshikawa Norikichi (whose 
undergraduate degree was in chemistry), but financial shortages "had 
rendered change difficult."210 Various other critics thought the laws 
were deficient. "We have not done very much in our legal system or 
anywhere else to encourage Japanese invention," said Representative 
Suzuki Bun'ichi in January 1912. "We must find a means [to promote 
invention], but the government has not found it yet" Suzuki proposed a 
system of grants to inventors and a fifty thousand yen pool to launch 
such a program. When a colleague asked for official reaction, the re­
sponse was positive. "The government thinks this is urgently needed," 
said Nakamatsu. "But the Bureau of Patents has no extra money it can 
use for promoting inventions. Finances have always made such action 
impossible."211 
Perceptions changed in part with the war, when the need for reform 
was more evident Most people in positions of authority realized that the 
period of patent protection needed to be lengthened, that violations of 
patents had to be treated morerigorously, and that the general popula­
tion had to display more sensitivity to the need for inventive activity. Yet 
even in these years, change was not rapid. Certain features of the patent 
laws "have produced stagnation in industrial inventions and gadgets," 
lamented Representative Oda Ryo in 1916. "This has been harmful to 
national development" According to Oda, the short period of patent 
protection was one of the negative features. Since a minimum of three 
years and a maximum of ten did not afford adequate protection, he 
favored patents for twenty-five years. (About seventeen is common to­
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day.) But the government found this excessive. "We do intend to make 
changes," the bureau chief, Kawasaki Saijiro, promised. "But they are 
still being studied, and I cannot explain fully."212 
One change favoring invention did come in the following year. On 
October 13,1917, the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce issued its 
"Regulations for Transferring Funds to Encourage Invention."213 But 
these regulations authorized loans, not grants, and did not address 
other needs of inventors. In November 1917 the Japanese Society of 
Mechanical Engineering sought to spell out those needs in detail, issu­
ing a report written by a long-time patent examiner. Sakata Teiichi, who 
was also principal of the Tokyo Higher Technical School, proposed a 
number of reforms: creation of a permanent exhibition hail solely for 
patented inventions, official regulation of the training of invention con­
sultants, the convening of periodic exhibitions ofJapanese inventions at 
which native inventors were honored, improvement of laws for protect­
ing the rights of inventors, more stringent regulation of patent law 
abuses, and the establishment of an agency for resolving suspected 
violations of patents. "The present system for protecting inventions," he 
noted, "still has many deficiencies."214 
In fairness to the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, one should 
not judge its actions too harshly. Some of its officials did see the need for 
major reform. Nakamatsu Mono in particular, the bureau chief from 
December 1907 to June 1913, and also a lawyer, called attention to the 
role of patent law in stimulating both indigenous technical creativity 
and economic growth as early as 1889.215 In 1916 the ministry and the 
bureau tried for reform but were thwarted by lack of support in the Diet 
Substantial revision of patent law posed many complicated problems, 
and the Ministry of Finance was always ready to deny funding. But the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce can be faulted on two major 
grounds. It gave too little attention to its technical staff and was too 
inclined to accept outside direction. "What kind of reform will encour­
age invention?" the bureau chief asked in 1918. "Should we give pa­
tents to chemical products? To methods of research? We asked the 
Association for the Chemical Industry (Kogyo Kagaku Kai) about this, 
but they could not give us an answer."216 The bureau chief seemed not 
to understand that this group was not the best source. Most of its 
members had made their fortunes exploiting confiscated patents once 
held by the Germans, and they were not very likely to change their 
approach.217 
Taking the case of research on synthetic fibers, we can see that the 
ministry did not respond quickly to trends. The first known patent for 
the manufacture of synthetic silk (better known as rayon) had been 
issued to a British chemist as early as 1855, and by the 1890s a number 
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of companies in Europe were successfully producing it. Progress in 
synthetic fibers made great strides after the turn of the century. Re­
searchers in France and the U.S. made significant chemical break­
throughs, and German firms in particular improved the means of com­
mercial production.218 Japanese scientists had taken notice by 1909 
and recommended research at that time. But the Ministry of Agri­
culture and Commerce rejected their views on the grounds that natural 
silk was superior (chapter 5). In 1913 300.000 yen was spent on im­
ports of the foreign-made textile.219 
How should Japan respond to this challenge? In January 1914, six 
months prior to the war, the ministry was relatively confident When 
Oka Makoto, chief of the Bureau of Industry, testified before the House 
Budget Committee at the end of the month, he admitted that a problem 
existed but saw it as manageable. Japan's market position in natural silk 
remained very strong, especially by comparison with rivals—France, 
China, and Italy. Synthetic silk, though cheaper than natural silk, still 
was not of high quality; color fastness, resistance to Are and moisture, 
and consistency of weave could not in every case be assured. Every­
thing was under control. The government had made research in the silk 
industry a continuing budgetary item. In particular, research was 
taking place at the Kuramae Higher Industrial School, the Ueda 
Sericultural Technical School, and the Industrial Experiment Labora­
tory. While the budget for this work was not large (16,000 yen at the 
Industrial Experiment Laboratory), the ministry was "pleased with the 
results of the work." Oka expected that importation of synthetic silk 
would "soon be restricted or prohibited entirely."220 
But his presentation was seriously deficient, as Oka, a Tokyo law 
graduate with no technical training, was incompetent to judge. In 1911 
he had an acrimonious conversation with the director of the Industrial 
Experiment Laboratory that showed his lack of understanding (chapter 
5). The ministry was later forced to concede that Japan would have to 
develop a new textile fiber "to withstand competition in the mar­
ketplace," according to the agriculture and commerce minister, Kono 
Hironaka. In consultation with textile manufacturers, the ministry had 
agreed to support such an effort The ministry thought this would take 
about three years, but the manufacturers thought more time would be 
needed. Research and development costs were estimated at five million 
yen, but the companies considered this estimate inadequate. Predict­
ably, the Ministry of Finance felt challenged by the size of the project— 
but might support funding if the time were extended.221 
The issue was not whether natural silk was better than rayon, or even 
whether silk could hold onto foreign markets. The real issue was the 
future of textiles and the place of research in the textile industry's 
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future. Not everyone found the ministry's report reassuring. Represen­
tative Nishitani Kinzo, who was in the silk business, was among the 
more nervous. "It seems impossible to predict when or how this prob­
lem will be solved. And because of the importance (of textiles] in Japan's 
foreign trade, the search for solutions makes us all very anxious."222 A 
colleague's response was even more vigorous. "It seems one cannot get 
a detailed, satisfactory answer from the minister of agriculture and 
commerce no matter how many questions one asks," said Representa­
tive Horikiri Zenbei, professor of economics at Keio University: 
At this critical time, when many Japanese are trying to do some­
thing for agricultural, industrial, or commercial development, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce either makes others do 
everything or acts arbitrarily.. . . They have no ideas about the 
future. They try to evade responsibility by saying that the matter is 
under study or that. . . they cannot give an answer because it 
would trouble the Ministry of Finance.. . .Would it not be better if 
we just abolished the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce? It 
would be more rational to put (its bureaus] under the Ministry of 
Finance. We could save the eight thousand yen presently paid in 
salary to the minister and use it to hire some other officials. This 
would be excellent for bureaucratic efficiency!223 
These remarks angered Kono but did Horikiri no harm. After the war 
he became a councillor in the ministry, and a few years later was ap­
pointed ambassador to Italy.224 
In a third wartime research project, the problems were more subtle. 
The Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce in 1915 proposed to expand 
the Industrial Experiment Laboratory, but many were not sure this 
would work. Some thought the rationale for expansion defective, even if 
the expansion itself was essential. Others thought an early termination 
of the war in Europe might prevent a return on investment There was a 
suspicion that many private firms might not cooperate fully. One well-
placed critic thought ministry interference might make the desired 
results unobtainable. Nevertheless, the project moved forward to a suc­
cessful conclusion, since no other alternatives appeared. 
The need for expansion was not in doubt A 1912 report by a Tokyo 
professor (see chapter 4) had documented the country's trade deficit in 
chemicals, and the war made the situation worse. The deficit, more 
than twenty million yen at the time of the study, had reached thirty 
million yen during thefirst year of conflict; the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Commerce became seriously alarmed.225 Their concern was justi­
fied by the response of private business. Privatefirms, as we have seen, 
began to take action, but their efforts too often fell short As of mid-1915, 
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Asahi Chemicals wanted to manufacture soda. Mitsui was trying to 
produce synthetic dyes. Several other companies hoped for success in 
producing synthetic ammonia. But all needed help from the Industrial 
Experiment Laboratory to achieve any success.226 
The failure in industrial research at the beginning of the war is not 
surprising. Few companies employed even as many as ten researchers. 
Such personnel usually belonged to a company section for product 
inspection or testing, implying that managers considered their func­
tions practical. Many in the past had had as a primary task the monitor­
ing of foreign technology. Few privatefirms were equipped to deal with 
complicated technical problems, for this had been the function of the 
Industrial Experiment Laboratory and was still more or less its assign­
ment227 The Chemical Industry Study Commission (CISC) in May 
1915 recommended to the minister of agriculture and commerce that 
the laboratory be greatly expanded.228 
When the Budget Committee took up this proposal, members 
focused on the probable outcome. Could one expect private firms to 
produce dyes and other chemicals if the capacities of the laboratory 
grew? For once Oka did not play expert but deferred to a qualified 
scientist Takamatsu Toyokichi, the laboratory's director, a CISC mem­
ber, and a chemical engineer, gave a carefully hedged response. Since 
the talent required was available, success was "certainly not impossi­
ble" if the firms could mobilize this talent, and if the laboratory were to 
help them.229 
Some members of the Diet were not so certain. Representative 
Yamada Seinen worried that a premature end to the fighting in Europe 
could preclude any long-term success. Western competitors would im­
mediately return to East Asian markets with much cheaper chemical 
products than those Japan could produce.230 Representative Shimizu 
Ichitaro was greatly concerned by a lack of creative incentives. "We do 
not have the kind of [patent] legislation that would allow (company 
employees] to reap the rewards of inventive activity to the extent that 
inventors in Germany can do. [Japanese] get salaries, but not too much 
else/1231 The strongest challenge to the ministry's proposal came from 
Representative Muto Kinkichi, who was active in textiles and banking, 
and edited a newspaper called Industrial News.232 
Muto criticized the plan for two reasons. One was its excessive con­
cern with import reductions. The other was the treatment of technical 
personnel in the ministry. "Whether the Industrial Experiment Labora­
tory is well-equipped or not, little research will be done and little enough 
accomplished unless the engineers are paid better and respected more. 
But in the past engineers have not been much respected in the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Commerce."233 Minister Kono had to respond, and 
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he made three major points in rebuttal. Japan, he said, had to stop 
copying the products of others. "Until recently, Japanese manufactur­
ing enterprises rarely operated on a scientific basis. Most of them just 
copied foreign products." But the same private firms could certainly do 
better if, as in this case, the government were to help. "These com­
panies in the chemical industry could produce these substances if we 
gave them certain kinds of assistance." He as minister would have to do 
more. "I realize that I myself must concentrate attention on the Indus­
trial Experiment Laboratory."234 But the ministry did not change its 
ways, and Mutd did not even comment on its treatment of engineers, 
which would soon become a major issue. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE RESEARCH SYSTEM IN 
AN AGE OF TRANSITION 
About a year before the war ended in Europe, Aoyama Tanemichi spoke 
about changes in the scientific community at his retirement dinner. 
"Our empire, he said, "has shown [of late] the vitality and energy of a 
newly emerging country. Our academic community has a new spirit, a 
growing enthusiasm for research. This has come about because scien­
tists took advantage of the present situation. Truly this spirit of scien­
tific research is the glory of the nation."1 The retiring dean did not 
stretch the truth. Significant change was under way, and it did indeed 
change the climate for research. World War I had inspired a strong 
inclination toward independence in science and technology, and during 
the early postwar years, this movement would feature not only greater 
independence in general but a particular interest in independence of 
Germany. Primarily because of the war and the attitudes to which it 
gaverise, Japanese scientists were forced to decide more precisely than 
before where they stood in the world science community. This scrutiny 
was painful for some. It was also important for professional growth. 
The early postwar years, 1918-20, saw many changes. Public expec­
tations about research by scientists had risen during the war. Now the 
structure of incentives to carry on research also changed. As before, 
new facilities were built and old ones upgraded. But a new and potent 
combination of rewards for those who did research—and penalties for 
those who did not—was also made part of the system. It included fresh 
attacks on academic moonlighting, stepped up efforts to stimulate com­
petition, and offered more grants and prizes, earlier retirement for se­
nior professors, and sharply higher salaries for those who remained. 
Several university faculties received new facilities, and the concept 
of the research professorship was born. Private foundations aiming to 
support research first appeared on the scene. Several new laboratories 
were created from scratch. Most important, Japan established a com­
petitive system of grants for research and, at the end of this period, a 
National Research Council. Potent new attitudes favorable to scientific 
research became characteristic throughout society. Private universities 
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started to become active in technical research, as did the Imperial Army 
and Navy. 
Not surprisingly, a growing feeling that scientists should take part in 
making the decisions that governed their lives accompanied these 
sweeping changes. Members of the academic and technical commu­
nities demanded that people with scientific educations be elected or 
appointed to serve in the Diet, and they made cogent proposals to fur­
ther that end. Within the central bureaucracy there sprang up the so-
called engineers' movement, which sought better treatment for govern­
ment officials with technical backgrounds, including more access to 
policy-making jobs. The university community did not lag behind. Pro­
fessors sought and obtained more control over academic appointments 
and the running of their own institutions. Ultimately, many of these 
demands would be frustrated, but for a while they seemed to win out. 
By 1920 former samurai were no longer a majority in the scientific 
community. Modern education had made careers in science accessible 
to the general population, including, for the first time. Japanese wom­
en.2 Research facilities and programs were now in place for scientists in 
all technical and scientific fields on some kind of regular basis. And 
criticisms of the scientific community for perpetuating "feudalistic" 
behavior became ever more widespread and strident For all of these 
reasons the early postwar years marked the end of an epoch. 
Changes in the Conditions for Scientific Research 
There were many indications after World War I that Japanese society 
took research more seriously. Criticism of professors for neglecting 
research continued unabated. "The value of the nation's universities is 
called into question if professors shirk their duty by neglecting re­
search," declared an editorial writer in 1919.3 "We do not want to turn 
out ordinary scientists," insisted Representative Yokota Koshi, a phar­
macist, during a 1920 meeting of the Budget Committee of the House of 
Representatives. "We cannot continue the system now prevailing in the 
country's imperial universities."4 Both critics demanded an end to fac­
ulty consulting; Yokota wanted more competition and raises in salaries. 
A physician colleague of Yokota's in the Diet, Kanasugi Eigoro, wanted 
to go even further. "Some of these professors are too decrepit to do any 
work, and even some of the younger ones do very little. These people 
should be fired at once."5 
Because of such pressures, some changes that improved the climate 
for research were made. Salaries went up. The Ministry of Education 
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claimed that the average salary for university professors in 1918 was 
2,370 yen. Given the realities of wartime inflation, that was probably 
inadequate.6 But in 1920, a 30 percent hike took place, making the lives 
of academics more comfortable.7 Some measures to increase competi­
tion were also put into effect. In February 1920 education's vice minis­
ter, Minami Hiroshi, announced that whenever a single professor repre­
sented an entire academic subdiscipline, his major lecturing would be 
shared by colleagues in fields close to his.8 Later in 1920 a new policy, 
whereby all professors at imperial universities were obliged to retire 
upon reaching age sixty, was implemented. It was instigated by 
Yamakawa Kenjiro, president of Tokyo University, and it reflected 
broad faculty acquiescence in the view that younger professors would 
do more research 9 But on one issue, consulting or outside employment, 
there was no policy change. Of course, it might be better if professors 
did not have side jobs, the vice minister of education conceded. "But 
considering the present state of Japanese culture, [outside em­
ployment) may not be so bad."10 
These policy changes were important for research, but so was the 
willingness to allocate more money. One could use prior gains to justify 
asking for more. On March 20,1918, Count Hayashi Hirotaro delivered 
a speech to the House of Peers that utilized this strategy effectively. He 
noted with satisfaction the large sum of money (78,700 yen) now bud­
geted at Tokyo University for the Institute for Aeronautics. He also 
pointed out that this level of spending had introduced some major 
distortions. The two parent faculties, science and engineering, with 
total authorized spending levels of 58,960 yen and 78,761 yen, respec­
tively, were about to be completely overshadowed. The obvious solution, 
he pointed out, was to spend more money on both.n The government 
was willing to oblige him, and in 1919 the cabinet recommended, and 
the Diet approved, substantial new funding for science and engineering 
at both Tokyo and Kyoto universities. Tokyo got new facilities and 
equipment Kyoto got three new chairs in physics, one in biology (its 
first), and an additional chair in applied chemistry.12 Even more re­
markably, 700,000 yen was approved and allocated for a new astro­
nomical observatory at Tokyo University in 1919, after five years in 
budgetary limbo.13 
The government even founded several new laboratories for particu­
lar missions. Experiment stations or institutes were established for the 
tea and silk industries in 1918 and 1919. An Institute for Research on 
Nitrogen Fixation (IRNF) was built in 1918. Nutrition and fuel re­
search both came to be housed in specialized laboratories (1920), while 
marine and high-altitude meteorological observatories were built at the 
end of the decade.14 The National Institute for Nutrition Research 
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(NINR) illustrated one important new trend. This was the tendency to 
draw on American, and not only European, precedents. The NINR was 
the brainchild of Saiki Nori, a bacteriologist trained at Yale University, 
where a comparable institution existed. Its chief legislative sponsor in 
the Diet was Kono Tetsushi, a physician who had received his M.D. 
degree from the University of Pennsylvania.15 
The NINR reflected in part the general enthusiasm for research into 
vitamins that swept the world at the end of the war,16 but it also had 
roots in Japan. "One of its objectives," noted Dr. Yagi Itsuro, a leading 
supporter in the Budget Committee, "will be to evaluate our rice-based 
diet with the aim of supplementing or even replacing it." Another root 
was its relationship to the national bureaucracy. The Ministry of Educa­
tion did not claim this institution, but the Ministry of Finance did its job 
for it. The finance vice minister, Shinno Katsunosuke. argued that 
nutrition studies were a part of physiology and for this reason should be 
housed on a university campus. Yagi opposed this on the basis that 
faculties of medicine in Japanese universities did not allow mission 
research. "(Medical) researchers might investigate the pathological as­
pects of a topic. If the results interest them, they might investigate its 
chemical or bacteriological aspects. But each of these sections—pa­
thology, biochemistry, bacteriology—is independent, so the investiga­
tors must ask members of each to do the work for them. The latter might 
say they would do it if they had time [for the project)." Yagi was actually 
thinking of Kitasato's one-time institute, whose transfer he had opposed 
in 1914. "Precisely because universities are divided into all of these 
separate sections.. . . Robert Koch left (Berlin] University to establish a 
separate laboratory."17 Yagi's objections had their effect The NINR 
was assigned to the Ministry of Home Affairs and not to the education 
ministry.18 
Postwar stress on scientific research was apparent in other ways, 
too. Small research funds for biochemistry and physics were estab­
lished at Tokyo University at the instigation of the retired professor 
Shibata Keita and in honor of the retired professor Tanakadate Aikitsu, 
respectively.19 The Imperial Academy in 1918 created a new prize for 
research contributions that it named for the former prime minister 
Katsura Taro.20 Several private foundations sprang up with the de­
clared aim of supporting research in all of the natural sciences. The 
most important of these was the Keimeikai. Created with an endow­
ment of one million yen, the Keimeikai made its intentions unmistaka­
bly clear by naming as its president the former minister of education 
Maltino Nobuaki, sponsor of the Imperial Academy and the faculty of 
science at Tohoku University.21 
Other developments on the policyfront also exemplified change. In 
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1920, the Ministry of Education unveiled a plan to spend the extraordi­
nary sum of seventy million yen over a ten-year period on the construc­
tion of new research laboratories at all the imperial universities.22 It did 
not, in fact, carry out this plan, but it did do three other things: create a 
system of grants for research, present the concept of the research pro­
fessorship (initially at the Aeronautics Institute in conjunction with 
Tokyo University),23 and complete the establishment of Hokkaido Im­
perial University. The initial plan for Hokkaido had envisioned an out­
lay of 1,460,000 yen to be obtained mostly by selling agricultural land 
that the government had owned for some time. But this strategy did not 
work, and the actual cost was much higher. In 1919 the land was sold, 
and in 1920 thirty-one private individuals and local government agen­
cies donated a total of 470,700 yen. Even with that, the two basic 
programs (agriculture and medicine) were not yet in place. The basic 
faculties were not complete until 1925, and it cost more than 3.6 million 
yen, beyond the funds received from private contributors.24 
Limits to the stress on research included the cost of projects like the 
establishment of Hokkaido University. Tokyo University's faculty of 
medicine, which had grown very little for ten years, was authorized to 
expand in 1918, but construction of facilities did not begin until 1922.25 
The Research Institute for Physics and Chemistry, though formally 
inaugurated in 1917, had no facilities of its own for another five years. 
Members of its research team continued to work in laboratories at their 
home universities.26 Kyushu University was repeatedly thwarted in its 
effort to obtain a faculty of science. First proposed in 1919 by President 
Mano Bunji, a mechanical engineer and former official in the Ministry 
of Education, the plan was blocked by either that ministry or the Minis­
try of Finance.27 The Kyushu science faculty was considered again in 
1922-and on a number of other occasions—but was not actually built 
until 1939.28 
As for laboratories, the ad hoc Institute for Research on Nitrogen 
Fixation, formally inaugurated in 1918, reflected wartime concerns 
about self-sufficiency in fuels and chemicals.29 But it was geared to­
ward work on the synthesis of ammonia because that work, by chemist 
Fritz Haber, had been highly influential in Germany's earlier military 
success.30 With access to reports on the subject by Haber, scientists at 
the IRNF duplicated his work in 1920,31 but they had very little fund­
ing. The IRNF was set up with an outlay of just 200,000 yen at a time 
when, Diet members claimed, the U.S. was spending forty million yen 
on the problem. The Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, to which 
the IRNF was attached, flatly refused in public testimony to authorize 
more funding, tax exemptions, or any other form of assistance on the 
grounds that the Japanese chemical industry was making large profits 
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(March 1918).M This situation did not last very long. When hostilities 
ended in November 1918, the Japanese chemical industry faced serious 
hardships.33 
Even with these limits, new attitudes favoring scientific research 
permeated society. The armed services, for example, established signif­
icant new research facilities. In 1919 the army opened both a Technical 
Headquarters (Rikugun Gijutsu Hombu) and a Laboratory for Scien­
tific Research (Rikugun Kagaku Kenkyu Jo). In 1920 it established a 
facility called the Aerological Observatory (Rikugunsho Kdkukyoku).34 
Together with the navy's establishment in 1918 of its Naval Aircraft 
Experiment Station (Kaigun Kdkuki Shiken Jo), these facilities gave 
the military limited independence of the professors at Tokyo University. 
The services continued to rely on Tokyo University for advanced aero­
nautics training,35 and they lost their bid for control over the Institute 
for Aeronautics. In September 1919, President Yamakawa thwarted 
their effort to name a deputy director whom they could control through 
the chain of command.36 Theyfinally had to settle in July 1921 for the 
appointment to the institute of several researchers who were officers.37 
Attitudes favoring scientific research were apparent in other ways, 
too. In 1918, the government granted the forces of private higher edu­
cation a major victory by authorizing their use of the term university. 
On the surface, this simply meant that private institutions like Keio and 
Waseda would enjoy the same legal status and privileges as the five 
imperial universities. But this action by government was also important 
for scientific research. Because of the high cost of technical educa­
tion—and even more, of technical research—Keio, Waseda, and Do­
shisha in the nineteenth century had all been forced to abandon their 
efforts to offer programs in technical subjects. In 1908 Tokyo Univer­
sity physicist Yamakawa Kenjiro questioned whether private institu­
tions would ever have theresources for work in medicine, engineering, 
or science.38 For a considerable period it seemed that Yamakawa's 
doubts were justified. Wasedafrom 1908 made a serious effort to estab­
lish a faculty of science and engineering, but limited funds and student 
demand made its growth slow. Before World War I, in fact, the Waseda 
faculty had only two engineering programs housed in one small frame 
building. 
The war was responsible for the change, because wartime conditions 
created a demand for more engineers and technicians. Industrial 
growth brought far greater profits to industry and higher tax revenues 
to government Public pressure on the imperial universities to admit 
more students overwhelmed their limited resources. Not surprisingly, 
men like the former education minister Kikuchi Dairoku, who had once 
opposed rapid expansion of higher education, in 1915 now did a com­
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plete about-face and advocated fundamental change.39 New ventures 
became possible. In 1916 Waseda was able to add applied chemistry to 
its program in technical studies, and in October 1918 it began construc­
tion of a laboratory for research in this field.40 Keio University was not to 
be outdone. Between 1917 and 1920 it built a faculty of medicine with 
superior equipment costing over 2.7 million yen.4' The legal change in 
the status of the private universities was not, as such, the cause of these 
ventures, but the high costs and risks of technical programs make it 
difficult to imagine their taking place without it 
It also seemed for a time in the early postwar years that government 
decisions about scientific research were going to be handled differently. 
Before the war, men with scientific and technical degrees had some­
times held bureaucratic posts with the right to make policy, while a 
number of such men had all along served in the House of Representa­
tives. Their participation in the Diet tended to increase, though slowly. 
Kitasato, for example, campaigned heavily for physician Diet candi­
dates in the 1917 general election and managed to get three or four 
elected.42 But by World War I technical men were no longer repre­
sented in policy-making posts in the national bureaucracy, though they 
continued to serve lower down. 
The issue of participation in government decisions was troubling to 
many with technical backgrounds, and they began to address it more 
fully. In 1916, Shiraishi Naoji, a descendant of a long line of Confucian 
scholars who was also a civil engineer, was elected to the Diet from 
Kochi on a platform of opposition to bureaucratic legalism and support 
for technical education.43 The physicist Yamakawa Kenjiro, Tokyo 
University's president during the war, complained of scientists' lack of 
influence in high-level policy making in a 1919 letter to the minister of 
education.44 A 1919 editorial in Ikai jiho offered its analysis of the 
problem: the bureaucracy had a relative monopoly on scientific and 
technical information; the Diet was supposed to supervise its actions 
but lacked the knowledge to do so; but even so, a solution was apparent, 
namely, to elect more physicians to the Diet Doctors, after all, belonged 
to a profession with a "scientific basis" and were able to "think 
scientifically."45 
Others snared this point of view and sought to follow through on it 
Two scientists, Kitasato Shibasaburo and Kikuchi Dairoku, had already 
been named to the House of Peers (December 1917). In 1919, President 
Yamakawa managed to secure appointment to the Peers of chemist 
Sakurai Joji as well.46 In 1920, Matsushita Teiji, professor of bac­
teriology at Kyoto University, was elected to the House of Representa­
tives. By that time medical men held more than a dozen seats in the 
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Diet's lower house. Eight of them had formed a caucus to focus on 
medical scientific, and technical policies.47 
While these critics concentrated attention primarily on the Diet, 
others took on the bureaucracy. In June 1916, the Institute of German 
Engineers (Verein Deutscher Ingenieuren) had sent an open letter to 
Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg demanding that top-
ranking posts in the German civil service be opened to men with tech­
nical training.48 This action got attention not only in Germany but in 
Britain and Japan. The London Times Education Supplement published 
a translation in November 1916, and this set off a lively debate. In April 
1917, a Japanese translation appeared in T6y6 gakugei zasshi. Its au­
thor, Matsubara Koichi, professor of chemistry at Tokyo University, 
added his own comments to the engineers1 text According to him sci­
ence was important not only for industrial and commercial development 
but had a profound relationship to social welfare and the problems of 
society. It was very important that European countries were debating 
the exclusion of science graduates from the higher civil service. Britain 
in particular could well expect to benefit. Finally, the reexamination 
had evidently come from broad recognition of "this present-day evil."49 
Matsubara's essay was significant both for what it said and for what it 
omitted. He made no demand for changes in the substance of Japan's 
examinations for the higher civil service but only implied that technical 
men serving in the government should receive better treatment. The 
chemist's essay attracted wide notice and served to define the terms of 
debate for what came to be called the "engineers' movement." 
This movement began in 1918 with technical experts in the forestry 
bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce. The basic argu­
ment of these (mostly young) men was that science and technology be 
accorded a greater (dace in postwar public administration. Since better 
treatment for technical men was part of this scheme, they formed a plan 
to secure the promotion of Matsunami Yoshimi, a noted forestry expert 
with many years' experience, to the office of bureau chief. In this effort 
they enjoyed support not only from technical experts in the rest of the 
ministry but also from another bureau chief,from the vice minister, and 
initially from the minister. These officials, however, reckoned without 
the vigorous intervention of the incumbent chief of the Bureau of For­
estry. Okamoto Eitard, a graduate of the Tokyo law faculty and a career 
civil servant, complained to the vice minister that making a technical 
man head of a bureau would "destroy bureaucratic order," and the 
proposal was dropped.50 
Matsunami'sfrustration did not end the movement It survived the 
division of the agriculture and commerce ministry in 1925 and spread to 
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the rest of the government. Engineers' caucuses (gijutsusha kon­
wakai) formed in many of the ministries. Their members held conven­
tions, gave speeches, and signed and submitted petitions to bureaucrat­
ic superiors, but no big changes ever resulted. The reasons even now 
are somewhat obscure.51 One can call this, of course, a legacy of 
feudalism, but the same pattern existed in other countries. Before 1945, 
only Britain among the European powers made substantive changes in 
engineers' roles in the national bureaucracy.52 
In Japan the long-term effort by many professors to win greater 
autonomy on university campuses promoted narrowness of perspective 
in some important groups and made communication among them more 
difficult For some time before the end of the war, professors had had a 
major influence over most matters pertinent to the growth of research. 
In some ways this influence had grown. When Aoyama died late in 
1917, President Yamakawa consulted the full professors in Tokyo Uni­
versity's faculty of medicine and accepted their choice for his suc­
cessor.53 In December 1917, when Kyoto University was preparing to 
add a chair of biology, its authorities called in an outside consultant who 
was himself a professor of biology.54 
This level of involvement was not enough for some. Following a 1913 
confrontation between President Sawayanagi Masatard (who had 
movedfrom Tohoku University) and his faculty of law at Kyoto, support 
for the idea that professors should elect the university president grew 
rapidly. In 1915 the Ministry of Education conceded this right and 
others as well. In 1919 university senates were given theformal (not, as 
before, merely informal) right to advise the minister on the creation of 
chairs. In 1920 the ministry authorized awarding doctorates directly on 
the basis of faculty decisions.55 But these changes did not always have 
the expected result, and by the mid- 1920s scientists were complaining 
that their influence had actually decreased.56 Academic autonomy 
tended to enhance the alienating effects of bureaucratic legalism as a 
negative influence on science. 
The postwar era, however, witnessed a powerful push for indepen­
dence in science, including psychological independence of Germany. 
The founding of the National Institutefor Nutrition Research, based on 
an American model, was one indicator. There were others as welL From 
1917 into the 1920s, the Institute for Metals Research had a lucrative 
partnership with Westinghouse Corporation through its Japanese pa­
tron, Sumitomo Metals.57 In 1918, the Ministry of Education estab­
lished a system of grants intended to increase research productivity. In 
1920, the country established a National Research Council as a result of 
political changes in science worldwide. These initiatives unquestion­
ably strengthened the research system. They also forced Japanese sci­
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entists to consider their own position in the international community of 
science. Were they, as some held, clearly second-rate? Were some fields 
particularly stronger than others? And were some on the verge of even 
greater contributions? 
The Ministry of Education's Science Research 
Grants Program 
Establishment of a system of grants for research was a very important 
development in Japan's research system. Competitive research grants 
weakened the near-monopoly professors at imperial universities had on 
the resources available for research. They served to alleviate the lack of 
resources in various academic institutions, promoted competition 
among Japanese scientists in all kinds of professional roles, and helped 
spread money around in the way that was thought most efficient Most 
of all, the Science Research Grants Program established the principle 
that research would be encouraged and supported in all technical 
fields, not just in those popular at the moment or whose leaders were 
politically astute. 
Such an innovative program did not emerge quickly. The Imperial 
Academy of Sciences had begun a system of competitive grants in 1913, 
though its importance was largely symbolic. The total amount of money 
involved was very small (2,460 yen in 1914, 7,000 yen in 1916, and 
20,000 yen in 1918). Funds were divided between humanistic and 
technical projects and between prizes for prior contributions and for 
research in progress. Before 1919 only academy members could even 
apply for the grants.58 For thesereasons, scientists and other observers 
of the academic scene began demanding an alternative program. Bac­
teriologist Sata Yoshihiko called for a system of grants for research in a 
1914 essay.59 Sawayanagi Masataro, former president of Tohoku and 
Kyoto universities, added to the pressure in 1915 with a critique of the 
academy's operations.60 
Nevertheless, it is hard to determine how the program originated or 
why it took certain forms. Originalrecordsfrom the Ministry of Educa­
tion no longer exist, and memoirs rarely mention the subject From 
academic journals and Diet records it is possible to shed some light on 
these questions. One thing we know is that thefinancial constraints of 
the war's early months brought academy programs under scrutiny. On 
June 2,1915, Wakatsuki Reijird, the minister of finance, recommended 
eliminating the special research fund of the Imperial Academy because 
of financial convenience. Wakatsuki qualified his proposal by saying, 
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"It will be necessary tofind another way to administer funds with which 
to encourage [scientific] research."61 His statement later proved to be 
prescient In 1921 the academy fund merged with the science research 
grants system to create a better-funded program.62 
The Ministry of Education's unwillingness or inability any longer to 
carry the political burden of apparent favoritism toward government 
schools was surely another factor in the birth of grants. Ichiki 
Kitokurd's serious mishandling of the 1914 laboratory transfer had sig­
nificantly damaged the ministry's credibility. Moreover, Takata Sanae, 
his successor, had been president of Waseda University, and if any­
thing was thought to favor private-sector schools.63 The politically as­
tute Okada Ryohei, who succeeded Takata in October 1916 and re­
mained in office until September 1918, probably saw the need to 
balance competing public and private demands in the Science Re­
search Grants Program, while spreading the money as far as he could. 
Such a conclusion seems justified by his defense of the program to the 
Budget Committee of the House of Representatives. 
The committee debated the ministry's budget, including this pro­
gram, on February 2,1918. Three committee members raised a number 
of questions. Hay as hi Kiroku, then professor of economics and later 
president of Keio University, noted that 20,000 yen was now supporting 
research through the Imperial Academy of Sciences. He called this a 
"paltry sum of money" and said the academy program had been far too 
inflexible and its aims too specialized. Implying that the new program 
should avoid these shortcomings, he declared that much more money 
should clearly be spent but that "even a coolie" should be able to recog­
nize its purpose. Representatives Matsunaga Yoshizaemon and Kono 
Tetsushi spoke more directly to the new program's features. Both ex­
pressed concern about availability of funds (150,000 yen for the first 
year). Matsunaga raised two other issues. According to him, the pro­
gram did not consider the needs of new recruits to afield. Grants would 
be so small as to exhaust the funds simply on the purchase of foreign 
journals and books. Then, the relationship of the program to other 
means of support for research had not been adequately defined by the 
ministry. Citing the foundation of the Research Institute for Physics 
and Chemistry as a major development for Japanese science, he insist­
ed on the need for a unified structure through which to pursue basic 
scientific research.64 
Okada's response showed how far the Ministry of Education had now 
moved away from any compulsion to centralize research. The Science 
Research Grants Program, he insisted, was not supposed to be related to 
any particular laboratories. Rather, it would try to alleviate the lack of 
facilities and resources in existing institutions. The money could be 
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used anywhere. "We are talking about helping people to do research 
even if it is not at their own institution." He also hoped to promote 
competition. "It is not good if people are doing research at one place, 
while those at other places are doing none.. . . Scientists mostly suc­
ceed and obtain best results when they compete with each other." But 
the government's resources were too limited to expand equipment bud­
gets everywhere, so the ministr^Uiad decided to support individual and 
team research projects. "We hope as much as possible," he concluded, 
"to encourage research at many different places."65 
On the whole, the program managed to do this. The first research 
grants, sixty-five altogether, were announced on July 20, 1918. They 
were shared by ninety-two investigators at thirty-four academic institu­
tions. Allfive imperial universities wererepresented, together with sev­
eral higher schools, medical colleges, specialized academies, and a few 
private institutions, including Waseda University. All broadly defined 
fields wererecognized. Grants were awarded for work in physics, chem­
istry, biology, geology, engineering, medicine, forestry, and agriculture. 
But it is difficult to say what the distribution meant, since we have only 
grant titles without descriptions and no information about their bud­
gets. Kydikujiron, apparently the soleremaining source of information 
on the subject, reports only that the largest grant was 10,000 yen and 
the smallest 500. According to it, the research topics selected by the 
grant recipients "all focused on important problems" and showed the 
Japanese scientific community's highest [accomplishments] as of this 
moment"66 
Not everyone agreed with this fulsome assessment Miyajima 
Mikinosuke, now associated with the Kitasato Institute, faulted the 
program on four counts in an essay published aboutfive weeks after the 
Kyoiku jiron article. First of all, partiality was blatantly evident, with 
private-sector scientists badly short-changed and Tokyo University re­
searchers too highly favored. In particular, several competent investiga­
tors of tsutsugamushi disease—Kawamura Rinya (Niigata Medical 
College), Ogata Masanori (Tokyo University), and Hayashi Naosuke 
(Aichi Medical College)—had not received grants for work on this topic. 
All the funding had gone to Nagayo Mataro's pathology team from 
Tokyo University's faculty of medicine. This was particularly unfortu­
nate because the Nagayo group had made claims that had not yet been 
accepted. Second, grant sizes were often inexplicable. The Nagayo 
group was getting too much, while Yamagiwa Katsusaburo's important 
cancer project had not nearly enough. Third, some research projects 
were not operating properly. Among the fifteen xeam projects that had 
received the first grants, Miyajima again singled out the Nagayo pa­
thology team because each of the three subtopics—pathogen connrma­
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tion, prevention, and treatment—was assigned to one of the three team 
members. "A professional scientist," according to him, "would surely 
find this regrettable." Finally, the grant conferrals were apt, however 
unintentionally, to discredit those projects that did not receive funding. 
Because the lay public tended to regard official approbation as tanta­
mount to correctness, there was a danger that the work of scientists 
who did not receive grants would not be widely accepted.67 
Officials in charge at the Ministry of Education clearly felt obliged to 
respond. First, Kawamura Rinya and Ogata Masanori were hastily add­
ed to the list of recipients.68 Then these same officials predicted that 
funding would increase. As of early September, they promised to in­
crease funding by 100,000 yen,69 but by late October, they scaled this 
back to 50,000 yen, and they were ultimately able to give no increase at 
all.70 The chief of the Bureau of Professional Education, Matsuura 
Chinjird, issued a disclaimer with the results of the second year's grant 
competition. 
This year (1919) we gave out 113 grants.. . . And those who re­
quested the grants were about twice the number who actually 
received them. There should not be any implication that those 
who did not get grants were unqualified. Some of those [not 
awarded grants] may be better researchers than those who did get 
them. But the Ministry of Education's plan was to give the money 
for one year; and if their work were going to cost too much money, 
we had to exclude them with regret from funding. Some people 
are sure to say [we should fund it] if the project is good, no matter 
how much it costs. But the Ministry of Education's thinking was 
that we would rather fund two people than one, or two types of 
research than one.71 
The bureau chief then added plaintively: "This problem [disbursing the 
money for grants] caused us a great many difficulties!"72 
Matsuura's comments raise two issues of major importance. How 
were the decisions actually made? Were they in any sense reasonable? 
In dealing analytically with either of these questions, one should recog­
nize the difficulties involved. Matsuura and his colleagues faced a diffi­
cult task, and so do present-day historians. The applicant pool for the 
first round of grants was particularly large, the community of medical 
researchers heavily factionalized, and the Ministry of Education itself 
lacked a man who had a technical background and could advise about 
decisions. 
Consider the size of the application pool. According to Matsuura 
himself, the 1918 requests from scientists at government institutions 
alone amounted to 3,000,000 yen. But only 145,000 yen was actually 
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available, and that money had also to cover funding requests from 
researchers in private institutions.73 This was predictable, since the 
research community had grown substantially. In 1913, there were only 
99 professionally active men with degrees in basic science; but by 1920, 
there were 165 in this group. The constraints imposed on Japan by the 
war created both more need for research and powerful incentives to do 
it, yet institutional support for research activities could hardly keep up 
with either. 
Evaluation was also complicated by factions, at least in the medical 
community. Charges and countercharges between the Kitasato group 
and Tokyo University's medical faculty had intensified after the labora­
tory transfer, and they had their effect on research. In July 1915 Nagayo 
Matard wrote in his diary of his concern for the reputation of the In­
stitute of Infectious Diseases in the light of its numerous problems. "I 
do not want the institute to be simply a place for manufacturing serums. 
We must be more active in scientific research."74 The topic he selected 
for reputation enhancement turned out to be tsutsugamushi disease. 
Because this disease had engaged the attention of numerous re­
searchers over a forty-year period, competition was intense.75 For ex­
ample, Nagayo and Kawamura disagreed on the number of insect vec­
tor types and on animal transmissibility, while Ogata and Kawamura 
disagreed completely on effective prophylaxis. On the other hand, Ka­
wamura's ideas about tsutsugamushi disease were much closer to those 
of Miyajima,76 so that Kawamura could be linked to the "Kitasato fac­
tion" and benefit from the support of its members.77 
But the Ministry of Education faced one other problem in allocating 
grants for which it alone was responsible. After Mano Bunji, a me­
chanical engineer, left the ministry for the presidency of Kyushu Uni­
versity in the fall of 1913, there were no longer any technical people in 
the top ranks of education bureaucrats. This might not have mattered 
in some situations, but the ministry was becoming self-contained. 
Once-intimate ties with Tokyo University were becoming more formal, 
and growing criticisms from professors in law at Kyoto University had 
created some longer-term tensions.78 Whatever the proximate cause 
of the pattern may have been, the ministry undertook to distribute the 
grants with very little outside assistance. 
Problems caused by ignorance at the ministry were not so clear at the 
outset Following the Diet's approval in April 1918 of the Science Re­
search Grants Program, the ministry asked all the institutions under its 
control to provide it with certain information. Who were the most active 
researchers? What topics were they investigating? What kind of ex­
penses did they expect to incur during the next twelve-month period?79 
In response to these questions, Kyoto University's faculty senate con­
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vened on April 25 to prepare its responses. Professors from the faculties 
of science, medicine, and engineering decided on a list of twenty-two 
projects with a total three-year budget of 90,000 yen. Three projects 
had priority: Kuhara Mitsuru's work in organic chemistry, Tanabe 
Sakuo's investigation of seismological waves, and Adachi Buntaro's his­
tological studies of human bones.80 Yet when the awards were an­
nounced about nine weeks later, not one of these three was included.81 
The 113 awards conferred in 1919 also show signs, if not of incom­
petence, at least of inconsistency. As we have seen, there was consid­
erable interest in Japan in all aspects of chemical research. According­
ly, Matsuura, chief of the Bureau of Professional Education, stated on 
October 25, 1918, that chemistry would be assigned top priority in the 
1919 competition.82 When the awards were announced, on June 28, 
1919, this intention was shown to be unrealized. The list of awards for 
1919 gives details about budget81 By determining the specialties of 
the various researchers and knowing the money each was awarded, 
one can calculate the funding by disciplines. Medicine received the 
biggest share, with 46,850 yen or 32 percent of all the money allocated 
(144,580 yen). Chemistry was second with 43,000 yen (30 percent).84 
Physics (also including civil, mechanical, and electrical engineering, 
as well as naval architecture) at 24,400 yen (17 percent) was a distant 
third.85 Biology (botany, zoology, genetics, and entomology) received 
15,500 yen (11 percent) in grants. Agriculture (defined here as agron­
omy, veterinary medicine, forestry, ichthyology, and plant pathology) 
was awarded 9,830 yen or 7 percent; and most of the remaining 5,000 
yen was awarded for projects in dentistry.86 
Inability to follow its own professed guidelines for 1919, the hasty 
addition of Kawamura and Ogata to the list of 1918 grant recipients, and 
the denial of funding to all three of Kyoto University's priority projects 
as defined by their academic peers is an indication that the Ministry of 
Education was not following the most rational procedure in administer­
ing its program for scientific research. This was argued at the time as 
well. Ikaijiho, in an August 1920 review of the first three grant years, 
took the ministry to task. The research grants program lacked clear 
objectives and standards. The ministry was "just giving out little pieces 
of the pie with no real policy." Distribution of funds was illogical. Recip­
ients had recently been told that their funds would be terminated "until 
further notice," since different procedures might soon be adopted. Fa­
voritism was evident—unspecified "private elements" had affected se­
lection. Ministry officials were unqualified for their role. "There is a 
certain amount of talent within the Ministry of Education," the writer of 
the essay was willing to concede. "But no one there is too well informed 
about the academic community's [internal] affairs." Worst of all, the 
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ministry opposed a real screening committee, simply asking the opin­
ions of a few Tokyo professors. Such deficiencies, according to the 
journal, "invite our criticism of irregular actions!"87 
The program was still a success, however. All grant recipients were 
formally qualified. About 80 percent already had the doctorate, and all 
but two held a teaching position. One of the two who was not a pro­
fessor—Tanaka Keisuke—was a physician on the staff of the Yokote 
Hospital (Akita Prefecture). But he already had his doctor's degree and 
had pioneered in the study of tsutsugamushi disease.88 The other case, 
that of Takagi Yoshiyuki, shows the ministry's intention to support 
individuals. Takagi was a clinical physician one year from his doctorate 
when he received his award (2,500 yen forresearch on rabies at Kyoto 
University, where he took his M.D.) in 1919.89 
Just as its sponsors intended, the Science Research Grants Program 
aided contributions to knowledge in several different fields. The 4,500 
yen awarded to Nagayo MatarO's research team, though controversial, 
nevertheless aided confirmation of the tsutsugamushi pathogen.90 
Yamagiwa Katsusaburo, who received one of the 1918 grants and won a 
renewal in 1919, wrote a paper on artificial inducement of tumors that 
was later recognized as one of the cornerstones of modern-day cancer 
research.91 The physical chemist Tawara Kuniichu, who received the 
largest grant (5,000 yen) in 1919, used his funds for chemical and other 
scientific studies of classical Japanese swords.92 This work, for which 
he received the Imperial Academy of Sciences Prize in 1921, may later 
have contributed to specialty steels in Japan.93 Yagi Hidetsugu, pro­
fessor of electrical engineering at Tohoku University, received a grant 
in 1919 that he used in part to develop what is still the world's most 
widely used antenna for short-wave and television reception.94 Finally, 
in 1919 Yasui Kono became thefirst Japanese woman to win recogni­
tion as a contributor to science by receiving a grant in plant cytology.95 
Any one of these projects would have justified creation of the Ministry 
of Education's Science Research Grants Program. But these five made 
it a historical landmark. 
The problems that cropped up in administering these grants were 
not unique to Japan, as must be stressed. Competitive research grants 
were a new phenomenon even in countries that supported science 
strongly. Italy and the United States began giving grants in the present-
day sense only at the end of World War I.96 In Germany they were also 
new to the scene. The German experience is particularly illuminating 
when seen from the Japanese vantage point Competitive grants for 
scientific research began in 1914, but the way they were administered 
left much to be desired by today's standards. During the second decade 
of this century, they were entirely controlled by individual scientists 
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directing the KWG laboratories (see chapter 4). Albert Einstein, for 
example, dispensed funds for research in physics by consulting only his 
assistant director, Max von Laue, and this was a typical pattern.97 Other 
small groups were awarding funds, too, but not byrigorousscreening.98 
Explicit peer review came only in 1920 with establishment of the 
Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaften." 
Establishment of the National Research Council 
Establishment of the National Research Council (Gakujutsu Kenkyu 
Kaigi) or NRC in 1920 best exemplified the growing independence of 
Japanese science in a period of major transition. On one level, the NRC 
gave the scientific community an institutional focus that the Imperial 
Academy had not managed to provide. Through ninety-four members, 
representing all fields of study, the council in the interwar period en­
hanced public awareness of research activities, facilitated the building 
of several new laboratories and programs, and promoted recognition of 
Japanese achievements in science worldwide. Io° 
On another level, the council's establishment helped liberate Japa­
nese science from its obsession with Germany. The NRC was created as 
an affiliate of the International Research Council (IRC). Since this 
agency had been founded as a device for isolating German science, 
members of the Japanese scientific community were obliged to evaluate 
carefully their place in the international community of science. Their 
efforts were painful but also therapeutic, since out of them came both 
greater self-confidence and greater objectivity in judging themselves 
and the West 
The NRC and its IRC parent were products of the war. Though 
designed to enhance cooperation among nations in science, they were 
also founded with the aim of excluding the former Central Powers. In 
early April 1918, while the war was still going on in Europe, an invita­
tion to attend the initial organizing meetings reached the Imperial 
Academy of Sciences in Tokyo. The invitation was accepted at once, 
and the academy voted to send Sakurai Joji and Tanakadate Aikitsu, 
professors respectively of chemistry and physics at Tokyo University, as 
delegates to the meeting in London.101 Their selection had much to 
recommend it Sakurai at the time was dean of Tokyo's faculty of sci­
ence and chairman of the academy's division 2 for technical fields, and 
Tanakadate, with his geophysical research in the late nineteenth cen­
tury, had done exactly the kind of work the meetings wanted to restore. 
Because Sakurai had studied with Williamson at London and Tanaka­
date with Kelvin at Glasgow both were fluent in English.102 Two other 
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facts are important Sakurai was very pro-British and somewhat anti-
German. He was also strongly inclined to stress the weaknesses of 
Japanese science and overlook its accomplishments. 
Sakurai's convictions were very deep-seated. Unlike most Japanese 
scientists, who had studied in Germany, Sakurai was British-educated 
and admired British culture. He dressed like an English gentleman and 
was fond of English theater and literature,103 and he had some dislike 
for the Germans. In 1885 he had forced a fellow chemist, Nagai 
Nagayoshi, out of Tokyo's faculty of science partly because Nagai was a 
pupil of the German chemist August von Hofmann, who had previously 
been a rival to his own teacher, Williamson.104 Sakurai's career had 
given him little satisfaction. He had held a number of administrative 
posts but published only twenty-eight papers. Several of his papers 
were important, but their number—in his view, small—distressed him 
considerably.105 As a result, he tended in general to view the work of his 
colleagues through a lens that was highly distorted. 
Tanakadate's position was considerably different His memoirs show 
that he enjoyed his work. He was not on Nagaoka's level as a physicist, 
but he did publish firry-seven papers. He also traveled extensively, 
taught students effectively, and played important roles in Japanese 
aviation research on the intellectual and institutional levels. Tanaka­
date had spent several years in Britain as a young physics student, but 
he was a genial man with acquaintances on both sides of the European 
conflict106 He was at first opposed to the German exclusion from the 
IRC and argued with Sakurai about it. "War is war, but science is 
different I see no problem in associating with German scientists." 
Sakurai, however, insisted on the need for Japan to follow British opin­
ion on the issue. According to another Japanese physicist who had 
traveled with the two to London, their debate continued from the hotel 
where they stayed to the site of the conference.l07 
The conference was held at the Royal Society and produced the ex­
pected results. Germany and its Central Power allies, Austria-Hungary and 
Bulgaria, were excluded from cooperation in science. To Sakurai and other 
delegates the reasons were obvious. The Central Powers," he wrote, 
"placed no restrictions on their (wartime] atrocities" and had "broken the 
laws of civilized [nations]." Scientific contacts with such nations as these 
"would lack any value whatever."108 But since international cooperation 
was clearly essential, several additional steps had to be taken. Delegates 
voted to withdraw from the prewar Association of Science Academies, 
since the Central Powers belonged to this group. In its place would arise a 
new central structure called the International Research Council. The IRC 
would establish "unions"for the variousfields of technical research. Each 
nation's science academy would contribute members to the technical 
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unions, and each delegation would urge its government to create an IRC 
affiliate in theform of a National Research CounciL109 
None of these motions was particularly surprising. The conference 
was confined to eight Allied nations and convened at a critical time. An 
Allied victory was near but not achieved, and feelings of revenge were 
intense.'10 Delegatesfrom the U.S. and Britain had already worked out 
many details of the proposed new structures before the meetings be­
gan. 111 Even so, not all went smoothly, since opinions varied. French 
and Belgian delegates, representing the nations that had suffered most, 
apparently intended to shun their wartime antagonists indefinitely. 
Other delegates seemed to feel that reconciliation might eventually be 
possible.112 The idea of individual NRC's (which the U.S. proposed) 
was at first a source of contention. By his own telling, Sakurai was 
himself a leading conciliator. With the aim of achieving at least surface 
unanimity, he induced Tanakadate to support German exclusion, and 
then, after securing American understanding, proposed that IRC affil­
iation for various countries be permitted through either the proposed 
new NRC or an existing academy of science.! 13 
At a meeting in Paris six weeks later (November 26-29), work con­
tinued. Delegates, this timefrom eleven nations, voted unanimously to 
establish a temporary IRC. A powerful steering committee, with mem­
bers from France, Britain, Italy, Belgium, and the U.S., was created. 
Delegates entrusted to it the tasks of evaluating proposals for scientific 
unions, selecting their members, and convening all subsequent meet­
ings. One issue remained controversial: admission of neutral countries. 
And the issue of membership for antagonists continued to loom. Britain, 
the U.S., and Sakurai for Japan wanted offers of membership to be 
made only with a two-thirds majority in favor, but a harder line pre­
vailed, and a three-quarters vote was required.!14 
This setback in Paris did nothing to lessen the influence of Sakurai at 
home. While Tanakadate remained in Europe on other academic busi­
ness, Sakurai returned to Japan in January 1919 and immediately set 
about organizing a National Research CounciL He was so committed to 
the NRC concept that almost any tactic seemed acceptable.115 Sakurai 
willfully misrepresented facts, gave evasive or misleading answers to 
critical questionsfrom Japanese colleagues, and seems to have stacked 
the NRC organizing committee to produce the desired result Ultimate­
ly, on December 11, 1920, it all blew up in his face. But by then this 
mattered very little, since the NRC had become a reality. 
Planning the NRC took considerable time. Sakurai gave the Imperial 
Academy of Sciences a detailed report on the London and Paris meet­
ings on February 25,1919, but he did not formally propose the NRC for 
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another three months (May 12). His February report was published, so 
we know what he told the academy. He gave information on the coun­
tries and delegates, on the proposed IRC, on the various unions, and on 
national representation—that is, the NRC. He held nothing back in 
regard to German exclusion. This was not his first report on the subject 
Immediately following the London meeting, he had cabled details to 
Tokyo and sought approval to represent the academy in Paris.! 16 Mem­
bers of the academy, then, could hardly be surprised when they learned 
of the German exclusion. Some scientists were clearly unhappy, and 
Sakurai encountered criticism as soon as he returned to Japan. "Why 
had I not spoken up for the Central Powers? Why had I not opposed the 
exclusion?" he wrote some twenty years later. He claims, however, to 
have paid it no heed, since it came from a 'Very small part of our 
scientific community." "I had not anticipated the criticism, and it was 
totally incomprehensible to me."117 
These claims were at best disingenuous. His own fellow-delegate, 
Tanakadate, had already argued against German exclusion, and in July 
1919 would support German membership at an IRC meeting in 
Brussels.!1S Indications that exclusion of Germany was unpopular with 
the majority of Japanese scientists are strong.!19 What is true, however, 
is that most scientists—especially those belonging to the Imperial 
Academy, which had sponsored his trip—were willing to avoid the issue 
for several reasons. Japan was a prominent member of the Allied 
Powers, so vigorous support for Germany might offend the Japanese 
government Many scientists were undoubtedly flattered by their inclu­
sion in what looked like a major new venture in science. But the strong­
est reason to keep quiet was their commitment to the NRC concept 
Sakurai Joji had the vision, the control of information, the connections, 
and the administrative skills to make the NRC a reality. Very few sci­
entists actively opposed him until their opposition was politically 
innocuous. 
Once Sakurai had firm plans, the establishment process acceler­
ated. He submitted his blueprint for the NRC to the Imperial Academy 
on May 12, 1919, and the members raised quite a few questions. 
Nagaoka Hantaro was skeptical of Sakurai's proposal to name some 
corporate executives to the proposed NRC, on the grounds that indus­
try would not benefit from its projects directly. Other members asked 
about the NRC's relationship to the academy and government bureau­
cracy, as well as about its mission. To these questions Sakurai replied 
that industrial-sector representation might promote science applica­
tions, that the academy would serve as the NRC's sponsor, and that 
rapid progress in planning might secure attachment of the NRC to the 
office of the prime minister. There was also a question about budget 
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How much money would the NRC need? To this query Sakurai gave 
an answer that was either shortsighted or deliberately misleading: 
money was not a problem, since the NRC would "not need a very large 
budget"120 All of these answers later proved wrong. No corporate ex­
ecutives became members of the NRC when the organization was fi­
nally constituted.121 The NRC was attached to the Ministry of Educa­
tion, not the office of the prime minister.122 And the budget which 
Sakurai requested on October 15, 1919, was for a very large sum— 
380,000 yen.123 
The May 12 meeting resulted in formation of an organizing commit­
tee. The academy's president, Hozumi Nobushige, a lawyer from Divi­
sion 1, named a sixteen-man committee, fourteen scientists from Divi­
sion 2 and two humanists from Division 1. The chairman (mathe­
matician Fujisawa Rikitard) was from Tokyo University's faculty of 
science. Despite Hozumi's formal role, it is more than probable that 
Sakurai influenced the committee's composition. There was no open 
discussion of who the members should be, Sakurai was named the 
executive secretary, and the membership was not representative of the 
larger scientific community. A majority (eight of fourteen) of its scien­
tist members had studied abroad in countries other than Germany.124 
Only one member came from medicine, despite its large role in Japa­
nese research, and his appointment is curious. Ozawa Kenji had earlier 
been dean of Tokyo University's faculty of medicine, and in that sense 
he was quite well qualified. But he was considered an antagonist by 
Kitasato, the country's foremost researcher and a known admirer of 
Germany.125 Ozawa's training in Europe was unusual for a Japanese 
medical professor. He had studied at the University of Strasbourg from 
1872 to 1875, took his M.D. there in 1875, and later worked at 
Strasbourg between 1879 and 1883.126 Ozawa's exact views on World 
War I are unknown, but his background arouses suspicion. Quite apart 
from the war's effect on the Strasbourg region and how he may have 
seen this, the university was in some respects French in the period 
when Ozawa trained there.127 
Following the committee's deliberations in May, Sakurai in early 
June began a campaign to sell the NRC concept to a larger public of 
scientists, intellectuals, and government officials. Publishing articles in 
intellectual journals was one of his strategies. In a June 5 essay, Sakurai 
listed a number of Japanese laboratories by name—the Institute of 
Infectious Diseases was one—and claimed there had been "no unity [or 
liaison] among them at all." As a result, "They have, in relative terms, 
wasted both time and effort while failing to produce any major re­
sults."128 In another essay he stressed the need for Japanese industry to 
support "pure chemistry" more vigorously. World War I, after all, had 
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shown that all the new war-related discoveries or inventions had come 
from university professors, not applied scientists in industry.129 Estab­
lishment of a Japanese research council would correct such deficien­
cies by promoting liaison among laboratories and between science and 
society, besides strengthening the ties of Japanese science with re­
search in the Westl 3 0 
His other strategy was to meet with officials. On June 17 the acade­
my's proposal for the NRC was formally presented to Prime Minister 
Hara Kei and the minister of education, Nakahashi Tokugoro. This 
document, though drafted by an academy lawyer, reflected Sakurai's 
views.131 Once again he expounded his characteristic themes. The 
country had built a number of research facilities, but there was little 
liaison among them, with 'few results forthcoming as yet"132 Thus, 
creation of an NRC was urgently needed. To sell his argument, Sakurai 
met several times during June and July with Prime Minister Hara, 
Education Minister Nakahashi, Vice Minister Minami Hiroshi, and 
Matsuura Chinjiro, chief of the Bureau of Professional Education. He 
gave them "detailed explanations and won their support"133 Following 
these meetings, Sakurai was confident enough of success to predict on 
July 15 that the NRC would be established "before the end of the 
year."134 
It certainly looked that way for a time. In early October the Ministry 
of Education approved plans for the NRC. Under the arrangements 
drawn up, the NRC was to have administrative and professional divi­
sions, between seventy and one hundred members, a total of seven 
technical unions, formal liaison with the IRC, and a small permanent 
committee to handle communications with communities of scientists 
abroad. To assure that its functions could be carried out smoothly, a 
budget of 380,000 yen was under consideration. Most of the money 
would go for overseas travel and various forms of professional commu­
nication. 135 It is not clear whether the budget request caused conster­
nation or not Sakurai called attention in the published report to the fact 
that geographically, Japan was "stuck off in one comer of the Orient" 
and asserted that this had "caused much inconvenience for [scientific] 
research."136 
After this highly auspicious beginning, the cause of the NRC stalled, 
though not through the Diet's inaction. That institution readily ap­
proved the NRC proposal in midautumn with little discussion, leaving 
all the major provisions intact—including the budget But even after 
this, there was no NRC in Japan. Sakurai, in fact, showed some concern 
for the loss of momentum on December 12 when he reported to the 
Imperial Academy. "Japan," he said, "has not yet joined the IRC as I 
had hoped. It is soil under discussion in the government. Once our 
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NRC is established, it can be our affiliating agency. Until then, the 
academy must fill this role temporarily."137 
Delay was a product of reactions in Germany and the anxieties this 
aroused in Japan about the prospects for overseas study. The Versailles 
Conference had taken place during the first half of 1919, but the Ger­
man government did not accept the treaty until October 13 of that 
year.138 The first reports of hostile reaction in Germany, both to Japan's 
involvement in the Versailles Conference and to its part in the IRC 
votes, did not reach Japan until a few weeks after that date. T. Axenfeld, 
professor of ophthalmology at the University of Freiburg, wrote angrily 
of both to a former Japanese pupil. "German scientists/1 he reminded 
hisfriend, "gave special help in their laboratories to Japanese in particu­
lar. Thus we are awaiting some gesture or explanation for the illegal 
treatment of Germany, especially the Japanese delegates' acceptance of 
the decision to boycott science in Germany." In late December Tokyo 
newspapers were carrying reports that German universities and labora­
tories were refusing to admit Japanese, with some even suggesting that 
entering Germany at all was forbidden.139 And on February 15,1920, a 
particularly alarming report was published in an education journal 
This report claimed that a conference of German academics had decid­
ed to reject all foreign students from Allied countries and forbid the 
export of German scientific publications. The report specified certain 
decisions of the U.S. government as the motive behind the new policy 
but asserted that Japan would become one of the main victims. 14° 
Reports of this kind were clearly alarming, but few in the govern­
ment would admit it Officials at first pretended nothing was wrong. 
"Bureaucratic authorities, when asked about the [German reaction], all 
say the same thing," noted one medical journal in the middle of Janu­
ary, "namely, that they pay no attention to reports in the press."141 
Later in the year they were only somewhat less cautious. In September 
Vice Minister Minami claimed that only in Munich were Japanese actu­
ally barred.142 Bureau Chief Matsuura insisted that, after all, "every 
country" was creating its own NRC.143 These less guarded comments 
reflected new information. In early August 1920 a new German envoy, 
Wilhelm Solf, arrived in Tokyo and told the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
that Germany would accept "large numbers of Japanese foreign stu­
dents." On August 19 the Japanese charge d'affaires in Berlin cabled a 
lengthy and reassuringreport on the German situation to superiors in 
Tokyo.144 For thesereasons, the cabinetfinally approved establishment 
of the NRC on August 17 and allowed its promulgation on August 
26.145 
But not all the action took place* in the government The scientific 
community had been alarmed for months and in various ways had tried 
to mollify the Germans. In late December 1919 and early January 1920 
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Miyashita Sosuke of the Osaka Medical College wrote to Axenfeld with 
assurances of goodwilL14€ Tokyo University biologist Ishikawa Chiyo­
matsu sent laboratory animals to a colleague in Berlin to replace those 
stolen by Germans needing food.147 Other Japanese professors sent 
private messages to colleagues, and at least two made large cash dona­
tions to feed the hungry in Munich.148 It was Kitasato's gesture, how­
ever, that attracted the most attention. In June 1920 he wrote Robert 
Koch's widow a lengthy statement of Japanese goodwill and enclosed a 
photograph of the Shinto service conducted at his laboratory on May 27 
in memory of her husband's career. The letter, written in German, 
promptly appeared in a German medical journal and elicited favorable 
comment from all over Germany.149 
Kitasato's message is worthy of attention as a typical statement of 
scientists' views. He called the war a mere "political conflict" that in no 
way reflected any popular enmity. For Japanese in general it was "di­
vorced from individuals." Japanese scientists continued to hold the 
same feelings of esteem for their German teachers that they had before 
the war. His letter makes no mention of the IRC exclusion or any part 
that his own colleagues may have had in its making. In fact, the only 
comment in it with political implications is a criticism of the peace 
treaty's attempt to "perpetuate enmity," which he contrasted unfavor­
ably with the Confucian moral concepts in which Japanese like him had 
been reared.150 
This kind of vague but high-toned apolitical stance was widespread 
among Japanese scientists. Many commentators in the professional 
press did link scattered acts of German ill will to the London conference 
vote and the Japanese scientists' role in it Tawara Teijird, for example, 
criticized Sakurai and Tanakadate for "confusing the role of the scien­
tist with that of the diplomat" and of "deferring to the vulgar opinions of 
the Powers."151 But most of the commentary was not for attribution. An 
unsigned essay in another journal accused the Japanese delegates to 
the London conference of 'Ignorance and lack of discernment" and of 
"licking the boots" of the other scientists present152 Most scientists' 
responses ignored the IRC. Before December 1920 there appears to 
have been only one public statement by a Japanese scientist seeking to 
reassure Germans by attacking the IRC, and the circumstances in that 
case were unusual. The scientist concerned, pharmacological chemist 
Keimatsu Katsuzaemon, was in Berlin at the time and probably felt that 
failure to act would cost him access to needed information. As a result, 
he and about thirty other resident Japanese sent a cable and a letter to 
the Imperial Academy in Tokyo, protesting Germany's exclusion from 
the IRC network.153 The Japanese government acknowledged their 
action, but the academy ignored it completely.154 
December 11,1920, marked the end of such innocence, real or con­
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trived. At the formal inauguration of the new NRC, a heated debate 
broke out on the issue of German exclusion, when presiding officer 
Furuichi Koi called for discussion of any "other business." Inoue Jin­
kichi, professor of chemical engineering at Tohoku University, raised 
the issue first He called exclusion very unfortunate and insisted that 
any revival of cooperative work in science would have to include Ger­
many and Austria. Nagayo Mataro, professor of pathology at Tokyo 
University, attacked not only the policy of exclusion but the motives of 
those who defended it. Defenders, he suggested, had acted in the belief 
that opposition was impossible for Japan "because of its present posi­
tion," and he attributed to them a belief that support for the views of 
Britain and France was really a moderate position. Calling this view an 
"insult to the entire scientific community," Nagayo moved that the 
NRC demand "immediate termination" of the Central Powers boycott 
and pressure the IRC to this end.155 
Nagayo's proposal was naturally controversial Two chemists (Ma­
jima Toshiyuki and Katayama Masao) and one physicist (Tamaru Taku­
ro) from Tokyo University rose to support him, and indications were 
that many felt the same. But not all present would agree to the motion. 
One senior member of the Imperial Academy conceded that his earlier 
support of German exclusion was probably wrong, but he said the acad­
emy should take up the problem. Sakurai Joji announced that he was 
flatly opposed even to discussion of the issue. Debate, however, in no 
way subsided until Furuichi called an hour's intermission. Following 
the cooling-off period, the NRC resumed its discussion and finally ap­
proved a watered-down version: "The National Research Council of 
Japan," it said, "expresses to the International Research Council the 
desire that all civilized nations participate freely [in IRC projects]." 
Even though the council meant "all" to include Germany and the other 
Central Powers, the force of the statement was considerably diluted.156 
Several reasons were behind the NRC's hedging. After all, German 
exclusion, as one scientist put it, was a "limited, conditional thing." 
The London conference had occurred while the war was still on, and 
its exclusionary policy could not be permanent Restoration of peace 
offered the chance for a revival of the prewar Association of Science 
Academies, in which Germany was naturally included.157 Others felt 
that Japanese scientists could in any case have done little to defend the 
interests of Germany. "The British, French, and American delegates 
were acting very self-righteously at the London meeting with no Ger­
mans present," another commentator wrote. "It is not difficult to imag­
ine that [Sakurai and Tanakadate] would have been ignored com­
pletely [had they spoken up for Germany]."158 There is some evidence 
that this cynical view was correct When Tanakadate attended the July 
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1919 IRC meeting in Brussels, he did speak up for German involve­
ment and become the target of several snide comments from Euro­
pean delegates.! ^ 
Sakurai and others lacked confidence in their professional achieve­
ments as scientists, and Sakurai's adherence to the exclusion of Ger­
many and willingness to defend it were not just a product of his training 
in Britain and admiration for British culture and manners. He was both 
highly deferential to authority and aggressively critical of Japanese sci­
ence. In 1881 he had reluctantly abandoned his promising research 
career in London to take a chemistry lectureship at Tokyo University 
when President Katd insisted he do so. In only two years he advanced to 
full professor and then was invested with administrative duties. While 
he clearly regretted this turn of events, deference to authority came 
naturally to him. l6° In 1913, when Yamakawa Kenjiro was under sus­
picion in the Ministry of Education and his appointment for a presiden­
tial term was held up, Sakurai Joji was installed in his place precisely 
because he was considered more pliable.161 
This combination of deference to authority and low self-image as a 
research scientist affected his behavior in London. When Nagayo 
Mataro approached Sakurai during the intermission of the NRC meet­
ing, he asked him to explain his support for German exclusion. Sakurai 
exploded with a burst of indignation: "Do you people not know where 
we stand [in science]? Think about it! What have Japanese contributed 
to science so far? Our accomplishments simply do not permit us to 
discuss such important matters as this on an equal basis with (scientists 
from] advanced countries!"162 Nagayo was a confident man with a 
different point of view. He told Sakurai he was mistaken and insisted 
that Japanese achievements had been materially aided by the Ger­
mans—however one chose to evaluate them. "Our scientists continued 
to read German books even while [the countries] were at war," he noted. 
"The appearance of exclusion will not change this at all." Sakurai was 
unconvinced but qualified his views the following day when Nagayo 
came to his home. "I do think that Japan, both in name and in fact, will 
eventually catch up with the top-ranking countries in politics, diplo­
macy, and science."163 This judgment, at least, would be proven 
correct 
CHAPTER NINE 
SCIENCE AND SOCIETY: 
A RETROSPECTIVE 
Building a tradition of scientific research required Japan to borrow 
effectively from Western traditions and manage its own simul­
taneously. There were plausible strategies for solving most problems 
and numerous pitfalls en route. Rigid adherence to any single model 
could have been disastrous, or at least prejudicial European science 
had arisen much earlier and under much different conditions from 
those in Japan. Japan lacked Europe's resources, and European ac­
tivities were closely linked in a synergistic system of enormous vitality. 
Yet the builders of research made surprisingly few errors. They investi­
gated numerous models, debated every option, and in a great many 
cases made reasonable decisions. Their achievements were significant 
Every major option had well-placed supporters with political influence. 
Japanese scientists' greater achievement was to manage the past, a 
past that was fraught with ambiguities. The Tokugawa government 
was scarcely dedicated to growth in science, but some functionaries 
had been interested in it. Tokugawa custom discouraged innovation, 
even though innovation occasionally took place. The society experi­
enced a rebirth of learning, though none of it led to modern science 
directly. A mathematical tradition of enormous creativity reached a 
point of stagnation in the eighteenth century. Medical doctors could 
carry on freely; most other fields were restricted by government. 
Tokugawa patterns offered complicated choices, values, and pro­
nounced inclinations to be bent, exploited, or simply set aside if a tradi­
tion of research were to arise and flourish. 
Consider the formation of the research community, where Western 
influence was fundamental. The abolition of inherited status in the 
1870s made it easier to combine mathematics with a knowledge of 
physics and was clearly inspired by European precedents. Compulsory 
schooling allowed more Japanese the choice of careers in the sciences 
and was also based on European models. Opportunities for Japanese to 
study in Europe inspired their development of research traditions, stim­
ulated formation of professional roles, encouraged commitment to val­
ues and norms, and shaped the establishment of modern research. Role 
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formation was particularly complicated. It showed some clear Western 
influence: the combination of teaching and academic research to form 
the role of professor, the norm of publication and rejection of secrecy, 
and the restrictions imposed on clinical practice by university pro­
fessors of basic medicine. In other respects it was highly distinctive. 
Researchers shared membership in professional organizations with col­
leagues in clinical practice. Ordinary clinicians with the proper connec­
tions could carry on research at imperial universities. University pro­
fessors in all technical fields engaged in consulting or supplementary 
work 
The scientific community of Meiji Japan was in many respects 
formed by tendencies inherited from the Tokugawa period. Most early 
scientists came from the samurai, a small minority (6-7 percent) of 
total population. Samurai interest in engineering and science developed 
initially through subtle encouragement from the Tokugawa govern­
ment and was further stimulated by Western military pressure. But 
samurai dominance in the Meiji years was particularly due to educa­
tional patterns of the Tokugawa period. Samurai were more likely to 
receive an education than any other members of the Japanese popula­
tion. Their socialization produced a kind of "need achievement," which 
drives some men to outdo others. Their attitudes toward schooling were 
also distinctive. In particular, they had greater endurance of educa­
tional hardships, since schooling was the key to reviving family for­
tunes. The curriculum assisted recruitment to science. Compared to 
the schooling commoners received, it was philosophical and not closely 
tied to job performance, and it stressed comprehension of knowledge, 
not mere mastery of particular specialties. 
Tokugawa patterns were helpful in other ways. Most Meiji scientists 
had fathers with significant connections (at least) to a Tokugawa intel­
lectual—Confucian scholar, wasan mathematician, scholar of Dutch 
studies, or most important, Chinese-style doctor. Meiji scientists came 
from areas of the country where schools had a long history. The scien­
tists' choices of specialtiesreflected the past, medicine being most pop­
ular. By 1868 medicine in particular was well positioned for an influx of 
talent because of its substantial earlier development, whereas the phys­
ical sciences had ground to make up because of Tokugawa restrictions. 
Scholarly conduct was also affected by the Tokugawa legacy. Tend­
ing to characterize all technical disciplines in Meiji Japan was an inti­
macy between mentors and pupils. This included both patronage with 
respect to employinent and also professional nourishment But the dis­
ciplines differed in other ways. The Tokugawa influence was strongest 
in medicine and, in some respects, botany. Since medical institutions 
were not deemed a threat to traditional morality, they had operated 
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fineely with official approval. Harmful factionalism and entrenched op­
position to new ideas had certainly existed in the Tokugawa period, but 
Tokugawa medicine was more than a chronological precursor to the 
modem tradition of scientific research. Medical specialists in Toku­
gawa Japan were already accustomed to open debate and public scru­
tiny of professional issues. Tokugawa botanists had formed an intellec­
tual society in the Owari region about 1800. Both groups generally 
publicized their findings. In mathematics, by contrast, the legacy was 
weak. Tokugawa mathematicians found it difficult to change, so Meiji 
mathematics was radically reorganized. New kinds of men were re­
cruited to the field, and theirrole in society was sharply redefined. The 
physical sciences were institutionally more backward. They were not 
disciplines at all in the Tokugawa period, having little autonomy, no 
organizations, a politically high profile, and low self-awareness. There 
was relatively little factionalism, but neither was there very much open, 
public criticism. This circumstance substantially accounts for the tardy 
appearance of such patterns among them. 
Institution building, like community formation, showed a sensitive 
blending of foreign and local influence. Agricultural experiment sta­
tions were based on American models. Kato Hiroyuki sold the idea of the 
comprehensive university almost entirely on the basis of European pre­
cedents. Hasegawa Tai, Inoue Kowashi, Toyama Shoichi, and Tak­
ayama Jintaro cited institutions in Europe to buttress their proposals. 
Kitasato constantly invoked the career of Robert Koch as a means of 
justifying a particular schema for organizing research. Makino No­
buakt as minister of education, in 1906 used arguments and prece­
dentsfrom European experience to force the creation of a science acad­
emy. But particular precedents were alsorejected. Government officials 
and most scientists opposed privatdozenten, the one-chair rule, free 
migration of students, rapidrotation of university administrators, and 
second-class housing for engineering and agriculture, despite ceaseless 
appealsfrom educators infatuated with practices in Germany and politi­
cians who wished to save money. 
Partly this was because Tokugawa institutions were poorly devel­
oped, offering no good model to imitate. Scientists and certain edu­
cators wanted rapid expansion in research infrastructure, while the 
politicians and bureaucrats who favored this at all wanted to do it cheap­
ly. The political tug-of-war ensured that there would be neither a 
one-chair rule nor student migration. General backwardness killed pri­
vatdozenten. Few Tokugawa institutions were congenial to modern 
science. The Bansho Wage Goyo and the Office of Astronomy were 
supposed to translate documents and restrict their access to govern­
ment officials, not add to knowledge and publicize it widely. Thus few 
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Meiji institutions had historical origins in the Tokugawa period. But 
this does not mean there was no continuity. State institutions were 
prominent in the Meiji period because of their prominence in the 
Tokugawa period. Such institutions were combined with others to form 
Tokyo University in 1877, while the Osaka Kyuri Jo, Nagasaki Igaku 
Denshu Jo, Tekitekisayuku, and Shirandd made important contribu­
tions through the early training they offered Meiji scientists. 
Institutional continuity was most evident in medicine. Medical aca­
demies established by daimyo were the scientific movement's most 
active leaders in the Tokugawa period, and the later establishment of 
programs at Tokyo University shows a perceived continuity in this area. 
Tokyo's modem medical school could use the facilities of its Tokugawa 
predecessor (the Igakkd), but it was deemed inappropriate for the basic 
sciences to be housed in the facilities of the Kaisei Gakko, which was 
closed down. Continuity was more than just perceived. Medicine's 
strength enabled Kitasato to mobilize resources for fundamentally new 
research in a manner and on a scale inconceivable in other disciplines. 
Agricultural chemist Kozai Yoshinao showed political abilities in a non­
medical field, but his institutional accomplishments were considerably 
less. Medicine was so securely established that its spokesmen could 
usually prevail in a conflict Hasegawa Tai managed to cut applied 
chemistry to the benefit of biochemistry in 1893. He and Kitasato to­
gether defeated the ltd cabinet and won public funding for a private 
medical laboratory. Kyushu University got Ministry of Education sup­
port for its faculty of medicine in 1901 despite the cheaper cost and 
greater need for a faculty of engineering or science at Tdhoku. 
Kitasato's Institute of Infectious Diseases got brand-new facilities in 
1905, when budgets were cut for other scholarly programs because of 
the war with Russia. 
The Tokugawa legacy affected the building of research institutions 
in its ability to promote competition. Regional competition among 
daimyo had encouraged school building in the Tokugawa period, while 
Alternate Attendance diffused innovations. After the Restoration, this 
legacy affected scientific institutions by constraining attempts to con­
centrate resources and instead offering precedents for their dispersion 
nationwide. Providing educational opportunities was attractive politi­
cally. Once the commitment was made to build Kyoto University, the 
door was open to others of its kind. Few regions got them before World 
War I, but every region wanted an imperial university and could use 
local subsidies and political maneuvering to make its views felt in the 
bureaucracy and the Diet Competition assured momentum. If Tokyo 
had something, Kyoto had to have it And if Kyushu were successful, 
Tdhoku must be, too. It is hardly surprising that Japanese officials in the 
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Diet and the government strongly supported academic competition. 
Given a history of daimyo domains that competed in school building for 
reasons of prestige, they had every reason to build new universities and 
expand the ones that they had. 
The physical sciences, because of their putative links to Catholicism, 
had been severely restricted and were dependent for support on the 
government. This is one major reason that so many Meiji physicists-
were officials' sons. Restoration leadership ended the restrictions, but 
the pattern of dependence lasted for years. Kyoto University had consid­
erable difficulty starting a program in physical science, and Kyushu 
University did not have one. The Industrial Experiment Laboratory was 
poorly supported by government and business. Physicists and chemists 
in academic life had finally to appeal for outside support because gov­
ernment support was so very inadequate. Such problems derived from 
the Tokugawa legacy. Vice Minister Makino even cited Tokugawa pre­
cedent to explain problems at Kyoto. > 
Officials' tendency to seek control of successful institutions was well 
established before 1868 and persisted beyond the Meiji years. Linger­
ing beliefs about state control of scholarship in part lay behind the 
Ministry of Educations efforts to close Hasegawa Tai's Zaisei Gakusha 
medical academy, Watanabe Kdki's campaign against Kitasato's labora­
tory, the 1914 seizure of the same laboratory, the pre-1918 refusal to 
grant formal equality with the imperial universities to Keio, Waseda, 
and Doshisha, and official resentment at these institutions for daring to 
offer technical programs. The seizure of the Institute of Infectious 
Diseases is particularly revealing. Here was a scientist of international 
reputation with epochal achievements in research to his credit He 
materially raised the standards of Japan's public health and worked 
indefatigably on behalf of basic science. Unfortunately his politicking, 
which was rooted in professional convictions, offended the views of 
powerful officials and caused his eventual undoing. 
Kitasato's fate calls sharply into focus another negative aspect of the 
Tokugawa legacy, namely, the treatment of scientists by Japanese offi­
cials. The Tokugawa state had instituted and the Meiji state continued 
(after a period of experimentation) strict subordination of technical 
experts to putative bureaucratic generalists. For this reason Kitasato 
never held a major official post (his power was de facto, not de jure). But 
Japan's science management was not so unusual, for Germany, Britain, 
and France had similar systems. Technical specialists were almost 
everywhere subordinated to legally trained generalists.2 Japan's offi­
cials were recruitedfrom a broad social base and were competent by the 
standards of the day.3 Turning over full authority on pertinent issues 
exclusively to members of the technical community would have been 
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neither desirable nor politically possible. Agricultural chemist Kozai 
Yoshinao's advocacy of unproductive spending in animal husbandry 
shows this too welL The only scientist (Kikuchi Dairoku) who ever had 
a grip on formal power (as minister of education) could not use it in 
science's or his country's best interests because of his sometimes archa­
ic and eccentric views. 
One might argue that, except for Kitasato, very few scientists had 
problems with the government Chemist Nagai Nagayoshi had free 
access to top officials. So did medical researchers Takagi Kanehiro, 
Aoyama Tanemichi and even (for about twenty years) Kitasato 
Shibasaburo; agricultural chemists Sakd Jomei and Kozai Yoshinao, 
physicist Yamakawa Kenjiro, mathematician Kikuchi Dairoku, and 
various other members of the scientific community. Even in the wake of 
the civil service changes, the Diet offered a channel for certain kinds of 
access, and consultations with bureaucrats took place regularly. Mori 
Arinori met with professors in his office at the Ministry of Education, as 
did his successors and the bureau chiefs under them. Professors were 
consulted about chairs to be established, and Tokyo University scien­
tists planned the Tohoku faculty of science. 
But there were serious problems with the management of science. 
Tokugawa traditions, reinforced by German influence, produced an 
autocratic government slow to sanction autonomy or forthright politick­
ing by scientists and professors. Some technical specialists lost access 
to the uppermost levels of policy-making men. The most serious prob­
lem, however, was the inability of administrators trained exclusively in 
law to communicate with scientists and technical experts. Physicist 
Nakamura Yaroku was fired from the Ministry of Agriculture and Com­
merce because he protested his exclusion from management Forestry 
professor and bureau expert Shiga Taizan met with incomprehension 
from colleagues whose training was only in law. Oka Makoto, chief of 
the Bureau of Industry, and chemist Takayama Jintaro found it difficult 
to agree on suitable programs for the Industrial Experiment Laboratory. 
The physicist Yamakawa Kenjiro rightly attacked the legally trained 
officials of the Ministry of Finance for their egregious ignorance of 
science. 
Ignorance of science became pervasive in the uppermost strata of the 
Japanese government In the early years of the Meiji period, technical 
experts supervised technical programs. But with civil service reform in 
the late 1880s—and probably complacency in later years—this flexibil­
ity of management gradually disappeared. The Ministry of Agriculture 
and Commerce and the Ministry of Finance were the worst, but the 
patterns that made them bad were widespread. It is particularly striking 
that the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Education, which 
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had been more open to the technical community, eventually went the 
way of the rest of the government, putting "lawyers" in charge of the 
management of science. 
Dominance by "lawyers" with no technical knowledge was a major 
cause of wrong decisions. The Ministry of Finance rejected the elec­
trical engineers' plan to standardize frequencies of electrical power 
transmission. Legally trained chiefs of the Bureau of Agriculture cut 
already modest funding for sericulture research, ignored warnings 
about foreign research on synthetic fibers, squandered large sums on 
animal husbandry programs, and wasted scarce talent at the downtown 
bureau headquarters, which they should have deployed at the (subur­
ban) Nishigahara station. Even medical research was finally disrupted 
(by the Ministry of Education) when the lawyer-administrator Ichiki 
Kitokuro managed to seize the Institute of Infectious Diseases. Par­
ticipation by technical men at the bureau chief level produced better 
results. Metallurgist Watanabe Wataru, as chief of the Bureau of Mines, 
helped establish the Industrial Experiment Laboratory, and agri­
cultural chemist Sako Jdmei, agriculture bureau chief, assigned more 
technical experts toresearch functions at the Nishigahara station and 
fewer to administrative tasks. 
Japan's management of science could certainly have been better. 
Some requirement of probationary service for administrators could have 
been imposed. Mathematics and science could have been incorporated 
into the training for higher civil servants; instead their place was dimin­
ished. University matriculants for law and humanities did not study 
mathematics or science after age seventeen, and the classroom time 
given these subjects was cut in 1900.4 The government could have 
followed the practice of some private businesses, which appointed en­
gineers to senior management posts to maximize the effects of scarce 
technical talent5 Failure to do this was particularly ironic in view of the 
policies of the early Meiji years, when technical men held such posts in 
areas of the government where their knowledge was needed! 
Naturally the system encountered opposition. Educator Fukuzawa 
Yukichi in 1898 called public attention to officialdom's ignorance of 
science. Scientists made much the same point.6 In Germany a group of 
engineers began to protest their exclusionfrom management in 1910.7 
In Japan Yamakawa Kenjiro in 1911 attacked the arrogant practices of 
the Ministry of Finance. Officials like Mori Arinori and Kubota Yuzuru, 
who made life difficult for scientists, met vigorous opposition from the 
scientific community. Some technical men abandoned government ser­
vice, though others shared discontents only with friends.8 
World War I focused attention on the scientific community. Mem­
bers were charged with neglecting research, now seen as vital to the 
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national interest The standard allegation was that the legacy of 
Tokugawa feudalism had led university professors to compromise re­
search through their neglect of norms of criticism and discussion, their 
tendency toward favoritism in academic appointments, and their re­
fusal to recognize the public nature of science. Actual behavior in the 
scientific community was both more subtle and more faithful to the 
spirit and essence of the researcher role. Japanese scientists could be, 
and generally were, faithful to the imperatives of scientific criticism 
even as they tried to be loyal to mentors. Their recruitment procedures 
in academic life were by no means indifferent to merit And there was 
recognition of science's public nature. 
Two particular aspects of the Tokugawa legacy were favorable to 
science at this level. Market demand, as in medicine, had aroused an 
interest in new techniques and ideas, while the pyramidal structure of 
the government and society had stimulated competitive pressures. 
These forces operated freely once feudalism ended, and one obvious 
result in the scientific community was the emergence of factions. The 
real issue is how one should see them. If, as alleged, the factions re­
pressed free discussion, made criticism impossible, hoarded all re­
sources, and were totally self-centered, the scientific enterprise in its 
modem Western form could scarcely have existed in Japanese society 
at all. 
This portrait however, is largely factitious. For one thing, the system 
rewarded "merit" though sometimes in frozen forms. One could not 
obtain a professorship by accident of birth. Strong performance in pub­
lications and degrees was essential to success. Family ties, usually of 
the father-in-law-son-in-law variety, could assist one's appointment 
but not if one were without "merit." Such familial ties would not be 
established if "merit" were absent in thefirst place. Achievement was a 
condition of ascription, not ascription a condition of achievement 
Nor were most scientists intolerant of dissent The typical scientist of 
the Meiji period showed active concern for younger men under him, 
striving to elicit their enthusiasm for research by deliberate strategies— 
storytelling, discussion, eating, and drinking. In these settings, at least 
reserve was cast aside and an atmosphere of openness generally 
maintained. 
Hie impact of factionalism on cooperation and sharing is a more 
difficult issue. There is little doubt but that Japanese society was prone 
to factionalism, or that such factions could duplicate effort waste re­
sources, and generate emotional strife.9 But to say only this gives an 
unbalanced view. The extreme self-centeredness that factions could 
display was not endemic or inherent in the culture; it could be traced to 
cyclical patterns in the academic market for employment Factions 
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stimulated intense competition, and competition is essential to develop­
ment in science. One historian of medicine has argued that the rivalry 
between the faculty of medicine at Tokyo University and Kitasato's 
Institute of Infectious Diseases had a beneficial impact on Japanese 
medicine. "Competition between institute and university contributed 
greatly to bacteriology in Japan and helped raise its work to interna­
tional standards."10 This outcome did not result simply from Tokugawa 
practices, but their longer term legacy encouraged it 
World War I solved a number of problems that scientists had long 
had to face. Major new research facilities were built and some old ones 
improved. The number of positions for scientists increased, though not 
always in line with supply. Several fields of study that were new to 
Japan—genetics, aeronautics, some areas of applied chemistry—won 
greater recognition and financial support. Private business began to 
fund research directly. A new imperial university was built in Hokkaido. 
The Ministry of Education's Science Research Grants Program made its 
appearance in 1918 and the National Research Council in 1920. 
Improvements in the treatment of at least some of the scientists also 
came with the war. Physicists and chemists in academic life could now 
function politically on something like the level that had historically 
been possible for their colleagues in medicine. They could play off one 
agency against another, appeal for support to nongovernmental 
sources, and hope to contain well-entrenched opposition when the 
stakes were sufficiently high. These new abilities help explain some 
important foundations: the Research Institute for Physics and Chem­
istry, the Institute for Aeronautics, and the Institute for Metals at 
Tohoku University. 
Wartime conditions had less impact on other important problems. 
Patent laws were improved, but not as much as they needed to be. 
Aspiring inventors in the corporate sector were still not protected 
enough. The patent office staff had inadequate funding, and the laws 
were too lax. Moreover, some elements of the business community were 
not wholly willing to change. Exploitation of foreign technology seemed 
more attractive than research to some, and the suspicion still lingered 
that patterns of dependence could be reinstated once the war was over. 
Hie war had a negative impact in medicine. By stimulating the idea of 
research independence, it led the Okuma cabinet astray. Kitasato's 
institute was seized by his enemies, and problems quickly followed. 
Serum and vaccine quality fell along with the income they generated. 
There was arise in the death rate from contagious diseases that should 
have been avoidable. Medicine's most effective champion of basic re­
search was removed from a post of great influence, and the cause of 
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medical research became more politicized and divided than ever. Some 
of this was due to widespread perceptions of Tokyo University. While 
officials praised it highly, others attacked it as a bastion of sloth and 
complacency. Some of the criticism was unfair, but it had its effects 
nonetheless. Mandatory retirement for university professors at the age 
of sixty was instituted in 1920 and persists to this day. University fund­
ing, especially for Tokyo, did not rise with need, and the university's 
erstwhile patron, the Ministry of Education, lost much of its political 
capital. Unfortunately, a ministerial staff (in Agriculture and Com­
merce) with even less talent and a narrower perspective assumed a 
more prominent role. 
Another result of World War I was to force Japanese scientists to 
evaluate themselves and their contributions to science. There was the 
question, for one thing, of overseas study and the directions it should 
take in the future. By siding with the Allies over the IRC, Japan opened 
itself up to retaliation from Germany, and even though responses from 
Germany were muted, scientists and officials in Tokyo worried. As early 
as January 1920 the Ministry of Education was rethinking foreign 
study- Trips for "observation' were going to become rare: "study" was 
to be the principal objective. The ministry might subsidize study in 
Japan at places other than one's home institution.!' In midsummer 
1920 it was announced that at least some ryugaku students in medicine 
would spend time in Britain and the U.S. as well as in Germany,12 and 
in late September Ikai jihd declared that the ministry had made a 
confidential decision to "abandon the earlier bias toward Germany." 
The government's view of world trends in science would probably lead 
to an Anglo-American bias.13 Whatever the truth of the reports, the 
ryugaku program definitely changed. The country's leading physicist, 
Nagaoka Hantaro, who had himself studied in Austria and Germany, 
began sending physics students to Britain, the U.S., and Denmark.14 
The 130 foreign students dispatched by the ministry in 1921 were 
reportedly bound for many different countries.15 
Another basic issue had to do with self-image. Kitasato Shibasaburo, 
as confident as ever, proposed that Japan try to bring Germans there,16 
and some Japanese scientists shared his views. One took umbrage at 
the suggestion of some Czech scientists that Japanese abandon Ger­
many in favor of Prague as an appropriate place for overseas study. This 
implied that Japanese scientists could do no good work without travel­
ing abroad! And why, after all, pay special court to Germany? "Is there 
something unusual about our situation?"17 Sakurai Joji thought that 
there was. According to him, Japanese scientists had not accomplished 
much. They duplicated work, hoarded information, and wasted time 
and resources.18 
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Sakurai was biased and essentially wrong. Kitasato's work on tet­
anus, which led to the discovery of natural immunity, was a major 
advance in medicine. Takamine Jokichi's discovery of adrenalin was an 
important step in hormone research even though the discoverer misper­
ceived its implications. Of course, Sakurai could discount these pro­
jects: the work was done abroad, the first was collaborative (with Emil 
von Behring), and the second was not elaborated fully. But other re­
search, done on Japanese soil, was also worthy of mention. Shiga 
Kiyoshi in 1897 discovered the dysentery bacillus that bears his name. 
Nagaoka Hantaro developed a useful—if ultimately imperfect—model 
of the atomic nucleus. Sakurai himself developed a new technique for 
determining the boiling points of substances in solution. Most impor­
tant, Yamagiwa Katsusaburo showed that tumors could be produced in 
laboratory animals by applying coal tar to their skins. 
Nor was it accurate to charge Japanese scientists with duplicating 
work and hoarding resources. There was some failure to share informa­
tion among researchers seeking the cause of tsutsugamushi disease, 
and in that area efforts were duplicated. Cooperation and sharing seem 
to have declined in medicine after 1900 because of the tougher academ­
ic job market, but several other facts must be taken into account As in 
the case of tsutsugamushi research, investigators read each other's 
work and enjoyed full access to published information,19 and scientists 
in a competitive situation are never prone to divulge unpublished mate­
rial to competitors who might try to "scoop" them for credit.20 
Sakurai's judgment also ignored the development of scientific so­
cieties. These societies discussed major issues and shared information 
across institutional boundaries. Their membership lists included people 
from many subspecialties, for example, agricultural chemistry, phar­
macological chemistry, and so-called basic chemistry, in the case of the 
Tokyo Chemical Society. Not all their members were professional aca­
demics.21 Most societies were concentrated in Tokyo, and in that sense 
their value was localized, but scientists outside the capital city (as in 
Sendai, the home of Tohoku University) formed their own local groups 
before World War I as a way to gain access to new information. 
Sakurai was correct in stating that Japanese science faced difficul­
ties. The physical sciences were not well funded before 1914 or even 
1920. Manpower, resources, and action were in medicine; other fields 
got what was left His emphasis on the country's isolation was well 
placed Japan was geographically removed from other centers of sci­
ence, and this clearly caused problems. Makino Nobuaki noted in 1897 
that Japanese scientists who had returned from Europe often fell be­
hind in research because they lacked adequate opportunities for tech­
nical discussion. Sakurai in 1919 justified creation of the National Re­
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search Council by noting that Japan was "stuck off in one corner of the 
Orient" and said this had "caused. . . inconvenience for scientific re­
search." A Tokyo professor of physical chemistry, Mizushima San'i­
chiro, later wrote that European scientists of Sakurai's era could easily 
get in touch with colleagues abroad, but that scientists in Japan were 
handicapped. Travel cost money and time, and chances for discussions 
with foreign colleagues were rare. Access to foreign journals was abso­
lutely crucial, but delivery of the journals left much to be desired. They 
were usually well behind the forefront of research by the time they 
arrived, sometimes by as much as two or three years.22 
Japan's isolation was both cultural and geographic. Since few if any 
foreigners—and essentially no scientists—spoke or read Japanese, one 
had always to consider how best to communicate. Foreign study gave 
scientists a mastery of languages as well as of technical specialties, but 
language facility did not solve all problems. To create and maintain a 
community at home, one had to share findings with colleagues. Most 
scientific publications and papers by Japanese authors (including pa­
pers at meetings) were written or delivered in Japanese, not in German, 
English, or French.23 Between the world wars the problem of language 
attracted more attention from scientists. Sakurai and others spoke and 
wrote of it often. The National Research Council undertook to address 
i t 2  4 No solution was found then, nor has one been found since,25 
underscoring the conviction that the greatest single problem confront­
ing Japanese scientists was their continuing isolation from the world 
science community. 
In view of the difficulties, the scientists of Japan did quite well. 
Medicine, in particular, wasremarkably strong. In 1919 Kyoto Univer­
sity microbiologist Matsushita Teiji wrote, "Japanese medicine at pre­
sent is not inferior to that of the West and can certainly stand com­
parison with American medicine."26 Another observer wrote at this 
time: "Japanese science is already distinguished. It is not yet on the 
highest [world] level, but is relatively good and [now] more indepen­
dent It continues to require some outside assistance and must dili­
gently collect information abroad."27 In this respect we can hardly say 
that Japanese science stands alone. 
EPILOGUE 
Decades have passed since Japanese science faced up to the challenges 
of World War I. Years of forward movement have alternated with peri­
ods of stagnation or destruction, but in general progress has been strik­
ing. Japan's research expenditures as a percentage of GNP now match 
or exceed those of other major countries. Japanese scientists regularly 
publish in every major field and are increasingly seen as leading in 
some. l Advanced communications and sophisticated technology have 
partially reduced isolation in science. Even the elusive Nobel Prize is 
more frequently awarded to Japanese researchers.2 Nevertheless, an 
impression that something is seriously wrong remains. Questions con­
tinue to be raised about the fundamental character of the research 
enterprise, whether basic research is not neglected in favor of a stress 
on applied research, or whether too much work is done byfirms and too 
little work in Japan's universities. There is still the same tension be­
tween the needs of the group and the wishes of individuals that existed 
in the period discussed in this book and the samefixation with interna­
tional standards of research creativity and whether, if at all, Japan's 
system can meet them. One sometimes has the feeling that nothing has 
changed! 
Such perceptions may reflect a limited sense of the past In the wake 
of major gains during World War I, expectations rose in the 1920s but 
were quickly reined in by financial realities. Commitments to the Re­
search Institute for Physics and Chemistry were not in every case hon­
ored, and the laboratory was slow in opening.3 Some privatefirms built 
laboratories of their own. Keio and Waseda universities established 
graduate programs in medicine and engineering. The National Re­
search Council sponsored large group projects in tropical medicine, 
geophysics, and several otherfields. But thefirst ten years after the war 
were not very promising in the imperial universities, where only in 
biology was there much growth.4 The 1930s were better, as science 
became the object of several new initiatives. New imperial universities 
were built at Osaka (1930) and Nagoya (1939), while a faculty of sci­
ence was added at Kyushu (also in 1939). Major changes were not 
confined to the campus—the Japan Society for the Advancement of 
Science (Nihon Gakujutsu Shink6 Kai, or Gakushin) made its ap­
pearance in 1932. Though a product of the Depression and Japan's 
seizure of Manchuria, the enthusiasm for it and the funding it attracted 
showed several kinds of interests at work. 
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Gakushin began with a report on the state of Japan's research facili­
ties submitted to the cabinet in March 1930. The report documented 
the relative stagnation of scientific infrastructure and research funding 
typical of the 1920s and insisted on the need to reverse this direction. 
Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijiro favored retrenchment in science be­
cause of his background in law and finance and the difficulties of man­
aging a depressed economy. But the vigorous commitment to Man­
churian development, his departure from office, and voices critical of 
academic science eventually produced a more favorable response. The 
military establishment in Manchuria wanted to promote certain large-
scale projects in technical research, and a number of professors had 
come to the view that universities lacked a strong research environ­
ment. The Japan Society for the Advancement of Science addressed 
these concerns by promoting team research for a number of projects, 
particularly relating to armaments and energy.5 
World War II gave the research establishment more opportunities, 
but a lack of foreign assistance and substantial isolation made pressures' 
much greater and constraints more severe. Two scientific organizations 
were particularly important in enabling Japan to prosecute the war. The 
National Research Council was responsible for organizing and coords 
nating war-related research,6 and the Research Institute for Physics 
and Chemistry took on special projects not envisioned by its founders. 
This case is particularly instructive. The institute could not function 
solely as a research enterprise because of the lack of funding. By the late 
1920s it had already been obliged to develop and sell patented tech­
nology and in some cases to manufacture products growing out of its 
research. In this it had some success, and by 1939 it was a business 
conglomerate.7 In such a situation its fate was predictable. Research 
projects became heavily oriented toward work with expected military, 
applications. Its factories produced such strategic items as piston rings 
for military aircraft8 A basic science program, as in nuclear physics 
under Nishina Yoshio was, however, retained. 
Military defeat in 1945 led to Occupation reforms in the research 
establishment The National Research Council was disbanded. The 
Research Institute for Physics and Chemistry was legally dismem­
bered. An organization called the Science Council of Japan was created 
in the place of the Imperial Academy. A component of the Occupa­
tion called the Economic and Scientific Section, Scientific and Tech­
nical Division, was the principal agency in charge. In this context an 
American physicist named H. C. Kelly played a role far too large for 
his age (he was born in 1908) or experience (war-related research at 
MIT).9 
Some look on Kelly's approach to reform in science as a reflection of 
New Deal philosophy. He believed, for example, in radical change, 
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without much regard for existing institutions. When Japanese mem­
bers of a science advisory group—whose formation was partly insti­
gated by Kelly—urged caution in abolishing the Imperial Academy, the 
American scientist insisted, telling the group they were "going to make 
history." Kelly also wanted scientists to solve society's problems. In one 
revealing exchange with the academy's president, Nagaoka Hantard, 
he attacked the 'Individualistic attitude'* of basic science researchers 
and insisted that members of the scientific community consider their 
responsibilities to all mankind. Another fact that was equally important 
in the longer run was that Kelly was a proponent of applied research. 
He wanted the Occupation to "encourage only those research pro­
grams which are directed toward improvement of Japan's economy" 
and went so far as to call basic research a luxury in the light of existing 
conditions.10 
Not all scientists agreed with Kelly's outlook, but a good number did, 
and some were very radical. One scientist named Watanabe Satoshi is 
known to have influenced Kelly's thinking with his bitter attacks on the 
Ministry of Education, Tokyo University, and other pillars of the sci­
ence establishment11 In 1946 the Japan Communist Party, with the 
open support of a number of scientists, published a famous thesis crit­
icizing "feudal remnants" in science.12 In 1947 the influential physicist 
Fujioka Yoshio launched a broadside against the prominence of fac­
tions in academic life and was publicly applauded by another well 
known physicist (Sakata Shoichi).13 The earlier pattern of militarism 
and the wartime experience, to say nothing of the American Occupa­
tion, had radicalized elements of the scientific community and helped 
to create a self-critical environment 
These same general trends helped intensify a split between academ­
ic scientists, the government, and business. Many scientists, embar­
rassed by their former acquiescence in militarism, supported the leftist 
League of Democratic Scientists (Minshushugi Kagakusha Kyokai, 
created in 1946), while control of the government remained largely in 
the hands of conservative politicians sympathetic to business.14 This 
pattern of estrangement affected research. Following President Dwight 
Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" address to the United Nations General 
Assembly in December 1953, business and political circles in Japan 
became captivated by the notion that atomic power offered the solution 
to Japan's energy problems and decided to import nuclear reactors from 
Britain. Prominent members of the scientific community—Fujioka 
Yoshio, Sakata Shoichi, and especially the 1949 Nobel laureate in phys­
ics, Yukawa Hideki—cautioned against this excessive optimism and 
reminded all concerned of the pitfalls. They emphasized that atomic 
energy was not at that time a proven technology and that to import it 
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successfully would require more research, a point widely accepted in 
Europe even among groups planning the sale. But political and busi­
ness leaders had their own point of view. They rejected further re­
search, saying the technology was safe and dismissing the scientists' 
views as self-interested and alarmist The results were an inefficient 
industry and power plant breakdowns through the 1970s.15 
Apart from the difference in political perspective between scientists, 
politicians, and the business community, three other factors contrib­
uted to this unhappy state. One was the traditional belief in Japan that 
the most important innovations and technical advances nearly always 
originated in some other country. There was a "deeply engrained Japa­
nese belief that what had been "proven* abroad should be imported 
[directly] rather than developed domestically." Another factor was the 
basic inability of government officials to understand the limits of reactor 
technology. "After all. most of them had majored in law in college, not in 
engineering or physics." The period in which nuclear reactors were 
imported corresponded to a time of rapid economic growth. The period 
of 'massive' importation of power reactors started with the government 
of Ikeda Hayato (prime minister 1961-64) and continued through the 
government of Sato Eisaku (prime minister 1964-69) who largely 
maintained the same [high-growth] policy."16 
During the past twenty-five years there has been more recognition of 
basic research, as well as an emphasis on large-scale projects, many 
(but not all) energy-related. October 1965, when Tomonaga Shin'ichiro 
won the Nobel Prize in physics, marked one turning point17 But the 
principal event shaping research priorities was the October oil-price 
hike of 1973. Following the quadrupling of oil prices by the Organiza­
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries, Japan responded by dramat­
ically expanding its research budget, in some areas by as much as 400 
percent18 This expansion showed a feature of the Japanese system 
strikingly different from the West While half the research done in 
Europe and America is funded by government (especially for military 
projects, in the case of the U.S.). an equal percentage of Japanese 
research is conducted by firms for private-sector use. Only 8 percent or 
so is based in universities, with military research getting far less (0.7 
percent).19 
Most recently there has been controversy among scientists in Japan 
centering less on the structure of research priorities and more on the 
mechanisms for funding research. Tonegawa Susumu, an MIT biolo­
gist and 1987 Nobel laureate in medicine who is also a Japanese citizen, 
has argued that he might not have been able to carry out his prize­
winning research on antibody production had he remained in Japan 
after 1963. (Most of his work was done in Switzerland.) The reason, he 
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suggests, is that young Japanese scientists in the postwar period have 
often had difficulty finding money for research because government 
agencies and academic institutions have usually awarded lump sums to 
senior scientists, who direct them to favorites. This has too often meant 
that relatively few resources reach the bottom level of the research 
community, at least in Japan's universities.20 In fact, three prominent 
features of the research funding system could conceivably have caused 
problems for a talented young scientist: (1) the system tended to allo­
cate funds to particular specialties according to the specialty's prior 
funding level; (2) a disproportionate amount of research funds went to 
the more prominent or famous scientists; and (3) there was at times a 
tendency among principal investigators heading large research 
teams—particularly in medicine—to allocate funds equally among 
team members without much regard for differing needs.21 
But to say this much and look no further gives a distorted perspective. 
The government (in this case, the Ministry of Education) did stress 
prior funding levels more than the content of actual proposals, but this 
was mostly in the period from 1949 to 1966. This priority was set up 
following extensive consultations with the Japan Society for the Ad­
vancement of Science, operated at the highest levels of classification— 
engineering, say, as compared to basic science—and had relatively 
little influence on individual grants. Revisions of the basic algorithm for 
calculating science funding (the "Fujioka Formula ; in 1967 and 1981 
seem to have decreased the importance of the prior funding record. 
Charges of preferential funding for the prominent and famous can also 
be qualified. Such a pattern was more common during the first two 
decades after the war, when money for research was particularly scarce 
and peer review panelists were often concerned for young, vulnerable 
proteges of established researchers. The gradual establishment of two-
phase reviewing has allowed some adjustments in the system. With 
second-phase reviewers representing fields ancillary to the applicant's, 
funding requests from unpatronized younger scientists have come to 
enjoy greater success.22 With Japanese science in a period of youth, 
greater success will characterize its future, too. 
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Conditions in Germany help explain the situation, German science and medi­
cine, despite earlier growth, had reached a plateau in the late nineteenth cen­
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